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Chapter 1
Tropics in the Snow: an Introduction
The supermarket presents us with a cornucopia of fruit, fish, and meat from 
near and far. Usually we haven’t thought too much about how it all got there 
and the fact that we can enjoy fruit from the tropics all year round is something 
that we usually take for granted. But we are constantly reminded of the perish-
ability of these refrigerated and frozen foods. Bananas, for example, are easily 
bruised and we know that they will spoil in a matter of days if we don’t hurry 
up and eat them. Although other fruits, such as apples or oranges, might be a 
bit more resilient, it’s still only a matter of time. And it takes just one rotten 
apple to spoil the barrel as the saying goes. We know that we have to rush fish, 
meat, and dairy products into our fridge or freezer, particularly on a hot day. 
The threat of putrification is constantly there. 
Considering this everyday, practical knowledge we have about the perisha-
bility and fragility of refrigerated and frozen products, it is remarkable that 
they have survived the journey to our supermarkets from far away production 
areas. Not the least because a lot of fruit is grown in tropical backwaters or at 
least needs to cross the equator in their journey from the Southern Hemisphere 
to the North. “Six foot, seven foot, eight foot bunch!” is a memorable line from 
the Jamaican working song Banana Boat Song (Day-O) made famous by Harry 
Belafonte. Bananas have often been harvested, loaded and transported under 
the heat of the sun and stowed onto ships in small ports lacking infrastructure. 
The ships themselves have to sail across vast oceans through hell and high wa-
ter. It’s therefore not surprising that in the past bananas and other perishables 
often arrived in port rotten. Since the first steps in the second half of the 19th 
century, the cold chain, in other words the long chain of events from planta-
tion, pasture, or fishing ground, to the retail outlet, has developed and become 
more reliable and resilient. But still, the core of the cold chain is still the same 
– highly sensitive and perishable products, still requiring high quality han-
dling. The aim of this book is to throw light on a particular link in this cold 
chain, but let’s start by taking a broader perspective. 
1 The Cold Chain
Bananas and other fruit that we discuss in this book typically originate from 
farms or plantations in South or Central America, South Africa, or New 
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Zealand. Sometimes they are carried in a refrigerated state, or sometimes in 
a non-refrigerated state by means of trucks, or possibly trains to a port termi-
nal. There, they are reloaded onto ships, with the capacity to carry refrigerated 
and frozen cargo, which transport the produce to the consumption areas. This 
reloading is done by stevedores. Often, the produce needs to be stored for a 
shorter or longer time in the terminals. This can be done in conventional, non-
refrigerated storage, or in refrigerated storage, so-called cold stores. The mari-
time link, when bananas travel from Central America to Europe or the US, or 
from the Philippines to Japan, or when fruit is carried from South America or 
South Africa to Europe, or when frozen meat is carried from for example New 
Zealand and Australia to Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, is the central focus 
in this book. When reaching the consumption markets, the cargo is discharged 
and then reloaded by stevedores onto trains and trucks which carry the cargo 
to wholesalers and then to the supermarket. The final destination is usually 
your fridge or freezer, tropics in the snow if you will. The details of the cold 
chain described above may vary somewhat but the model more or less applies 
to all cargo types. For fish and meat, the whole chain needs to be cold, while 
for some fruits, this need not be the case. Fish is sometimes brought from the 
fishing grounds to a port terminal where it is reloaded onto ships which take 
them to the consumption markets, but sometimes it is reloaded on the very 
fishing grounds themselves. The latter is called transshipment and is a delicate 
procedure where two ships need to be close to each other, often in difficult 
weather conditions. 
The historical development of the cold chain that has led us to be able to 
experience the cornucopia will be touched upon incidentally in the book, but 
as stated, the main aim is to explore the maritime link – maritime reefer ship-
ping – and more particularly one specific actor in the maritime link. 
2 Maritime Reefer Shipping
The maritime link, which is often the longest link in the whole cold chain, re-
lies on ships that are equipped to carry refrigerated cargo. It also relies on com-
panies or people who own those ships, and companies that actually run the 
shipping operation, making sure that the right ship is at the right place at the 
right time. For the moment, we will focus on the companies running the op-
eration of the ships, to introduce three different actors. We will first describe 
the actors briefly, and then turn to the ships. 
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 The Actors
Maritime reefer shipping can be catered for by the liner industry, which con-
sists of shipping companies mainly dedicated to non-refrigerated cargo but 
which have the capacity to carry refrigerated cargo on their ships. They sail 
with scheduled departures. Examples of liner companies, which appear in this 
book, are Blue Star Line and Maersk. A second actor which can cater for mari-
time reefer shipping is the shippers, in other words, the exporters and import-
ers. They might own or charter a fleet of specialized reefer ships that are 
primarily dedicated to carry their own refrigerated or frozen products. Exam-
ples of such actors are the fruit producers Chiquita and Dole. A third actor is 
the independent reefer operator. They are not in-house logistics departments 
owned by shippers but rather third-party, independent companies, who do not 
carry their own cargo. In this way, they are similar to the liner companies, but 
with a focus on refrigerated cargo and their operations are only sometimes 
based on scheduled lines. They are free to say yes or no to any business offered 
by shippers and are never primarily dedicated to carrying the cargo of one 
shipper only. A crucial aspect is that the independent reefer operator actively 
competes for reefer cargo amongst a number of customers. Examples of im-
portant independent reefer operators are Salén’s reefer division and, after its 
bankruptcy, the reconstructed Cool Carriers, which were market leaders from 
the 1950s until the 1990s, Lauritzen, which was the first independent reefer op-
erator, and Seatrade, which is the market leader today. The latter two types of 
actors are specialized, meaning that they are primarily dedicated to carrying 
refrigerated cargo, their own or that of others. What unites the two latter actors 
is that they operate reefers. But what is a reefer? 
2.1 The Reefer
As has been described, refrigerated and frozen products can be carried either 
on vessels that are mainly carrying general cargo, but with refrigerated cargo 
capacity, or ships specialized for carrying refrigerated or frozen cargo. In this 
book, we call the latter category reefers. But many readers have probably heard 
the problematic word reefer in various contexts and used in different ways. 
This word has created significant conceptual confusion, so in the following 
section we’ll try to both problematize and tidy things up. 
To start with, the word reefer is just an abbreviated way of saying refrigera-
tor and it has been used over the years to refer to all sorts of refrigerated units 
from train cars to household refrigerators. However, in a maritime shipping 
context, it traditionally refers to a cargo ship with the capacity of carrying re-
frigerated cargo. 
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Many of the early ships were multi-purpose, being able to carry general car-
go, passengers, and some of their holds were insulated and could be refriger-
ated. These vessels are occasionally referred to as reefers, or part-reefers. 
However, in this book, we do not define these general cargo ships with some 
refrigerated capacity as reefers. 
A term that sometimes crops up is the “freezer” which is a vessel capable of 
freezing, but not cooling, its entire cargo. These, usually smaller vessels, have 
been widely used to support the fishing industry, carrying the produce from 
sea to shore. These “freezers” are sometimes called reefers, and sometimes not. 
The earliest specialized reefers, back in the nineteenth century, were all freez-
ers, yet they are usually referred to as reefers. The main point was that reefers 
could both cool and freeze their cargo, while freezers could only freeze their 
cargo. Some freezers were later rebuilt with more temperature control, which 
effectively enabled them to carry non-frozen cargo such as fruit, which turned 
them into reefers. In this book, we include freezers as a subset of reefers, but 
we still use the word freezers as a way to indicate this particular type of ship. 
There were several material features that emerged during the twentieth 
century, besides refrigeration, which can be said to be typical of reefers. One of 
them was speed. Reefers were usually faster than regular cargo ships and the 
need to rush perishables to the market is understandable. Another feature re-
lates to port access. Many small ports are not accessible to larger vessels, but it 
so happens that the refrigerated trades are particularly reliant on these. They 
can be tropical ports, small and undeveloped, but a tremendous source for ba-
nanas and other fruit. Reefers have also called on small fishing ports in the far 
north and on the southern tip of South America, as well as the Falklands. This 
effectively limits the size of reefers but also makes a shallow draft advanta-
geous. A third feature is the priority placed upon the ship’s own ability to han-
dle cargo. Loading and unloading cargo breaks the cold chain, so reducing the 
time that perishable cargo spends between the port’s cold storage facility and 
the reefer ship is important. Reefers are therefore well-equipped with their 
own derricks, and later on cranes, since infrastructure has usually been lacking 
in the small ports they call upon. It’s also the case that major ports may experi-
ence delays that may be circumvented because of the reefer’s own capacity in 
this regard. So to sum up, speed, smallish with a shallow draft, and well-
equipped with derricks or cranes are features that are usually associated with 
reefers. 
Until the early 1970s the reefer cargo was stowed and stacked in “breakbulk”. 
This could be in nets, sacks, boxes, barrels etc. Banana stems were just stacked 
in the early days. However, since the 1970s maritime reefer shipping increas-
ingly moved towards the carriage of palletised cargo. These reefers were 
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frequently termed pallet-friendly reefers or simply modern reefers in contrast 
to the old breakbulk reefers. Refrigerated containers began to make serious 
inroads into the refrigerated shipping market in the 1990s, and these contain-
ers are also referred to as reefers, but in this book we identify them as reefer 
containers. During these years it is common to read the phrase conventional 
reefer to mean a ship with refrigerated holds as distinct from a container ship 
carrying refrigerated containers. Occasionally, the reefer was also referred to as 
a bulk reefer. For many years a distinction was maintained between conven-
tional reefers and the container ships (partly equipped to carry reefer contain-
ers) operated by the container lines. Reefers it was held, were not, by tradition 
more so than by any logical definition, container ships. This distinction be-
came increasingly difficult to maintain, since the so-called conventional reef-
ers were, with each successive newbuilding, equipped to carry increasing 
numbers of refrigerated containers. These vessels may be termed hybrid ships 
(refrigerated holds plus refrigerated containers) but at the time they were just 
considered reefers with high container capacity, sometimes they were, once 
again, labelled modern reefers. 
Specialized container ships designed to primarily, or only, carry refrigerated 
containers began to appear in the years around 2000 and they were frequently 
termed reefer-container ships, but with time increasingly just reefers or reefer 
ships. Since we term any ship which is primarily dedicated to carrying refriger-
ated cargo a reefer, we also call these ships reefers. The latter term clarifies that 
it is the ship and not the reefer containers carried onboard that counts. In re-
cent years the operators who controlled conventional reefers, have begun to 
use the term specialized reefers. So what at the present distinguishes the spe-
cialized reefer is not whether the cargo is stowed in containers or in a hold, but 
rather that the ship is primarily designed to carry refrigerated cargo directly 
and without delay to its destination. Interestingly, since the appearance of 
containerization, palletised reefers are sometimes called breakbulk reefers1. 
So what is a reefer? As we’ve seen, exactly what is meant by the word, and 
how it has been used, has changed over time. After this conceptual exercise, we 
conclude that the best definition of a reefer ship is perhaps the simplest one: A 
ship specialised for transporting refrigerated cargo. We are back to where we 
started, but hopefully with a more nuanced understanding of this very central 
concept. 
1 “Carriers put money on hybrid ship designs”, Shanghai Shipping Exchange, 19 November 2012, 
<http://en.sse.net.cn/info/detailen.jsp?id=310233>.
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3 Aim, Preliminary Research Question, and Potential Contributions
After this brief introduction to the artefacts and actors involved in both the 
cold chain and maritime reefer shipping, it is possible to position this study. In 
this book, we focus on studying the independent reefer operators. Similar to 
independent tanker companies (not owned by either exporting oil companies 
nor importing companies), bulker companies, and liner companies, these in-
dependent reefer operators are unambiguously a part of the third-party com-
mercial shipping industry for which shipping is not only a support function 
but the main business area. For this reason they should be as important to 
study as other third-party shipping companies, although the current scarcity of 
studies might be due to the discourse of decline and the fact that they employ 
less capital than for example tankers and bulkers. Since it is their core busi-
ness, the study of the independent reefer operators is a direct way of studying 
maritime reefer shipping and, in a more indirect way, the cold chain.
Given its position as an intermediary between shippers and ship-owners, 
the independent reefer operators have a challenging position, having to please 
both these stakeholders as well as being profitable themselves. As Wijnolst and 
Waals2 indicate, there is a great discrepancy between ownership and operation 
in the reefer industry. Most of the independent operators’ tonnage is owned by 
others, which means that the operators have a great market presence despite 
having a low degree of ownership – this precarious position is interesting to 
study from the perspective of business strategy. How do the independent reef-
er operators manage to stay in business and be profitable over time? 
One should also note that there is a methodological reason behind studying 
the independent reefer operators – a question of access. Given previous stud-
ies, one of the authors had already discussed the reefer industry with repre-
sentatives of Salén, Cool Carriers and Holy House. This preliminary study 
made it possible to get access to more respondents through the contacts that 
were made. Given that the study started with one independent reefer operator 
it was possible to get access to all reefer operators, but it was more difficult to 
get access to ship-owners, and even more difficult to get access to shippers. 
Also, the independent reefer operators are limited in numbers which also 
makes it possible to study them in a comprehensive way. The same cannot be 
said about shippers and ship-owners. For these reasons, we hold that the inde-
pendent reefer operators are a suitable looking glass not only for reaching a 
deep understanding of this type of actor, but also to shed some light on the 
2 Wijnolst, N. and Waals, F. 1999. Shipping Industry Structure, Delft: Delft University Press. 
Chapter 7, pp. 138-160. 
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broader functioning of the cool trades, which could be explored in future re-
search. 
One can approach these operators both collectively and individually. Ap-
proaching them collectively means that one sees them as a set of companies 
which share some main characteristics, and are different than other sets of 
companies, such as liner companies. This approach would study how and why 
they emerged as an alternative to the liner companies, what led to their domi-
nance in the carriage of refrigerated and frozen cargo, and their subsequent de-
cline. Approaching them individually means that we can also recognize their 
particularity which is due to their different origins, resource bases, and strate-
gies. Given the empirical material that we present in this book, the differences 
between the different companies are obvious and to neglect these differences 
would not give an accurate perspective of the development the independent 
reefer operators. An immersion in the empirical material has led us to focus 
on the strategies the various actors adopted, and how they tried to compete 
with each other and with the liner companies. We take a particular theoretical 
perspective when studying the independent reefer operators, which we will 
explain later in this introduction. But already here we can say that rather than 
conceiving the maritime link as just a logistical operation moving goods from 
A to B, we will study not only this material reality, but also the way the inde-
pendent reefer operators make sense of themselves and the industry, and the 
psychological drivers for their business decisions.
Our research question in its simplest form is: How have the independent 
reefer operators developed, individually and collectively, since their beginning 
until today? 
This book aims to contribute to business studies and maritime history by 
providing a historical analysis of the independent reefer operators. Such com-
prehensive studies have not been done before and given that the maritime 
transport of refrigerated products has been a well-defined niche in the ship-
ping industry, it is important to describe it and shed light on its historical de-
velopment. Furthermore, the book contributes by understanding and 
problematizing the workings of the industry by means of our three-dimen-
sional theoretical framework – its material base with ships and cargoes, how 
actors within and outside the industry make sense of it by means of discours-
es/talk/language, and the psychology of the actors involved. This theoretical 
approach fits into current calls for more theoretical studies within the field of 
business history3. We believe that a deeper understanding of the independent 
3 See for example de Jong, A., Higgins, D.M. and van Driel, H. 2015. Towards a new business his-
tory? Business History, 57: 5-29. 
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reefer operators can also lead to insights into the driving forces of the shipping 
industry. 
4 Independent Reefer Operators and Their Customers and Suppliers
Having specified the aims of our study, we will now give an overview of the ac-
tors involved in the maritime link and the various strategic choices they are 
confronted with. Many of the dynamics emerge through interactions between 
the independent operators and other actors, and it is therefore of importance 
to understand the context in which the independent reefer operators find 
themselves. 
4.1 The Shippers 
The independent reefer operators are embedded in a transport system, where 
shippers – in other words, those who want to transport cargo to the buyer, or 
those who want to transport cargo from the supplier – decide how to ship their 
goods, whether on their own ships, by means of short term contracts with ship-
ping companies, or in some cases even outsourcing the whole shipping activity 
to shipping companies. While these actors are very important in the reefer in-
dustry, they are not covered as thoroughly, since our main purpose is to study 
the independent reefer operators – in other words, those actors who cater for 
the transport services of the shippers. These actors are often more or less inde-
pendent from the shippers, in the sense that they are not owned by the ship-
pers nor fully restrained by the desires and agendas of shippers. It should here 
be noted that if all shippers decided to organize their transport based on their 
own ships, there would no need for independent reefer operators. However, in 
the industry’s history we have seen that in some phases shippers have wanted 
to own their fleets, in some phases they charter ships, and in some cases, they 
decide to collaborate with an independent reefer operator or a liner company 
to ensure a cost-effective and secure transport system. And of course, combi-
nations of these different choices. 
It is generally the demands of the shippers and the buyers which decide 
how much maritime shipping capacity is needed in the industry. The major 
categories of refrigerated goods to be transported across the ocean have been 
quite stable during the era of the independent reefer operators which tenta-
tively started in the 1930s. As will be explained in chapter 2, the reefer industry 
as a whole started with meat and was followed by bananas, other fruit, and fish. 
These different cargo categories have their own inherent dynamics. Bananas 
have been the absolutely most important reefer transport commodity during 
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the era of the independent reefer operators, occupying approximately 40% of 
transported volumes4. Apart from volumes, for the shipper to understand how 
much tonnage is needed, there is also a need to know the distances the pro-
duce is transported. For example, a round-trip that last twice as many days 
with the same amount of cargo will require twice as much tonnage. We can il-
lustrate this perhaps easiest by considering the following example. A large 
trade takes place with bananas from the Philippines to Japan since the 1960s. 
Failed harvests in Philippines, due to bad weather for example, means that Ja-
pan might source its bananas that year from Ecuador. The result is that the 
shipper needs more shipping capacity during that year. 
Bananas are produced throughout the year but most other fruits, for exam-
ple apples, grapes, citrus and kiwifruit, are seasonal. When such fruit ripens in 
the Southern Hemisphere, it needs to be transported to the major consump-
tion markets in the Northern Hemisphere. These seasonal volumes are usually 
fixed by short-term time-charters and any excess is picked up by the spot trade. 
For the shippers, the spot trade acts as a kind of reserve shipping capacity. 
Shippers are reluctant to contract their entire anticipated requirements since 
inclement weather, for example, can destroy the harvest. A bumper crop on 
the other hand, means that there will be a shortage of shipping which will in 
turn lead to high spot rates. Graph 1 shows the average spot rates in the mid 
1990s for the purpose of showing the significant variation of rates throughout 
the year with high demand, and thus high rates, in March and April. This sea-
sonal variation is what allowed some operators of old tonnage to sail in the 
peak months and then have their vessels in lay-up during the off-season. It can 
be estimated that the transport demand in the high season can be between 50-
80% higher than in the low season5. 
So, the demand for ships is determined by the volumes as well as the dis-
tance between production sites and consumption markets. The demand for 
imported refrigerated goods is related to consumer purchasing ability which is 
in turn influenced by both the availability of supply (i.e. pricing) and the ef-
fects of economic recessions and periods of prosperity. Demand can also be 
stimulated or otherwise by social factors: health consciousness, fashion and 
marketing initiatives.
Major reefer fruit trades include the banana trades from South and Central 
America to the USA (see Graph 2) and to Europe in particular. Bananas from 
the Philippines are important as are New Zealand’s apple and kiwi exports. 
Grapes from Chile and South Africa, citrus from for example Morocco, Israel 
4 “Kylsjöfart”. Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, pp. 72-74.
5 “Kylsjöfart”. Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, pp. 72-74.
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and other places and our list of important trades could include pineapples, 
melons and tomatoes and so on. And in most cases the destination has histori-
cally been the US, Europe or Japan. These major consumption centres are also 
important destinations for fish and squid which can come from places such as 
the South Atlantic. The meat trades from Argentina and Australia to originally 
Graph 1 Indicative reefer spot rates mid 1990s (US cents)  
Note: Lauritzen Cool in Perspective, 2003.  
Graph 2 US banana imports 1961-2013. Transporting bananas to the USA is 
a major business for maritime reefer operators, only the banana 
trade to the European Union is larger. 
Note: (c) FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TM> 
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Europe and later the USA are large and these trades were early to be container-
ized. The demands of the consumption markets have changed during the stud-
ied period. For example, after the collapse of the Soviet Union more fruit, fish 
and meat were imported into Russia and other Eastern European countries. 
Russia has become a large banana importer in recent years (see Graph 3), par-
ticularly from Ecuador.
Also, the development of China the last two decades has had an impact on 
the market. Furthermore, one can see the growing importance of supermarket 
chains, with the likes of Walmart and Tesco having significant buying power. 
Moreover, there have been significant regulatory changes, first in terms of the 
deregulation of import and export markets, hand in hand with the penetration 
of economic liberalism throughout the world. Import and export boards have 
been replaced by a more free-market structure. This has altered the environ-
ment in which independent reefer operators act. 
The strategic choices of shippers depend on what kind of shipper they are. 
Some shippers in the meat trade have during some periods had an entire inte-
grated value chain, owning everything from cattle, abattoirs, cold stores, ships, 
and retail outlets. Banana majors have the possibility to either own their ships, 
charter ships from an independent ship-owner or let an independent operator 
do the job. Often they choose a combination. As we will describe in the follow-
ing, the shipper might consider that transport is or is not a core business worth 
to invest money in. A main question for the shipper is whether the money 
Graph 3 Russian banana imports (tonnes) 1994-2013. Russia’s banana 
imports have increased significantly since the late 1990s. 
Note: (c) FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TP>.
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employed when buying and owning ships is adequately invested. Maybe one 
should rather aim at improving plantations and acquiring more fertile land? 
But how can one ensure that the independent reefer operators will do their 
job? Sometimes strategic partnerships are formed between shipper and opera-
tor. When it comes to shippers of other fruit, due to their seasonality, it is less 
likely that the shippers will buy their own tonnage. Rather, as has been de-
scribed, they employ ships on time-charters and on the spot market. A strate-
gic decision here becomes how much tonnage should be time-chartered, what 
tonnage, and from whom. The shipper of course wants to see the cargo arrive 
in good condition without delays. Failure to do so will lead to various kinds of 
discussions and settlement between the shipper and the ship-owner and/or 
operator. 
The shippers pay the operators or ship-owners on the basis of the transport 
capacity of the ship and also the potential of other alternatives. The transport 
capacity includes the carrying capacity of the ship, the speed (since a faster 
ship can transport more volumes in a give time period), the bunker consump-
tion (a highly fuel consuming ship leads to more costs), the cargo handling 
equipment (since it affects the time in port), and other extras. The sine qua non 
is of course that the ship should be able to carry the produce of the shipper. 
Freezers might not be able to carry bananas, and so on. An extra bonus can be 
paid for going to far-off or more inaccessible areas.
The shippers also pay the operators and ship-owners on the basis of availa-
ble alternatives, such as carrying the cargo on competitors’ ships, and on liner 
vessels or container lines. Sometimes a lower rate can be perfectly fine for a 
ship-owner that owns old, depreciated ships. And sometimes the shipper, giv-
en the alternatives of a cost-competitive liner service, cannot or will not pay a 
significantly higher rate for transporting cargo in a reefer. A premium over the 
low-cost alternative by a certain percentage might be acceptable. 
Since shippers do not own all the means to take care of their maritime ship-
ping needs, there is a reefer shipping industry, which consists of a few major 
kinds of players. 
4.2 The Ship-Owners
Ship-owners invest in a ship using equity, loans and/or other forms of financ-
ing. The investment can either be done on speculation (without a clear cus-
tomer in mind) or based on a customer’s particular requirement. To secure a 
long time-charter is often a requirement from the ship-owner in order to build 
a new ship. Therefore, the banana companies with their stable and non-sea-
sonal trade are excellent business partners for a ship-owner who wants to con-
struct new vessels. 
 15Tropics In The Snow: An Introduction
After the ship is owned it is either chartered to a shipper or time-chartered 
to or allowed to be used in a profit sharing scheme by an independent reefer 
operator. A ship-owner can have various motives for owning ships. Ships can 
be used as a way to generate profits through their everyday operation, and then 
it is important that the income exceeds operational and capital expenditure. 
They can also be primarily aimed at the increase of ship value, for example 
that the ship is bought before the market goes up and sold when the market 
has risen. A ship can also be used as an investment which allows the main 
owner or related co-owners to reduce their tax burden. A merchant ship is a 
major investment and yearly depreciations can dramatically cut the tax bur-
den of other businesses. 
Sometimes the ship-owners are highly knowledgeable about shipping, but 
sometimes they see the ships as pure financial investments and rely to a great-
er extent on the judgment of the independent reefer operator or shipper. What 
are then the strategic options available to a ship-owner? It is to decide if one 
should own ships, if more ships should be bought, or if ships should be sold. 
Strategic choices can also concern how the ships should be maintained – how 
much money should be spent on maintenance and what crews are suitable? 
Here there are questions of short-term or long-term cost, quality, and longevity 
of the ship that are central. Given the different motivations of the ship-owners, 
it could be the case that a ship-owner buying ships for speculative ends might 
be less interested in excellent maintenance for the longevity of the ship, but it 
is not certain. The maintenance could be done in-house or by independent 
ship management companies, thus allowing the ship-owner to strike the bal-
ance between in-house full control and dedication (but also being tied up with 
costs) and outsourced operations, where there is often access to more compe-
tence, but where the ship-owner is one amongst many. 
The ship-owner must also choose where to flag the ship. Depending on 
which flag state a ship-owner chooses, the ship can be employed in different 
trades and are subject to different regulations when it comes to manning, tech-
nical controls, etc. Most ship-owners have during the century which is the fo-
cus of this book moved away from national flags to flags of convenience, 
meaning flag states where the demands on crewing and technical mainte-
nance is lower, and states where the tax regime is beneficial6. Flag states regu-
late various aspects connected to running ships and sometimes there are also 
6 Carlisle, R. 1981. Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian 
Flags of Convenience, Maryland: Annapolis. De Sombre, E.R. 2006. Flagging Standards: 
Globalization and Environmental, Safety, and Labor Regulations at Sea, Massachusetts & 
London: Cambridge.
16 Chapter 1
international consequences. For example, reefers flagged to certain states 
could not be employed in the squid trade during the Falkland Islands conflict. 
Many ship-owners in the 1930s transferred their vessels to the flags of countries 
that it was assumed would be untouched by the upcoming war. Avoiding war-
time confiscation was one of the reasons for the emergence of flags of conve-
nience, another reason was to bypass the prohibition of alcohol in the USA 
after 1922. Moving on from flagging, it is worth noting in this context that po-
litical actions, such as trade embargoes, impact on shipping. For example, Rus-
sia has reduced its imports of frozen poultry from the USA during times of poor 
political relations. This has immediately affected the market and for carriers of 
frozen cargo it’s been anything but good news. Trade embargoes of particular 
products or against particular countries impact on shipping. Vessels that have 
called on Israeli ports have sometimes not been welcome in certain places.
When it comes to commercial operation, the ship-owner can commercially 
employ the ship in-house. But as we have mentioned, there are other options. 
A time-charter agreement with a shipper or an independent reefer operator is 
a common choice. The shipper or operator thus agrees to pay the ship-owner a 
rent to be allowed to use the ship in their operations. There can be timecharter 
agreements ranging from weeks to years. The profitability of the ship-owners’ 
business becomes quite predictable, since the ship-owner more or less knows 
the income and the cost of owning the ship. Several risks remain, for example, 
technical breakdown or the risk that time-charter agreements will not be pro-
longed, or that they will be cancelled. If time-charter business is the main busi-
ness of the ship-owner, there is often no need for a large commercial function. 
However, the time-charter rate is a negotiated price which is often a win-win 
situation for several parties, meaning that the ship-owner could potentially 
reap even more profits if she decides to operate the ship herself. For example, 
a time-charter rate might be based on the shipper’s assumption that the ship 
will sail with no cargo back across the Atlantic. But if the ship-owner knows 
that there is indeed a profitable return cargo that will not delay the ship sig-
nificantly, the ship-owner might see even more potential for profit. Then, she 
could decide to operate the ship herself. One option is to operate the ship on 
the spot market. When a cargo is available, the ship-owner has a potential to 
transport it by offering the best price and conditions. However, some shipping 
markets have a more developed spot market than others (for example crude oil 
transport). It is widely considered that the reefer market is not and has never 
been one of them. This could lead to significant risk for the ship-owner that the 
ship will be unemployed, generating cost but not income. 
Another possibility is to have contracts of affreightment, which means that 
the ship-owner binds herself to doing a number of voyages for a shipper during 
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a specified time period. During the time when the ships are not employed by 
the shipper, the ship-owner has the opportunity to use the ships in whatever 
way she deems fit. This is, in a sense, a middle ground between the time-char-
ter and the spot market. The ship-owner can also offer the ship to an independ-
ent reefer operator. The operator often has a large number of ships and the 
ship-owner gets a share in the profits from all the ships. This share corresponds 
to the size, speed, age, etc. of the ship. For the ship-owner, the independent 
reefer operator works according to best effort, and can therefore render larger 
profits than a time-charter agreement. Also, since the market risk is shared 
with other ships, there is often a minimal earning that is higher than the worst 
calamity on the spot market. So, for the ship-owner, the decision whether to 
employ the ship on time-charters, contracts of affreightment, the spot market, 
or with an independent reefer operator is dependent on several factors. Time-
charter requires less work and leads to a stable income during a time period. 
Contracts of affreightment leads to stable income for some consecutive jour-
neys and the possibility of extra profits from the time in-between. However, it 
requires more work and pesonnel in order to find the cargo to transport. The 
spot market requires even more management and expertise but has the poten-
tial to reap even higher profits, if the spot market in the particular shipping 
industry is healthy. 
4.3 The Independent Reefer Operators 
The central actor for this study is the independent reefer operator. The opera-
tor is an intermediary, or middle-man, between shippers and ship-owners, us-
ing the ship-owners to secure ships and marketing these ships to the shippers, 
alternatively securing a contract with a shipper and securing ships with a ship-
owner. In a sense, the operator takes on market risk and gets the chance to reap 
profits. We have seen that ship-owners can also market ships to customers, but 
a main importance is that an operator markets the tonnage of various ship-
owners. The operator itself can also be a ship-owner, but only if it markets 
other tonnage as well, do we classify it as an operator. Wijnolst and Waals give 
a comprehensive description of the reefer industry until 19957. Apart from sur-
veying the state of the art of the reefer market, they pay explicit attention to 
the ownership structure of the industry, noting that the biggest owner in 1995, 
Seatrade was owning a mere 3.5% of the world reefer fleet. The authors also 
pointed out how reefer ships are arranged in different pools that have a larger 
market share than is visible in the ownership numbers. According to Wijnolst 
7 Wijnolst and Waals 1999, pp. 138-160. 
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and Waals the more detailed analysis of such operators is left undone, which is 
a reason why we attempt such an analysis in this book. 
There are mainly two ways for the operator to secure a ship. The operator 
can either timecharter ships from a ship-owner, or they can convince the ship-
owner to let the operator employ the vessel to take a share of the income of the 
operator (without any promises of a rate). It is of course assumed that the in-
come is greater than if the ship-owner would have employed the vessel by her-
self or charter it to a shipper. If the ship is timechartered the operator pays a 
monthly rate to the ship-owner, which makes it possible to earn but also lose 
money if the differential between the market level and the timecharter rate is 
significant. Also, the independent operator can own ships. The line between a 
ship-owner and an operator is not fixed. We will see periods in time, where 
ship-owners become operators and vice-versa. Sometimes we will describe 
how much external tonnage an operator controls to get a glimpse into to what 
extent they are a traditional ship-owner and to what extent they are an inde-
pendent operator. 
The operators have the shippers as customers and sign short-term or long-
term contracts of affreightment or time-charter contracts with the shippers. 
Some specific ships might be fixed, or employed, with a shipper. Other ships 
can be arranged in a so-called pool. In this pool, all constituent ships share the 
revenues from the pool. The ships share the revenues not equally but depend-
ing on the ships’ capacity, speed, consumption, age, cargo handling equipment, 
and other potentially relevant factors. When many ship-owners collaborate, is-
sues of fairness will constantly crop up, and it is important that ship-owners 
perceive there to be fairness. An operator can have different pools, similar to a 
market segmentation. For example, small ships suitable for fish trades can be 
in one pool, while larger ships suitable for fruit transport might be in another 
pool.
Independent reefer operators usually control more ships than ship-owners 
do and this is why they are able to secure higher proftablity. They can optimize 
transport patterns. For example, in the periods in which a ship is not needed by 
a shipper, the operator can employ the ship in other trades needed by other 
customers. The operator also has constant contact with several market chan-
nels and in general has more insight into the market than do single ship-own-
ers. Also, since at least theoretically, any ship in the pool can take a particular 
cargo, the independent operator will always have ships closer to the customer 
due to their market scope. 
An illustration of how to increase the utilization of vessels follows. An op-
erator has been given the contract to take squid from the Falkland Islands to 
Japan. Finding suitable backhaul cargo on the return leg to the Falklands may 
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be impossible, although some reefers with large fuel tanks have transported 
bunkers there. But, perhaps second-hand Japanese cars can be carried to Bue-
nos Aires or maybe to Valparaiso. The reefer operator could offer a low rate for 
this transport, as the alternative would be to sail empty. 
The role of the independent operator is often quite precarious. There is the 
constant risk of ship-owners thinking that they can do better themselves, or 
with another operator. Much of the success of the independent reefer opera-
tors is built on that the ship-owners believe that they are maximising their 
revenue. The independent reefer operators therefore need to keep the ship-
owners loyal, both by actual revenue, and by expectations of large revenues in 
the future. 
An operator is often a big actor that has direct relations to major customers. 
Sometimes operators want to integrate across the value chain and offer door-
to-door services. In other words, that the produce is picked up with trucks, 
transported by ship and then with train and truck again until reaching the final 
destination with all transports arranged by the reefer operator. With such 
Figure 1 Finding backhaul cargo and repositioning empty reefer containers are two 
problems facing operators. Pictured is an NYKCool reefer loading its competi-
tor’s empty containers as backhaul cargo to the Caribbean. Antwerp, 2014  
Photo: P. Birch (author)
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strategic decisions, the operator can solve the customer’s problems, but it also 
requires the necessary personnel and administrative skills to handle the rela-
tions to various actors in the supply chain. When venturing into land transport, 
new competences are needed, which the company might or might not have. 
We have also mentioned the development of transport of reefer cargo with 
large container lines. These companies, such as Maersk and MSC, can also be 
conceived of as operators who offer transport services to shippers. The distinc-
tion between the container lines and specialized reefer operators is that reefer 
operators are usually shipping the cargo faster and more directly in purpose-
built ships, while container lines carry different kinds of containerized cargo in 
a logistical network. A frequent discourse in the reefer business is that inde-
pendent reefer operators offer a taxi service, while container lines provide a 
bus service. We can therefore see that operators need to make strategic deci-
sions when it comes to what service they are offering, in terms of price, time to 
market, quality, etc. 
4.4 Brokers
Another kind of company is the broker, which connects different actors in the 
industry. Brokers can help operators to find shippers and help shippers to find 
ship-owners or even operators (although they are quite well-known). There are 
also sales and purchase brokers, helping ship-owners to find good appropriate 
ships to buy, and newbuilding brokers, who are middle-men between ship-
yards and ship-owners. 
5 Implications of the Industrial Landscape for the Study of Strategy
We have now described some main actors in the specialized reefer industry, 
but it must be emphasised that the same company can belong to different cat-
egories. It is possible that an operator is also a ship-owner, or vice versa, and 
that a shipper primarily operates its ships on the international competitive 
market (outside the transport needs of the shipper itself). Furthermore, anoth-
er consequence of this situation is that the independent reefer operators are 
indeed dependent, in the sense that they are always part of an industrial net-
work. When we study their strategies, we are well aware that their freedom to 
act and formulate strategies is very dependent on the network they are part of. 
Even though we study the independent reefer operators, it is likely that some-
times their strategies have been highly influenced by other actors, for example 
their customers. Actors have historically played different roles and had shift-
ing power relations. Therefore, in our study, incidentally, we problematize the 
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locus of strategy – the power to act and influence a company’s own develop-
ment as well as the direction of the industry. 
Corporate actors are often seen as the main locus of strategy, but it is impor-
tant to note that they cannot make decisions. People make decisions, for ex-
ample as individuals, or as groups and networks of various kinds. In the study, 
we will shift our view between various actors and their strategic choices, in 
order to problematize the locus of agency that is sometimes assumed to be the 
top management in organizations. In our study, we will show that it is some-
times the customers, sometimes a community of employees, sometimes the 
owners, and indeed sometimes the top management who shape strategy. We 
will therefore argue that there is an intricate web of actors and decisions that 
together has shaped the development of the independent reefer operators. 
Although we are interested in being close to the empirical material in this 
book, we are aware that much has been written about strategy, also in the ship-
ping industry, and it is helpful to survey the various strategic options that ac-
tors can choose. Researchers Niemié and Germain8 describe earlier research 
on shipping strategy stating that shipping companies can engage in differentia-
tion – meaning that they do things differently from the competition, thereby 
creating a value proposition that is attractive to the customers. Rather than 
just moving goods from A to B, shipping companies can add terminal opera-
tion, warehousing, increased geographic coverage, added frequence or direct-
ness of sailings, and so on. By doing this the shipping company can charge a 
price over the market price. Some smaller players might adopt the strategy of 
concentration, or in the Michael Porter’s words focus, where they focus on a 
specific geographic segment, or other kind of niche of a shipping market. De-
fining what constitutes a niche is of course debatable. Something is always a 
niche in relation to something else, and there can be niches within niches. For 
example, reefer shipping can be considered a niche within the broader ship-
ping industry. Focusing on time-chartering vessels to major banana companies 
would then be a niche within the niche. Shipping companies can also adopt a 
strategy of cost leadership – being the cheapest company to offer the service. 
This could be achieved by having an older fleet, for example, with ships that 
are already amortized. 
Niemié and Germain connect the shipping literature to Igor Ansoff ’s strat-
egy of diversification, which means that a shipping company manages risk by 
not putting all eggs in one basket. The company can invest in other maritime 
sectors than the one they are operating in, or in non-maritime sectors, such as 
8 Niemié, O. and Germain, O. 2014. Strategies in Shipping Industry. A Review of “Strategic 
Management” Papers in Academic Journals, Working paper, ESG/UQAM. 
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real estate or finance. However, strategic choices do not always fit neatly into 
these frameworks. Companies can choose to collaborate with customers, sup-
pliers, or even competitors, in order to increase the competitiveness of the 
company. Similar literature sees networks and business relationships as a cru-
cial aspect for strategy9. 
Niemié and Germain’s study concludes that much of the strategic literature 
on shipping is outdated theoretically. It remains quite rationalistic, in that 
companies are assumed to formulate their policies after having done a rational 
assessment of the situation. It also excludes novel theoretical discussions in 
the broader field of strategy, for example sense-making perspectives, which 
highlights how strategies are formulated with reference to many more aspects 
than the so-called (material) reality, for example stories, myths, collective 
(mis-)perceptions. In this study we use a theoretical framework that hopefully 
goes beyond the often-used theories of Porter and Ansoff, and thereby throws 
additional light on what shipping companies are doing and why. It is to this 
framework we now turn. 
6 Three Theoretical Dimensions of Business Activity
We present three dimensions that are important for the study of businesses or 
industries: the material, the discursive, and the subjective. This is a framework 
that was developed by the philosopher Alain Badiou and utilized in business 
studies to study the shipping companies Stena Bulk and Concordia Maritime10. 
In that study, it was argued that the promotion of a particular concept of “qual-
ity” was carried out both through discourses (such as “oil should always travel 
first class”) and symbolism, such as the visual representation of ships. This had 
an impact on how quality was framed within the oil shipping industry. Al-
though this can be dismissed as just irrelevant “talk” and “images”, it had a real 
impact on material dimensions, such as scrapping rates. 
9 Håkansson, H. and Snehota, I. 1989. No business is an island: The network concept of busi-
ness strategy. Scandinavian Journal of Management, 5: 187-200. Håkansson, H. & Snehota, 
I (eds.). 1995. Developing relationships in business networks. London: Routledge. 
10 Lennerfors, T.T. 2013. Att skapa en värld – Stena Bulk, Concordia Maritime och marknads-
föringens betydelse i tanksjöfarten 1982–2012, Gothenburg: Breakwater Publishing in col-
laboration with BAS. Other studies that use a discursive approach are Forsberg, P. 2001. 
Berättelser och omdömen i en redares vardag, Göteborg: BAS. Guy, E. 2013. Representations 
and policy change: evidence from the Canadian-flag shipping industry. Environment and 
Planning A, 45: 1184-1198.
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Our reason for dividing reality into these three particular dimensions is be-
cause we hold that they provide a novel and productive reading of the inde-
pendent reefer operators. The main distinction from established analytical 
frameworks is that the utilized framework highlights the role of discourses, 
language, sensemaking, as well as the psychological drivers behind the devel-
opment of this industry. 
The subjective dimension was later updated based on more recent work by 
Badiou to encompass Plato’s concepts of eros, thymos, logos, which will be ex-
plained below11. The present book connects these two triads and develops 
them further and is therefore part of the explorative project of utilizing phi-
losophy to understand an industry. 
Many industrial studies have focused on either the material dimensions, for 
example the size of markets, or availability of capital. Other studies have spot-
lighted the individual traits of a particular entrepreneur. Business studies have 
also followed the discursive turn in social sciences to understand underlying 
structures of sense-making in organizations. However, this study encompasses 
all of these perspectives. The advantages of combining these dimensions is 
that we can see how these dimensions interact with each other. This gives, we 
believe, a richer and also a more accurate and nuanced presentation of an in-
dustry. However, the increased complexity makes it an approach that lends it-
self more to understanding rather than the clear-cut conclusions that can 
follow from the application of simplified models. 
6.1 The Material
The first is the material, physical, dimension. Here we claim, unsurprisingly, 
that it is of importance to understand the cargoes, the ships, cargo handling 
techniques, the geographies of export and import markets, and the people in-
volved in the industry. Related to mainstream business strategy literature, the 
most direct connection is to the concept of resources. For example, the Re-
source Dependency Theory states that an organisation is an open system that 
interacts with its environment and is dependent upon resources in that 
environment12. To understand a reefer company, one must understand the 
company’s access to financial resources, ships, and knowledgeable people. The 
11 Badiou, A. 2005. Being and Event, New York: Continuum. Badiou, A. 2009a. Logics of 
Worlds, London: Continuum. Badiou, A. 2009b. Theory of the Subject, London: Con tinuum. 
Lennerfors, T.T. 2015. Eros, thymos, logos: A study of the spirit of entrepreneurship and in-
novation at Stena, Gothenburg: BAS.
12 Pfeffer, J. and Salancik, G.R. 1978. The external control of organizations: A resource depen-
dence perspective, New York: Harper & Row. Pfeffer, J. 1976. Beyond management and the 
worker: The institutional function of management. Academy of Management Review, 1: 
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Resource Based View (RBV) describes that companies can achieve sustained 
profitability, by having resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable (VRIN)13. Recent RBV studies investigate how resources are com-
bined with other resources to create profitability14. RBV has recently started to 
discuss non-firm resources and how they contribute to a firm’s success15. Re-
sources are connected and there is interaction between them. The Resource 
Interaction view16 describes how companies have long-standing relationships 
to other companies. In this theory, one cannot say that a resource in itself is 
valuable, rare, inimitable and nonsubstitutable, but one must consider the in-
teraction between resources in industrial networks17. This view is particularly 
interesting in the reefer industry which abounds with alliances, clusters, and 
long-term customer relationships. 
To focus on the material dimension means not just to see the material real-
ity as separate artifacts, but rather to conceive of the world as a network of in-
terconnected people and artifacts. These networks can form stable patterns, 
for example a transport system consisting of trucking bananas to the port, re-
packing them in pallets, loading them by crane, transporting them across the 
ocean, and discharging them at the destination. 
What we exclude when we single out the material dimensions is the sense-
making, the discourses around this material phenomenon, and the thoughts, 
desires, and affects concerning this material reality. However, discourses as 
well as the subjective dimension influence material reality. For example, a 
36-46. Hillman, A.J., Withers, M.C. and Collins, B.J. 2009. Resource Dependence Theory: 
A Review,  Journal of Management, 35: 1404-1427.
13 Penrose, E. 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Barney, 
J. 1986. Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck and business strategy. Management 
science, 32: 1231-1241. Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, 
Journal of management, 17: 99-120.
14 Kalling, T. 1999. Gaining competitive advantage through information technology – A re-
source-based approach to the creation and employment of strategic IT resources. Lund: In-
stitutet för ekonomisk forskning, Lunds universitet. Priem, R. & Butler, J. 2001. Is the 
resource-based “view” a useful perspective for strategic management research? Academy 
of management review, 26: 22-40. Kraaijenbrink, J., Spender, J-C. & Groen, A. 2010. A re-
source-based view: A review of and assessment of its critiques. Journal of management it, 
36: 349-372, Jansson, C. 2012. Företag med framgång: hur resurser kan skapa varaktiga 
konkurrensfördelar, Göteborg: BAS.
15 Lavie, D. 2006. The competitive advantage of interconnected firms: an extension of the 
resource-based view. Academy of Management Review, 31: 638-58.
16 Håkansson, H. & Waluszewski, A. 2002. Managing technological development – IKEA, 
the environment and technology, London: Routledge. Baraldi, E., Gressetvold, E., and 
 Harrison, D. 2012. Resource interaction in inter-organizational networks: Foundations, 
comparison, and a research agenda, Journal of Business Research 65: 266-276.
17 Baraldi et al. 2012, p. 266. 
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discourse about the importance of high quality, will lead to a focus on changes 
in the material dimension, for example, the design of cargo holds, cargo gear 
and hull shape. 
People’s actions and the result of them are also part of the material dimen-
sion. This can concern the habits of loading bananas onto a ship, but also the 
everyday, habitual work of fixing cargoes in commercial operations. Once 
again, the focus is on the material and not on the discourses and the subjective 
attitude of the participants in the practices. This focus on the networks of arti-
facts and people connects to a few recent streams of thought in business stud-
ies. One is actor-network theory, which similarly to our material dimension, 
does not distinguish between artifacts and people. Both kinds of matter are 
connected in networked relationships, which directs the development of both 
actors and networks. Also, it connects to strategy as practice18, which to some 
extent reduces the subjective dimension in strategic work – in other words, 
rather than claiming that strategies are formed by means of rational, cognitive 
processes, they claim that material practices (as well as discourses) can signifi-
cantly influence what strategic actions are taken. 
In our description of the various reefer companies we will describe how 
they have evolved in the material dimensions: what ships they have bought or 
sold, innovations in ship design or cargo handling, recruitment of people, 
where the companies are physically located, the logistical systems of which 
they are part, and so on. 
6.2 The Discursive
A second dimension is the discursive, which means how we describe, discuss, 
make sense of, and represent reality. People in a company can for example 
discursively make sense of the company as an “intuitive” or fast one, alterna-
tively as a company where decision-making processes take a long time. This is 
certainly related to the material dimension, that a company is really fast or 
slow, but sometimes the discourses do not correspond to the material reality. 
Perhaps they once did. Sometimes they also contribute to changing the mate-
rial. We maintain that it is important to highlight the discursive dimension, 
and its inclusion into the framework is a reason for why the framework is pro-
ductive. While other approaches might focus on the real, economic forces 
in an industry, we hold that language, discourses, sense-making are equally 
important for the development of an industry. The approach that we have 
18 Jarzabkowski, P. 2004. Strategy as Practice: Recursiveness, Adaptation, and Practices-in-
Use, Organization Studies, 25: 529-560. Whittington, R. 2006. Completing the Practice 
Turn in Organization Studies, Organization Studies, 27: 613-634.
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outlined here is similar to approaches in organization studies which have been 
prevalent since the 1980s, positing that constructed perspectives are crucial for 
understanding organizations19. Very broadly conceived, such studies state that 
the way we make sense of a situation is very important in how we decide to act 
upon the situation. 
For example, industry reports about the reefer industry are fundamentally 
discursive. The material reality of fleet sizes, capacity, market rates, and so on 
are framed by discursive processes of inclusion and exclusion. For example, 
the segment of smaller reefer ships is frequently excluded from market data. A 
study which is solely based on market data thus becomes limited due to the 
discursively constructed nature of the so-called objective material reality. 
Speed is sometimes measured at “banana draught”. In other words, much of 
the attributes of the material artifacts are created and presented discursively. 
Sometimes these discourses are produced by habit, being repeated and imi-
tated. Sometimes a new subjective force makes itself visible in the discourses. 
The discursive dimension throws light on market expectations, the percep-
tions of industry insiders, the small-talk at business conferences; all of these 
have real life business implications. Therefore, when we study the reefer com-
panies from a discursive dimension, we focus on how the persons involved 
describe their companies, how the company is represented in archival mate-
rial of various kinds. We also study how the companies make sense of their 
cargoes, ships, and also other actors, such as competitors. For example, we 
have already argued that the way we understand the word “reefer” has been an 
important factor in shaping actions of reefer companies. The same goes with 
the word “container” as we will show. 
6.3 The Subjective
The third dimension is the subjective. In general, this zooms in on the human 
actors that are part of the industry, understanding their perceptions, their 
views, and their psychological relation to the material and discursive dimen-
sions of the industry. Here, we locate the human actors’ agency to initiate ma-
terial and discursive action. This is the dimension which captures the 
intentional strategies of actors. We have mentioned above that actions are in-
fluenced by discursive and material realities. In a sense, the subjective dimen-
sion points to the residual – to the share of human action that is not determined. 
19 Boje, D. 1991. The storytelling organization: A study of story performance in an office-
supply firm, Administrative science quarterly, 3: 106-126. Czarniawska, B. 1998. A Narrative 
Approach to Organization Studies, London: Sage. Kristensson Uggla, B. 2002. Slaget om 
verkligheten. Filosofi, Omvärldsanalys, Tolkning, Stockholm: Symposion. 
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Also, it points to the desires and drives, fantasies and imaginations, of the in-
volved actors. 
This subjective dimension encompasses the lived experience of friendships, 
ethnic loyalties, patriotism, or for that matter, dislike which shape business 
decisions. There have been cases, for example, where ship-owners have firm 
opinions about who they will do business with. Rather than selling to the 
highest bidder, social considerations may outweigh rational, economic moti-
vations. These considerations have been largely ignored by the business rela-
tionship literature20. The subjects’ desire for prestige can result in the seeking 
of contracts with major fruit companies. The pursuit of prestige can lead to a 
desire to keep ships well-painted – aesthetic considerations. 
Moroever, perceptions of reality are part of the subjective dimension. The 
later years of the reefer industry have been marked by a decline which is as 
much perceived as it is actual. Perceived decline influences which actions are 
seen as viable. Similarly, the perceived boom in earlier years led to an invest-
ment in reefer ships that flooded the market. 
However, most of the strategic literature seems to assume that strategies are 
formulated rationally, as a means to reach a certain desired end – for example 
to earn money, to grow the business, or to expand market share. By highlight-
ing the subjective dimension, which for us can consist of much more than a 
rational, instrumental means-end calculus, we open up for a more nuanced 
way of understanding the psychologies in the industry. 
We further choose to divide this dimension further into three interrelated 
constituents: eros, thymos, and logos. Eros means a search for instantaneous 
gratification, the primordial drives, the urges. Thymos covers the posture of 
pride, desire for recognition. Logos means the rational and structured applica-
tion of means to reach a certain end. Plato21, which has inspired the use of 
these three concepts, describes their interrelation as that between a charioteer 
and its two horses. One horse, eros, is constantly seeking to satisfy its desires 
and appetites, pulling in different directions and subjecting the chariot to un-
controlled, but forceful movements. The other horse, thymos, is stout-hearted, 
proud, and courageous. It holds its head high and has the confidence to go on. 
Logos is the charioteer who as far as possible tries to control the two horses. 
Logos thinks of itself as the locus of strategy, controlling the movement of the 
chariot, but much of the movement is decided by the interplay between eros 
and thymos. 
20 Lowe, N. and Hwang, K-S. 2012. A NICE agenda for IMP research, Industrial Marketing 
Management, 41: 706-714.
21 Plato. 2011. Phaedrus, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
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We hold that in order to understand an industry, it is important to also in-
clude this subjective dimension. When we describe the actors from a subjec-
tive dimension, we will try to get a glimpse of what really motivates them, 
going beyond the discursive and the material. For example, when it is obvious 
that an actor is rationally seeking to increase the company’s wealth, this would 
correspond to the dimension of logos. When a company engages in business 
because of the status and pride it gives the actor, we might be dealing with 
thymos. And when a company is immersed in the market, making deals for the 
deals themselves, it might correspond to eros. 
Our primary research question is thus developed as: How have the inde-
pendent reefer operators, individually and collectively, developed in their ma-
terial, discursive and subjective dimensions since their beginning until today? 
7 The Structure of the Book 
In this introduction, we have already indicated several of the factors influenc-
ing strategies in the reefer industry, for example seasonality, containerization, 
and so on. In chapter 2 will set the stage for the corporate narratives that fol-
low. A historical narrative of the macro level factors is presented, thereby de-
scribing the environment in which the reefer shipping companies operate. In 
part two, we will present a number of corporate narratives of the independent 
reefer operators, describing the history from the perspective of each company. 
In part three, we describe some important customers and competitors, in or-
der to see the independent reefer operators from another perspective. In part 
four, we conclude the book by doing an analysis of the strategies of the inde-
pendent reefer operators, based on our theoretical framework.
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Chapter 2
The Reefer Industry in a Historical Context
This book follows the independent reefer operators from their birth until the 
present day. The following macro level description serves as a background and 
general context to the corporate narratives that we will present in the rest of 
the book. The independent reefer operators are part of the maritime link in the 
cold chain, which in turn is connected to the development of agriculture, in-
ternational trade, technological and political developments. To fully describe 
this would be beyond the scope of this book. Instead, we sketch some basic 
contours which are relevant to the understanding of the development of the 
independent reefer operators. 
Also, the discursive construction of the reefer, which we explained in the 
introduction, complicates the limited historical data that is available. For ex-
ample, reefer tonnage is sometimes included with refrigerated liner capacity, 
and sometimes not. Smaller reefer vessels are frequently excluded from data 
sets and processes of inclusion and exclusion vary and are usually not explicit. 
Therefore, the description below is not aimed at giving a quantitative overview 
of the development of the industry, even though some data is used for illustra-
tive purposes. 
1 The Beginnings: Meat, Bananas and Fish 
The refrigerated shipping market was born in the late nineteenth century, ini-
tially with the meat trade. This development, as well as the banana and fish 
trades that followed, will be descibed below. The timing of the birth of the re-
frigerated trades fits well into the development of the shipping industry and 
the emerging systems of international trade. From 1842 to 1887, the sea trade of 
general cargo grew by 4.2% per year. The advent of steamships made long-haul 
trades viable for a greater range of cargo than before. Previous trades with lux-
uries like spices, silk and sugar could now be supplemented with less valuable 
cargoes. One outcome of this was that colonial possessions that didn’t produce 
these luxuries could now generate more value since shipping costs were re-
duced and the cargo spent less time at sea. Without the transformation of the 
shipping industry from sail to steam, from wooden to iron hulls, using screw 
propellers, and a deep-sea communications network these international trades 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
30 Chapter 2
could not have emerged. At the same time, the prospects of international trade 
fuelled such shipping innovations. 
Towards the late 1800s there was a constant pressure to make the long-haul 
trade more effective with more efficient engines (reducing the fuel consump-
tion by 75% per ton mile from 1855 to 19151), and to increase the speed of ship-
ments further. The passenger traffic and mail contributed to the commercial 
pressures to increase the speed of shipping2. This increased pressure for speed 
was also a prerequisite for carrying sensitive reefer cargoes. 
The reefer trades are thus a natural part of the more general trends of indus-
trialization, the development of long-haul international trade, and the large-
scale technological transformation of the shipping industry. Given the sensitive 
nature of the reefer cargo, the emergence of such international reefer trades 
was also dependent on the development of refrigeration technology, although 
early attempts involved the use of natural ice. 
1.1 Meat
The early refrigerated shipping market was mainly concerned with transport-
ing frozen meat to the growing and increasingly affluent British population. 
While local British supply was scarce, meat was abundant in the British Do-
minions of Australia and New Zealand, and also in Argentina and elsewhere in 
the Americas3. Early, canned meat was imported and also chilled meat from 
North America using natural ice4. But canned meat wasn’t able to satisfy the 
market and the North American exports declined in the late 19th century. To be 
able to secure long-distance imports, there was a need for refrigerated vessels, 
or rather, freezers. Meat, compared to other refrigerated cargo that would ap-
pear later, was, in retrospect, a quite simple cargo to transport. It basically 
needed to be kept below freezing point. 
Experiments with emerging refrigeration technologies were proceeding and 
the market opportunity prompted their refinement. The first freezing works 
were built in Sydney in 18615 and soon the technology was applied to shipping. 
Initial Australian attempts to ship meat failed but were soon followed by 
1 Stopford, M. 2009. Maritime Economics, New York: Routledge, p. 26.
2 Stopford 2009, p. 23.
3 The early history of British meat imports is described in Oddy, D.J. 2007. The Growth of 
Britain’s Refrigerated Meat Trade 1880-1939, The Mariner’s Mirror, 93: 269-280.
4 Perren, R. 2006. Taste, Trade and Technology: The Development of the International Meat 
Industry since 1840, Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 47-49.
5 The history of early Australian meat exports is based on Pearson, M. and Lennon, J. Pastoral 
Australia: Fortunes, Failures and Hard Yakka: a Historical Overview 1788-1967, Collingwood: 
CSIRO Publishing, pp. 68-70.
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a limited French success with the Frigorifique in 18776 and more so with the 
Paraguay in 1878. The voyage of the clipper sailing ship Dunedin, which was 
retrofitted with coal-powered compression refrigeration, from New Zealand to 
the UK in 1882 was a successful venture, inspiring others to equip vessels with 
refrigeration. 
Thirty years later, in 1912, there were 251 vessels with a total of 44m cbf of 
refrigerated cargo space employed in the meat trades7. A common size of a 
reefer hold was about 180 000 cbf, although some vessels had about 530 000 cbf 
of refrigerated capacity8. Many of the vessels were not specialized reefer ships, 
but cargo liners with a “half and half” configuration, half frozen and half gen-
eral cargo, and others merely had some minimal refrigerated locker space. The 
6 The cargo was chilled to 0 degrees and a significant part of the cargo was spoiled. Wijnolst 
and Wergeland 2009, p. 287.
7 Critchell, J. & Raymond, J. 1912. A history of the frozen meat trade, an account of the development 
and present day methods of preparation, transportation, and marketing of frozen and chilled 
meats, 2nd ed London: Constable & Company. 
8 Dellacasa, A. 1987. Refrigerated transport by sea, Rev. Int. Froid, 10: 349-352. The early period 
is described on pages 349-350. 
Figure 2 The Dunedin’s successful voyage in 1882 established the viability of modern 
refrigerated shipping. Pictured in Shaw, Savill and Albion Line colours, and prior 
to the fitting of its refrigeration machinery. The ship was lost near Cape Horn in 
1890. Painted by Frederick Tudgay in 1875  
Image source: Hocken Library
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infrastructure of modern cold storage plants on land was also expanding. A 
company that eventually managed to make the most of this early refrigerated 
market is the meat and shipping empire built by the Vesteys, including Blue 
Star Line (see chapter 8). 
1.2 Bananas
Long before reefers came into the picture, large volumes of bananas were 
shipped to the United States. The first recorded banana shipment to New York 
was by schooner from Cuba in 1804. Irregular, small-scale shipments com-
menced9. They were constantly at the mercy of favourable winds, and spoil-
age was a major problem. On the other side of the Atlantic, some regular cargo 
vessels had sporadically carried bananas from the Canary Islands to Europe. 
It was the establishment of large-scale plantations in Central America, pro-
ducing enormous volumes at low economic (albeit not social and environmen-
tal) cost, in conjunction with railroads, that created a major market for 
bananas in the United States in the late 1800s. More than 12 million bunches of 
bananas passed through U.S. ports in 1892 and bananas were considered a “sta-
ple article” and they featured in recipe books10. 
These large-scale plantations were developed by the forerunners of the 
companies that became United Fruit (now Chiquita) and Standard Fruit 
(Dole). Close relationships were built up between the companies and political 
interests in these countries that resulted in major land concessions to the fruit 
companies. This was a capital-intensive business which resulted in just a few 
vertically-integrated companies dominating the market. Capital and power in 
the banana industry tend to concentrate, as Soluri puts it, “in between farms 
and kitchens”. Indeed, legendary “banana men” like Lorenzo Dow Baker, Minor 
Keith, the Vaccaro brothers, and Samuel Zemurray, all began their carreers as 
shippers, railroad builders, and wholesalers, not planters11. 
By the late nineteenth century there was a well-developed infrastructure 
supplying the United States with bananas. The bananas were brought to mar-
ket by rail, then steamboat, and then rail again in the United States. The trans-
formation from sail to steam in the shipping industry increased the speed and 
reliability of the shipments. Spoilage was reduced by improving the cargo’s 
ventilation, vents were added and fans to remove the ethylene gas that ba-
nanas produce, expediting the ripening process. These ventilated fruit carriers 
were a modest improvement over the ordinary cargo vessel. Using the reefer 
9 Soluri, J. 2005. Banana Cultures, Austin: University of Texas Press, p. 36.
10 Soluri 2005, p. 36-37.
11 Soluri 2005, p. 226.
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vessels developed for the meat trade were not an option since bananas are 
subject to chilling damage and the first reefers could not manage the optimal 
12-13 degrees12. 
The competition between the banana companies was intense and one area 
of competition was the market’s perception of whose bananas were the best. 
Fruit buyers preferred blemish-free fruit and bunches with as many bananas as 
possible. To achieve this quality fruit required a high amount of investment in 
the most uptodate logistics (and later also chemical treatments). For the major 
banana companies, it was a strategic advantage to develop and invest in refrig-
erated banana transport.
While the banana majors focused on satisfying the demands of the US mar-
ket, they also realized that if the quality of maritime transport would improve, 
the lucrative potential of the overseas, European, market was within reach. 
British companies were already showing an interest in the transatlantic ba-
nana trade and this threatened the existing set-up with United Fruit being 
dominant and with Standard and Cuyamel as the secondary players.
In the race with bananas across the Atlantic, a British company emerged as 
the first-mover. The first ship to carry bananas in a reefer hold was the Imperial 
Direct West India Line’s passenger liner Port Morant that shipped bananas 
along with mail and passengers from Jamaica to Bristol in 1901, about twenty 
years after the arrival of the frozen meat cargo in London. The cargo arrived in 
good condition and a regular banana trade with bananas to Europe was inau-
gurated. To compete with the European shipping lines, in 1903, United Fruit 
shipped bananas across the Atlantic with the 25-year old Venus, a river freight-
er that was retrofitted with primitive refrigeration equipment consisting of ice 
blocks, animal hair, air ducts and fans13. A relationship with Elders & Fyffes 
was formed to develop the transatlantic banana trades. Cuyamel (later joining 
with United Fruit), Standard Fruit (later Dole) and French fruit interests also 
acquired reefers for long-distance trades. It is estimated that United Fruit con-
trolled as much as 77% of the world trade in bananas at this time14.
The development of suitable reefer transportation in the early 1900s en-
abled large-scale exports to Europe and the gradual emergence of a global ba-
nana market. Public awareness of the health benefits of eating fruit were a 
12 Tolerton, N. 2008. Reefer Ships: The Ocean Princesses, Christchurch, NZ: Willsonscott Pub-
lishing.
13 Cohen, R. 2012. The Fish that Ate the Whale: The Life and Times of America’s Banana King, 
New York: Random House. 
14 Taylor, T. 2003. Evolution of the banana multinationals, in Josling, T.E. and Taylor, T.G. 
Banana Wars: The Anatomy of a Trade Dispute, California: Institute for International Stud-
ies Stanford University, pp. 67-96.
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factor that stimulated demand. The banana also benefited from widespread 
concerns about germs; the banana, with its peel, was considered a hygienic 
choice. In time, they became the most important commodity carried by reefers 
but it remained a luxury commodity in many parts of the world until after the 
Second World War and in other places not until much later. 
1.3 Fish
While fishing vessels often return from fishing grounds when the cargo holds 
are full, another common practice is to offload the cargo to transport vessels 
that carry the fish to shore. Traders have often sought out fishermen offshore to 
buy their cargo at a price beneficial to both parties and quickly get it to the 
markets. With growing populations and more effective means of fishing, par-
ticularly the advent of efficient trawling in the beginning of the 1900s, fish 
stocks in rivers and near the coast have gradually been reduced, and fishing has 
moved farther offshore. Refrigeration technologies are a prerequisite for these 
long-distance fish trades in the same way as they are to the banana and meat 
trades described above15. 
Mechanical freezing of fish kicked off in the late 1800s at onshore refrigera-
tion sites. The fish was placed on metal plates in contact with a pipe grid where 
a refrigerant was circulated. Before that, fish was kept cold using natural ice. 
An early record suggests that in 1797, natural ice was used to preserve fish on 
imports to the UK. In 1911, the Danish Ottesen patented the process of freezing 
fish in brine, and gradually ships were equipped with the Ottesen installation 
and other freezing equipment. The Japanese government subsidized the intro-
duction of these refrigeration technologies at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury16. 
2 1920s, 1930s, and into the 1940s
The experimentation with banana shipments across the Atlantic was interrupt-
ed by the First World War. Most of the commercial fleets were tied up in war 
activities, and during the War, navies as well as merchant fleets were decimat-
ed. After the War, trade caught up which caused a demand for shipping. Frozen 
meat, and rapidly increasing quantities of chilled meat, was transported from 
15 Dellacasa 1987. Some notes about fish transports are found on pp. 349-350.
16 Nissui. 2012. A History of Hundred Years of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd., p. 26. Available at: 
<http://www.nissui.co.jp/english/corporate/100yearsbook/pdf/100yearsbook.pdf>.
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the Southern Hemisphere, complemented with dairy products17. Moreover, 
apples and pears, particularly from New Zealand, were carried18. 
The transatlantic banana trade also grew. New fruit and banana trades were 
initiated by colonial powers, for example bananas from Italian Somaliland to 
Italy. The song “Yes! We Have No Bananas” released in 1922 was a major hit. 
Banana marketing efforts were initiated by the fruit companies in order to 
teach Europeans to eat bananas and to penetrate the US market even further. 
By 1929, exports from the banana producing areas of tropical America reached 
a world-record of 29 million bunches, up dramatically from the 8.4 million of 
191219. 
The banana business became more capital intensive due to the cost of man-
aging the problems caused by two diseases. One of them, Panama Disease, was 
managed by flooding land areas that were affected while the other, Sigatoka, 
17 For a view of Australian exports of meat and dairy products to Britain, see Burley, K. Brit-
ish Shipping and Australia 1920-1939, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press. 
18 Wijnholst & Wergeland 2009, p. 288.
19 History of the Banana: 1800 to present, Available at: <http://cwh.ucsc.edu/bananas/Site/
Modern%20History%20of%20the%20Banana.html>.
Figure 3 Reefer shipping opened up new markets for tropical fruit. Banana marketing by 
Fyffes at the Stockholm Exhibition in 1930  
Photo: Arkitektur- och designcentrum
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was managed by chemical treatment. The increased capitalization created bar-
riers to new entrants in the banana market and favoured the development of 
the banana majors. 
In the 1920s Japanese fishing companies introduced refrigeration onboard 
vessels and they also built cold stores on shore. The greatest cost for fish was 
the transport cost and the cost of crushed ice for refrigeration and innovation 
could be the way out of this situation20. In-house on shore ice making facilities 
were a way for Nissui to lower their costs, rather than relying on a third-party 
provider. Some fishing companies thus were quite vertically integrated. How-
ever, on shore refrigeration equipment helped little when it came to distant 
water fishing. On-board freezing equipment was necessary. In 1930, new rapid 
freezing equipment was installed on a handful of Japanese trawlers21. As be-
fore, the trawlers sometimes went back ashore after filling their cargo holds, 
but sometimes they transshipped the cargo to a transport vessel, a reefer, 
which took the fish ashore. 
The British refrigerated fleet was the largest in the interwar years, estimated 
three-quarters of the world fleet in terms of cargo volume in 1923 and two-
thirds in 193922. Reefer tonnage, as with all shipping, was catastrophically 
 affected by the Second World War. The merchant fleet was therefore supple-
mented by the construction of swiftly constructed “Empire” vessels. These ves-
sels were of many types and included refrigerated cargo liners. The Empire 
Clarendon and the Empire Abercorn, for example, had refrigerated capacities of 
over 360 000 cbf and a service speed of 14.5 knots. They later sailed for Blue Star 
Line and the New Zealand Shipping Company, which also constructed the im-
portant Haparangi class in the late 1940s, consisting of eight large cargo ships 
with a high capacity for refrigerated and frozen goods.
Refrigerated and frozen cargo during these years continued to be carried in 
various types of ships. Many were general cargo vessels with a refrigerated ca-
pacity that could be as little as refrigerated lockers. These were liner trades and 
were usually regulated by the shipping conferences. There were also dedicated 
reefers, particularly for the banana trade, but even these frequently carried 
passengers. Ventilated fruit carriers and general cargo vessels continued to 
carry fruit, particularly for shorter distances, for example from the Caribbean 
to USA and in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Lauritzen and Saléns started 
to operate in these regional trades but had the ambition to service the transat-
lantic reefer trades. 
20 Nissui 2012, p. 63.
21 Nissui 2012, p. 77.
22 Wijnolst and Wergeland 2009, p. 288.
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3 The 1950s and 1960s
The post-war refrigerated shipping market was constrained in a number of 
ways and its growth was initially modest. Many important markets for perish-
ables were in ruins, particularly in Europe and East Asia. Following the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, the signatory countries lowered tariffs 
which contributed to the growth of world trade. This combined with postwar 
reconstruction contributed to the start of a period of economic prosperity in 
the 1950s for most industrial countries, which increased the trade of various 
goods (oil, ore, grain, etc). This affected the shipping industry positively, also 
increasing the demand for refrigerated tonnage. It wasn’t long before bananas 
and other imported fruit were a part ordinary people’s lives in prosperous re-
gions. The demand side was slowly recovering. In 1961, the world reefer trade 
was about 18 million tons, while at the end of the same decade it had increased 
to around 25 million (see Graph 5).
But during the 1950s and 1960s, the shipping industry also underwent a 
transformation from the structure of cargo liners, passenger liners and tramp 
ships that had existed since the early 1900s. In this period, the cargo liner com-
panies were undergoing a revolution as the modern intermodal container be-
gan to make serious headway23. In 1969, the first purposebuilt reefer container 
ships were introduced by OCL and ACT24. This posed significant demands on 
new terminals and new cargo handling equipment and skills related to general 
cargo. For the reefer cargoes, the challenges were even bigger. Early refrigerat-
ed containerization was based upon the idea that the ship had central refriger-
ated units and the cold air was ducted to what are usually referred to as porthole 
containers. However, early refrigerated containerization was not a success and 
this created great opportunities for independent reefer operators. This coin-
cided with increased consumer expectations for off-season produce, for ex-
ample, apples in the supermarket year-round. Also, the partly refrigerated 
passenger liners were a dying breed and the passenger traffic they had carried 
had dwindled as the jet-era of mass tourism had begun. 
The general trend was that the general cargo was containerized, the passen-
ger traffic and mail gradually shifted to airlines, and that a number of special-
ized shipping segments were emerging25. Specialized bulk shipping vessels 
23 For more background on containers see Levinson, M. 2006. The Box: How the shipping 
container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger, Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, and, Donovan, A. and Bonney, J. 2006. The box that changed the world, Ubm 
Global trade. See also Klose, A. 2015. The Container Principle, Massachussetts: MIT Press. 
24 Wijnolst and Wergeland 2009, p. 288.
25 Stopford 2009, p. 36. 
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such as oil tankers had existed but developed significantly during this period 
– their size grew exponentially, given that the transport cost per unit decreases 
with increasing ship size. A similar but not as pronounced tendency can, as we 
will see, be witnessed in the case of reefers. 
Perhaps the timing of this transformation of the shipping industry was not 
unexpected. Tonnage losses, as previously mentioned, had been enormous 
during the Second World War, and the fleet that survived was soon obsolete. 
This presented opportunities, however, to renew the transport system within 
all shipping segments. Technological advances had been strong within fields 
such as refrigeration and automation, and such advances trickled down into 
the maritime reefer industry. The 1950s and 1960s therefore turned out to be a 
period of innovation and it enabled the subsequent boom in perishables trans-
port in the decades that followed. Improved refrigeration reduced spoilage. 
Automation and more reliable machinery reduced maintenance and crewing 
requirements. Some vessels had unmanned engine rooms. The refrigeration 
systems were also improved and the development of electronics made systems 
of automatic temperature control possible. Modern vessels could manage a 
wide range of temperatures, handling many types of cargo with different atmo-
spheres in its separate gas-tight compartments. Improved cargo handling and 
faster vessels reduced turnaround times drastically. Speed was a major factor 
due to the precarious nature of the cargo. While the speed of reefer vessels 
before the Second World War were often around 15-16 knots, this increased and 
for example Lauritzen’s Italian Reefer class boasted a speed of 22 knots in 1968 
(see Graph 4). 
Apart from the general developments in world trade and the shipping in-
dustries, the reefer industry was impacted by developments in their respective 
cargo categories. Regarding bananas, the Panama Disease all but wiped out the 
Gros Michel banana in the 1950s, and this led producers to develop a disease-
resistant variety, the Cavendish26. However, the Cavendish was more fragile 
and easily bruised during handling. To solve this problem, the banana compa-
nies started to pack them in boxes prior to shipment. The increased operating 
cost associated with boxing and disease control contributed to economic prob-
lems for both United Fruit and Dole. Both companies subsequently reduced 
their own fleets in order to free up capital. Their shipping needs were increas-
ingly supplied by independent reefer operators like Saléns and Lauritzen. 
26 The Cavendish is the main variety internationally traded today. Plantains used as food in 
India and many parts of Africa actually constitute the largest volume of bananas that are 
grown. The Cavendish banana is presently being ravaged by a different strain of Panama 
disease in many parts of the world. A replacement is being sought and efforts are also be-
ing made to genetically engineer a resistant variety.
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Regarding fish, fishing fleets continued to search further afield and increased 
the necessity of transshipment. A new development within the fishing indus-
try was the growth of the international fish trade and this provided a new busi-
ness where fish was transported from port to port. For example, Gustaf 
Erikson’s 1957 newbuilding Fiskö went directly from the shipyard to load fish in 
Reykjavik, Iceland27.
Similar to the unitization of the liner companies, unitization was also dis-
cussed within the reefer trades. The cargo on reefer vessels were of varying 
kinds, sizes and shapes, and given the inefficiency of handling such cargo, the 
reefer industry started to consider the unitization of cargo. Although some ex-
periments had been made with container technology, the major breakthrough 
was palletisation. Palletisation began in earnest and Saléns started an integrat-
ed pallet service for Sunkist in 1969. 
27 Malmberg, T. and Hag, E. 2013. Kalla Systrar från Åland på världens alla hav, Mariehamn: 
Stiftelsen Hilda och Gustaf Eriksons samt Gustaf Adolf Eriksons Understödsfond, p. 90-
91. 
Graph 4 Reefer speeds. The graph gives the typical rated speed for newly constructed 
large reefers. The lower speeds after the late 1970s is due to the prioritisation 
of fuel efficiency following the oil crises. 
Note: Created on the base of indicative speeds of large reefer newbuildings 
from 1935 to 1995 from Tolerton 2008.
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4 The 1970s and 1980s 
The 1970s promised to be a golden era for the independent reefer operators. 
The liner industry was struggling with refrigeration, while the demand for per-
ishables was increasing year by year. New, modern ships, like Salén’s Snow class 
and Blue Star Line’s A-class, were ordered, and new entrants were eyeing the 
reefer segment. The liner conferences’ importance diminished during these 
decades28. This presented more cargo opportunities for the independent reef-
er operators. 
However, the oil crises of the 1970s drastically raised operating costs, and 
combined with oversupply of tonnage, translated into weak profitability. Giv-
en the increased cost of bunker fuel the operational speed of newbuilt reefers 
stagnated. While the focus had been on pushing up the speed for each succes-
sive generation of reefer vessels in the 1950s and 1960s, the oil crises of the 
1970s stopped this development. This is not to say that reefers were slow ships 
– a typical reefer speed stabilized at 20 knots. However, the rise of oil prices led 
to more concern with bunker consumption than in previous periods (see 
Graph 4). 
Due to the oil crises, there was an abrupt end of the boom in the shipping 
market that had been ongoing since the 1950s. This cascaded into the ship-
building market which was of central concern to the governments of ship-
building nations29. European governments subsidised national shipbuilding in 
the 1970s and 1980s to remain competitive and avoid the unemployment that 
would result if the shipyards were closed. Many shipping companies, including 
the reefer segment, seized the opportunity to build vessels, but in general the 
verdict is that this resulted in an oversupply of tonnage in all ship categories. 
State subsidised shipbuilding was threatened by the Gibbons Bill in the US, 
which would have prohibited subsidized vessels from entering ports in the 
US30. Subsequently, shipbuilding became more competitive and most reefers 
in later decades were built in East Asia. 
Still, the demand for transport of refrigerated products grew. Graph 5 shows 
the development of the international trade in refrigerated products. In the 
1970s and 1980s, the trade of refrigerated products increased. In 1970 it was 
around 25 million tonnes while in 1990 it had risen to almost 50 million tonnes. 
28 Stopford 2009, Chapter 13. 
29 Todd, D. 1991. Industrial Dislocation: The Case of Global Shipbuilding, London and New 
York: Routledge.
30 Waters, R.C. 1993. Federal Regulations and the Competitiveness of U.S. Liner Ship 
 Operators, Transportation Journal, 33: 53-58. 
 41The Reefer Industry In A Historical Context
Graph 5 Total international reefer trade (not just seaborne) 
Note: Modified from: Arduino, G. and Parola, F. 2010. Cold Chain in the 
Shipping Industry: Bulk versus Container in the Banana Trade, 12th World 
Conference on Transport Research, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal. 
Figures are in turn drawn from Nomadic ASA and Drewry with authors’ 
elaboration. 
Graph 6 Kiwi fruit exports from New Zealand (tonnes)
Note: (c) FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TP>.
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Exported volumes of grapes from Chile and kiwifruit from New Zealand grew 
rapidly during the 1980s (see Graphs 6–7). The ship supply increased accord-
ingly. From a capacity of 250m cbf in 1980 it increased to about 325m in 1990 
(see Graph 8). 
The palletisation process which gained traction in the 1960s, continued into 
the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, new pallet-friendly reefers were built with op-
timised deck configurations. The idea was to maximise the number of pallets 
that a ship could carry. The height of each deck was designed to cater for fully 
stacked pallets and the ships were also built “squarer” to avoid unutilized cargo 
space in the holds. This was also done in order to increase speedy deliveries 
even though the ships were not sailing faster. The old breakbulk reefers contin-
ued to see service for many years as backup tonnage and for service in the fish 
trades. Palletisation also brought with it a change in cargo handling equip-
ment. From derricks having been the major cargo handling equipment on 
reefer vessels, newer vessels increasingly came with cranes which could load 
multi-pallet cargo holders. 
Graph 7 Grape exports from Chile (tonnes) 
Note:  (c) FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
<http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/TP>. 
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Palletisation and Pallet Heights
The first reefers built for palletised goods were designed for pallets load-
ed to a height of approximately 1.9 metres, for example Salén’s Snow ves-
sels. This equated to the height of seven boxes of fruit and also allowed 
for a small amount of airspace above the boxes, for the proper circulation 
of cold air. During the 1970s, however, the Confederation of Importers 
and Marketing Organisations in Europe of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
(CIMO) lobbied for this height to be increased. More goods per pallet 
would equate to reduced transportation and handling costs. The major 
fruit companies resisted this initially. On the one hand, the cartons that 
contained the fruit needed to be robust enough to handle the additional 
weight but, more significantly, the higher pallets wouldn’t fit into the ex-
isting cargo holds. However, the oil crises made the existing fleets expen-
sive to sail and thus there was an interest in obtaining new bunker-efficient 
vessels that could then also meet the new agreed up standard pallet 
height of approximately 2.1m (8 boxes high). The new vessels were there-
fore built with a deck height of 2.2m, once again allowing sufficient air-
space above the cargo to allow the cold air to circulate. Older vessels were 
usually sold and considered obsolete by the major operators, at least for 
some of the fruit trades that attracted better freight rates. In some cases, 
for example the Snow vessels, they were converted by lowering the grat-
ings on which the pallets rested and installing thinner insulation in the 
ceiling. While palletisation was ongoing, less modern vessels were still 
used by operators as a reserve fleet, which was laid up except for in high 
markets, or as ships that could serve fishing fleets. 
5 1990s to the Present
During the 1990s and 2000s, the world underwent a process of privatization 
and liberalization of markets. Many fruit exporting countries had national ex-
port boards which acquired transport capacity. Often the exported quantities 
were high because of the association of many independent growers, leading to 
the potential to fill up an entire specialized reefer. However, many of these ex-
port boards have been dissolved, leading to more fragmented quantities which 
could be carried by liner vessels. On the demand side, there has been a growing 
number of large players, such as supermarket chains. Walmart is a good ex-
ample. With considerable market control, major supermarket chains have a 
complex supply chain and meticulously control the supply of goods. It has 
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been argued that such players prefer the continuous delivery of fruit, meat and 
fish rather than large but less-frequent bulk-deliveries supplied by specialized 
reefers. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and related political change opened up 
new markets for reefer operators. There was a demand for imported fruit in the 
post-Soviet and Eastern European countries, a demand that was previously in-
adequately supplied. The opening up of these markets also led to the entry of 
new players and ships on the market. Eastern Europe has grown in importance 
while Western Europe has declined in the first decade of the 2000s31. 
On the demand side, the period after 1990 witnessed a veritable boom in the 
trade of refrigerated products. From the traded volume of 50m tonnes in 1990, 
in 2010 the traded volume amounted to almost 170m tonnes (see Graph 8). In-
terestingly, this market boom coincided with a decline of specialized reefer 
tonnage. From the peak of about 380 m cbf of specialized reefer tonnage in 
1994, the capacity has declined to about 230 m cbf in 2013, a bit lower than it 
was in 1980 (see Graph 8). The number of newbuildings since the 1990s has 
decreased to the point that at the end of 2016 there were about 16 newbuildings 
in the orderbooks ranging between 120 000 and 650 000 cbf32. Scrapping on the 
other hand has been on the increase, particularly since 2008 resulting in a 
dwindling world reefer fleet (see Graph 8). 
At the high point for the independent reefer operators, in 1993, about 35 m 
tonnes of cargo was transported by ship33. Graph 9 shows the relative impor-
tance of the commodities carried by reefers. Bananas have occupied an excep-
tional position in the transport of refrigerated cargo. 
A third of the maritime reefer cargo was carried in containers34, where the 
dominant cargo was meat (40%) followed by bananas (20%), dairy (13%) and 
other goods35. In 1998, 45m tonnes was transported by ship36. 40% of this was 
bananas, something which has varied little since the 1980s. In 1997, when the 
capacity of the container lines overtook that of specialized reefers, the con-
tainer lines still only conveyed 42% of the cargo.37 In 1980, full reefers of more 
than 100 000 cbf provided 65% of global capacity, but in 1997 this had fallen to 
31 Damas, P. Reefer Market Overview, Drewry, Conference presentation, Long Beach 5 
March 2013.
32 “Healthy Orderbook for Reefers”. The Maritime Executive 29 January 2017. <http://mari-
time-executive.com/editorials/healthy-orderbook-for-reefers>.
33 “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, p. 72. 
34 “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, p. 72. 
35 “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, p. 72. 
36 “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 2000/50, p. 55. 
37 Branch, A. 1998. Maritime Economics: Management and Marketing, New York: Routledge, 
p. 101. 
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47.2% under deck and 2.8 over deck.38 In 2019, the share of the container lines 
is expected to reach 83%.39
Refrigerated containers began to make serious inroads into the refrigerated 
shipping market in the 1990s. Integrated containers became the preferred tech-
nological choice because of their flexibility; they only required a suitable pow-
er source40. The growth of the refrigerated container business from the South 
to the North is also partly a result of the container lines desire to find backhaul 
cargo for their business. In other words, what was the main business for reefers, 
was interesting backhaul cargo for the container lines. The container lines 
were therefore willing to accept fruit in refrigerated containers at low rates in 
the same way that reefer operators were willing to frequently transport cargo 
at low rates on their backhaul routes. 
As can be seen from Graph 10, from the early 1990s, reefer container capac-
ity on ships has increased rapidly. It is now worth remembering that we are 
essentially dealing with a re-entry of liner operators into the reefer cargo, 
which was enabled by the technological development of the reefer container. 
Reefer containers gradually became more reliable, could control the tempera-
ture more accurately, and also developed systems for controlled atmosphere 
38 Branch 1998, chapter 4. 
39 “A Perspective on Refrigerated Container Trade Growth”. GEP Mind. <https://www.gep.
com/mind/blog/perspective-refrigerated-container-trade-growth>.
40 See also Wijnolst and Wergeland 2009, pp. 287-290. 
Graph 8 Specialised reefer fleet capacity  
Note: Data supplied by Seatrade.
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Graph 9 Reefer cargo by volume (1993)  
Note: “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1993/50, p. 72.
Graph 10 Reefer container capacity 
Note: Note that this graph shows capacity, not what was actually used. 
Arduino and Parola 2010. Figures are in turn drawn from Drewry and 
Containerisation International.
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necessary to transport fruit. Due to the increased containerization, cranes on 
specialized reefer vessels are designed to carry heavier loads. A recent paper by 
Thanapolou41 discusses the specialized reefer market and shows that the bulk 
reefer market has reached the declining end of the product life cycle. Another 
recent paper by Arduino concurs with Thanapoulou’s analysis and explains 
that the costs of transporting a pallet in a reefer container, vs. a pallet in a spe-
cialized reefer vessel is a major reason for this shift42. 
This re-entry of container lines into the reefer segment led to increased 
competitiveness and also a need for specialized reefer operators to take strate-
gic action. While the strategies of the various operators will be covered in the 
main bulk of the text, we can here say that regarding ships, more ships moved 
into the hybrid type, where the under-deck palletised cargo was complement-
ed with reefer containers on the weather deck. Some operators have built reef-
er container vessels, which are small container vessels where the entire cargo 
can be refrigerated. There has also been development towards side-loading 
vessels, which are palletised reefers without hatches, making them insensitive 
to the weather. Furthermore, in the 2010s, the development of a reefer ro-ro 
ship was discussed, where pallets could be carried on cassettes, similarly to 
how forest companies transport their outgoing cargo. 
6 Summary
The independent reefer operators and the reefer industry in general have been 
affected by various economic and political events over the decades. Partly as a 
result of these global trends, the reefer market has had its ups and downs over 
the years and one representation of this is to look at the development of mar-
ket rates. Graph 11 charts 12-month nominal timecharter rates. One observa-
tion that we can make is that if we allowed for inflation then it should be 
apparent that rates have decreased in real terms. The good years and the bad 
years have had various effects and different actors have followed different 
strategies as we shall see in the chapters below. However, it is also important to 
note that these market rates are also influenced by the individual actors, their 
willingness or unwillingness to invest in tonnage, increase operational efficien-
cy, negotiate rates with shippers, and so on. This is one reason why one cannot 
41 Thanapolou, H. 2011. Bulk reefer market economics in a product life cycle perspective, 
Maritime Policy & Management, 39: 281-296. 
42 Arduino, G., Murillo, D.C and Parola, F. 2013. Refrigerated container versus bulk: evidence 
from the banana cold chain, Maritime Policy & Management, 42: 1-18. p. 2. 
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neglect taking an individual perspective of the independent reefer operators, 
apart from seeing them as a collective phenomenon. 
Returning to the graph, the stability in the 1960s can be explained by the 
continued regulation of shipping conferences. The rise in rates during the 
1970s was a result of several factors, a modest rise in refrigerated trade is one of 
them. An important factor is the scrapping of liner tonnage with reefer capac-
ity. This created a “gap” which the reefer industry successfully made the most 
of and many new vessels were built. The effect of the global recession follow-
ing the oil crises impacted heavily on the reefer industy in the mid 1980s and 
this contributed to a decline in market rates. Some excellent years in the late 
1980s fuelled ambitious newbuilding programmes which in conjunction with 
the competition from the container lines created an overcapacity which con-
tributed to a decline in the late 1990s. This led to a gradual scrapping of the 
specialized reefer fleet and a sharp decline in reefer newbuildings, which has 
continued until the present day.
Graph 11 12 months timecharter rates  
Note: The graph is created on the base of data from “Kylsjöfart”, Svensk Sjöfarts 
Tidning 1993/50, p. 74. Cool Facts 1989, p. 6, Cool Facts 97-98, p. 4 (data supplied 
by A/S Klaveness Chartering, Oslo), Cool Facts 1999-2000 p. 6 and Star Reefers 
Annual Reports. The data in the graph is derived from multiple sources which in 
turn derive their figures by different methods, it should be regarded as indicative 
rather than precise.
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Part 2
The Independent Reefer Operators 
∵
50 Chapter 2
In this part we describe the protagonists of our study – the independent reefer 
operators. Some of them began their operations as independents while others 
diversified from being a liner company or a shipper. 
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Chapter 3
Salénrederierna
Sven Salén1 was born in the Swedish city of Borås in 1890. He finished his stud-
ies at the business school in nearby Gothenburg in 1910. Salén continued to 
study languages and international business and landed his first job at Göte-
borgs Handelsbank. However, only a few years later in 1915, Sven Salén bought 
his first ship. Apart from his interest in shipping, he was a professional sailor, 
who would later in his life compete in two Olympic Games. He was also inter-
ested in music and one of his best friends was the Swedish troubadour Evert 
Taube. In 1916, Salén bought another two ships, which carried pulp to Spain 
and wine on the return voyage, cargoes that quite accurately coincided with 
the comparative advantage of each of the two countries. Still, the records tell 
us that Sven Salén, at the end of the First World War was back at the starting 
point, with no ships and not a lot of money. In the early 1920s Sven Salén got 
back into business, freighting paving stone from Bohuslän to Gothenburg.
1 A Fruitful Relationship 
Because of Sven Salén’s interests in sailing, he met the slightly older Norwegian 
Carl Matthiesen at the sailing club Göteborgs Kungliga Segelsällskap. Not only 
did they share this interest, they also shared an entrepreneurial streak. Unlike 
Sven’s father who was a public official, Carl’s father, Christian Matthiesen, had 
started a lumber business in the last decade of the 1800s. The story goes that on 
a train ride from London to Newcastle, Christian met with the British banana 
importer A. Roger Ackerley. Inspired by this meeting, Christian got an idea, and 
soon he produced wooden boxes for the British company Elders & Fyffes, part-
ly owned by the banana giant United Fruit, in exchange for the sole rights to 
import bananas to Norway. The commercial activities started in 1905, when 3 
1 The early parts of Sven Salén’s career and Banan-Kompaniet are described in Sjöberg, S. 2007. 
Saléns: till rors i tre generationer, Stockholm: Salénia, Lindström, A. and Malmberg, G. 2015. 
Svensk Sjöfartshistoria i storm och stiltje, Göteborg: Breakwater Publishing, pp. 124-132. The 
history of Banan-Kompaniet and BAMA (the company founded by Carl Matthiessen) is mostly 
documented in company materials, for example AB Banan-Kompaniet 1909-1999, available at 
<http://classic-web.archive.org/web/20080605050627/> <http://www.banan-kompaniet.
se/90ar.htm> and the corporate website of BAMA, see for example <http://www.bama.no/
om-bama/bamas-historie/1905/>.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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tons of bananas arrived in Norway. Christian would soon get the nickname 
Banan-Matthiessen.
Christian’s banana business grew rapidly. In order to expand it further, 
Christian’s son Carl, at the age of 23, was sent to Gothenburg, 300 km south of 
Oslo to explore if the Swedes would have a taste for bananas. In 1909, Carl es-
tablished The Banana Company AB, which soon changed name to the better-
known AB Banan-Kompaniet. At that point in time the banana was almost 
unknown in Sweden, as unknown as it had been in Norway just a few years 
earlier. The first banana cargo arrived at Gothenburg in 1909 all black and fro-
zen, and only a small amount of the sorry shipment could be sold. The bananas 
which arrived in a good state were well appreciated, but most bananas that 
 arrived at Swedish ports were too ripe, frozen, or damaged in other ways. Since 
the Swedish market was interested in bananas, Banan-Kompaniet built up a 
logistical operation with their own quays to ensure fast distribution, since 
there were no cooling houses at the time. But the core problem remained – the 
bananas that arrived at the quay were already damaged. 
Carl was therefore looking to improve maritime banana transport. Sven 
Salén was a suitable candidate. Carl Matthiessen’s knowledge of and con-
nections to the banana industry complemented Sven Salén’s knowledge of 
shipping. Together they decided to develop the import of bananas to Swe-
den and Scandinavia, taking on more control of the maritime transport than 
previously. Sven chartered in the ship Caledonia in 1922 to transport bananas 
from Rotterdam to Malmö and Stockholm2. Sven and Carl established a line 
Rotterdam-Ghent-Antwerp-Stockholm, serviced by three ships, as well as Rot-
terdam-Gothenburg-Oslo, serviced by two ships, what we today would call a 
feeder service. To Rotterdam, the bananas were delivered with United Fruit’s 
banana carriers. 
Brokers: From Klaveness to Orion 
Torvald Klaveness established his company in 1946. His family had a 
background in shipping and his wife’s father was the head of Banan-Mat-
thiesen, who in turn was connected to Sven Salén. He started brokering 
reefer ships and also bought the reefer Balao, built at the Drammen ship-
yarda. In the early 1960s, he focused on brokerage rather than ship-own-
ing, in order to not be exposed to the vagaries of the shipping markets. 
2 Salénnytt, 1968/1. Salénnytt is the corporate magazine of Saléninvest, aimed primarily at em-
ployees but also open to any person interested. It was published from 1968 to the bankruptcy 
in 1984.
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 Klaveness had employed our respondent Alv Thomassen as its sole 
reefer broker already in the 1960s, but the business grew to the point that 
by the mid-1990s, there were seven. Thomassen recalls that in the early 
days the focus lay on finding tonnage for a particular cargo and that this 
later changed to the reverse, that is to say, find cargo for a particular ship. 
Klaveness was an international operation that worked with both Laurit-
zen and Salén, despite their rivalry, and also the banana companies. 
 During the late 1990s the upper management of Klaveness decided to 
sell its reefer brokerage arm to RS Platou. The brokers were unhappy with 
this decision and instead decided to start their own operation to be 
known as Orion. They approached Jan Olaf Tonnevold, a former investor 
in the reefer segment to be a part-owner. 
 To kick off the venture, Orion received five or six vessels to exclusively 
manage from Tonnevold. In the early 2000s, business was good, but the 
profit went down in 2006 and 2007. Because of the decline and consolida-
tion of the independent reefer operators, many brokers started to leave 
the reefer segment. Orion experienced that the spot market, which was 
particularly important to the brokers, had shrunk. Seatrade and Green 
Reefers also started to use in-house brokers. Furthermore, Trade Winds 
reported that “Reefer brokers have been forced to stand aside as exporters 
and ship owners tie up tonnage themselves”b. Therefore, the three bro-
kers Espen Harr, Peter Oyen, and Morten Saetre wound up Orion but con-
tinued to do business separately. Orion’s demise meant that there were 
few reefer brokers left in the market, Ocean Reefer Services in the UK was 
one.
Notes: a Borgen, P.O. & Heieren, R. 2011, Made in Drammen: industrihistorie fra en øst-
landsby med hovedvekt på perioden 1870-1970, Drammen : Drammen Rotary, p. 123. Avail-
able at: <https://www.drammen.kommune.no/Books/made%20in%20drammen/files/
assets/basic-html/index.html#page1>; b “’Madness’ reigns in the reefer zone”. Trade 
Winds 29 January 2010.
Soon after the business was established, Sven Salén started to invest in tonnage 
for the new lines, since there was a lack of suitable tonnage that could be char-
tered in. The first ship was the steamer Chr. Matthiessen bought in 1923 which 
was rebuilt for transporting bananas, and she was followed by three more ships 
bought in 1926-1929: Jamaica, Sigrid Matthiessen, and Sverre Nergaard3. More-
over, they were upgraded to ventilated fruit carriers and heating equipment 
and insulation were installed to prevent the cargo from chilling injury in the 
3 They all had an operating speed of 10-12 knots, were of about 1300-1500 dwt.
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winter months. The relatively short distances and the cool climate made the 
operation viable but lacking refrigeration the spoilage was nevertheless con-
siderable. Bremerhaven was soon added as a port where Salén picked up ba-
nanas. 
Coinciding with this development of logistical operations, the Swedish ba-
nana consumption grew rapidly from 465 tons in 1920 to 10417 tons in 1930. This 
was of course not only due to Salén’s shipping operation. Banan-Kompaniet 
promoted the banana through advertisements of various kinds, and they de-
veloped their land facilities: in 1928, Banan-Kompaniet built a terminal at 
Stockholms Frihamn, comprising their new headquarters, new cold storage fa-
cilities, repacking space, and exclusive rails to carry the cargo to the hinterland.
Given Banan-Kompaniet’s position as the sole importer of bananas and the 
success of their product, it was time to invest. In 1931, the first newbuilding was 
delivered to the company – a ventilated fruit carrier called RH Sanders, that 
was rebuilt in 1932 with a refrigeration plant. During the 1930s, an important 
financial connection was established with Jacob Wallenberg and the Enskilda 
Bank, which became Salén’s main lender for the procurement of new vessels. 
The RH Sanders was not used on Salén’s lines but chartered to an Italian ship-
ping company for transport of bananas from Somaliland to Genoa. During a 
voyage, she was struck by fire and scrapped after only two years in operation. 
Figure 4 Sven Salén started transporting bananas from Rotterdam and Bremerhaven to 
Scandinavia with small ventilated fruit carriers like the Sigrid Matthiessen  
Photo: Lindenborn, M./ Sjöhistoriska museet
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During the 1930s, Salén continued building the fleet with 20-30-year-old, sec-
ond-hand ships, for example Lillie Matthiessen, Sandhamn, Carl Matthiessen, 
Banana, and others. 
The fruitful encounter between Carl Matthiessen and Sven Salén had kick-
started a new venture which replaced the third-party operators’ lines with new 
lines with dedicated fruit carriers. They were struggling with technological is-
sues and a lack of know-how regarding how to best carry bananas from the 
Continent. 
2 The Transatlantic Trade
Sven Salén, now confident in his shipping competence to transport bananas 
short sea, decided to extend his operations and start his own banana imports 
from Central America. He ordered the reefer Sandhamn4 at Öresundsvarvet, 
Landskrona, but unfortunately the building process coincided with the incep-
tion of World War II. Banana imports were discontinued and the ship was laid 
up upon delivery in 1941. 
The banana trade was reestablished in 1945, when a cargo of 2000 tons of 
bananas was imported from the Canary Islands for resale to the Soviet Union. 
At this point, Sven had become the sole owner of Banan-Kompaniet, while 
Carl stayed on as the managing director. To fulfil the objective of importing 
bananas across the Atlantic, Carl Matthiesen went to the US to negotiate with 
United Fruit, the largest banana company in the world, while Sven Salén char-
tered in tonnage for the trades across the Atlantic. At this time Carl and Sven 
had a good reputation at United Fruit – Carl being not only the son of Banan-
Mathiessen but also the one who developed the Swedish market, and Sven as a 
competent ship-owner. Since the encounter between Carl and Sven, more than 
20 years had passed. It’s also likely that with anticipated but uncertain post-
war growth, United Fruit saw the benefits of augmenting its capacity with 
third-party tonnage. Wartime tonnage losses and the high capital cost of own-
ing all its vessels are also relevant factors. In any case, United Fruit was willing 
to let Salén transport some of its transatlantic quantities. 
Salén’s own ship, the now four-year-old Sandhamn, was put to work carrying 
bananas. In 1946, she arrived in Gothenburg from Puerto Armuelles in Pana-
ma. But at the arrival, disappointed stevedores saw that the cargo was already 
turning, in other words, maturing. The reason, according to the captain, was 
that Sandhamn had just carried apples from Australia and that the fruit had 
4 It had a capacity of 183 000 cbf.
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emitted ethylene gas, causing the bananas to ripen. All efforts to ventilate were 
in vain since the gas had made its way into the insulation in the cargo holds. To 
save something of the valuable cargo, urgent measures were needed. The cargo 
was transported to Stockholm, and the edible bananas were packed in boxes 
and sold, while the others were thrown on a barge and disposed of. When Sven 
Salén saw the cargo, his facial expression was allegedly unchanged. From Carl 
Matthiessen he had learned how to look stoic in the face of rotten bananas. 
This is just an anecdote, but points to a more general assessment of Sandhamn 
– that it was not a total success from a technical perspective5. 
Salén and Mathiessen had developed a functioning transport system in 
Northern Europe and took the first steps to develop a Transatlantic trade in the 
1940s. The technological competence of Salén was fair, but nothing compared 
to that of United Fruit. But with this partnership with United Fruit, Salén was 
well-positioned for the decades of growth to come. 
Atlanttrafik 
Atlanttrafik was another Swedish specialized reefer company that was 
set up and owned by shipping liner interests: Broströms and Trelleborgsa. 
Both owners had planned to enter the segment and decided to collabo-
rate. Six reefers were delivered from 1946 starting with the Blue Ocean, 
followed by two more in 1953. During the 1960s, the Sea class, comprising 
five larger sister ships to Salén’s Hispaniola were deliveredb. At the time 
Atlanttrafik started a line carrying meat from Australia to the US East 
Coast and general cargo back. Another four, significantly larger, vessels 
were added in the 1960s to service this line. They were operational until 
1974, when Atlanttrafik bought three partly containerized cargo vessels 
with reefer container capacity. 
Note: a “En svunnen epok: Kylfartygsflotta under svensk flagg”. Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 
1987/47, p. 14-19 and “Den svenskflaggade kylfartygsepoken”. 1987/49, p. 17-21; b The Blue 
Ocean had a capacity of over 200 000 cbf and did 17.5 knots at banana draught, while the 
Sea class had a cargo space of 270 000 cbf and a speed of 18 knots.
5 The four cargo holds were of very different sizes and the refrigeration system struggled to cope 
with the largest one in particular. The air circulation was horizontal and at about fifty times 
per hour was less than optimal and the open brine refrigeration system caused excessive 
corrosion.
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3 The Route to Global Leadership
In the 1950s and 1960s6, global trade developed in all cargo categories, and re-
frigerated and frozen products followed the general development. Salén was 
well positioned in the market with a burgeoning business relationship with 
United Fruit and contracts regarding other types of cargo.
As presented in the previous parts, Salén had already embarked on limited 
in-house technological developments that led to the newbuildings RH Sanders 
and Sandhamn. However, the relationship to United Fruit would dramatically 
accelerate Salén’s technological competence. The close relationship between 
United Fruit and Saléns and the mutual trust that had been established led to 
the latter gaining access to the drawings of United Fruit’s reefers in the late for-
ties. Saléns could also study and inspect the ships as much as they liked. This 
knowledge-transfer enabled Saléns to catch up in technology and its next new-
buildings reflected this. 
These were the Arawak class consisting of five ships built in 1952-1956 at 
three Swedish shipyards7. They were designed for banana transports from 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia to Rotterdam, Bremerhaven, and occa-
sionally Gothenburg. A round trip took five weeks and the backhaul was gener-
ally in ballast. These ships were slightly larger and faster than the Sandhamn. 
They featured a patented air circulation system developed at United Fruits and 
the cargo holds were designed more uniformly to make refrigeration as well as 
loading easier8. The vessels could also satisfactorily handle frozen cargo, unlike 
Sandhamn. 
6 This part is based on Sjöberg 2007, and articles in Salénnytt (for example in Salénnytt 1968/2, 
Salénnytt 1968/4, and Salénnytt 1974/1, p. 2). and Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning (for example informa-
tion about Swedish reefers from Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1987/47, pp. 16-19, and Svensk Sjöfarts 
Tidning 1987/49, pp. 17-21). Technical information, as well as insights into the crucial technol-
ogy transfer from United Fruit, are based on the document Saléns 80.08.10 by Carl-Olof 
Anderson. Some points have been picked up from a short document written by Tony Breach 
(former Port Captain in Port Hueneme) as well as in conversation with Ralph Mohlin and Åke 
Jonsson at Cool Carriers.
7 Three ships were built at Eriksberg, one at Götaverken, and one at Ekensberg.
8 The Arawak class measured 240 – 255 000 cbf and travelled at a speed of 18 knots on banana 
draught. The air circulation system was the so-called Robson system developed by the United 
Fruits refrigeration expert of the same name and patented in 1931. The air was circulated 
through the cargo vertically from bottom to top, rather than horizontally. Evenly distributed 
cooling in a cargo space, important for temperature sensitive cargo, is achieved by generating 
a slight excess of cold air pressure in the floor space. The number of air circulations per hour 
was also improved. The refrigeration system was closed and thus less prone to corrosion. The 
cargo holds were of a more uniform size making refrigeration as well as loading easier. 
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Given the competence that Salén had come to acquire within the field of 
refrigerated transport, it embarked on a strategy to continuously renew its ton-
nage and incorporate improvements as a way to stay ahead of the competition. 
The tonnage renewal was primarily aimed to increase efficiency and cater to 
the growing transport and quality demands of United Fruit. The A-series, B-
series, and San-series all mirrored these objectives. In 1962, the fleet comprised 
about 35 ships, but by the end of the 1960s it would be over 100. 
The six ships in the A-series, starting off with the Atlantide in 1960, were 
proudly described as the largest banana carriers at the time. An innovation of 
the last three ships in the series, was that cranes at each hatch replaced the 
derricks that had always been there in the past. Yet another innovation was an 
automated refrigeration system which reduced the need for crew for monitor-
ing. This system proved itself to the extent that several of the earlier vessels 
were retrofitted. Developments on the refrigeration side were the result of col-
laboration with the Swedish refrigeration company Stal. Salén thus success-
fully tapped into Swedish industrial know-how, similar to Lauritzen’s 
relationship with Atlas. The close working relationship between Saléns (and its 
successor Cool Carriers) and Stal continued all the way into the nineties. Si-
multaneously, the B-class was built for Salén in France9 – the first reefers built 
by Salén outside Sweden. The names of the ships, the Bolero, Barcarolle, and 
Ballade, were inspired by music, a strong passion for Sven Salén.
In 1967, a series of four “San” ships were built, San Blas, San Bruno, San Be-
nito and Tasmanic at Eriksberg shipyard, that at 408 000 cbf were slightly larger 
than the A’s. Apart from new developments in refrigeration technology10, these 
9 They were built in 1961-1962 at the Chantier Naval de la Ciotat. 
10 The compressors in the refrigeration system had been of the reciprocating (or piston) 
type in previous vessels but the availability of reliable screw compressors led to them 
Figure 5 
Salén expanded its fleet and 
incorporated new innovations 
with each series of newbuildings. 
The Argonaut, one of the 
A-series, was built at Eriksbergs 
Mekaniska Verkstad, Gothenburg 
1964. Rated at 19 knots, it was 149 




were the first ships that were not adapted for carrying bunches of bananas, 
since the banana companies had started packing bananas in boxes. As a side 
note, because of this, the banana branding was carried out in the production 
areas, which led to United Brands establishing a common brand for all markets 
from 1967: Chiquita. Furthermore, the San ships were improved regarding hull 
design. They had a bulb which improved their resilience to storms and large 
waves. This became obvious on the first trip of San Benito, which left Gothen-
burg for Wallhamn, loaded 140 cars, and sailed for Halifax. The trip to Halifax 
was unproblematic, but when the ship was heading from Halifax to Guayaquil 
in Ecuador, a severe storm broke out. The captain reported that the ship han-
dled it better than the A-class vessels. Still, the speed of the ship through the 
storm was no higher the 5-7 knots. It reached Guayaquil 21 February, slightly 
less than a month after leaving Gothenburg, and loaded about 200 000 cartons 
of bananas. 
This fleet expansion was coupled with market development. Positioned 
with modern reefers for United Fruit’s traffic, Salén also had the production 
means to serve a wider customer base. Not all of Salén’s fleet was constantly 
tied up by United Fruit’s cargo flows, which led to diversification and business 
development in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s, Salén began transporting ba-
nanas from West Africa to the Soviet Union, and it was also during this decade 
when the transport of apples and pears from South America, and also from 
China, became significant. The 1960s meant a focus and penetration of the 
reefer traffic to the Far East, with fish, meat, and fruit. The first cargo to Japan 
was a shipment of squid and red snapper from the Canary Islands in 1961 with 
the ship Hispaniola. Salén became a key partner to Japanese fishing companies 
who fished in the Atlantic. Since Salén’s ships could carry the produce back to 
Japan, the utilization of the trawlers could be maximized. At this point in time, 
Japanese fishing companies still had limited transport capacity. This also led to 
the Japanese getting a taste of Salén’s sleek, white, seemingly profitable reefers. 
Morover, Japan had sourced their bananas from Taiwan, but in the early 1960s 
it gradually opened up for banana imports from Ecuador, and in 1963 the im-
port obstacles were removed. Salén was well-positioned and became a main 
transport provider for bananas to Japan from Ecuador. A particularly exotic 
cargo from Salén’s perspective was the shipments of whale meat from the Japa-
nese whaling vessels near the Antarctic to Japan, and there are even reports 
about a cargo of exotic animals – a kind of Noah’s ark. 
being introduced on the San’s. The moving parts in screw compressors only rotate and 
this generally leads to easier maintenance. 
60 Chapter 3
Transatlantic, a large Swedish shipping company, and Salén had for a long 
time collaborated in the reefer trades and in the early 1960s they decided to 
build ships together to use them on the common trades. Some ships were from 
the A-series. In 1968, there were six ships in the jointly owned company Transal, 
and it was reported in Salénnytt that about 25-30% of all the fruit from Aus-
tralia to Europe was transported with the company’s tonnage11. A new com-
pany was set up in Australia to handle relationships to Australian growers and 
explore new market opportunities. 
In the mid-1960s a new collaboration was started with Sunkist, an exporter 
of citrus. In 1964, 200 000 boxes of citrus were transported for Sunkist, a vol-
ume which grew from year to year. A main trade was to European continental 
ports via St John in New Brunswick, Canada. The business opportunity for 
Salén arose since the liner conferences could not guarantee delivery to the 
consumer markets on Mondays, which led to opportunities for reefers, which 
could offer a flexible service that suited the market and was more customer-
friendly than the incumbent liner companies.
Towards the end of the 1960s, the core of the reefer division was transport of 
bananas from Central America to the European continent. Other main trades 
were fish transports from the Atlantic to Japan, meat, fish and fruit from China 
to Mediterranean and Baltic ports, and meat and fruit from Australia to Eu-
rope. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the reefer division expanded rapidly, but Salén 
also grew in other business areas. In the 1950s, the company invested in oil 
tankers, which was a new and very profitable business area throughout the 
1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, investments were made in the dry cargo segment. 
This forceful expansion is partly attributable to the entry of a new CEO, Sture 
Ödner, when Sven Salén passed away. Sven Salén’s sons Sven and Christer Salén 
took over as overseeing owners, but Sture Ödner was a strong CEO with ambi-
tious plans to expand. The company also didn’t want to be entirely dependent 
on the reefer segment. 
11 “VD har ordet”. Salénnytt 1968/5, p. 2. 
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4 Salén Reefer Services on the Top of the World
The reefer division had expanded to the point that it was operating around 70 
ships in 196812. Salén owned part of the fleet themselves, but many ships were 
held by other owners and operated by Salén. 


















An employment ad tells us about the competences needed at the expanding 
reefer division in 1968. We see that the division was highly international and 
that trips abroad were common practice. Language requirements were there-
fore of utmost importance. Salén was further looking for people with good 
schooling, preferably an academic background. It was furthermore stated that 
the business of the division was highly dependent on thorough and precise 
calculations. As a final note, it was written that the industry was undergoing a 
12 The rest of the narrative about Salén is based on contemporary articles from Salénnytt 
and Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning as well as interviews with key personnel who were employed 
during the period. Some access has been granted to archival material, for example mar-
keting materials and public information about Salén Reefer Services. 
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shift from conventional handling of cargo to a modern way of handling, and 
therefore a person with cargo handling know-how was sought13. 
Due to the variety of transport requirements, seasonality, and the constant 
will to increase utilization of the ships, scheduling was a core function in the 
reefer division. Described as a “superhuman” task, computerized support was 
sought for the scheduling14. In the early 1970s, a computer was installed and it 
generated suggestions about what ships to employ where. According to the 
scheduling staff, about 80% of the computer’s suggestions were useful. These 
archival traces show how Salén discursively positioned itself as an advanced 
operator with skilled personnel with advanced technological support systems. 
But materially, there were also developments. The end of the 1960s and ear-
ly 1970s were marked by developments in two customer relationships. On 1 July 
1969, Salén took over the chartering activities of United Fruit and the new com-
pany was called Salén Reefer Services. Its CEO was Claes-Henrik Zethelius. This 
led to a strengthening of the competence and know-how in Stockholm. From 
the start SRS employed 125 reefers, which was a much larger operation than the 
reefer division was used to. The company reorganized into two parts: contracts 
and tramp. The contract division was related to United Fruit. But the tramping 
division was also gradually moving towards more long-term contracts. 
The relationship with Sunkist also intensified. A new contract was signed in 
1969 between Sunkist and Salén for transports from Long Beach to Japan and 
Hong Kong. Salén, despite its higher price, managed to outcompete the liner 
conferences with which Sunkist had shipped most of its produce before. From 
the sources, the discursive positioning as a competitive, modern, new entrant 
in contrast to the traditional liner conferences is clear. From January 1970, the 
contract comprised 40 shiploads per year. The first shipload was taken with the 
Bolero. Sunkist preferred way of cargo handling, namely pallets, and their wish 
to also export their produce on pallets placed demands on Salén. Salén’s ships 
could be loaded with pallets, but the ships were adapted to breakbulk cargo 
and the entire cargo holds could not be well-utilized if loaded with pallets. 
Salén and Sunkist therefore started a joint project to develop the maritime 
transport of palletised fruit, which would result in new classes of ships. In mid-
1971, a new service was inaugurated from Long Beach to Europe with palletised 
citrus, something which caused great interest within the industry. By the end 
of 1971, a new contract ensured year-round transport of citrus, although the 
quantities were smaller during November-February. In 1977, 100 million boxes 
from Sunkist had been delivered by Salén’s ships. 
13 “Salérederierna söker personal till Kyltrafikavdelningen”. Salénnytt 1968/1.
14 “VD har ordet”. Salénnytt 1968/1, p. 2. 
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At the intersection of these two relationships, a new series of ships was 
built. Together with United Fruit, Salén ordered eight Snow ships at the French 
shipyard where the B-class had been built. But, United Fruit’s plantations were 
ravaged by hurricane Fifi, and United Fruit pulled out of the deal. Salén had to 
take all the eight ships, but fortunately the Franc was devaluated, which led to 
Salén getting the additional four ships for much less than expected. The Snow 
vessels were indeed state-of-the-art as their longevity proved15. Marine enthu-
siasts warmly reminisce about the beauty of these vessels. They were also very 
large at a little over 610 000 cbf. They were fast, boasting a speed of 23 knots, 
and were frequently called kyljagare, refrigerated destroyers. These vessels had 
five hatches and 22 decks of which 18 were isolated from each other resulting 
in the ability to manage a wide range of cargo with differing requirements in 
refrigeration. The advent of palletisation was coupled with the introduction of 
forklifts on reefers and their weight had the effect of breaking the gratings that 
were carefully designed to regulate the airflow. With this in mind the gratings 
were strengthened. Compared to previous vessels, the Snow’s had more ad-
vanced automation in regards to refrigeration; computerisation also was seri-
15 In later years these vessels were modified to rationalise their pallet-intake when they were 
owned and operated by Holy House Shipping.
Figure 6 Salén’s constructed eight Snow-class vessels in the early 1970s. Exceed-
ingly large, fast and versatile, they are also fondly remembered as 
beautiful ships. Scheerhafen, 1975  
Photo: Magnussen, Friedrich / Stadtarchiv Kiel
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ously considered, but ultimately not implemented. The Snow vessels may have 
been state-of-the-art for their time but they also represented a first attempt at 
catering for the palletised trades, in other words the Sunkist trades. In a sense, 
the Snow ships are a solution to the requirements of palletisation, but without 
compromising the possibility to take more conventional cargo. 
Snow Flake’s maiden voyage was to Cape Town where she was loaded with 
the biggest cargo of apples, pears, and grapes that had ever been loaded on a 
Salén vessel in South Africa. Two weeks later part of the cargo was discharged 
in Hamburg, and some days later in Southhampton16. Snow Flower and Snow 
Land sailed for Long Beach to load palletised citrus. These state-of-the-art 
ships were delivered to a market that was experiencing a downturn. 
5 A Market Downturn and Some New Players on the Reefer Scene
The market had turned down in the end of the 1960s due to problems that 
Salén had never experienced before. In Salénnytt, the employee magazine, in 
the end of 1968, Sture Ödner wrote that “it appears that some ship-owners, 
lacking other investment opportunities, have decided to build reefer ships, 
without knowing well the conditions for employment of these vessels. This has 
led to that there will be a great oversupply of reefer tonnage, which is offered 
to low rates. Today you can charter reefers of foreign flags to not too many per-
cent over the daily operation costs of reefers under Swedish flag.”17 This is of 
course discursively constructing the other ship-owners as unknowledgeable 
outsiders breaking the informal norms of the industry. 
Maritime Fruit Carriers (MFC) was the company that Ödner particularly 
had in mind. Starting out as a fishing company, the top management made the 
most of Israeli state subsidies and Norwegian shipyard subsidies to build up a 
substantial fleet of reefers. But the relationship, or antagonism, between the 
two companies started already in 1963, when Salén was approached by MFC, 
who announced that they were about to build a large number of reefers and 
charter them out in the market. The reefer division of Salén was shocked by 
this development – why would anyone build dozens of ships without paying 
attention to the market demand? Apart from discursively constructing MFC as 
lacking knowledge, this is a discursive sign that the reefer market had been 
quite controlled, especially from Salén’s perspective. Not only MFC, but also 
Japanese shipping companies and fisheries had started to expand their reefer 
16 “Snow Flake på jungfruresa”. Salénnytt 1972/2, p. 9. 
17 “VD har ordet”. Salénnytt 1968/5, p. 2.
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fleets, which reduced market rates. Sture Ödner’s assessment was that the rates 
were not good enough for newbuildings, such as the Snow vessels, but that 
older ships were profitable. He further stated that the advances in cargo han-
dling might give Salén a competitive advantage18. The new Snow ships could, 
however, utilize the good market for non-refrigerated dry cargo. To add to the 
low market rates, in early 1970, bunker prices had increased which also nega-
tively affected Salén Reefer Services19. 
MFC had by the early 1970s become a severe disturbance to Salén’s domi-
nant position in the reefer market, having a fleet of 42 ships. They once again 
offered their tonnage for Salén to charter and this time Salén felt that it was 
necessary to accept. Mats Ruhne, a major figure within the industry, explains, 
“We included the ships into our fleet to control the tonnage”. The ships were 
chartered in for 15 years to keep them away from competitors and to maintain 
Salén’s dominant market position. At this time SRS was broken up and United 
Brands, as United Fruit was now named, went back to operating its ships. It 
was agreed, however, that SRS would continue to transport a large share of 
United’s bananas20. Another reason for the United Brands and Salén’s break-
up of SRS was that the ships in SRS were of such a varying quality that many 
expected advantages could not be achieved21. 
Japanese shipping companies and fisheries also entered the market at this 
time and they were, from Salén’s perspective, impossible to collaborate with, 
or perhaps, control. They were subjectively perceived as having unlimited 
funding for newbuildings and employing an overly aggressive pricing strategy. 
Their lack of English made informal communication difficult. Stereotypes am-
plified the idea that they were irresponsible newcomers to be kept at a dis-
tance, a process of othering that delayed cooperation with Japanese actors for 
many years.
In 1973, the year of the first oil crisis, MFC was in particularly bad shape. It 
was highly financially leveraged and had also tried to profit from a high expo-
sure to the crude oil tanker segment. In 1975, with no signs of market improve-
ments, there were severe problems with MFC and a bankruptcy was impending. 
MFC ships were arrested by banks, their seafarers went on strike and Salén’s 
MFC ships ended up on the blacklist of many customers. Salén therefore can-
celled its timecharter contracts with MFC on 28 June 1975, which triggered 
MFC’s bankruptcy. People from Salén, headed by Mats Ruhne, went to London 
18 “VD har ordet”. Salénnytt 1972/3, p. 3. 
19 In 1970, the company bought 1.4 million tons of bunkers. With a price increase of 75 SEK 
per ton from Dec 1969 to Dec 1970, the result was 20m SEK lower than expected.
20 “C-H Zethelius: En återblick”. Salénnytt 1974/1, p. 2
21 “C-H Zethelius: En återblick”. Salénnytt 1974/1, p. 2
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to solve the MFC imbroglio. This work was highly successful from Salén’s per-
spective, and more than 30 ships out of 42 could be kept within the Salén op-
eration. Also, the legal side of the deal was successful. MFC sued Salén of 1.5 
billion SEK due to the contract breach but was in the end entitled to only 35 
million SEK when the case was resolved in 1978. Mats Ruhne became CEO of 
Salén Reefer Services following the successful handling of the MFC crisis and 
Claes Henrik Zethelius entered Salén’s corporate top management. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Salén had also expanded rapidly in the oil 
tanker segment. Salén together with the Swedish state, became the owner of 
the Götaverken shipyard in 1971 and became a controlling owner of Kockums 
Shipyard in the following year. After the oil crisis, both the shipyards and the 
oil tanker segment started to bleed. To avoid collapse, Salén had to get out of 
the shipyard segment. 
6 Palletisation and Maximal Flexibility
As a way to convince the Swedish state to buy the remaining part of Götaverk-
en from Salén, Salén offered to build six reefers at the shipyard. The ships were 
highly flexible and could load boxes, pallets, cars, and containers on and under 
deck. The experience of the Snow vessels taught Saléns the need to optimise 
deck heights and to rationalise the configuration of the Winter vessels. They 
had a capacity of 608 000 cbf, almost as large as the Snow ships; there was no 
market demand for even larger vessels. The ships had strong cranes (with a 
capacity of 16 tons). They were so called open hatch ships with very large 
hatches in order to eliminate the need for horizontal movements within the 
cargo holds. Similar ships with open hatches had been introduced for the 
transport of paper reels in North America and from Sweden in the mid- to late 
1960s. Multi-pallet loaders, lifting up to 12 pallets a time, were developed for 
the Winter type ships, intended to increase cargo handling speed with 100%. 
During the 1970s, there were many discussions within Salén about the tech-
nological development of the reefer industry. Salén Reefer Services’ preferred 
method was palletisation, which rationalized cargo handling over breakbulk 
handling. But although some customers were interested in palletisation, for 
example Sunkist, others were not. In some countries, stevedores were inexpen-
sive and boxes were an easy to handle size, compared to pallets which required 
infrastructure, such as pallet trolleys, and competence. Salén Reefer Services 
tried to convince its customers to see the benefits of the pallet. In some cases, 
it worked. For example, in 1979, the first pallet of citrus was loaded from Bue-
nos Aires. However, in an interview with Mats Ruhne in 1975 in Salénnytt, he 
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stated that “Regarding bananas there has been no development the last 15 
years, which is due to the advanced cargo handling with elevators and con-
veyor belts.” Banana companies were not, at this time, interested in palletisa-
tion, since they had already found their preferred way of handling cargo 
– boxes, conveyor belts, and elevators. The mixed cargo handling techniques 
on the exporter side and uncertainty about the future way of handling cargo 
led Salén Reefer Services to always construct flexible ships. 
Discussions were held about another form of unitisation: containerisation. 
Salén saw the container as a too large unit for reefer cargo, on the customer 
side. In other words, no customers would like a full container of some fruit, but 
the right unit size was rather the smaller pallet. Also, the container was much 
more expensive than a wooden pallet, and to move a refrigerated container 
inland required excess containers, since a reefer ship seldom stayed in port a 
long time. However, Salén closely followed the developments of refrigerated 
containers in order to not keep all of their eggs in the same basket. They knew 
that United Brands had experimented with carrying bananas in refrigerated 
containers since 1972, when they introduced a twice-weekly service between 
Cortez, Honduras and Gulfport, Mississippi, employing two small self-sustain-
ing cellular reefer vessels. Salén was therefore eager to gain knowledge in the 
field. They initiated a collaboration with Sea Containers, the pioneer in con-
tainerization, and Standard Fruit. In 1981, they inaugurating a two-ship service 
operating between Honduras, Guatemala, and Texas. Each ship had a capacity 
of 325 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU)22. However, containerization was 
only seen as interesting in short sea shipping, and Salén Reefer Services em-
phasised that although they were not strangers to containerization, their strat-
egy to work with palletisation of fruit trades remained unaltered. Thus, 
Saléninvest discursively positioned itself as a company that was going to focus 
on palletised cargo – not containers, although containers could be carried on 
the weather deck. 
During the 1970s, Salén Reefer Services also invested in port infrastructure. 
In 1975, Salén entered as an investor in an existing cold store in Hong Kong. In 
1979, a new cold store was built in Sharjah in the UAE, by the quay in Port Kha-
lid. And in 1980, a new fully palletised cold store was built in Eemshaven. There 
were also other ventures. For example, in 1981, SRS bought 50% of the French 
fruit importer Dunand & Cie, which could increase the utilization of Salén’s 
fleet. 
22 Sinclair, J. et al. 1989. Refrigerated Containers, Technical paper. available at <http://docu 
ments.worldbank.org/curated/en/618601468739777372/text/multi-page.txt>.
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In an interview, Mats Ruhne explained that in 1982, structural changes in the 
reefer market were perceived and McKinsey were hired to do a study about the 
global reefer market. According to McKinsey, SRS was considered to be quite 
good within its particular niche. A success factor was seen as the ability to offer 
various transport solutions to their clients and to continue to develop the suc-
cessful palletisation concept23. The Winter ships were the core of this flexibil-
ity. Based on this analysis, more ships were ordered, the eight ships in the 
Spring class. Each had a capacity of 430 000 cbf, which was smaller than the 
earlier ship types. They had open hatches, a high flexibility, and a higher con-
tainer capacity – 93 Forty-foot Equivalent Units (FEU) or 215 TEU. The ships 
were built in three different shipyards, Koyo Dockyards, KESC and Hyundai. 
The ordering of the Spring vessels showed that palletisation was still the pre-
ferred concept. To get an understanding of Salén Reefer Services’ discursive 
construction of their preference for pallets, we will quote a section in SRS bro-
chure Keep Cool: 
The problem of unitizing cargo can be solved in different ways. By simple, 
task-oriented systems that can be implemented without excessive cost. 
Or by expensive systems that are both sophisticated and complex.... 
A container system cannot meet the requirements for flexibility in the 
refrigated-goods market. Container shipments call for return cargoes, ef-
ficient ports and large investments. And these are not feasible in many of 
the localities from which refigerated goods are shipped. The cost of en-
ergy is another problem. The most competitive port-hole container re-
quires 50% more energy per unit of goods than the corresponding space 
aboard a reefer ship. Integrated plug-in type containers require four times 
as much energy. But one of the biggest problems when it comes to con-
tainers is simply this: As a cargo unit, the container is too big for most 
consignees.... The palletised load is a better alternative than the contain-
er. The pallet system is simple and practical. If it’s used consistently it 
meets today’s demands for efficiency. In addition, it requires less invest-
ment and can thus generate much higher yields than an expensive con-
tainer system. Most important of all, palletised cargoes meet the specific 
demands of shippers of refrigerated commodities for fast adaptation to 
seasonal changes and fluctuations in volume.... Which is why we are con-
vinced that for most trades the future lies with palletised cargoes. Not 
with containers.”24 
23 “The reefer market of the future”. Salénnytt 1983/5, p. 19. 
24 Keep Cool, 1982, p. 6-7. Brochure about Salén Reefer Services. 
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When the ships were delivered, SRS controlled a fleet of 80 ships. In the same 
year, a new organization was created with four business areas. The only new 
business area was the TransPacific division which carried citrus from US west 
coast to Asia and containers from Asia to the US West Coast. The ordering of 
the Spring vessels is remarkable, since Salén was at this time undergoing a sig-
nificant reconstruction. That Mats Ruhne gained the approval to purchase the 
vessels symbolizes the power of division managers, the perceived centrality of 
the reefer division, and perhaps the lack of oversight within the company. 
In 1984, United Brands left Salén after a 50-year long relationship. In the end 
of the 1970s, Salén handled 40% of UBs traffic, although only 3% went to Scan-
dinavia. In the early 1980s, United Brands direct chartered ships and forced 
Salén to take over these ships to high charter rates in exchange for keeping the 
transport contract from the Americas to Europe. However, United Brands re-
ceived another bid from Lauritzen, and broke the contract with Salén. 
In the early 1980s, the group was diversified and divisionalised, and every 
year the divisions received a clean slate, and therefore did not have to take re-
sponsibility for incurred losses. During the last decades the company had 
Figure 7 Spring Deli, previously Spring Delight, later sailed for Seatrade. Note the massive 
hatches folded up ondeck  
Photo Garitzko
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diversified and expanded significantly, and the investments in the shipyards 
had been costly, as well as the tanker division that had been bleeding since the 
first oil crisis. During the final years, the central management tried to sort out 
the situation but it was too late. The poor performance throughout the group 
forced the company into bankruptcy on December 19, 1984. 
7 Summary
From a fruitful encounter between a banana importer and a ship-owner, Ban-
an Kompaniet and later Salénrederierna first established market dominance in 
the Nordic countries and then gradually developed its Transatlantic business 
with United Fruits. In the 1960s, Salén’s reefer division became the world lead-
er in maritime reefer transport. They collaborated with shippers, learned from 
them and developed ships and cargo handling techniques. During the years, 
Salén built up significant technological expertise, which was fuelled by new-
buildings. To remain a market leader, new classes of increasingly modern ships 
were developed. The market was looking better and better until the end of the 
1960s, but new entrants and significantly higher bunker costs made the 1970s 
difficult. In the 1960s Salén described itself through discourse as a modern, 
high-tech, global market leader with state-of-the-art ships. It prided itself sub-
jectively of being the biggest, of the strong relationship to the major fruit com-
pany United Fruit, and of its innovative cargo handling techniques – focused 
Graph 12 Salén reefer services turnover from 1968 to 1980 in mSEK 
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on optimizing pallet handling. It also discursively described the competitors as 
newcomers who were unknowledgeable and invested irresponsibly. The orga-
nization had the high degree of self-confidence that comes from being the 
market leader. Through the adverse market in the 1970s and early 1980s, Saléns 
continued full steam ahead to renew its fleet and develop. The results were 
neither sustained nor highly positive since the end of the 1960s, but neither 
were there any major losses within the reefer division. The reefer division was 
never questioned within Saléns but was seen as a core area where investments 
should be made. However, given the liberal investment policies at Saléninvest, 
due to the divisionalized structure, Salén’s reefer division invested significantly 
in the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. This is quite a different to the situation 
within the organization that will be described in the following section – Cool 
Carriers. It was a viable reefer operation that followed Saléninvest into the 
abyss, which is why it was possible to resurrect it so quickly. Looking ahead it 
might be interesting to compare this story with that of Lauritzen, which of 
course did not go into bankruptcy but where another event struck the reefer 
division in the mid-1980s – namely the McKinsey report. 
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Chapter 4
Cool Carriers
The day Saléninvest’s bankruptcy was announced, it was doom and gloom for 
many at the office on Norrlandsgatan, Stockholm1. Many of the former em-
ployees at Saléninvest barely knew what they were going to do, but the man-
agement of the reefer division Salen Reefer Services (SRS) were completely 
prepared. Mats Ruhne and his closest executives, also known as the Five, had 
feared that the end was near for Saléninvest and had made   plans to quickly 
revive the reefer division, in case of a bankruptcy. In November 1984, a com-
pany was created called Salén Supporters. Officially, the investor was Gyllen-
hammar and Partners, but Stenbeck and Sven and Christer Salén were also 
involved. There was a feeling that the reefer division was the genuine Saléns, 
that it was world-leading, and that it could not be allowed to fall just because 
other divisions had failed. 
When the bankruptcy was a fact, the backup plan was activated and a new 
reefer operation was in place the day after the bankruptcy. A person who was 
there from the start in the almost identically-named new company, SRS Reefer, 
says that “we found it hard to keep a straight face among all the sadness. We felt 
an incredible joy to work. We got up and rushed to work while everyone else at 
the defunct Saléninvest were staring into the walls”. Everyone in the reefer sec-
tion knew what had to be done. When a shipping company goes bankrupt, 
there are always gold-diggers appearing to see how they can profit from the 
mess. SRS Reefer needed to win the race against these gold-diggers. In some 
way, perhaps SRS Reefer was lucky regarding the timing of the bankruptcy. 
While many reefer companies checked out in order to celebrate Christmas and 
New Year, at SRS Reefer it was full steam ahead. 
1 This part is based on annual reports of Cool Carriers and its owners, the annual review of Cool 
Carriers called Cool Facts, newspaper clippings from Swedish and international newspapers, 
articles in Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning, archival material from Mats Ruhne’s private archive, as well 
as a large number of interviews with management and employees of Cool Carriers as well as 
their owners. We have also made use of already published literature about the post-Salén-
bankruptcy businesses such as Sjöberg 2007, Sjögren, H. 1997. Spelet i Saléninvest, Stockholm: 
Ekerlid, Fagerfjäll, R. 1999, Företagsledarnas århundrade. D. 3, 1967-2000: från Werthéns 
förvärvsstrategi till Barneviks globala nätverk, Stockholm: Norstedts., Lennerfors, T.T. 2009, 
Stockholmsrederierna – Ägandet och nätverkens betydelse för tanksjöfartens utveckling i 
Stockholm 1980-2000, Göteborg: BAS & Breakwater Publishing. Müller, L., Hallén, P. and 
Lennerfors, T.T. 2016. Handel och sjöfart, in Ekström, S., Müller, L., and Nilson, T. 2016. Sjövägen 
till Sverige: Från 1500-talet till våra dagar, Malmö: Universus Academic Press, pp. 69-120. 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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A “command centre” was built up in Saléninvest’s offices. The SRS fleet list 
was posted on the wall next to a list of SRS’ customers. Half of the employees 
started phoning around to the shipowners to convince them to reemploy the 
ships within SRS Reefer. Some owners, however, were sitting on contracts with 
good charter rates, and these were renegotiated after the bankruptcy. Many 
shipowners were involuntary, for example banks and the Swedish state, and 
those often agreed to let SRS Reefer commercially operate their ships. The sec-
ond half of the employees phoned around to customers and assured them that 
everything was business as usual. One might wonder how many customers ac-
tually realized that Saléninvest had gone. 
While the Swedes were preparing for Santa Claus and the Swedish tradition 
of watching Donald Duck on Christmas Eve, the command centre was imbued 
with cigarette smoke and the smell of strong, very strong coffee. Through the 
door of the office and into the room stepped the CEO of SRS Reefer, Mats 
Ruhne, who had jogged along with his dog to the office. It was freezing cold 
and both Ruhne and the dog were covered with ice. But the staff remember 
that Mats Ruhne infused courage and work enthusiasm into the group. They 
shared this task, there was solidarity, they sacrificed their leisure and their 
families in order to save the business, and their jobs. 
SRS Reefer, soon renamed Cool Carriers, was devoted to operating but not 
owning ships. In the Swedish Shipping Gazette in January 1985, Christer Salén 
explained that the new reefer operation “shall own vessels only exceptionally 
and this means that we will operate with a much lower risk profile. It will not 
have the same exposure [to risk] as in the old company [Saléninvest]”2. The 
company tried to position itself through discourse as more of a “software” com-
pany than its predecessor. More brokering, more an organizer of pools, operat-
ing vessels for others, using some chartered-in tonnage. It was disclosed that 
the company would also focus on modern ships with large hatch openings (i.e. 
the Winter and Spring vessels), the right dimensions of the holds, and right 
angles, all to improve the efficiency of loading and unloading. 
Behind the scenes, the Five went around to banks and made deals in order 
to secure tonnage for their operation, because they knew that despite the dis-
cursive positioning as a software company, without control of tonnage the 
company was nothing. The ownership structure of the ships was very compli-
cated, and it has been repeatedly stated that very few knew how the whole 
set-up was organized. However, it is clear that the owners of SRS Reefer, in 
other words, those who had provided capital for the business as well as the 
Five, were also trying to get ownership of the hardware – the ships. It was also 
2 “Saléns seglar vidare. Nytt bolag håller kylsjöfarten igång”. Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1985/1-2, 
p. 2.
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shortly after the bankruptcy that personnel at Cool Carriers started to under-
stand who was actually owning the company. An employee explains: 
After the urgent time was over, after a month or so, it started to become 
clear to us that the Five had ownership in the company. The whole team-
spirit was gone, a cold wind swept through the company. We were de-
graded to just workers. It was the Five and there was us. They lost the trust 
of the personnel.
This was the start of an increasingly collective collegiality amongst the em-
ployees, and against some of the owners. These employees started to perceive 
the owners as antagonists, rather than on their side. This subjective perception 
would strongly influence the history of Cool Carriers.
Initially the ships were operated under what was called a best effort system, 
i.e., that the owners of a ship got what the ship had earned minus an opera-
tions fee which SRS Reefer took. However, this could lead to one ship getting 
really good trades and earning a lot of money, while another ship received poor 
trades and did not earn anything at all. Furthermore, the best effort system 
could lead to owners suspecting that other owners were favoured. This could 
be avoided by creating a pool where all ships shared the revenue from the en-
Figure 8 Cool Carriers managed to secure the operation of most of Salén’s reefer 
tonnage following the bankruptcy. Pictured is the San Blas from 1967, 
renamed the Malayan Victory, in Stockholm 1986  
Photo: Östring, Bill/ Sjöhistoriska museet
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tire pool3. The pool that materialized was called Leonina. The name was cho-
sen since Leonina was considered to represent the lion’s mother who protects 
her little lion cubs – in other words, the big, strong, experienced SRS Reefer 
who protected the ship-owners. This was how the management of Cool Carri-
ers perceived of the company and how they discursively constructed its pur-
pose. That Leonina later was discovered to be an old Biblical myth – about a 
lion who hunts together with an antelope – led to significant confusion about 
what Leonina really meant. Furthermore, in business language, Leonina could 
even be seen to refer to leonine clauses in contracts – clauses that are heavily 
biased. 
Somewhat into the year of 1985, SRS Reefer had gained control over some 
60-70 vessels. A few months later, in April, it moved out to new offices outside 
the city at Danderyd. The budgeted revenues were 2 billion and a profit of 49 
million SEK. The organization was identical to that in Saléninvest, depicted in 
Graph 13. 
Cool Carriers was thriving, with new contracts, such as transporting ten 
large shiploads of octopus to Japan in the first half of 1986, and a large banana 
contract from Colombia, primarily, and Ecuador to the United States in 1986. 
The banana contract concerned 17 million banana boxes employing 6-7 ves-
sels. The fruit was delivered by Uniban in Colombia, shipped to Galveston, 
Tampa and Newark, received by Turbana (Uniban’s sales company). The finan-
cial outcome of the first year of operations was a profit of 50m SEK. 
3 “All permanent ships employed in the Leonina System (i.e. not the pool’s own short term 
tonnage) share the System’s net result on the basis of (a) the ships’ cubic capacity (b) the 
number of days in the System and (c) a factor (trade factor) which reflects the ships’ suitability 
for the various trades which are served by the System. While there is a great number of inputs 
which go into the mathematical determination of these factors, the main ones reflect the 
ships’ suitability for pallet cargoes, fuel consumption, and cargo handling facilities. [...] The 
trade factors are checked yearly to reflect changes in market conditions, bunker prices and 
also the ships’ actual performance”. Cool Carriers Information Memorandum December 1986, 
p. 4. Mats Ruhne’s private archive.
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Given the successful development of Cool Carriers the upper management 
led by Mats Ruhne started to subjectively perceive themselves increasingly as 
entrepreneurs, although their ownership in the company was limited. A classi-
cal conflict between owners and managers ensued, where the principal strug-
gle was personified as Mats Ruhne vs. Jan Stenbeck. There are a number of 
stories related to this struggle and it is unlikely that it will ever be established 
what really happened. The conflict was aggravated by all the assets that were 
outside Cool Carriers, namely the ships. The owners of Cool Carriers were try-
ing to get control of the ships that were owned by banks and managed to do so. 
Who was invited to each deal and who was not became a core issue of the con-
flict, as well as who the banks think they sold the ships to – was it to a daughter 
company to Cool Carriers or to the owners as private persons? Another conflict 
concerned what company should be chosen to be an insurance provider to the 
new cargo insurance that Cool Carriers offered to its pool members. When the 
managers decided to not use Stenbeck’s insurance company, this was not re-
ceived favourably. Stenbeck called in auditors and claimed that Ruhne had em-
bezzled money from the company. When the Five returned from negotiations 
to buy the six Winter vessels from the Swedish state shipping company Zenit4, 
there was a security guard with a guard dog in front of the main door, hinder-
ing them from entering. 
1 Perfresh
The Five decided to start up something of their own5. They bought into a 
stock-listed company named Percal and renamed it Perfresh. Perfresh filled 
four main functions. First, to be a base so that they could continue working 
with existing customer contacts and forge new ones. Second, Perfresh intend-
ed to own ships. Right from the start, they had brought with them five vessels 
from Cool Carriers that were owned by the banks. The Five managed charter-
ing and operation of the vessels. Third, Perfresh developed an import and dis-
tribution business in the fruit and vegetable trade. Previously Cool Carriers 
had been part owner of the Dutch fruit and vegetable importer Jan van den 
Brink. This company had successfully managed to build a business around 
small shops that sold vegetables throughout Holland. Perfresh and Jan van den 
Brink tried to launch this concept in Denmark, but with little success. Fourthly, 
4 Zenit is described in Lennerfors, T.T. 2014. An involuntary ship owner – the background and 
effects of Swedish state involvement in shipping during the 1970’s and 1980’s, International 
Journal of Maritime History, 26: 702-719.
5 Part of this episode is described in “Nya kylrederiet Perfresh förvärvar första fartyget”. Svensk 
Sjöfarts Tidning 1986/49, p. 2. 
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the Five thought that the time was right to build new reefers. Perfresh devel-
oped a ship based on the knowledge accumulated within Salén and Cool Car-
riers and Per-Olof Oweson went to the Gdansk shipyard in Poland to negotiate. 
The yard initially agreed to build some ships at what looked to be a very low 
price. Subsequently, the yard was forced to change the deal and at this point 
the narrative diverges as to exactly what happened. Oweson’s perspective is 
based upon that Perfresh had cancelled the deal while the remaining Four 
claim that the deal was still under negotiation. However, the broker – Christian 
Larsson – considered the revised higher price from the yard to still represent 
good value and tried to recruit investors and one of those was Oweson, who 
subsequently left Perfresh. The Five had become Four. 
The legal dispute between Stenbeck and Ruhne continued and these high-
level conflicts affected Cool Carriers which became somewhat paralyzed. 
However, because of the subjectively perceived antagonism between the up-
per managers and the organization at Cool Carriers, the lower echelons of the 
organization decided to collaborate with owners not directly involved in the 
conflict to find a solution to the problem. They approached Bilspedition as a 
potential buyer of Cool Carriers, in order to find a solution to the ownership 
situation. 
After some twists and turns, the whole package, Perfresh and Cool Carriers, 
was sold to Bilspedition. 
Holy House
After the settlement with Bilspedition, Mats Ruhne controlled a number 
of vessels including four of the Snow ships. These ships became the foun-
dation for Mats Ruhne’s Holy House Shippinga, which still exists today 
(2018). The purpose of Holy House Shipping was to be a shipowner and to 
timecharter ships to operators. Cool Carriers chartered a few ships but 
some people at Cool Carriers still mistrusted Ruhne, so Holy House de-
cided to approach the customers of Cool Carriers – banana companies. 
From 1990 to 1995, Holy House chartered their ships to Chiquita and this 
resulted in a confict that is notable. When the EU banana regulations 
were altered, the reefer market was negatively affected, and Chiquita 
broke the contract with Holy House two years before the end date of the 
timecharter. They claimed that the Snow vessels did not conform to the 
deck height specification. Holy House started arbitration against Chiq-
uita, and finally won a 10m USD claim against GWF, Chiquita’s shipping 
arm, in 1997. After all, Chiquita had signed the contract and had accepted 
the Snow’s configuration. When the contract with Chiquita was lost, the 
ships were timechartered and went in traffic to Capespan (South Africa) 
until 2005. 
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During the second half of the 1990s, Holy House expanded their fleet 
with second hand tonnage. These vessels were of varying age, in fact most 
were quite old, but the main commonality of these purchases was that 
they represented good value for moneyb. By 2001, the Holy House fleet 
consisted of 17 ships. The fleet remained stable, but after the crisis of 
2008/2009 Holy House scaled down their fleet to five ships. In 2013, they 
bought Hansa Bremen and Hansa Lübeck and employed them in NYK 
Cool but later transferred them to Seatrade’s pool. In 2015, they had seven 
reefers in their fleet, and in 2017, they had four. The strategy of Holy 
House over the years has been to own a fleet of well-maintained large 
ships, that despite their age could compete for the same trades as the 
major independent operators.
Note: a Written on the base of publicly available material in TradeWinds, the Holy House 
webpage as well as interviews with Mats Ruhne and Anna Börjesson Ruhne; b In 1996, 
Laponian, built in 1992, was acquired for 20-21 mUSD. Two years later Kea (built in 1982) 
and Kyma (1972) were bought for 9m and 4.5m, and later Kudu (1984) for 3.2m. In 2001, 
Holy House also purchased three 1970s-built reefers, the Selma (1979), Cherry and Morillo 
(both 1971) at a low price of $3.5m in June. In September 2001, they bought the Pacific Star, 




Caesar Reefers came about as a result of Perfresh not going through with 
the constructions of the vessels in Gdansk as outlined previouslya. This 
was one of the most profitable deals during the last 30 years in the reefer 
market. Many other speculative ship-owners, with no interest in own 
commercial operations, invested during this period. This story exempli-
fies the realities of ship-owning and reefer investment. 
The Swedish ship-owner and businessman Mats Arnhög was a leading 
investor in the consortia that took over the deal. The ships were going to 
be built at the Lenin shipyard at Gdansk in Poland and both Arnhög and 
the broker Christian Larsson had a past relationship with the shipyard. 
When Mats was working for the oil trader STC, STC had placed an order 
of six medium-sized tankers (40 000 dwtb) at that very shipyard in 1979 
brokered by Christian Larsson. This was not just any Polish shipyard, nor 
any time period, seen in hindsight. It was during the building of these 
very tankers that Lech Wałęsa founded the Solidarity trade union move-
ment on 14 August 1980 at the shipyard. 
Christian Larsson knew that Arnhög was an interested investor within 
the shipping segment, and therefore reached out to him. At first, Arnhög
 79Cool Carriers
was not interested in the deal, but the Poles were persistant and after 
eight days of negotations in Stockholm, a deal was signed for six ships but 
with the right to cancel four of them. At first, the ownership consortia 
never intended to be the owners of the ships, but rather thought of the 
newbuilding contracts as a form of speculation. When it was clear that 
the market was improving, as it did during the end of the 1980s, gradually 
the ownership consortium became convinced that they wanted the ships 
to be delivered to leverage their speculation. 
To handle technical management of the ships Johan Reksten was con-
tacted. He had relationships with the same shipyard since the 1970s. Jo-
han Reksten is the son of Hilmar Reksten, who was not only a shipowner 
but also a Norwegian hero, who had assisted the Norwegian government 
from London during the Second World War. Hilmar was deemed to be the 
richest man on the globe in 1973 – but was exposed to risk since he had all 
his VLCC oil tankers in the spot market, and Johan was portrayed on the 
front page of Time as the world’s richest heir. What followed was a long 
period of misfortunes, where the dark side of a Norwegian national hero 
was unmasked. After the collapse of the Reksten empire, Johan Reksten 
had kept a technical management organization in Bergen, which was en-
trusted to manage the reefers. 
During the building of the ships, the Polish Department of Industry 
decided to dismantle the shipyard, which was a great risk to the investor 
consortia. Certainly, they had bank guarantees, which would theoreti-
cally allow them to get all invested money back if the ships were not de-
livered. But it was unclear how much these guarantees were worth. The 
earlier relationships that Arnhög, Larsson, and Reksten had to the ship-
yard were proven to be of high value. The manager of the shipyard when 
STC built the product tankers had now become No.2 in the Department 
of Industry, and a meeting was set up with him and the Minister of Indus-
try. After the meeting, the minister was on board, convinced that the 
ships should be finished. 
When the ownership consortium had decided to take delivery of the 
ships, they needed to find a customer. At first, a deal was almost struck 
with Chiquita, but through a broker, Dole approached Arnhög, with a 
better deal. The fleet of six ships were going to handle Dole’s Central 
American exports to Europe, and the ships were timechartered to Dole 
for four years with an option for another two years. All of the crew was 
Polish, including the top tiers. The ships worked very well in the service 
for Dole and the timecharter rates of over 90 cents per cbf were very fa-
vourable for the shipowner. 
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After the timecharters were prolonged, the investor consortia decided 
to sell the ships, due to two reasons: First, the market was still strong, but 
deteriorating. Second, the trend of containerization grew stronger. They 
got an offer from the Oetker group to buy the ships, including personnel, 
and timecharter contracts, and the deal was sealed. 
Note: a This section is based on archival material in the form of drawings, contracts, for 
the newbuildings, as well as interviews with key actors such as Mats Arnhög, Christian 
Larsson, and Per-Olof Oweson. The story about the shipping investments of Mats Arnhög 
are described in Lennerfors, T.T. 2016. Elling Ellingsen – The Shipping Entrepreneur, Stock-
holm: Medströms;  b Deadweight tonnage (DWT) expresses the quantity of goods a ship 
can carry including provisions, lubricants, and fuel.
2 Bilspedition as Owner: Ship Investments and the Golden 90s that 
Never Came
To understand Bilspedition’s ownership of Cool Carrier, it is necessary to give a 
brief orientation about what kind of company Bilspedition was6. In the early 
1980s, Bilspedition was a land logistics company, basically trucking, owned by 
truck-owners and Saléninvest. In 1982, Martin Lundberg became CEO of Bil-
spedition and embarked on an expansive strategy. Lundberg has explained 
that Bilspedition was quite strong in the Swedish market but weak internation-
ally and that they had to grow in order to offer a complete transport solution, 
to become a full transport house. Parallel with this, and perhaps even more 
important, was the will of the CEO to grow and leverage the company. Since 
organic growth was perceived as too slow, Bilspedition started to buy other 
companies. Scansped, Sweden’s largest group in international transport and 
forwarding, was purchased in 1985. Later, Bilspedition bought land logistics 
companies in Finland, Norway, Denmark and Poland. It also expanded off-
shore. Most of the shipping investments were done because of the potential 
profits in the segments, but some synergies were also envisioned. Bilspedition 
expanded into bulk carriers, but for our purpose the most important deal is 
when they bought Cool Carriers. 
Strategic change in two dimensions followed at Cool Carriers from 1987 and 
onwards. First, Cool Carriers revised its fleet policy. Rather than just operating 
tonnage that was owned by a surrounding ecosystem of ship-owners, Cool Car-
riers began to invest in its own newbuildings, and second-hand tonnage. Relat-
ing to our discussion about various actors in chapter 1, Cool Carriers became 
6 Lennerfors 2009, pp. 115-116. Apart from interviews with Cool Carriers, this part draws on in-
terviews with Martin Lundberg, the manager of Bilspedition, as well as Göran Bergkvist, head 
of ScanShip, the shipping division at Bilspedition. 
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more of a ship-owner than it once was. In corporate documents, it was ex-
plained that Cool Carriers had transferred from a cautious low-risk philosophy 
to higher risk strategy7. The new policy was that about 40-50% of the pool 
should consist of long-timecharters and owned tonnage. Cool Carriers invest-
ed 65 million USD between 1987 and 19908 and committed to long-term 
timecharters, amounting to 1135m SEK from 1990-19959. The feeling at the time 
was: 
The revised policy implies an altered course towards a higher risk profile, 
but with substantially increased profit potentials and, above all, long-
term expansion and control of the core fleet. The significance of the lat-
ter aspect can hardly be overemphasized by Cool Carriers as a dominant 
player in a rising market10. 
In this fleet renewal, the competencies of Cool Carriers, inherited from Salén, 
could be used. The ship types, such as the Crystal class and the Northern reefer 
class, were developed by Cool Carriers. Although it was framed as an ambitious 
R&D programme11, many internal sources have explained that these ship types 
were not innovative, but rather just efficient and simple specialized reefers. In 
a sense, the changes made were just incrementally better than the latest ship 
types developed at Saléns – the Spring vessels. An idea of the magnitude of the 
fleet renewal is to see a snapshot of delivered or to be delivered tonnage to 
Cool Carriers or related owners from 1989 (See Table 2). 
Second, apart from expanding the fleet, Cool Carriers was embarking on a 
path of vertical integration – to become an integrated provider of transport. It 
integrated vertically regarding the maritime business. Rather than the pool be-
ing the core business of Cool Carriers, its business areas quickly expanded for 
example into crewing and technical management. Also, it has been explained 
that the CEO, Bo Natt och Dag was strongly promoting the development of the 
vision of the complete Cool House (Sw. Kylhuset) that aimed at expanding the 
business beyond sea transport. For example, terminals were added to the busi-
ness. Furthermore, attempts were made to investigate whether Bilspedition’s 
land logistics business (Autotransit) in the Netherlands could serve as a part-
ner to Cool Carriers in order to integrate vertically to be able to deliver refriger-
7 Cool Facts 1989, p. 5. 
8 Cool Facts 1990, p. 5. 
9 Report to the board of directors of Cool Carriers, p. 5. Presented in March 1988 by Peter 
Rothschild and Mats Ruhne. Mats Ruhne’s private archive. 
10 Cool Facts 1989, p. 5.
11 Cool Facts 1989, p. 5. 
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ated goods inland in the Netherlands. The conclusion was that there were no 
synergies. 
According to a board member of Cool Carriers, “The feeling was that Bil-
spedition changed very much of Cool”. But what explains this strategy of 
growth, financial risk-taking, and vertical integration? The first explanation is 
the very reason for which Bilspedition bought Cool Carriers. According to Mar-
tin Lundberg, Cool Carriers was bought in order to sell it to Lauritzen in ex-
change for Tor Line and DFDS’s land logistic business that Lauritzen owned: 
We wanted to buy Tor Line and DFDS transport and spedition business, 
since they had entered the market as one of our competitors. That was 
troublesome, since they were very competitive.
























Lundberg of course knew that Lauritzen was interested in reefers, but one 
should also point out that Lauritzen’s reefer division was at the time ailing and 
under revision by the consultancy company McKinsey. Lauritzen was there-
fore probably not very willing to invest in the reefer segment. Another reason 
which complicated the deal were the European authorities. Lauritzen would 
become too important on the reefer market if they merged with Cool Carriers. 
Informal negotiations with the authorities in Brussels were held, but they were 
lengthy, time-consuming, and did not result in the desired outcome. A third 
obstacle, as so often happens in mergers and acquisitions, was that the owners 
of Lauritzen and Bilspedition had diverging ideas about the value of the com-
panies that were pieces in the transaction. Eventually, the deal never material-
ized, but it had impact on the strategy. A software company will inevitably be 
less valuable than a hardware company, and Bilspedition’s fleet expansion pol-
icy was partly related to a wish to make Cool Carriers a more valuable object to 
trade with Lauritzen. 
The second reason is the very business philosophy and strategy of Bilspedi-
tion. It was a company focused on high growth and it had a high risk profile. 
This was partly due to the agency of Martin Lundberg but also because of the 
context of the stock market. Bilspedition’s ambitions were fuelled by cheers 
from many stock market analysts and investors, since increased ownership of 
reefer vessels could lead to higher earnings and stock price. This owner strate-
gy strongly affected Cool Carriers. A related reason was that many Swedish 
ship-owners were at this time expanding and it is likely that Bilspedition got 
confidence from this collective expansion. A last explanation was that the 
business strategy of the early years of Cool Carriers was no longer seen to be 
viable. Martin Lundberg explains that “We had difficulties in securing the ton-
nage for our operations. We had to abandon the idea that we were just pool 
operators”. When the market gets better, some owners decide to operate the 
ships by themselves or timecharter them out directly to some customer. This 
led to a contraction of Cool Carriers’ pool which had to be compensated with 
own tonnage. In short, while the pool strategy was beneficial in a lukewarm 
market, in a growing market the policy had to be changed.
The Winter Ships Return to Swedish Ownership
In 1988, three Winter ships, developed by Salén in the end of the 1970s, 
were bought by the Swedish shipping entrepreneur Folke Patriksson and 
his new business partner Lennart Bylock. It was the initiating business 
deal in the new partnership which soon became formalized as Bylock & 
Nordsjöfrakt. Folke, in his autobiography, explained that: 
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“One day Lennart called from London. There he had encountered 
Christer Salén, which had been told that three of Salén’s old, nice reefers 
were up for sale for a good price. Both Lennart and I thought it was an 
attractive project. We took the chance and together bought three of the 
so-called Winter vessels, Winter Water, Winter Wave, and Winter Moon. 
Bylock got 60 percent, Nordsjöfrakt 40. It was our first joint deal”a.
A few years later the remaining three Winter ships were bought by the 
newly formed Bylock & Nordsjöfrakt (B&N). When the ships were bought, 
the company had no competence in reefers, and therefore intended to 
function as a ship-owner, outsourcing commercial operations. Still, the 
reefers did something to Bylock & Nordsjöfrakt. Nordsjöfrakt had earlier 
just been in the short-sea shipping segment, and the reefers took B&N to 
the next level. It became an international company.
“To begin with, almost all our ships were bunched up in the North Sea 
and Baltic Sea, it was really just the Winter boats that were spread out 
across the map’s vast oceans. But it was a new world that lay before us”b.
Bilspedition owned parts of Nordsjöfrakt and B&N employed their 
vessels in the Cool Carriers pool. There were even plans to merge B&N 
with Cool Carriers, which would make sense from Bilspedition’s perspec-
tive. Bilspedition was, as we have noted, interested in making structural 
deals. But nothing materialized. Furthermore, Seatrade had grown to be-
come a new major player within the reefer industry in the 1990s, and 
B&N decided to try out this pool. But for B&N, the reefers were not the 
core business. 
After various offers to buy the Winter vessels from Cool Carrier’s new 
owner Höegh and one of its former owners Mats Ruhne, in 1997, Svenska 
Orient Linien AB, owned by B&N underwent an IPO and the six Winter 
vessels were part of that IPO. The reefer market was good in 1997, so the 
Winter vessels were a way to make the offer more enticing. Later, the 
ships were sold by SOL at a low price. 
Notes: a Patriksson, F. narrated for Ulla Linton, 2012. Att kunna ta en storm, Gothenburg: 
Breakwater, p. 149; b Patriksson, F. 2012, p. 149.
This expansion at the end of the 1980s was experienced by many as an era of 
hope. People spoke about the upcoming Golden 90s, where the earnings would 
be over 100 cents per cubic feet. This discursive construction of the future le-
gitimised the newbuilding programme. Initially, the strategy paid off. 
However, there were critical voices. Peter Rothschild, a member of the Five 
was invited by Bilspedition to evaluate the business operations of Cool 
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Carriers in 1987. Mats Ruhne was involved in producing the report12. Some 
people within the company chose not to cooperate in this evaluation due to 
the history of the Five, while others did. Although Bilspedition was now the 
sole owner, the organization was still split and due to the turmoil people had 
different loyalties. The report criticized the business for having moved away 
from Cool Carriers’ original goal, namely to be a software company. While the 
upper management of Cool Carriers considered the acquisition of ships a ne-
cessity, the report shows that there were dissenting views amongst those still 
loyal to the Five. 
1990 was a really bad year for shipping. Iraq had just invaded Kuwait, and 
the shipping markets were affected. Bilspedition, which now had investments 
in reefers, forest product carriers, and oil-bulk-ore vessels, worsened every 
year. In 1992, the share-price was down to 20 SEK against a peak of 160 SEK at 
the end of 1989. Because of this unfortunate development, Martin Lundberg 
was replaced by the new CEO Håkan Larsson and Bilspedition started to sell off 
their maritime businesses, for example Cool Carriers. This downturn affected 
the strategy of Cool Carriers. After having engaged in negotiations with differ-
ent potential buyers, for example NYK and French Altus, in 1994 Cool Carriers 
was sold to the Avrista consortium, consisting of Höegh, holding 75% and Tuf-
ton Oceanic, holding 25%. The following year, Bilspedition was bought up by 
the German logistics company Stinnes and the company was renamed Schen-
ker-BTL. 
To sum up, under the ownership of Bilspedition, Cool Carriers changed 
strategy, which paid off until the shipping markets started to fall in the early 
1990s. The owners, affected by the bad results in the shipping segments, need-
ed to divest. From the perspective of employees at Cool Carriers, Bilspedition 
was not a particularly competent owner. Although they had recruited an expe-
rienced manager for all of their shipping investments, neither he nor the CEO 
of Cool Carriers had any specialized knowledge of the reefer industry. This re-
sulted in a lack of a business idea for Cool Carriers, when it became clear that 
it was difficult to attract tonnage to the Leonina pool. We can only speculate 
what would have happened if the Five would have remained at the helm of 
Cool Carriers. At least from their perspective, Cool would have developed dif-
ferently. Since they all were highly competent and had been running SRS, it is 
likely that their departure negatively affected the business development of 
Cool Carriers. At the same time, it might have been impossible for them to run 
Cool Carriers due to their negative reputation within the company. Particularly 
12 Rotschild, P. 1988. Report to the board of directors of Cool Carriers, March 1988. Mats 
Ruhne’s private archive. 
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when the market turned down in the early 1990s coupled with the problems 
that Bilspedition underwent, people at Cool Carriers were frustrated. Some key 
employees decided to leave the organization to work with a growing competi-
tor, Seatrade. 
3 Höegh and the Others: Broadened Market Presence with Limited 
Investments 
It is time to get acquainted with the new owner of Cool Carriers. Höegh started 
out in 1927 as a company owning oil tankers, and later expanded into liner 
shipping (Java Pacific Line and West Africa Line)13. In the 1960s the company 
diversified into oil-bulk-ore carriers and car carriers. The latter business was 
developed in a joint venture with the Norwegian ship-owner Ugland in 1970 
creating HUAL (Höegh Ugland Auto Liners). In 1973, Höegh contracted the 
world’s first LNG carrier with special tanks and started to develop this business 
segment. In 1987, Höegh underwent an IPO, which was the trend for many 
shipping companies in the late 1980s. As a consequence of the Exxon Valdez 
oil-spill and the resulting Oil Pollution Act, which posed greater financial risk 
for companies engaged in oil transport, Höegh’s OBO and tanker related activi-
ties were demerged and listed. The Höegh group had been through 12 years of 
consolidations but it was time to expand. In the context of the history of Höegh 
as a diversified shipping company, a fair interpretation for why Höegh bought 
Cool Carriers is because Höegh was interested in further diversification. The 
diversification would not end until 2000, when Höegh placed all its focus on 
car carriers and LNG. 
In other words, it was not an interest in reefers per se, but rather a will to 
continue exploring different shipping markets, hedging the cyclical nature of 
various shipping markets against others, that was Höegh’s interest for buying 
Cool Carriers. Höegh, the chairman of Höegh, stated that Cool Carriers was 
bought due to its strong market position, and that although the reefer market 
is weak at present, the deal could pay off in the future14. As we know, the future 
is always unknown, and a weak market can be the perfect time to enter a new 
business segment. Also, reefer shipping was at the time seen as low risk, indus-
trial shipping, and Höegh’s decision was not discussed to a large extent in the 
Norwegian shipping community. Apart from Höegh’s own interest in diversify-
ing, a main driving force behind the deal to acquire Cool Carriers is said to have 
13 Bakka, D. Jr. 1997. Höegh: shipping through cycles 1927-1997, Oslo: Leif Höegh & Co Asa. 
14 “Leif Hoegh is looking for more cool deals”. TradeWinds 28 January 1994, p. 19. 
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been Ted Kalborg of Tufton Oceanic – an investment banker – and the holder 
of 25% of the shares of Avrista. Soon, however, Höegh bought Tufton’s share in 
Cool Carriers. 
Mats Jansson, who had extensive experience leading shipping companies 
within dry cargo and oil tanker, was appointed CEO of Cool Carriers in May 
1994. The strategy of Cool Carriers, when Jansson entered the company was to 
reduce market risk and get rid of timechartered tonnage. As we know, vessels 
were timechartered from 1990 to 1995, and given the downturn of the market, 
the charter price naturally surpassed current market rates. 
The result was negative in the first year of operation, 1994, due to the de-
pressed market and the loss-driving timecharter agreements. As a part of the 
deal, Bilspedition paid the losses during 1994, but then the results turned black. 
Due to the positive expectations in 1995 and 1996, Höegh expanded its owner-
ship of vessels. Höegh was, as an owner interested in expanding in the seg-
ment, particularly through the acquisition of second-hand tonnage15. While 
they had no specific knowledge about the reefer market, they were willing to 
invest, and to a large extent trusted the local organization with its leader Mats 
Jansson. Since Höegh was based in Oslo, there were some discussions about 
moving Cool Carriers to Norway. But, due to the risk of losing know-how – not 
all were willing to move to Norway, the organization stayed in Stockholm. 
By the end of 1995, Höegh therefore invested in reefer vessels connected to 
Cool. From the annual report, it is stated that the company’s total assets had 
increased from NOK 3,964 million at the end of 1993 to NOK 5,568 by year-end 
1995, a result that is partly attributable to reefers16. 
Cool Carriers did well during 1995 and 1996, but Mats Jansson had an idea 
that the company required a greater market presence and a larger fleet in order 
to reach economies of scale. The management’s plan was to collaborate with 
other players within the industry. A potential partner was the South African 
liner company Safmarine, which had been founded in 1946. Following the end 
of the sanctions against South Africa, Safmarine began to look for new oppor-
tunities in the international market. Apart from its liner services with contain-
er ships, it expanded into the reefer segment and had a fleet of ships as well as 
a commercial operation. The idea from Cool Carriers’ perspective was to take 
over both the ships and the human resources of Safmarine. The hardware 
would provide a welcome boost to Cool Carriers’ fleet, while the software, 
called Universal Reefers, included good relationships to the South African fruit 
exporters Unifruco and Outspan. These exporters were not only partners to 
15 “Leif Hoegh is looking for more cool deals”. TradeWinds 28 January 1994, p. 18.
16 Leif Höegh Annual Report 1995. 
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Universal Reefers but also owned 50% of it. The fruit exporters, mostly Out-
span, wanted to remain in control of the software side and urged Safmarine to 
keep its 50% stake. A South African shipping company was a more preferred 
partner. However, in September 1997, Safmarine pulled out of its ownership in 
Universal Reefers to avoid a conflict of interest between Cool Carriers and Uni-
versal. Universal Reefers would be run by the fruit exporters Unifruco and Out-
span17. 
Höegh and Safmarine joined forces on the 1st of January 1997 and formed 
the new company Unicool. It consisted of the Cool Carriers software company 
and 18 ships owned by Höegh and Safmarine and its assets were valued at over 
400 MUSD. The ownership structure of the new company was Safmarine Inter-
national (50%), Höegh (49.8%) and Mats Jansson’s company Girestad. The 
company in Stockholm was now both a significant ship-owner and an operator 
(see Table 4). The organization, the software, was intact, but Safmarine had 
exchanged the ownership of their vessels for the ownership in Unicool. When 
discussing the deal with Mats Jansson, he says that the philosophy was to ex-
pand, to get a larger market share without a significantly higher risk. Safma-
rine’s fleet also suited Cool Carriers well. 
Another aspect of the expansive but still low-risk strategy was to try to col-
laborate with companies in new pools. Cool Carriers had a relatively small 
17 “Safmarine pulls out of charter”. South China Morning Post, 17 September 1997, <http://
www.scmp.com/article/211636/safmarine-pulls-out-charter>.
Table 3 Revenues, operating profit, book value of vessels and investment in vessels for 
Höegh’s share of Cool Carriers 1994-2000. In 1997, figures correspond to Höegh’s 
50% share of Cool Carriers after the merger with Safmarine 
Year (NOK million)a 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Freight revenues 711 744 1074 752 787 (107 
MUSD)
96 MUSD 174 MUSD
Operating profit -61 6 4 122 44 (-8 
MUSD)
-9 MUSD 4 MUSD
Book value (vessels) 174 672 1291 976 829 (116 
MUSD)
154 MUSD) 137 MUSD
Investments in 
vessels
213 566 722 0 0 0 21 MUSD
a Leif Höegh Annual Report 1997, p. 57, Leif Höegh Annual Report 1998, p. 45, Leif Höegh 
 Annual Report 1999, p. 44. 
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presence in the handy sized reefer segment. A representative of Cool Carriers 
said that “for two years [i.e. since 1994] Cool has been searching for a partner, 
realizing it was too small of a player on its own”18. 
The partner was a relative newcomer on the reefer scene – Eastwind – with 
its base in the US. With a fleet of about 25 handy sized reefers, the new reefer 
venture ECo Shipping was a fact. The E in the name came from Eastwind, and 
the Co from Cool Carriers. The start of the operations was the same date that 
Safmarine and Höegh joined forces, 1 January 1997. The company was co-man-
aged from Stockholm and from Eastwind’s offices in New York. Glenn Selling 
was head of the Swedish division, while Toby Moors was head of the American. 
In TradeWinds, more about the respective strengths is understood:
In Eastwind´s case this was ten-years´ experience of operating small reef-
ers. For Cool Carriers it was a history of building long-term relationships 
with customers.19 
18 “ Eastwind and Cool to share management”. TradeWinds 15 November 1996, p. 12. 
19 “Reefer venture on a rough ride” TradeWinds 23 December 1998, p. 11. 




















ECo was strong on fish, kiwi from NZ to Japan, mandarines from Morocco to 
Russia20. But in the long run, ECo Shipping was not sustainable. The smaller 
ships did not have significant earnings due to the heavy competition from the 
container lines. Rather, Cool Carriers had to focus on larger ships to achieve 
economies of scale. In 1998, the management of the pool from Stockholm was 
discontinued, and all commercial management of the ships was taken care of 
in New York. Eastwind president John Kousi explained: “Rather than us both 
focusing on each size it made sense for Cool to concentrate on the larger ships 
and us to focus on the small ships. It means that together we now cover a broad 
spectrum and that we can offer customers a complete range of sizes”21. In 1999, 
Eastwind expanded the Eco shipping pool with outside owners22. 
Cool Carriers delivered a better result in 1997 and the annual report notes 
that, “high contract coverage and better contribution from cars on traditional 
ballast legs, in good cooperation with Höegh Ugland Auto Liners, contributed 
to the improved result”23. So, although the business of Höegh and Cool Carriers 
seemingly had not much in common, some synergies could be created be-
tween the car carrying division and the reefer division of Höegh. 
Business kept expanding, and Cool Carriers managed to win a contract with 
Noboa in September 1997, that led to the possibility of an integrated service 
minimizing ballast voyages. In the Höegh annual report of 1997, the circular 
trade that according to Cool Carriers was a subjective point of pride was de-
tailed:
Due to its size and customer base, Cool Carriers can offer competitive 
logistic solutions. One example is the long term agreement entered into 
with the Noboa group in September for the transportation of bananas 
from Ecuador to the US west coast and Japan. The transportation of ba-
nanas is combined with Cool Carrier’s present agreement with Sunkist 
for the transportation of citrus fruits from the USA to Japan. Backhaul 
cargoes from Japan includes secondhand cars to South America and New 
Zealand and from New Zealand apples and kiwi fruit are loaded for Eu-
rope. This is a good example of a system which through a combination of 
cargoes optimizes the utilization of the vessels, creating a more cost effi-
cient solution for the customers24. 
20 Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1996/47, p. 6. Interview Glenn Selling. 
21 “Reefer venture on a rough ride” TradeWinds 23 December 1998, p. 11. 
22 “ Rates prompt reefer players to opt for spot” TradeWinds 18 February 2000. 
23 Leif Höegh Annual Report 1997, p. 54
24 Leif Höegh Annual Report 1997, p. 54
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Furthermore, a new pool was set up, which was similar to the setup of ECo 
Shipping. The reason was that “increased competition from the container lines 
– and customer demands for fixed arrivals, reefer containers, and special qual-
ity requirements – has locked much of the more sophisticated reefer tonnage 
into fairly rigid trading systems. This change in the main market has left a large 
fleet of less sophisticated, standard pallet-reefer vessels of good quality outside 
the systems. However, these vessels still offer competitive advantages and flex-
ibility to many customers, owing to cost advantages”. It was further explained 
that: 
The company will focus on traditional reefer shipping but will also en-
gage in emerging markets with future potential, and specialise in the 
somewhat shorter market perspective allowing it to take advantage of 
opportunities arising from short to medium term market fluctuations25.
On 1 January 1999, Arctic Reefers was set up with tonnage from Ahrenkiel of 
Hamburg, Eastwind of New York, Mediteranska Plovidba of Korcula, the Dawn 
group of London, Tokumaru Kaiun of Tokyo, Zodiac of London and Oster-
reichischer Lloyd of Vienna. 
Also, the creation of Arctic Reefers was a result of the Cool Way – a new 
strategy announced in 1998. They thought of this as the Toyota Way of reefer 
shipping, with a base in skilled and competent staff, customized services, en-
hanced operative efficiency, and cutting-edge technology. This is also a discur-
sive strategy to position oneself as a well-organized and modern company. For 
example, a new liner service to South Africa offered door-to-door services 
when the export market was deregulated in 1999. The Cool Way was seen as the 
core of Cool Carriers, and the creation of Arctic Reefers was also a way to dis-
tance Cool Carriers from its less sophisticated, but still potentially profitable, 
tonnage. 
On the tonnage side of the business, two newbuildings were made. In 1996, 
Mediteranska Plovidba, or Medplov, of Croatia ordered two 600 000 cbf reefer 
vessels at Split Shipyard, with a scheduled delivery for the end of 1998 and ear-
ly 1999, for an estimated 30 mUSD each. Mediteranska Plovidba, a state-owned 
shipping company, had close relationships with the Split shipyard and it is 
plausible that ships were ordered to secure employment at the shipyard. Since 
the early 1980s Medplov had ordered seven reefer ships at Split, many of which 
have been operated by Cool Carriers26. Höegh took an ownership share in the 
25 Leif Höegh Annual Report 1998. 
26 “Split clinches double-reefer order” TradeWinds 29 November 1996, p. 5. 
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two ships, of 20% each. The first one was delivered in January 200027. Accord-
ing to Cool Carriers, these ships were probably the last ones needed of today’s 
reefer design. However, the staff at Cool Carriers were working on the next 
generation of reefer vessels, called the Pallcon vessels, in which loading and 
unloading of the fruit pallets would take place utilizing elevators through side 
doors in the hull. Also, a high container capacity was a main part of the design. 
Turning to ownership, according to the upper management, the relation-
ship between Safmarine and Höegh went remarkably well. This dual owner-
ship also led to more independence and agency for the Cool Carriers 
organization to develop its own strategy. Of course, the strategy had to benefit 
the owners, but both owners adopted a hands-off policy and let the competent 
staff led by Mats Jansson run the show. But it seemed that Cool Carriers was 
destined to be plagued by ownership problems. 
The owner of Safmarine, the insurance company Old Mutual, was going to 
do an IPO in 1999 and wanted to sell their shipping interests before the IPO. 
Maersk bought the liner business of Safmarine28, and the bulk and reefer divi-
sions were sold to Capital Finance (owned by the Greek family Restis) for R210 
million, or about 35m USD29. Restis and their related company Enterprise 
Shipping and Trading was established in 1973 and consisted at that time of one 
reefer ship. In 1995, they had built up a managed fleet of 26 reefers. But the 
main objective for Restis when buying Safmarine, was not its reefers, but its 
bulkers30. When Restis bought Safmarine’s share of Unicool, Guttormsen from 
Höegh stated: 
We are very happy about this and know Restis already, as the company 
has had vessels in the Cool Carriers pool before. It is a long term player in 
this market and that is also positive31.
TradeWinds reported that Höegh had not been consulted before Safmarine 
sold its stake to Restis. And behind the happy facade, there was a concern that 
Restis was not a suitable owner for Cool.
The collaboration between Restis and Höegh was far from harmonious. We 
have stated that Höegh ran Cool Carriers as a stand-alone operation, while 
27 “Hoegh takes stakes in two reefers” TradeWinds 8 April 2000. 
28 Jephson, C. and Morgen, H. 2014. Creating Global Opportunities, Maersk Line in Containeri-
sation 1973-2013, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 263. 
29 “South Africa: Safmarine Falls Into Foreign Hands”. AllAfrica 8 April 1999, <http://allafri 
ca.com/stories/199904080036.html>.
30 “Restis gains a stake in reefers” TradeWinds 9 April 1999. 
31 “Restis gains a stake in reefers” TradeWinds 9 April 1999.
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Restis had a much more hands-on approach. From the perspective of the 
former’s locus of agency, Cool Carriers’ upper management, there were a range 
of issues that hindered a harmonious collaboration. At first, Restis wanted to 
integrate his own reefers into the Cool Carriers operation, old reefers that did 
not fit into the high-quality profile of Cool Carriers32. This was met with scepti-
cism from Cool Carriers since it diluted the brand and complicated the opera-
tions. Also, compared to Safmarine and Höegh, Restis was not interested in 
developing Unicool and continuing the expansion, but wanted to commit 
their funds to other segments, such as bulk. Restis also questioned why Cool 
Carriers had so much cash. Cool Carriers’ personnel speculated that Restis was 
probably more interested in the hardware part of Unicool rather than in the 
software. Cool Carriers, the former locus of agency, had now a rival who saw 
the software as an obstacle rather than a resource. We know, however, that 
Cool Carriers has always been an independent organization willing to oppose 
owners that they did not like. And this is exactly what happened – there was 
resistance. If Restis would have owned 100% of the company, such resistance 
would have been futile, but it is likely that Cool Carriers, together with Höegh, 
collaborated to reach a solution. 
It was decided that to solve the deadlock, which hampered business devel-
opment, one party had to buy out the other. There was a so-called Texas Close 
Up, where you placed a bid for either selling or buying the ships. If your bid was 
100 it meant that you either had to buy the vessels for 100 or sell the vessels for 
100. The highest bidder wins. Restis won the Texas Close Up, but after some 
turbulence, Höegh became 100% owner of Cool Carriers from the beginning of 
2000. 
Höegh had been an appreciated owner, but as the 2000s were approaching, 
Höegh believed that the reefer segment did not have a viable future. Further-
more, the financial resources tied up in the reefer business could be better 
used in the car carrying and LNG segments. Höegh was looking for an exit. 
This exit affected the business development of Cool Carriers. In fact, there 
was a newbuilding program underway at Cool Carriers with the Israeli com-
pany Agrexco (Agricultural Export Company), a leading exporter of Israel’s 
fruit. Agrexco were using two ships for their exports, but both of them were 
built in the early 1970s and needed replacement, not the least due to their low 
container capacity33. The two newbuildings that Cool Carriers were develop-
ing were far from ordinary. They had pallet friendly reefer holds, and tween-
32 “Cool couple splits up” TradeWinds 26 November 1999.
33 The container capacity was 80 TEU. “New Reefer up Agrexco fruit trade” TradeWinds 24 
October 2003, p. 16. 
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decks with side doors. Also, they had a box capacity of 880 TEU. They were 
described as “part reefer, part container and part roll-on, roll-off and have side 
loaders”34. In other words, completely customized ships for a particular com-
pany’s transport needs. But due to the exit of Höegh, the owner was far from 
willing to commit to take part-ownership in the vessels. The negotiations were 
stalled to great frustration for Cool Carriers staff, and eventually the ships were 
ordered by another owner. Delivered in 2003, they turned out to be very bunker 
inefficient and heavy ships. This did not matter that much since they were tai-
lormade for Agrexco, but when Agrexco went into bankruptcy in 2011, the up-
per management of Cool Carriers were relieved that they did not carry out the 
project. 
Höegh was looking to exit and Lauritzen turned out to be the buyer. We will 
describe this deal more in the part on Lauritzen’s history. Höegh exited the 
software part in 2001, but retained ownership in the vessels, since Lauritzen 
was only interested in the software and not in the hardware. From 2000, Höegh 
dismantled its reefer fleet, and finalized their exit by 2003 (See Table 5). 
Table 5 Höegh’s exit from the reefer segment
Yeara 2000 2001 2002 2003
Reefers 17 14 12 0
a Höegh Annual Report 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003. 
4 Summary
Cool Carriers started out as a continuation of the reefer division that existed at 
Saléns. Given the foresight and risk awareness of the upper management of the 
reefer division, Cool Carriers could be set up immediately after the bankruptcy. 
Much of the identity of the former organization was carried on to Cool Carri-
ers. In the post-bankruptcy disorder, it was not entirely clear how everything 
was organized regarding ownership of both the organization and the related 
ships and this led to shattered expectations, broken promises, and harsh con-
flicts between the organization and the upper management of Cool Carriers 




– the Five – as well as within the owner consortium. Given the antagonism 
between the rest of Cool Carriers and the upper management and owners, the 
organization developed a subjective sense of autonomy which is complement-
ed with a discourse that they are in control – that “they have to look for other 
owners” if the present owners do not suit their taste. This new subjective di-
mension was an addition to Salén Reefer’s subjective feeling of market-leading 
knowledge, operational excellence and working with high-class customers 
which also continued to reign at Cool Carriers. During the late 1980s the mar-
ket prospects looked good and people discursively described the 1990s as being 
“golden”. However, the 1990s never fully lived up to these expectations. 
Throughout that decade, Cool Carriers had different owners but still they per-
ceived themselves to be in charge, and also resisted when the owners acted too 
much against their interests. This subjective feeling of pride and autonomy 
thus significantly affected the business of Cool Carriers. The main organization 
– Cool Carriers – was discursively positioned as modern and high-class with 
large reefers, even though they also owned second-tier brands such as ECo and 
Arctic, which were separated from the main organization, but still linked to it. 
Now, in 2001, Cool Carriers had been acquired by Lauritzen, and when you read 
the story about Lauritzen from the mid-1980s onwards to the acquisition, 
please note the interesting similarities and differences that existed, in terms of 
fleet renewal and profitability, discursive positioning, and subjective feelings. 
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Chapter 5
J. Lauritzen
In 1884, the consul Ditlev Lauritzen (1859-1935) moved from his hometown 
Ribe in Western Denmark to Esbjerg to start the company J. Lauritzen1. The 
company was named after Ditlev’s father since Ditlev was under 25 years old 
and not of age to start a business. He started an import business with wood, 
coal and fodder. He began with chartered ships for his imports but bought a 
few ships in late 1880s and could call himself a ship-owner. In 1895, the newly 
started shipowning company Vesterhavet, had a fleet of three ships. The fleet 
grew remarkably, and merely five years later, another seven ships had been 
added to the fleet. Lauritzen was both a shipowner and a shipbroker until 1918 
when he closed down his shipbroking office. Apart from shipping, many of 
Lauritzen’s businesses were onshore. The Ditlev Lauritzen as portrayed by re-
searcher Ole Lange is a truly dynamic entrepreneur, constantly on the move, 
catching new opportunities wherever they would arise. But it was the shipping 
business that was the core, and more precisely the transportation of coal, wood 
and cotton. By the end of 1914, the fleet comprised 26 ships. At about that time, 
the headquarters moved to Copenhagen. Sometimes Lauritzen’s ships carried 
fruit as a backhaul cargo – the first shipment of oranges was from the Spanish 
Mediterranean coast to England in a conventional general cargo vessel in 1905. 
1 Mediterranean Adventures
The time during the First World War was, not surprisingly, turbulent. For Lau-
ritzen, the increasing demand for ships during the war served as an impetus to 
sell off the current fleet and order new ships. This was in line with his vision to 
have a fully controlled shipping company of about 50 modern ships. The strat-
egy was successful and after the war, the fleet was sold, and what was left was a 
number of competent employees and 16 ships on order at German shipyards. 
After the war, Lauritzen continued ordering ships to profit from the post-war 
1 The section on Lauritzen is based on Lange, O. 1995. Logbog for Lauritzen, Copenhagen: 
Handelshøjskolens forlag., Thorsøe, S. 1984, J. Lauritzen 1884-1984, Gravesend: World Ship 
Society., Tolerton 2008. Lauritzens corporate website <http://www.j-lauritzen.com>, the cor-
porate magazine Lauritzen News, and interviews with former executives and employees at 
Lauritzen reefer division or LPR. 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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boom. In the summer of 1919, he had 28 ships on order. But, since many other 
ship-owners also ordered ships en masse, the rates decreased in 1920. Some 
ships were cancelled, but in 1924 the fleet comprised 28 almost new ships. Also, 
Lauritzen ventured into buying the Køge shipyard, a venture that turned into a 
failure due to the post-war slump and lack of competence in managing a ship-
yard.
The market downturn affected the tramp market first, where Lauritzen was 
most active. It was no longer profitable to be in tramp shipping, so Lauritzen 
needed to rethink the business strategy. The changes were made in two dimen-
sions. First, Lauritzen sought new, less turbulent markets, and therefore he ex-
panded his business in the Mediterranean, rather than mainly sailing in the 
Baltic and the North. Also, he sought to reduce his exposure to market fluctua-
tions by entering into more long-term contracts. Rather than being an inde-
pendent player, Lauritzen entered into collaborations with other shipping 
companies, for example with Swedish Lloyd, but sometimes, however, he also 
played the role of an aggressive upstart. 
In the Mediterranean, there were often opportunities to carry fruit back to 
Northern Europe. In 1923, of about 70 voyages to the Mediterranean, on 39 re-
turn voyages, fruit was carried from Spain in ventilated fruit carriers. In 1925, 
Lauritzen opened its first foreign office in Valencia, which would directly cater 
to the fruit trades. In September-October, grapes and apricots were transport-
ed, in November-January, oranges and bananas. 
During the winter of 1926, Ditlev’s son Ivar Lauritzen – who by the way was 
married to Lillian Kirkebye, daughter of the Fyffes banana importer A.W. 
Kirkebye, went to Spain and France to negotiate freight rates and conditions 
for fruit transport. He was just 26 years old. He, and his brother Knud, would 
represent Lauritzen’s strategic shift into the reefer segment. This was an impor-
tant event in Lauritzen’s history, because from that time, fruit transport was to 
become one of Lauritzen’s two main activities (the other one being wood and 
pulp from Finland). The contracts negotiated by Ivar were one-year long and 
Lauritzen’s strategy of being less dependent on the spot market was being im-
plemented. For both reefer and dry cargo, Lauritzen had to charter in six ships 
in 1926 and eight ships in 1927. 
In 1927, it was time for Lauritzen to create its own liner service. Given that 
Lauritzen was an established player in the Mediterranean fruit market, the 
company was approached by a consortium of Sicilian fruit growers. They were 
not happy with the fact that the conference Associate Liners serving the Sicil-
ian fruit export had increased their freight rates by 25%. Lauritzen established 
a line with scheduled departures from Sicily to Liverpool using eight to ten 
steamers. The conference strongly retaliated with lowered rates. Lauritzen did 
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not give in but continued competing, with the hope that they would be asked 
to join the conference. This did not happen, but the line continued carrying 
oranges and citrus from Sicily, later expanded to the north of Italy, to the UK 
until 1935 when sanctions against Italy made Lauritzen discontinue the line. 
2 Worldwide Growth
In February 1932, Lauritzen was contacted by French fruit interests. The com-
pany that was going to transport their bananas from West Africa to France had 
suddenly turned down the business, and another solution needed to be found. 
Lauritzen had experience with fruit transport, but only had ventilated fruit 
carriers, which were not regularly used for long-distance banana transports. 
However, due to the urgency of the situation, Lauritzen got the contract and 
successfully transported the bananas from Conakry in French West Africa to 
Nantes in the ships Grete and Ulla. Each ship made a profit of 20 000 DKK. After 
this success, Lauritzen offered to take care of the transport for Companie Gé-
nérale Transatlantique, which catered for the West Indies, and Agences Mari-
times Henry Lesage, carrying bananas from West Africa. Six ships were 
converted to reefers: Grete, Ulla, Erna, Else, Betty and Edith. They all had a re-
frigerated hold capacity of about 100 000 cbf and a speed of 11-12 knots. Laurit-
zen also joined a conference with Swedish Lloyd and DFDS transporting Jaffa 
fruit from Palestine and established a line from Sicily to Gdynia in Poland. Also, 
a line was established from Canary Islands via North Africa to Antwerp based 
on bananas and general cargo. The banana traffic was lucrative, generating a 
surplus in 1932 of 634 000 DKK, more than half of the total surplus of Laurit-
zen’s shipping business. It was therefore not remarkable that Lauritzen contin-
ued pursuing this segment. 
The first newbuilding that was tailormade for refrigerated cargo was Helga, 
built in 1932. It had refrigeration equipment from Atlas, and Atlas would be a 
strong partner for Lauritzen’s technological development. Her maiden voyage 
was to Chile to pick up a load of apples for Oslo. 
After the start in the Mediterranean, in 1933, Ditlev’s younger son Knud Lau-
ritzen went to New York to negotiate with South American exporters, the result 
of which was a number of contracts, from Chile and Equador to the U.S., Brazil, 
and Europe. The results from reefer shipping were good in the mid 1930s but 
the outlook was considered to be insecure due to increasing competition. 
Eight new reefers, Stella, Ninna, Laura, Jonna, Jutta, Paula, Asta, and Dora 
were delivered in 1933 and 1934 from Danish shipyards with state guaranteed 
loans. In this period of depression, it was a win-win deal. Helga and Ninna were 
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sold in 1934 at a good profit. Six ships were ordered in the summer of 1935, of 
which three were reefers. A few months later, Asta and Dora were sold to 
French fruit related companies due to flag discrimination that hindered Lau-
ritzen from participating in the French fruit traffic. The reason for all the new-
buildings was that Lauritzen believed in the future of the shipping market. He 
stated that he wanted to sell 30 of his ships and buy 30 new ships, because you 
can’t stay “in the same, old clogs”, a discursive sign of a subjective belief in a 
modern fleet. As the fruit business was developing, a series of diesel powered 
ships were built. 
In September 1935, African Reefer, the company’s first refrigerated motor-
ship, with specialized cooling machinery was delivered, followed by five more 
reefers in 1936-72. They sailed all over the world, carrying apples, pears and 
oranges from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil to Northern Europe, bananas from 
West Africa, apples and pears from the west coast of North America to the 
2 All built at Nakskov Shipyard: Canadian Reefer (1936), Brazilian Reefer (1936), Chilean Reefer 
(1936), followed by the slightly larger American Reefer (1936) and Australian Reefer (1937). 
These ships had a cargo capacity of 185 000 cbf and boasted a speed of 15.5 knots.
Figure 9 Lauritzen was the first independent reefer operator to establish itself in the global 
fruit trade. Pictured is the African Reefer in Puerto Cuatreros, Argentina in 1939  
Photo: Unknown
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Mediterranean, and bananas from Central America to San Francisco and Se-
attle. 
Also Egyptian Reefer was bought from Maersk in 1937 – Maersk dabbled in 
the reefer segment but did not commit to it (see chapter 10 about Maersk). Un-
like the other reefers at Lauritzen, this reefer had its engine placed in the aft. 
When the new reefers were delivered, all previously converted reefers went 
back to their former non-refrigerated trades. Indian Reefer and Argentinian 
Reefer were delivered from 1939 to 1941. 
During the 1930s about fifteen ships were built, around half of them reefers 
and by 1937 the fleet boasted 47 ships. Lauritzen was the biggest Danish player 
transporting refrigerated goods, although both Torm and Maersk were also en-
gaged in the fruit trade to a lesser degree. Lauritzen went into the shipyard 
business, buying Aalborg Shipyard. In the late 1930s, the overseas fruit and car-
go business was the most important part of Lauritzen. 
During the war, several of Lauritzen’s reefers were sunk, and after the war 
only four reefers were left: African Reefer, Egyptian Reefer, Indian Reefer, and 
Argentinian Reefer. 
3 Rebuilding the Fleet after the Second World War
Following the pre-war development, the liner trades were the most important 
for Lauritzen, especially the reefer trades. As soon as the fruit trade to the US 
and Europe restarted after the war, Lauritzen developed its fleet. 
In 1953, the company ordered new reefer ships: Mexican Reefer, Brazilian 
Reefer and Peruvian Reefer3. These ships were seen as the most modern afloat. 
The ships incorporated innovations such as glass wool insulation, and alumin-
ium lining instead of wood. Brazilian Reefer was christened with orange juice 
instead of champagne. The ships carried banana bunches to the US and Eu-
rope. 
In 1957-1958, three new reefers were ordered: Arabian Reefer, Belgian Reefer 
and Chilean Reefer4. Rather than being painted white, the ships were red, be-
cause of easier maintenance and also to be more visible in conditions of mist. 
The red colour became a symbol of Lauritzen. The ships were put into contract 
traffic from Ecuador to Antwerp with a departure every eighth day. The older 
ships were put into other fruit trades and also a new service with frozen meat 
from New Zealand to Japan was inaugurated in 1957. In 1962, Ecuadorian Reefer 
3 The speed was 18 knots and the cargo capacity 225 000 cbf.
4 They had a speed of 18.5 knots and a refrigerated hold capacity of 242 000 cbf.
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was delivered, which was incrementally larger and faster. Some older ships 
were sold in the 1960s to keep the fleet modern. 
From 1968 to 1974, these ships were followed by the Italian Reefer series5, six 
ships with a cargo carrying capacity of 422 000 cbf, that moved at 22.5 knots. 
These ships had deck heights which suited pallets, about 2.30-2.40 meters. 
They also had aluminium gratings, which replaced the earlier wooden grat-
ings. In short, the Italian Reefer series was designed for high speeds and palle-
tised cargo, similar to the Salén Snow class. According to representatives of 
Lauritzen reefers, the Italian Reefer series was a breakthrough from earlier ship 
series ordered by Lauritzen. 
Moving to the corporate level, we can see that although the reefer part of 
Lauritzen was growing, Lauritzen was losing market share in general cargo and 
these lines were discontinued. To continue growing, Lauritzen diversified into 
various shipping segments and increased its industrial interests. Lauritzen 
moved into tankers and shipping to the polar regions in the early 1950s. The 
industrial division also expanded, with Atlas in the lead, providing refrigera-
tion equipment to many different sectors. After having bought shares gradually 
for about 20 years in DFDS, a company which had domestic and international 
5 Italian Reefer, Nippon Reefer, Persian Reefer, Roman Reefer, Samoan Reefer and Tunisian Reefer.
Figure 10 Ecuadorian Reefer sailing through the Kiel Canal in 1964 
Photo: Magnussen, Friedrich / Stadtarchiv Kiel
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lines as well as three shipyards, Lauritzen managed to take control of the ship-
ping company in mid-1960s. The adventurous polar traffic diminished, while 
the oil tankers rendered good results. As a general assessment, the 1950s and 
1960s were very good for Lauritzen, particularly from the end of the 1950s and 
onwards. 
4 Lauritzen Peninsular Reefers 1970-1983: the Shark’s Teeth
Around 1970, Lauritzen adopted a pool concept in the reefer segment, “in order 
to secure economies of scale through the control of a large number of vessels 
from other owners”6. Here the histories of the British liner company P&O and 
Lauritzen were to intertwine. P&O had for decades been transporting reefer 
cargo in their liner vessels but had also invested in specialized reefers. But at 
the time, P&O had no experience in the tramp reefer segment and was looking 
around for a partner. They went to the market leader Salén Reefer Services, 
who offered P&O to put their ships in the Salén pool. P&O wanted more, but 
this was about all that Salén were prepared to offer, they were the market lead-
er, and not seldom perceived to have some of the arrogance that can follow 
from holding such a position. P&O turned to the second largest company in 
the reefer segment – Lauritzen – and got a better deal. 
What was negotiated was a joint venture – each of the partners, that is, P&O 
and Lauritzen were going to put ships into the newly founded company Laurit-
zen Peninsular Reefers (LPR) and operate the ships together. What is impor-
tant to remember is that Lauritzen had significantly more experience than 
P&O in the segment. Given that Lauritzen had more experience, most of the 
staff were from Lauritzen, but there were also people from P&O that joined the 
company, which was operated from Copenhagen. There were potential syner-
gies – while Lauritzen had a limited presence on the global market, P&O as a 
liner company had a worldwide network of agents, which could be a valuable 
support for the highly international reefer trades. 
In the negotiation phase, Lauritzen had more reefers than P&O, so P&O 
went to the Norwegian Yard Drammen to build more vessels. P&O and Dram-
men jointly built four reefers and they were included in LPR. LPR was also a 
way for Drammen to continue building reefers. This shipyard even owned reef-
ers that they put into the LPR operation7. 
6 Lauritzen News 2007/7, p. 11.
7 The Drammen manager said: “British P & O came to Drammen and told us about a collabora-
tion [...] under the name Lauritzen Peninsular Reefers. As the cooperation should be equal, 
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LPR thus functioned as a pool operating both Lauritzen’s and P&O’s ships, 
as well as those of Peter Berg, owner of Drammen Shipyard. The collaboration 
started in 1971. In the beginning, the new company owned 16 ships plus char-
tered-in tonnage. By 1975, LPR controlled a combined fleet of 25 ships. Accord-
ing to a respondent, LPR was informaly called the “shark’s teeth”, which is a 
discursive representation of a young and aggressive organization, in tough 
competition with Salén. And not the least, LPR saw themselves subjectively as 
a fierce, and wild, competitor to Salén’s and other operators. During this peri-
od, from 1978 to 1980, four large, fast sister vessels – the Asian Reefer class were 
delivered to Lauritzen8. 
LPR was according to many respondents successful, but in the early 1980s, 
the mother company P&O was in trouble. The general cargo division of P&O 
was suffering from the shipping crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978, 
the fleet list GCD – the general cargo division of P&O – was about 110 ships, and 
in 1983 all the ships were disposed of. P&O might have been able to keep its 
operation in the reefer segment, but the reefer market was weak in the early 
1980s. Therefore, in 1983, LPR disbanded and Lauritzen continued as Lauritzen 
Reefers.. P&Os reefers were sold to the Greek shipowner Comninos and the 
Singaporean shipyard Sembawang. 
Alhough the relationship was discontinued, according to employees of LPR, 
the experience of the collaboration was good. The company was organized in 
a fair 50/50 fashion. The two partners were equal and the collaboration be-
tween them was very good. Both partners were interested in the reefer seg-
ment, and P&O often sent trainees to the office in Copenhagen to increase 
knowledge about the reefer market. Both representatives of P&O and Laurit-
zen pointed out, however, that the tonnage that P&O entered the LPR collabo-
ration with was not good. The ships were perceived to be beautiful, but did not 
have optimized cargo capacity, and some of them were very unstable in bad 
P&O needed four additional vessels in the fleet. A board decision was made in P&O to build 
two ships at Drammen, assuming that Berg would also add two ships into the new constella-
tion, as part of P&O’s fleet. [...] So, the shipyard suddenly received a welcome filling of the 
order book until 1978. – I got a seat on the board of directors of the new operator in Copenhagen. 
It gave us the ability to build reefers for ourselves. If the shipyard did not get new contracts, 
we could continue building reefers and employ them in Lauritzen Reefers Peninsular. And we 
could also sell ships when the opportunity arose, explains Berg. Following this philosophy the 
shipyard built reefers to be owned by themselves: Ragni Berg, Elisabeth Berg (in Haugesund), 
later also Elizabeth B and Cäcilia B Borgen, P.O. and Heieren, R. 2011, Made in Drammen : in-
dustrihistorie fra en østlandsby med hovedvekt på perioden 1870-1970, Drammen : Drammen 
Rotary, p. 125. 
8 Asian Reefer, Balkan Reefer, Canadian Reefer, Ecuadorian Reefer with a hold capacity of 588 
000 cbf each.
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weather. It was even explained that one of the ships sailed around with 500 
tons of concrete to keep it upright. 
Looking at Lauritzen from the corporate level, DFDS was suffering from 
losses, and its fleet was reduced significantly in the early 1970s, leading to im-
proved profitability. The Lauritzen group entered into the offshore business by 
buying a drillship in 1973-4, which turned out to be a success. Lauritzen had 
entered into long-term contracts for the tankers, and the reefer segment was 
not affected by the more general slump in shipping markets. 
The 1970s were marked by the death of Ivar Lauritzen in 1974 and Knud Lau-
ritzen in 1978. When Knud Lauritzen died, the Lauritzen group consisted of 60 
Danish and international businesses, with a turnover of 4 billion Danish kro-
ner, and with 12500 employees. The shipping business – shipping services, off-
shore, and DFDS – stood for 46 percent of the turnover. After Knud Lauritzen’s 
death, the professional managers gained power. The professionalization of 
Lauritzen led to a corporate structure where, according to Ole Lange’s narra-
tive, responsibility was everywhere and nowhere. Many ambitious projects 
were embarked upon by the new leaders, for example DFDS cruises in the US 
(New York – Bahamas), which almost led to the demise of the Lauritzen group. 
To try and save DFDS, not only were the cruise activities dismantled and the 
newly bought ships were sold – also two rigs and two heavy-lift ships from the 
profitable offshore business had to be sold. But the problems went deeper, so 
new equity had to be raised for DFDS. The shipyard business was ailing as well, 
and this business was restructured, focusing the newbuilding activities to 
Frederikshavn. 
Table 6 LPR’s fleet in 1975
P&O’s ships in LPR Lauritzen’s ships in LPR
Wild Auk Italian Reefer
Wild Avocet Nippon Reefer
Wild Cormorant Persian Reefer
Wild Curlew Roman Reefer
Wild Flamingo Samoan Reefer
Wild Fulmar Tunisian Reefer
Wild Grebe Chilean Reefer




5 From Beautiful to Economical Ships: the Entry of the ULRCs 
After the dismantlement of LPR, Lauritzen sought pool partners, and contin-
ued to develop the business. In the early 1980s Lauritzen developed a new type 
of reefer – the ULRC (Ultra Large Reefer Carriers), also called the African Reef-
er class, or the Jumbo Class. This was a ship type which was developed inhouse 
by Lauritzen with the input of the commercial and the cargo people. The jum-
bo ships are sometimes described as boxes with an engine in the aft, and as 
stable workhorses. These are discursive traces showing that the ships were op-
timized for cargo space and low bunker consumption, and not as fast nor as 
beautiful as previous reefer ships. They were designed for 17.5-18 knots. 
Although the Italian Reefer series had capacity for carrying pallets, the Jum-
bo class was the first one explicitly designed to carry pallets, with strong grat-
ings, designed for pallet handlers and forklifts. The ships were also very 
box-shaped in order to optimize the intake of pallets. The first ones were Anne 
B and Betty B, which were built by the pool partner Finn Bugge in Japan in 1983. 
Norwegian Finn Bugge had a close relationship to NYK in the 1960s and 1970s 
when he did most of their tanker spot fixtures. People at NYK introduced him 
to the Tsuneishi Shipyard in Kyushu, Japan, and he ordered a number of tank-
ers in the 1970s. It is within the scope of this long-standing relationship with 
Tsuneishi shipyards that he built Anne B and Betty B. These two ships are called 
pre-Jumbo ships, since they did not have aluminium gratings for carrying pal-
lets. 
After the pre-Jumbos were built, six Jumbo ships followed, four built in 1984-
1985 and two in 1988, owned by pool partners such as Saudi Arabian Company, 
Sembawang, and Henrik von Platen. Lauritzen representatives recall that Salén 
were building the Winter ships at around the same time, and that they were 
beautiful racing ships, but less optimized for cargo and had a significantly 
higher fuel consumption than the Jumbos. The Salén vessels were regarded as 
fancy and advanced while the Jumbos were optimized workhorses. This re-
membrance is a trace showing that Lauritzen perceived themselves subjec-
tively to be more about business than beauty. 
The early 1980s was also a time of business development at Lauritzen. A deal 
that is remembered by a respondent was when Lauritzen tried to break into 
the South African deciduous exports market. They already had good relation-
ships with Outspan, the citrus exporter, but the South Africa Deciduous Fruit 
Board was committed to liners and Salén’s Snow and Winter classes. Luckily, a 
new person became the head of the marketing board and wanted to make 
some changes. Because of the Jumbo ships, Lauritzen could offer rates that 
were lower than the liners. Salén and Blue Star Line were also interested but it 
was Lauritzen that picked up the business. 
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The main competitor, Salén, was in trouble during the the early 1980s. Dur-
ing Salén’s crisis, Chiquita reportedly felt that Salén was not adequately taking 
care of their business relationship. Chiquita had through the affiliated German 
banana company Atlanta gained experience with two ships of the Asian Reefer 
Class. They liked those ships and did a deal with Lauritzen, thus moving busi-
ness away from its “purveyor to the court”. By outcompeting Salén in this pres-
tigious business relationship, Lauritzen subjectively perceived themselves to 
be number one. 
Still, the market was not good, and the reefer division was under pressure 
from corporate management. LPR was history and Lauritzen now had to han-
dle the investment and operation on its own. Apart from the new Jumbo class, 
other ships were in the pool, for example as a result of Saléninvest’s bankrupt-
cy. Although Lauritzen Reefers had developed its pool since the end of LPR, it 
was still not earning enough money. 
As many companies do in periods of crisis, Lauritzen brought in consul-
tants, from McKinsey, to scrutinise Lauritzen’s businesses and suggest ways 
forward. In 1985, a report was presented by McKinsey about the reefer seg-
ment, suggesting two plans, plan A and plan B. Plan A was to dismantle the 
whole reefer segment, selling all ships, which would lead to an income of 940 
million DKK. Plan B was to significantly scale-down the operation. The McKin-
sey report came as a big blow to the people within the reefer division who 
thought that McKinsey did not have an accurate understanding of the busi-
ness. For example, McKinsey suggested that backhaul cargo should be sought 
for, but did not give any indications about what kind of backhaul cargo was 
interesting. And the top management was also shocked, calling the suggestion 







Anglian Reefer, late Jumbo
Argentinian Reefer, late Jumbo.
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to cut back on reefers “a big bomb” which would have severe negative repercus-
sions. The long tradition of Lauritzen’s reefer division definitely played a part 
in the negative reactions to the report. This was of course related to the subjec-
tive self-perception that an important part of Lauritzen’s DNA was related to 
reefers. The argument against plan A was that this would lead Lauritzen to be 
dependent on the offshore sector – a high risk sector. It was decided that Lau-
ritzen should go for plan B. Reefer activities would be cut back and any new 
investments would be made by pool partners rather than by Lauritzen. In the 
end, the McKinsey report changed little in the short run, since plan B was al-
ready in motion since the early 1980s. But we believe that the report did estab-
lish one thing – the reefer division was no longer a sacred cow. 
Problems continued and during 1985 and 1986, there were losses in the range 
of 70-120 million DKK in the reefer segment. The offshore market also collapsed 
and Lauritzen recorded a 486 million DKK loss in 1986. At the 1987 general 
meeting, Ole Lauritzen criticised the company’s management, claiming that 
they had lost 3 billion kroner over the previous nine years. The problems con-
tinued. In the summer of 1988, Danyard suffered a crisis that endangered the 
whole group. 
6 The Family Class and the Weak 1990s
To solve the shipyard crisis, the upper management devised a bold plan: a so-
phisticated ship that would increase the competitiveness of Lauritzen’s ship-
yards. The development of this ship type was supported by the Danish Ministry 
of Industry’s Project Ship programme, an effort to strengthen the innovative-
ness of Danish shipyards. Lauritzen’s innovative ship, was first conceptualized 
as a container ship, but later became more and more linked to the fate of the 
reefer division. A related fact was that the reefer market was improving from 
1987. The concrete project was about creating a new type of reefer, with smaller 
crews, less energy consumption, and less time in port. The ship would have a 
cargo capacity of 765 000 cbf and therefore be the world’s largest specialized 
reefer vessel. Its advanced and automated control systems implied that they 
could be manned with a crew of just six persons. It later turned out that they 
required more than this in practice, at least nine, but it was still very low. 
The Family Class, as this ship type was called, stemmed from a technology 
push from the corporate level rather than a real demand in the reefer market. 
Indeed, top managers at Lauritzen Reefer considered the Family class to be 
unsuitable for the reefer trades and felt that their opinions about the project 
were ignored. The negativity within the reefer division towards the Family 
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class was not an anti-innovation sentiment, but more a concern about the cost 
of the new ships. During the unfolding of the project, the two late Jumbo ships 
Anglian Reefer and Argentinian Reefer were up for sale in the open market for 
about 17-18 MUSD per ship, which the reefer division considered much more 
sensible investment than the plan to order Family class ships for more than 50 
mUSD each. Although the reefer division tried, they could not convince the 
upper echelons that these were good investments. The upper management 
had their focus on the Family Class. Related to the subjective dimension of the 
theoretical framework, they were not only convinced of the business sense of 
the idea, but given the way the ship was discussed and presented they felt a 
strong pride for the innovation. 
Three large Family class vessels were ordered at Danyard, and later a fourth. 
The price of the first two reefers was 54 mUSD each. While the first three ships 
were designed to take laden containers under deck, the fourth one was a 
stripped-down version of the first three, which led to a price of about 10 mUSD 
less. 
After the Family class vessels had been delivered, there was a conference 
where the results of the Family class vessels and the Anglian Reefer, a Jumbo 
class vessel, were tabled on the same graph. Basically the two ships had the 
same earnings, which was a matter of discontent for the managing director of 
Lauritzen, since the price of a Family class vessel more than doubled that of a 
Jumbo vessel. Given this reaction, one might argue that he held a subjective 
belief that these vessels had to earn more than the conventional Jumbo vessels. 
For these low earnings, the Reefer division, rather than the Family class vessels, 
was held accountable. 
For the reefer division, the following time was dedicated to increasing the 
profitability of the Family class vessels, mostly by developing new trades. 
The reefer division developed a business with Noboa which put the ships on 
a triangular service from Ecuador to Long Beach with bananas and then cit-
rus to Japan in the compartments vacated by the Ecuadorian cargo, and then 
managed to find some backhaul business from Japan to South America with 
cars. According to many, that was the best utilization of the Family class. To 
handle this triangular trade and make it sustainable over time, several new 
offices were opened or significantly expanded in Ecuador, Peru, Long Beach 
and Tokyo, solely for servicing the Family class vessels, which of course also 
increased cost. Some employees at Lauritzen were very proud of this trade, 
which they considered one of the first liner businesses in reefer shipping, and 
that this idea could be exported to the Atlantic. This is yet another sign of the 
subjective dimension – that the reefer division not only considered the higher 
profitability of the vessels, but also felt pride because they had a liner business. 
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It is evident that wild newcomers – the independent reefer operators – still 
subjectively believed that the business of the traditional liner companies was 
desirable. But notwithstanding the triangular system, the trade was according 
to some not good enough if you take the building price and fuel consumption 
of the ships into account. 
With the exception of the Family class vessels, the reefer division developed 
according to its former strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Apart from ex-
panding the fleet with two Jumbo vessels, Lauritzen entered into an ownership 
agreement with Gustaf Erikson. Gustaf Erikson was a shipping company from 
Åland in the Baltic Sea that had operated small reefers in the International 
Reefer Services pool in Hamburg. They were looking to enter into the segment 
of larger reefers, which was potentially more profitable and more prestigious 
from a subjective point of view. Most of the expansion in Gustaf Erikson was 
attributable to the Norwegian broker Thor Ronhovde. He had appeared as a fi-
nancier of Gustaf Erikson and wanted to make the company a significant owner 
and operator of larger reefers. The foundation of this intended transformation 
Figure 11 The Family Class were controversial, they were innovative but expensive. They 
showcased Danish shipbuilding and did generate orders for Lauritzen’s Danyard, 
including several vessels for Chiquita’s Great White Fleet. The Ditlev Lauritzen is 
pictured sailing in the Port of Rotterdam, 2005 for NYKLauritzenCool  
Photo: AlfvanBeem
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was the order of a series of ships, the Penguin class, at Kvaerner’s Kleven yard. 
As the delivery drew closer, it became apparent that Gustaf Erikson required 
additional operational know-how and sought to partner with amongst others, 
Lauritzen. 
Gustaf Erikson
The Åland-based company bearing his name was founded by Gustaf Er-
ikson in 1913 and acquired its first reefer, Kallsö, in 1950. In 1957, the com-
pany built a reefer at their own shipyard in Nystad, Finland. The ships 
were employed in the spot trade, but also operated a line between the 
European Continent and Canada and the US. For about a decade, Gustaf 
Erikson operated a liner service with fruit from Spain to Finland. 
In 1977, another three reefer ships were built at the company’s own 
shipyard. In 1978, the company had 16 reefer ships in their fleet with sizes 
ranging between 50 000 – 90 000 cbf, and their specialty was carrying 
deepfrozen commoditiesa.
Note: a Malmberg and Hag 2013.  
Five vessels, one of which was owned by Lauritzen, were added to the Laurit-
zen pool, a larger version of the Penguin Class, dubbed the Emperor Penguins. 
The Penguin ships are often described as being good from the engine room 
forward. The engines were fraught with quality problems but, nevertheless, 
around 18 ships were ordered in the series. Like many entrepreneurs in the 
reefer industry, Thor Ronhovde encountered problems in this difficult market 
situation. The bold entry into the larger reefer segment failed and also ended 
Gustaf Erikson’s history as a shipowner. During this turbulence, Lauritzen 
bought three more of the Emperor Penguins. The rest of the distressed tonnage 
ordered by Gustaf Erikson was coordinated through the company WISIDA, to 
which Per-Olof Oweson – a former Saléninvest and Cool Carriers keyperson 
was recruited. 
For Lauritzen, the addition of the Family Class vessels, the Jumbo reefers, 
and the Emperor Penguins resulted in a growth of the Lauritzen Reefer pool. 
From a capacity of 15.4 million cbf in 1988, it grew to 21.5 million cbf in 1993. 
Peter Weitemeyer, president of J. Lauritzen, commented with pride that ”Lau-
ritzen has the most modern reefer fleet in the world”9. But, many other reefer 
companies expanded during this period, and former Soviet reefers entered 
9 “Lauritzen hopes for thaw in ice-cold reefer market”. TradeWinds 6 August 1993, p. 10.
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into the international market which caused an oversupply of tonnage. Corre-
spondingly, the market fell from 80 cents per cubic foot/month in 1991 to 55 
cents in 1993. Protectionism in the European Union first against the import of 
apples from Chile and then the favouring of ACP bananas rather than dollar 
bananas, led to further market depression. Lauritzen’s business was disadvan-
taged by these regulation changes and profitability suffered accordingly. 
Like in the early and mid-1980s, Lauritzen Reefer was in the red. At Laurit-
zen Reefer, much critique was directed at the Family class vessels. In the early 
1990s, according to upper management of Lauritzen, they became embroiled 
in corporate politics, rather than business. In this situation, some top manag-
ers in Lauritzen Reefers left the Reefer division to pursue other opportunities. 
Torben Naesvang and Mikael Lund were the managing directors of the reefer 
department. Naesvang left for Armada Shipping in 1993 and Mikael Lund was 
transferred to Kosan Tankers. This is similar to how a number of top executives 
left Cool Carriers in the early 1990s to pursue other opportunities due to a sub-
jective feeling of stagnation, decline, and lack of excitement. 
The Lauritzen group was recording losses, 393 million DKK in 1993, and 346 
million in 1994. To deal with this crisis, the Lauritzen’s new strategy would be 
concentrate on less segments within shipping. In 1995, the business was fo-
cused on chartered-in bulk tonnage, reefers, the Greenland trade, and the gas 
and product carriers, while the tanker and offshore business segments were 
dismantled.
After a few years of the newly built Family trade, Lauritzen lost the Noboa 
contract to Cool Carriers and the circular trade was disrupted. This aggravated 
the financial problems in Lauritzen Reefer. To assure a stable income from the 
ships, they were chartered to Cool Carriers. Although the Family class came 
under critique at Lauritzen Reefers, how did the ships affect Lauritzen’s ship-
yards? The skills and competitiveness of Danyard developed during the Family 
Class project and led other companies to place orders for similar, but less so-
phisticated vessels at Danyard. Five ships for DIFKO for service with Noboa, six 
640 000 cbf reefers were built for Chiquita and two 625 000 cfb reefers for 
Geest. In the time period of three and a half years from 1990 Danyard had built 
17 reefers. It has been recounted that these ships have been very successful for 
their owners. Whether they were profitable for the shipyard is not clear. 
Notwithstanding, the results of the reefer division were not good, which put 
the division under heavy pressure from the upper management. It’s told that 
one of the owners had his office next door to the reefer department, and every-
day the reefer employees would hear how unhappy he was with them. There 
was a requirement from the owners to deliver a 13 % return on investment, 
which seemed to be impossible. They cut down on unprofitable trades which 
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also made the operation smaller. It was no longer of interest to run a pool to 
earn money for other owners. The Lauritzen pool was terminated in 1996/1997, 
after which Lauritzen Reefers was established as a stand-alone entity operat-
ing tonnage fully owned and chartered by Lauritzen. In this way, Lauritzen also 
lost the upsides of a pool – to get a wider market presence. The market was not 
always bad in the end of the 1990s, but the reefer division was still suffering 
losses. The cost cutting and discontinuation of trades continued and at the end 
of 1999, Lauritzen Reefers fleet comprised 31 reefer vessels with a total capacity 
under deck of 16.9 million cbf. In an annual report from 1999, it is written that 
“Throughout 1999, J. Lauritzen A/S has been advocating consolidation in [...] 
the [...] reefer markets” and that “With the exception of Lauritzen Reefers, J. 
Lauritzen A/S expects an improvement in the results of the individual business 
areas in comparison with 1999.”10
The upper management of the reefer division was interested in trying to 
create something together with some other player, rather than standing back 
and watching Lauritzen Reefers slowly decay. This is also similar to the devel-
opment at Cool Carriers, where the upper management tried to find owners 
and investors that supported the ideas of the organization. In 1998, Torben Jan-
holt became the CEO of Lauritzen. He had experience with reefers and was 
allegedly very pragmatic in contrast to the previous CEO. He listened to the 
upper management of the reefer division. Janholt tried to make a joint venture 
with Höegh but it did not materialize. He approached Seatrade and was pre-
pared to let the new joint venture be placed in the Netherlands, but the two 
parties could not agree. The solution that was arrived at was to buy Cool Carri-
ers. It was a software organization and could therefore be acquired cheaply 
compared to creating a joint venture with an organization owning hardware. 
7 LauritzenCool: Two Market Leaders Become One
At the end of 2000, Lauritzen announced the take-over of Cool Carriers for 35.4 
million USD. It was stated in the annual report of 2000 that “Through the ac-
quisition of Cool Carriers AB at the end of the year, JL carried through the long 
awaited consolidation in the reefer market”.11 It was further explained that “the 
acquisition of Cool Carriers AB, forms the natural foundation for JL’s contin-
ued engagement in reefer transport [...] though its contribution is hardly likely 
10 Annual Report Lauritzen 1999, p. 4, 6.
11 Annual Report Lauritzen 2000, p. 6
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to include increased investment in tonnage”12. Since Lauritzen was not inter-
ested in increasing its investment in tonnage, they did not buy any of Höegh’s 
ships. 
The acquisition of its main rival in the reefer segment was a way to consoli-
date and to turn red figures into black. Lauritzen Reefer’s losses had that very 
year been about 140m DKK, but the synergy effects from Cool Carriers and Lau-
ritzen’s operations was expected to be 15 mUSD per year13. The CEO of Laurit-
zen Reefer at the time was Birger Lindberg Skov. He explained that part of the 
reason to buy Cool Carriers was to get hold of the income that the Family Class 
vessels generated for Cool Carriers. A few years earlier, Lauritzen Reefer had 
chartered these vessels to Cool Carriers, which prided itself in being able to 
employ the vessels more efficiently and profitably than Lauritzen Reefer. Cool 
Carriers subjectively derived strong pride from their market and trade knowl-
edge. 
When the announcement came, the staff at Cool Carriers were shocked. A 
Cool Carriers employee said: “We were petrified. Lauritzen was our worst com-
petitor.” At the same time in Copenhagen there was a meeting in which it was 
declared that Lauritzen bought Cool Carriers, but rather than moving the op-
eration to Copenhagen, the new head office was to be in Stockholm. Mats Jans-
son, head of Cool Carriers, stated that it was remarkable that Lauritzen 
accepted that the new company, LauritzenCool, would be based in Stockholm. 
Indeed, it’s not the usual way of doing things when one buys a competitor’s 
operation. 
A few Lauritzen employees started working in Stockholm. A top executive 
from Lauritzen explained that he thought that the Stockholm office had a bet-
ter management structure than the Lauritzen office, which as we know, had 
been in quite some turbulence during the 1990s. He also looked forward to 
work with Mats Jansson and Lars Rutberg, two experts within the reefer indus-
try. Other former employees from the Copenhagen office joined Arctic Reefers, 
which had been established in Stockholm, but now moved its headquarters to 
Copenhagen. Arctic Reefers, as we have explained earlier, had an identity as a 
profitable but second-tier operator due to its old tonnage. 
That Lauritzen and Cool Carriers joined forces was seen as a good move 
from the perspective of both organizations. The fleet size increased. Compe-
tence from both organizations could be utilized. Lauritzen had a good network 
in South America. In Argentina, Lauritzen and Cool Carriers were more or less 
equally strong, but Lauritzen was stronger in Chile and in Brazil. While Cool 
12 Annual Report Lauritzen 2000, p. 6-7
13 Annual Report Lauritzen 2000, p. 6-8
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Carriers had worked with large exporters from Chile, Lauritzen had developed 
their own liner services from Chile, having good contacts with both larger and 
smaller exporters.
From the perspective of the Stockholm office, Lauritzen’s ownership was 
quite hands-on. They wanted to implement their own systems in Lauritzen-
Cool. Furthermore, many cultural differences were perceived between Danes 
and Swedes, for example that the Danes were more deal-driven than the 
Swedes who wanted a systematic, functioning operation of the ships, and that 
the Danes were faster than the Swedes, and that the Danes were more prone to 
loud discussions and voicing of opinions than the Swedes. 
Deregulation of export and import markets had now progressed, and in an 
interview Mats Jansson explained that this posed demands on LauritzenCool. 
Rather than being a provider of transport capacity, LauritzenCool needed to be 
able to offer full transport solutions to a larger number of smaller customers. 
Given this change in the competitive landscape, LauritzenCool Logistics (LCL) 
was created. The idea was to offer intermodal door-to-door transport for refrig-
erated cargo. The maritime transport could be done by any of LauritzenCool’s 
reefers or sometimes with container lines. LCL grew and was seen as a core 
part of the new LauritzenCool. 
Furthermore, the threat from container lines had become significant. Many 
larger container lines had now increased their capacity to carry refrigerated 
cargo on North-South routes, rather than focusing on East-West routes. How 
would LauritzenCool compete with the container lines? Mats Jansson stated:
In several ways, and partly by joining the concept. Our reefer vessels have 
significantly increased their capacity for carrying containers on deck. We 
have also extended our liner services. Our advantage is shorter transit 
time: we make few port calls, whereas the container lines have many 
scheduled ports to visit. We also have greater flexibility: should a custom-
er quickly need additional capacity, we can send an extra reefer ship to 
meet that urgent need – not to mention a change of port destination at 
short notice.14 
He concludes that the question whether reefers or container will win out was 
the wrong question. Instead, the two alternatives should be described as “spe-
cialized reefer operators with full focus on carriage of perishable cargo, under 
deck and in reefer containers on deck” and “container lines carrying reefer 
containers in addition to their core business”. And the relevant question was 
14 LauritzenCool in perspective, p. 3-7. 
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whether specialized reefer operators would be able to match the global con-
tainer lines in offering the most competitive solutions for the overseas ship-
ment of reefer cargo. Here it is clear from a discursive perspective that Mats 
Jansson believed that the way the reefer industry spoke about reefers vs con-
tainer lines was not fully adequate – in other word, the discourse does not 
match the material dimension of the theoretical framework. One needs to 
change the discourse in order to truly understand what is at stake. 
Table 8 LauritzenCool’s fleet in 2003 (excluding ReeferShip)
Class/Name Cbf Built Reefer container plugs
Family Class
Ditlev Lauritzen 759 000 1990 184
Ivar Lauritzen 759 000 1991 184
Jorgen Lauritzen 759 000 1991 184
Knud Lauritzen 759 000 1990 184
Jumbo Class
Belgian Reefer 691 000 1983 68
Brazilian Reefer 691 000 1984 68
Swan Chacabuco 677 000 1990 45
Amer Choapa 674 000 1987 45
Chaiten 674 000 1988 54
Island
Dominica 644 000 1993 108
St. Lucia 644 000 1993 108
Tundra
Tundra Queen 596 000 1991 129
Tundra King 595 000 1991 129
Tundra Princess 595 000 1991 129
Lady
Lady Korcula 590 000 2000 120
Lady Racisce 590 000 2000 120
Hansa
Hansa Lübeck 592 000 1990 80
Hansa Stockholm 592 000 1991 80
Hansa Bremen 590 000 1989 80
Hansa Visby 590 000 1989 80
Summer
Summer Meadow 590 000 1985 82
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Class/Name Cbf Built Reefer container plugs
Summer Flower 590 000 1984 82
Summer Wind 589 000 1985 82
Summer Bay 589 000 1985 82
King Ivories
Atlantic Reefer 601 000 1998 61
Pacific Reefer 601 000 1999 61
Ivory Girl 566 000 1996 70
Polarstern 564 000 1999 104
Polarlicht 564 000 1998 104
Ivory
Ivory Nina 527 000 1990 30
Ivory Dawn 527 000 1991 30
Ivory Tirupati 527 000 1989 30
Ivory Ace 527 000 1990 30
Mexican Reefer 527 000 1994 44
Reef
Polar Chile 537 000 1993 47
Polar Uruguay 537 000 1993 47
Polar Colombia 529 000 1992 47
Polar Ecuador 529 000 1992 47
Mountain
Amer Whitney 508 000 1990 0
Amer Himalaya 503 000 1990 14
Amer Fuji 502 000 1990 14
Amer Everest 495 000 1989 0
Amer Annapurna 478 000 1987 66
Rapa 461 000 1990 25
Atlantik Frigo 460 000 1989 25
Emperor Penguins
Chilean Reefer 424 000 1992 42
Peruvian Reefer 424 000 1992 42
Scandinavian Reefer 424 000 1992 42
Packer 378 000 1990 80
Planter 378 000 1989 80
Transporter 378 000 1990 80
Table 8 LauritzenCool’s fleet in 2003 (excluding ReeferShip) (cont.)
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Class/Name Cbf Built Reefer container plugs
Crystal
Pride 376 000 1992 29
Primadonna 375 000 1992 29
Privilege 375 000 1992 29
Prince 375 000 1992 29
Fleetwise, the focus of LauritzenCool was still on top quality, modern tonnage. 
Regarding the second-tier, older tonnage, consolidation was sought in collabo-
ration with other parties. In 2002, the venture ReeferShip was established by 
Arctic, Eastwind, and Armada Shipping, employing 53 ships in the size range of 
220 000 cbf to 600 000 cbf. 
Mats Jansson tried to initiate newbuilding projects to renew LauritzenCool’s 
tonnage but the board showed little interest. The Pallcon ship – the sideloader 
with container capacity – which was developed by Cool Carriers was present-
ed to the board but did not make an impact. Jansson explained that: “I sug-
gested how LauritzenCool ought to develop for the Lauritzen board. They did 
not want to invest in reefers while they invested heavily in other sectors. I no-
ticed quite early that reefers are not prioritized.” Gradually, it started to seem 
as if Lauritzen had acquired Cool Carriers as a way to exit the segment. No new 
tonnage was acquired.
In 2004, the feeling that Lauritzen was on its way to exiting the industry was 
confirmed. Lauritzen was successful in its other segments, such as bulkers and 
short-sea ro-ro, and had by this time decided that there was no future in reefer 
shipping. Because of this the upper management had looked around for other 
potential owners of the operation. One such possibility was presented by a 
former key person at Cool Carriers – Lars Rutberg – who for some years had 
been working for NYK Reefers. In 2004, LauritzenCool entered a tonnage shar-
ing agreement with NYK Reefers and NYK Reefers bought 50% of Lauritzen-
Cool Logistics. LauritzenCool and NYK struck a deal to create a joint venture, 
and in January 2005, NYKLauritzenCool was created. The company employed 
around 60 specialized reefer vessels ranging from 300 000-760 000 cbf with ad-
ditional capacity for reefer containers on deck, equivalent to about 20% of the 
under-deck capacity. NYK knew from the beginning that Lauritzen was going 
to exit the segment but agreed that a three-year phase out was suitable for both 
parties. 
Table 8 LauritzenCool’s fleet in 2003 (excluding ReeferShip) (cont.)
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Lauritzen finally ended its long-standing presence in the reefer segment 
when it sold its share of NYKLauritzenCool to NYK in 200715. Torben Janholt 
was praised at Lauritzen for being able to exit the reefer segment in such a suc-
cessful way. A gradual decline of Lauritzen would not have led to the same fi-
nancial outcome. 
Table 9 Turnover of Lauritzen Reefers (in mDKK 1998-2002 and in mUSD 2003-2007)
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Turnover 1688.4 1405.6 1437.1 3900.6 3342.9  
(423.4 USD)
466.7 USD 439.0 96.3 74.0 48.6
Net result -280.2 -9.0 -157.0 2.7 -96.7 ordinary 
before tax 
6.5
15.1 36.0 13.2 5.8
8 Armada’s New Reefer Venture
Lauritzen’s difficulties in the 1990s encouraged its employees to think about 
pursuing other possibilities. In September 1993, Torben Naesvang and Carsten 
Hansen decided to start working with Armada Shipping (based in Fredens-
borg, Denmark). Armada were also in the reefer segment having bought a com-
pany called Mortensen and Lange, which was the owner of Copenhagen 
Reefers. Copenhagen Reefers consisted of very specialized ships, small side-
loaders, basically carrying fish in the North Atlantic, North Sea, and the Baltic. 
Copenhagen Reefers had a fleet of four ships, one built in 1985, and three in 
1990-1991. But Armada was interested in doing something more on the reefer 
side of business. Carsten Hansen explained that “we had free hands to develop 
the business”. The market was depressed and that can be a suitable time to 
enter the market. 
Armada Reefers started to take some ships on charter, smaller ones and then 
gradually bigger and bigger. In 1996, the company started buying ships. In the 
same year, Armada bought the three Dutch Prince types ships (stemming from 
the operation of Antony Veder). Also in 1996, Armada acquired two Jumbo ves-
sels, American Reefer and Reefer Jambu, that they believed were the most prof-
itable vessels in the Lauritzen fleet. According to TradeWinds16, they paid 
15 JLauritzen. Annual Report 2007. 
16 “Armada linked to reefers this time” TradeWinds 25 April 1996.
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between USD 17.5m and USD 18m for each ship. Also, the two Japanese ships 
Amber Atlantic and Amber Pacific (both built 1989, 300 000 cbf) were bought 
from the owner Sumitomo, operated by Kyokuyo which was slowly exiting its 
reefer shipping business. The ships traded worldwide. With the Prince type 
vessels citrus was carried from Argentina/Uruguay to St Petersburg. Other 
ships traded with grapefruit from Florida to Japan, from New Zealand with 
apples and dairy, and various fish trades in the Far East. In 1996, the fleet 
amounted to 13-14 ships. 
The office was moved from Fredensborg to Switzerland, where the rest of 
Armada’s business was located. This was a move to consolidate and to cut costs 
in a very weak period in the shipping markets. During its first years, Armada 
Reefers played a role in the reefer market as an outsider to the large players 
such as Cool Carriers. Shippers are often interested in creating a functioning 
market that is not oligopolistic, which benefited players of the size of Armada, 
and also Holy House Shipping. Although the reefer business of Armada was 
developed by ex-Lauritzen employees, the relationships were kept with Laurit-
zen – for example the Jumbo ships were chartered to Lauritzen. 
When Lauritzen and Cool Carriers merged, Arctic Reefers moved to Copen-
hagen and some former employees from Lauritzen joined. Armada decided to 
join Arctic creating a new company called ReeferShip in 2002 – a collaboration 
between LauritzenCool, Eastwind, and Armada. ReeferShip had a fleet of over 
50 ships, which were more spot oriented than the operation of LauritzenCool. 
Therefore, once again the reefer employees of Armada moved back to Den-
mark. The head of Arctic Reefers was Jerker Nilsson, from the Cool Carriers 
sphere. The company was founded in a weak market. The market improved 
and along with it, the pool’s results. However, LauritzenCool’s new partner, 
NYK, was not interested in running a second-tier operation such as ReeferShip. 
As a condition for them buying 50% of LauritzenCool, they wanted ReeferShip 
to be dismantled. As for Eastwind, they thought that they could navigate the 
bullish market by themselves. In 2005, the history of ReeferShip ended. 
In 2005, Maestro Shipping bought Arctic and renamed it Maestro Reefers. 
Since 2005, Maestro has sold its Prince vessels as well as the small reefers stem-
ming from Copenhagen Reefers. Maestro has since then been a self-sufficient 
operation keeping technical management and crewing in-house. They take a 
long-term view on ship maintenance, and in an interview in 2015, said that 
their vessels can go on for another 5-10 years. 
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9 Summary 
Lauritzen’s reefer operation grew out of its general cargo business in the 1920s, 
converting ships to ventilated fruit carriers and later to reefers. In the early 
1930s, Lauritzen started to trade across the Atlantic, over a decade before Salén. 
There was a subjective belief in fleet renewal, in this growing market. The Sec-
ond World War took its toll on Lauritzen’s reefer fleet, but as soon as the mar-
ket started to grow again, Lauritzen ordered newbuildings. Similar to Salén, 
Lauritzen constantly added tonnage in the 1950s and 1960s in order to cater 
to the global demands of refrigerated transport. Also, similar to Saléninvest, 
Lauritzen diversified into various shipping segments as well as shipyards. To 
gain a larger market presence, LPR was created as a 50/50 partnership, which 
is different from the concept of Salén, where the whole operation comprising 
other shipowners’ vessels was controlled by Salén. Lauritzen was during the 
1950s and onwards smaller than Salén, and of course smaller than the liner 
Figure 12 Maestro Reefers operate Jumbo-class vessels that had proven themselves with 
Lauritzen. Ice Rose, on time charter to Alaska Reefer Management, arriving in 
ballast in Dutch Harbour, Aleutian Islands 2012 to load frozen fish for East coast 
Canada and Europe
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companies, which is expressed through the discourse of the wild operator – 
“the shark’s teeth”. Lauritzen also subjectively was proud of the state-of-the-art 
ships and high-class operations. 
Similar to Salén, Lauritzen’s general profitability was ailing after the 1970s oil 
crises and the reefer division was put under pressure from the mid-1980s. Still, 
they were given leeway to invest in efficient tonnage, which according to the 
subjective beliefs was a movement from the beautiful reefers to the efficient 
reefers. They even discursively drew on the ULCC tanker concept (which car-
ries a unit of oil cheaper than any other ship due to its size), calling their reef-
ers ULRC – Ultra Large Reefer Carriers.
Lauritzen’s reefer operation was in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s 
affected by being within the Lauritzen group. They received funds to invest in 
the ULRC but they had to invest in the Family class against their will, a new-
building project which tried to exploit synergy effects within the group, but 
was seen as too expensive and too sophisticated by the reefer division who 
were now subjectively believing in the ULRCs. The profitability which never 
was enough for the upper management and the dominance of politics over 
business, led some core employees to leave the organization and pursue other 
more subjectively exciting opportunities. Towards the end of the 1990s, the 
reefer division was decreasing in size, and it seemed to be gradually disappear-
ing. To counteract this, the upper management of the reefer division suggested 
the bold step to merge with Cool Carriers and was heard by the CEO of Laurit-
zen.
Lauritzen and Cool Carriers had complementing customers and ships, but 
the merging of two proud organizations was not a simple task manifesting it-
self in discursive references to cultural differences and different national busi-
ness styles. Lauritzen had from the beginning expressed that they would 
probably not invest in tonnage, and when this became increasingly clear to the 
upper management, they subjectively felt hindered, and started to “look 
around for new owners”. In this period of consolidation, where NYK had just 
exited a collaboration with Star Reefers, to take over the LauritzenCool opera-
tion looked like a good option – something that we will discuss further in the 
part about NYK. 
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Chapter 6
Seatrade
The Netherlands is famous as a maritime trading nation. This is a rich history 
filled with the exploits of shrewd merchants, brave explorers and great ship-
ping companies and even today, Rotterdam is Europe’s biggest port. But Seat-
rade doesn’t really share this heritage, and its roots are not spectacular, in fact 
they are more mundane. It is in local shipping, with coasters, mainly plying the 
waters and riverways of Northwestern Europe, that we find the mercantile mi-
lieu that gave rise to Seatrade1. 
There had been a long tradition in Groningen, in the North of the Nether-
lands, of coastal trade. Part of the province originally consisted of peat moors. 
Ditches were built to drain the moors and in time the ditches were enlarged so 
that barges could ferry the peat to various markets. Subsequently ports and 
shipyards were located inland amongst the canals that crisscrossed the land. 
The size of the vessels constructed was necessarily small; the width of the ca-
nals limited their size. Transporting peat outwards, the captains sought car-
goes for the return trip, and thus a modest shipping industry was born. These 
coasters were small vessels carrying dry cargo and were usually in the hands of 
captain-owners who sometimes sailed with their families onboard. Local farm-
ers were not infrequently investors. The vessels, even well into the twentieth 
century, were sailing ships: spritsail barges – “tjalks” – and later schooners as 
well. Several people who sailed in this era were the ancestors of people that 
feature in the history of Seatrade and in several cases their surnames crop up 
in later years (Tammes, Schuur, Pepping, De Wit). Rebuilding Europe after the 
Second World War created a boom for the dry coastal trade and many vessels 
were constructed. The consequent cooling of the market after a few years was 
the context in which Seatrade was born.
1 This part on Seatrade is based on Peerbolte, H. (ed). 1991. Seatrade 1951-1991, Groningen: 
Seatrade, Gorter, D. 2012. Nederlandse koopvaardijschepen in beeld – Seatrade, Alk B.V., articles 
in Simply Seatrade, for example Tom Tammes recollections of his career at Seatrade (“My 60 
years of Seatrade”. Simply Seatrade 2011) as well as Willem de Bruijn’s (“Willem de Bruijn”. 
Simply Seatrade 2008, December, p. 7), articles from Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning and Tradewinds, 
and interviews with Seatrade former and present management.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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 Scheepvaartkantoor Groningen: from Coasters to Reefers 
Five captain-owners met at the Café Bleeker in Groningen on the 24th February 
1951 and started the company Scheepvaartkantoor Groningen (SKG), the same 
company that later became Seatrade. The five: E.H Schuur, C. Tammes, R.T. 
Tammes, J. Tammes and C. Lente were all in their thirties and now lived ashore. 
In his inaugural address E.H. Schuur spelt out the conditions that suggested 
the opportunity they were about to create. In the past captains had arranged 
their own cargoes. Faster ships and faster handling in ports had deprived the 
captains of the possibility to do this; there just was not time. Instead, more of 
the action had been placed in the hands of brokers. Schuur’s point was that the 
assembled captain-owners could do this for themselves and regain control 
over their vessels and, of course, the profits. The business started with a hand-
ful of coasters and an office in Groningen. The aim was to fix the vessels on 
time-charters to secure stable income in the competitive market. New ships 
were built, but the attitude was always conservative and external financing was 
used with caution. The cargoes consisted of wood, coal, clay, steel, grain, ferti-
liser, and potatoes. The number of ships in the mid-fifties was exceeding fif-
teen, and it was at this point in time when the first pool was created. Tom 
Tammes, son of C. Tammes recalls: “In order to avoid that ships (in particular 
the 1 000-ton ships) would compete against each other internally, it was de-
cided to operate these ships in a simple pool”2. The pool consisted of four half-
shelterdeckers of about 1000 ton. The idea of having a pool with vessels of 
similar capabilities is something that comes back to us in more recent times.
In the late 1950s, the era of small coasters was coming to a close and many 
shipping companies never survived. One strategy was to specialise in a grow-
ing segment such as gas tankers or reefers. Pinkster Shipping of Dublin had 
just built a reefer at a shipyard in Groningen, Nieuwe Noord Nederlandse 
Scheepswerven, which was going to operate between Ethiopia and Italy for De 
Nadai, and according to Kees Tammes3, the captain-owners were impressed. 
The decision was clubbed at the meeting on 2 December 1960 and the first 
reefer was ordered from the same yard, locally in Groningen: the Arctic. 
The ship, which was delivered in 1962, had 62 000 cbf of reefer space, about 
a tenth of the larger vessels trading today, and a speed 12.5 knots as compared 
to about 20 knots today. The Arctic, on her maiden voyage, was chartered to 
Dammers & Van der Heide, a significant player in the reefer market and a 
name that will so importantly return to us in a few years as we continue this 
2 “My 60 years of Seatrade”. Simply Seatrade 2011, August, p. 6.
3 Peerbolte 1991, p. 50.
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narrative. After being employed for a year in various trades, she got a time-
charter for two, three years for Pescanova, trading between Cape Town, South 
Africa and Vigo, Spain. Marnix van Overklift comments: “It was a good start to 
fix the ship to a prominent company”. The Spanish company Pescanova had 
found an abundance of hake along the coast of South Africa and Namibia, then 
still called South West Africa, and needed capacity to carry back the frozen fish 
to Spain. 
More reefers followed such as the Tempo in 1963, also chartered by Pescano-
va, and the Pacific in 1965, both faster at 15 knots, and alongside with the in-
crease in the reefer fleet, the coasters were gradually sold off. The Tempo and 
the Pacific were often time-chartered through the London-based reefer broker 
Andrew Olszowski in the company J.S. Hamilton, to Algerian and Moroccan 
citrus exporters as well as to Miguel Mico – a reefer broker and operator in 
London. Assisting Olszowski was the young Tom Tammes, who married his 
daughter Margaret Mico. Already at J.S. Hamilton, Tom Tammes noted that al-
though the ships were employed 6-7 months in the citrus business, it was vital 
to get employment during the Northern summer. For this off-season trade, the 
North Atlantic would be a perfect arena. 
Figure 13 The launching of the second Arctic in Westerbroek, Groningen, 1978.  
Photo: Seatrade
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At the end of 1967 Tammes started to work at SKG and was instrumental in 
setting up the reefer pool. To secure the off-season trade for the reefers, Tammes 
managed to fix the first North Atlantic voyage: “In 1967 one of the first North 
Atlantic voyages was fixed through Nils Thorstad with frozen fish from North 
Norway to Gloucester, Massachusetts, USA where father and son Frank Elliott 
took care of the stevedoring and distribution of the cargo”4. The Elliott family 
developed a longstanding relationship with Seatrade extending as far as some 
investment in tonnage.
The first North Atlantic voyage was in some respect the symbol of a new 
beginning. Scheepvaartkantoor Groningen began to take control over its own 
vessels. As a complement to chartering out to others they began to engage in 
the fish trades. A major trade for the company at the time was the transport of 
frozen fish (mainly frozen codblocks) from Norway, Denmark and Poland to 
Gloucester, Massachusetts USA. Gloucester was at the time the distribution 
point for all fish on the USA’s East Coast. On the return voyage the ships occa-
sionally picked up fish offal from Newfoundland destined for the mink farms in 
Sweden and Finland. These trades were frequently carried out at small ports, 
with tiny wharves and no stevedoring facilities to speak of. 
1 The Management Buy-Out
There were 12 reefers sailing in the fleet in 1973 when the company changed its 
name to the more internationally palatable Seatrade Groningen. Seatrade had 
grown and the workload was increasing, but it was still a small company. Mar-
nix van Overklift joined the company in 1973, but he already knew SKG well by 
that time. His father owned a few coasters and one of them came into SKG 
chartering operations in 1960. Marnix therefore knew Tom Tammes well and 
also Tom’s brother Kees. When Marnix van Overklift started to work in a short-
sea shipping company in Amsterdam at the end of 1968 he was responsible for 
managing three general cargo ships. One of the ships, which had a hold for 
reefer cargo, was trading between Morocco and Rotterdam for many years, and 
Marnix developed a liking for reefer business. He also took care of the manning 
and operation of the family’s ships, since he noticed that the “quality of seafar-
ers is vital”, especially in the reefer segment. To secure high-quality seafarers, 
he learned from Seatrade. Marnix explains that “Wim Blaauw who ran the per-
sonnel department was a friend of mine, because his father was a partner in a 
ship with my father.” Therefore, Marnix borrowed crew now and then from 
4 “My 60 years of Seatrade”. Simply Seatrade 2011, August, p. 7.
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Seatrade. In 1973, the personnel manager told Marnix that “Tom Tammes wants 
to meet you”, and Marnix joined Seatrade soon after. From Tammes’ point of 
view, there was a need for new personnel at Seatrade: 
After the delivery of the newbuilding Leo Polaris (90 000 cbf) in 1970, the 
reefer market for the smaller ships dropped and instead of having new 
ships built, several existing ships were purchased. Some of these ships 
were the ex Horn ships of around 60 000 cbf. Because of the increased 
work, I asked Marnix van Overklift to join us at SKG in 1973, killing two 
birds with one stone since he brought three ships along5.
Marnix joined a company where “things were running like they were”. It was 
not the case that Marnix and Tom radically wanted to transform the company, 
and had clear ideas how to do it. But still, there was a subjective feeling that the 
former owners were not entrepreneurial enough and more action was re-
quired. No doubt this had to do with their age – they were ready for retirement. 
They objected to business travel and felt this was expensive and had doubts 
about the necessity of it. Marnix once wanted to travel to New York and Schuur 
said “is that necessary?” Marnix said: 
I managed to convince him and I booked an excellent paying cargo and 
ending up with a vessel up in Papua New Guinea, then I sold the ship for 
good to Indonesia. Had I not built up this contact with this particular 
broker, this deal would not have happened.
Furthermore, in the 1970s, new opportunities were identified and the fish 
trades developed, which further strengthened the will of the new generation to 
take command. The major event in the mid-1970s was the extension of nation-
al economic zones to 200 nautical miles which forced many European trawler 
fleets to seek new fishing grounds. The outcome, particularly for Dutch fishing 
companies since herring fisheries were practically closed due to low stock, was 
that the targeted species became mackerel and horse mackerel which was of 
less interest to traditional markets. This combined with existing fish surpluses 
in the European Economic Community were factors that made West Africa a 
market for European fish exports. Nigeria, with its population and oil, was the 
dominant new market in Africa. Seatrade, through their broker in Norway, Nils 
Thorstad, got in touch with the Nigerian-Indian company Inlaks which started 
importing frozen fish in the mid-1970s. This is the start of Seatrade’s long 
5 “My 60 years of Seatrade”. Simply Seatrade 2011, August, p. 7.
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association with the transport of fish cargoes to West Africa. Also at that time 
a Swedish trading company called Joint Trawlers from Helsingborg developed 
strongly and with this company Seatrade entertained a lot of business to West 
Africa. Van Overklift explains:
The West Africa trade which started in 1974-1975 was quite a drive for us. 
I travelled quite a few times with Walter to Nigeria, meeting customers 
and potential customers. That’s how the know-how develops, you learn 
who is who, who’s fishing, who’s buying, etc. It was a big export of mack-
erel from Holland, as well as from Norway, Scotland, Ireland and Maure-
tania. Nigeria was in the late 1970s importing up to 800 000 metric tons of 
frozen fish per year. We were heavily involved in contracts with exporters 
but also with importers, fish from Norway, Ireland, Scotland, Shetland Is-
lands, and Holland to Nigeria. We even once had five ships simultane-
ously in Lagos, discharging fish. We might have done 250-300 000 tons of 
frozen fish to Nigeria only. That was important.
Seatrade maintained its relationships to the Dutch pelagic fishing companies 
such as Jaczon of Scheveningen, Parlevliet & Van der Plas of Katwijk, Cornelis 
Vrolijk of Ymuiden and W. van der Zwan of Scheveningen – well-organised 
trawling companies, operating large freezer trawlers in the North Sea, Atlantic 
Ocean, Morocco and Mauretania, as well as the West Coast of South America.
The perceived conservatism of the owners and the plethora of opportuni-
ties in the market led to the younger generation taking over the company in 
1976. The new owners were Tom Tammes, Henk Schuur, and Marnix van Over-
klift. Henk Schuur was the son to E.H. Schuur and was a naval architect and the 
head of the technical department. Tom Tammes had been instrumental in set-
ting up the fish trades in the North Atlantic, in fact he was known as a cold 
water man. This management buy-out did not include the ownership of the 
vessels. The old owners were offered a profit-share in return for the stock and 
could look forward to retirement as the new guard took over.
Seatrade were on the lookout for ships, customers, and know-how. An im-
portant step was taken when Geert Pepping was recruited in 1977. The Pepping 
family had a long history in shipping. Geert’s father had joined Dammers & 
Van der Heide in 1951 and had retired as the director of the technical depart-
ment in 1973. Geert Pepping worked in the chartering department of the same 
company before joining Seatrade. Marnix van Overklift knew Geert Pepping 
since they fixed ships from time to time for the transport of tuna. Van Overklift 
explains: 
128 Chapter 6
I thought it was good to bring in somebody else, and Dammers was at 
that time quite experienced with larger ships. We felt that in the long run 
you would have a better economy on larger ships than on smaller ships. 
And I thought it would be good for the company to have an addition in 
the chartering department and see how we could grow the company, so I 
invited Pepping to join as a chartering man.
Dammers were more advanced than Seatrade in the business of transporting 
fruit and operating larger reefers. Pepping brought knowledge and experience 
with the fruit business, which is the largest segment within the reefer business. 
He brought with him a few vessels owned by his family. He had a relationship 
with an important customer: the major Italian fruit trader Orsero-Fruttital/
Simba. Although Seatrade transported fruit, it is with Geert Pepping’s knowl-
edge and contacts with the large-scale fruit trade that the foundations were 
laid for later expansion into the larger size reefer segment. And indeed, after a 
few years, Pepping’s contributions were deemed substantial and he became a 
partner together with Tammes, Schuur and van Overklift. However, although 
know-how is a necessity, larger and also more modern vessels were required to 
make serious inroads into the fruit trades, for example the seasonal trades 
from Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa. It would take about five 
years until the building of the N-type “fruit carriers”. Seatrade continued to 
develop its business in the fish trades.
2 Argentina and the Atlantic Fish Trade
Spanish fishing companies in conjunction with local operators had been fish-
ing in Argentinean waters since at least the early 1970s. This fish was mainly 
Merluza, otherwise known of as Argentinean Hake, a highly sought after fish. 
This was mainly exported to Spain, Italy and the USA. Also, shrimps were car-
ried to Spain. 
In 1978, Marnix van Overklift was travelling in Argentina with the Salén rep-
resentative Thorsten Klenell. Klenell introduced Van Overklift to fishing com-
panies for a trade from Argentina and Uruguay to Gloucester, Massachusetts. 
This trade was serviced by liner companies and could be a market for small 
vessels, which did not interest Salén. Seatrade made the deal and the trade 
became important for the company. Some years they freighted close to 200 000 
tons of fish between South America and Gloucester. These fish shipments were 
first picked up at La Paloma in Uruguay. This fairly small port had a bar in the 
harbour that limited the draft of the vessels that could enter. La Paloma was 
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therefore the first port of call while the reefers were lightly laden. The vessels 
then proceeded to Mar del Plata, filled up with cargo and then sailed for 
Gloucester. The parcel-service from Argentina called at several predetermined 
ports but without a fixed schedule, like a liner service. 
This trade was developed together with the shipping agent Hector Gato of 
Oceanida, who “knocked on Marnix’ shoulder” in Montevideo. He was repre-
senting Reefer Express Lines, but he offered to represent Seatrade as well. To-
gether with Hector Gato, the fish business from Argentina to Europe and to 
West Africa and USA was developed. Marnix: “We were loading a lot of fish: up 
to 200 000 tons a year from Argentina from Southern ports to Spain and then 
Italy. Later the cargo for Italy was discharged in Eemshaven in Holland and 
trucked to Italy.” 
The ultimate integration of the Atlantic fish trades was the route Argentina 
– Gloucester – Northern Europe – West Africa – Argentina, although the trade 
to the US East Coast lasted not for many years, since the volumes were not 
enough. In Northern Europe the vessels loaded mackerel or herring in ports in 
the UK, Netherlands and Norway and sailed to West Africa, mainly Nigeria, but 
also to the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Cameroon and Angola. There were usu-
ally lengthy delays at the Nigerian ports but having discharged the vessels pro-
ceeded, usually in ballast, to Uruguay and Argentina to once again load fish 
bound for Gloucester or Europe. So this trade was a circular one, the vessels 
making an enormous clockwise tour of the Atlantic Ocean. An alternative 
was that the vessels, having discharged in West Africa, would proceed to Abi-
djan in the Ivory Coast to load frozen tuna in bulk from tuna purse seiners for 
Northwest Spain, discharging at the canneries as well as loading tuna in Tema 
(Ghana) for Puerto Rico. Seatrade also transported Greenland shrimp both to 
Denmark, Aalborg for the Royal Greenland Trade Department, and to Glouces-
ter. also transported, according to van Overklift, potatoes and citrus from 
Egypt, seed potatoes from Netherlands to North Africa, butter and poultry. In 
the mid 1970s, the fish trades accounted for about 50-60% of Seatrade’s  income. 
3 The Newbuilding Programme
Seatrade began ordering newbuildings and took advantage of the Dutch invest-
ment premiums scheme for merchant shipping that were introduced in 1976. 
The Oceanic, which was the last newbuilding ordered by the original partners 
of SKG was delivered in 1977. This ship was followed by the so-called ABC’s (At-
lantic, Baltic and Celtic), which were delivered to the Norwegian fish trade by 
the time fishing restrictions, due to overfishing, had destroyed the large-scale 
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westbound cod business in the North Atlantic around 1980. They were later 
lengthened and employed in other fish trades. The ABC’s were followed by the 
Arctic class of 130 000 cbf, later lengthened to 185 000. The old vessels from the 
1960s that still remained in the fleet were disposed of and replaced by these 
newer and larger ones. Although the size of the vessels ordered gradually in-
creases over time, it is still apparent that Seatrade at this time is maintaining 
its focus on small vessels servicing the fish trade. Alongside with the order-
ing of newbuildings, Seatrade started to engage in the sale and purchase of 
second-hand vessels. It is often stated that it is in this field that the greatest 
profits are to be made and Seatrade has increasingly since the 1980s been an 
active player in this market.
Seatrade had employed several shipyards for its newbuildings. These were 
usually local shipyards in Groningen including Nieuwe Noord Nederlandsche 
Scheepswerven. Another was Scheepswerven v/h Gebr. Van Diepen in Water-
huizen, just outside of Groningen on the Winschoterdiep canal. Before looking 
at development of the N-type and the M-type that followed it is worthwhile to 
recall that Seatrade, at this time in the early 1980s, still had much in common 
with the small company that five captain-owners formed thirty years earlier. 
Yes, it had specialised by focusing on reefers and it had grown both in size and 
ambition. However, it was still very much a Groningen company operating in a 
local milieu. The company was managed on a day to day basis by its three own-
ers who were ship-owners themselves. Ships were built locally and a signifi-
cant part of their investment came from established local investors, just as it 
had been for generations. Everyone could attend the christening of a new reef-
er; the shipyard was just a short trip way. Many of the crew onboard the ships 
called Groningen home. These things would change but it is in this context 
that the N-type was built.
The N-type, which was developed by Geert Pepping and Henk Schuur, was 
revolutionary, according to respondents at Seatrade. Marnix van Overklift de-
scribes them as “marking a shift in the company history”. The ships were revo-
lutionary to Seatrade not only in size but more so in efficiency. Not only were 
they generally larger than what the company had built previously with about 
265 000 cbf. Also, they were exceedingly “rational”. They responded well to the 
new trends in the reefer markets, namely that bunker prices remained high 
after the oil shocks, and that perishables, as well as other cargo, were increas-
ingly being transported on pallets. The N-types were designed to maximise 
their volume and could transport over 2400 pallets; and could do this with a 
small crew and in a vessel that was bunker-efficient by the standards that pre-
vailed at the time. The reason that the N-types could sail with small crew was 
related to a new shipping law that came into effect in 1983 whereby the size of 
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vessels that were categorised as “small” was increased to 4000 gross tons. This 
meant that the vessel didn’t require a radio officer for instance and that the 
crew didn’t require merchant marine documentation for deep sea trades. This 
meant that the new bigger ships could use the same crew that had sailed on 
Seatrade’s other ships. These factors reduced operating expenses. This law also 
encouraged shipowners to lengthen their smaller vessels. In any case, the N-
types were designed to exactly comply with the new regulations. 
The first of these modern cost-effective vessels was the Nautic built in 1983 
at the Gebr. Van Diepen shipyard. The management of Seatrade remember 
that the planning and discussions with the shipyard about these newbuildings 
were fairly informal. The owner of the Van Diepen shipyard regularly visited 
the Seatrade head office in Groningen on Fridays and discussed things over 
coffee. A disagreement on pricing led Seatrade to build the second of the N’s 
“across the street” from Gebr. Van Diepen at Scheepswerf Pattje and this was 
the Normandic also in 1983. Over the next three years another five N’s were 
built and a few years later another two that were slightly larger. Besides the 
Figure 14 The Nautic was the first of the N-types, efficient locally-constructed vessels, and 
the start of a long newbuilding programme that eventually established Seatrade 
as major force in reefer shipping  
Photo: Seatrade
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Normandic, all these were built at Gebr. Van Diepen. These vessels were mar-
keted as sister-ships but they actually differed slightly from one and another. 
They were ordered one at a time and as they were built Geert Pepping and 
Henk Schuur would inspect and plan for improvements to be incorporated on 
the next one. It must not be forgotten that Geert had a particular predilection 
for technical matters. The procedure was followed when the six larger6 M-type 
vessels were built at the same shipyard from 1988 to 1993. After a few more ves-
sels the era of locally built reefers ended and Japan became the source of new-
buildings. 
To sum up, eigtheen state-of-the-art reefers were built in about ten years, 
including ships for Vroon and Van Diepen itself. Dutch investment premiums 
for shipping companies helped to finance the newbuilding programme. Seat-
rade as a company was the largest investor but, as mentioned, local families 
and investors were also involved. Stakes were also taken by other parties, 
6 310 000 cbf. 
Figure 15 The M-types followed on from the N’s, they were a little larger at 310 000 cbft, and 
established a larger presence for Seatrade in the fruit trades  
Photo: Seatrade.
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including the shipyard and the agent in Gloucester. Favourable time-charters 
were obtained for many of these vessels which facilitated bank financing 
which had, as usual, also been taken.
Some of the new vessels, mainly the N’s were partly used in the company’s 
fish-trades, including the parcel-service from Argentina. They were, however, 
designed to carry palletised fruit and bananas and this meant expansion into 
the spot market for fruit trades. This included some banana business for Geest 
and Jamaica Producers, and also for the Italian fruit traders De Nadai and Ors-
ero. Seatrade acquired additional know-how including contacts in the fruit 
business when Erik Musterd, an experienced charterer, joined the company in 
1987. As with Geert Pepping, he came from their Dutch rival Dammers & Van 
der Heide. The delivery of the N-types changed the transport patterns for Seat-
rade. Rather than fish standing for 50-60% as in the mid 1970s, around 1985, 
proportionally it was around: 30% fish, 25% bananas, 25% other fruit, and 20% 
various. 
4 The Seatrade Pool
The Nigerian fish importer Primlaks that had been an important Seatrade cus-
tomer entered the reefer market in the mid 1970s. They purchased reefers orig-
inally through Jaczon and also general cargo ships that they converted to 
reefers. Their shipping operation, based in Rotterdam, faced financial difficul-
ties after a few years so the banks requested that the vessels be placed under 
professional commercial management: half of their fleet of 16 vessels entered 
the Seatrade Pool in the mid-1980s. Seatrade had operated a pool since the late 
1950s, but it was with the addition of the Primlaks vessels that the pool opera-
tion really kicked off. Other third party operators at the time include the major 
Dutch shipowner Vroon and the Dutch fishing concern Jaczon, each with a few 
vessels. Laskaridis-owned Lavinia was “in and out” of the pool. The number of 
vessels in the pool changed constantly, but in 1986/87 numbered around thirty 
vessels. Within a few years this figure would double. And later double again. 
The reason for ship-owners to enter the pool was to access competent and able 
commercial management team that could generate more income than they 
could if they operated the ships themselves. 
The pool was split into what was appropriately called Pool 1 and Pool 2. Pool 
1 consisted of the smaller vessels only doing fish-trades. Pool 2 consisted of the 
larger ones in mainly fruit trades. Seatrade, with newbuildings, fruit business 
and an expanding pool has by this stage grown into a medium-sized operator 
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in the global reefer market. Another medium-sized operator was its Dutch 
arch-competitor in Rotterdam: Dammers & van der Heide.
5 Dammers & van der Heide
Dammers & van der Heide’s Shipping and Trading Company (Dammers) of 
Rotterdam was an important and respected player in the reefer industry until 
the death of its founder7. Seatrade’s subsequent acquisition of Dammers in 
1989 caused Seatrade to double in size. The story of Dammers’ rise is a story 
worth telling for its own sake and its importance for Seatrade makes it doubly 
so. The two companies developed along similar lines, from a small coaster op-
eration, to small reefers and then to larger reefers carrying fruit. In a sense it 
was Seatrade that followed in the other’s footsteps: it was Dammers that al-
ways took the first step. However, despite some similarities, these were also 
two very different organisations. The story begins in 1945.
Jan Dammers at the age of 35, with experience in shipbroking decided to go 
his own way when the Second World War ended. The company was founded 
together with Antonius Wilhelmus van der Heide on 1 September 1945 and 
started with two small coasters, one of them the Tijger, was owned by Hendrik 
 
7 The part on Dammers is based on Gorter 2012. and Otten, J.M. 2005. Dammers & van der Heide, 
Ridderkerk: JeMoTek, and Peerbolte 1991, and interviews with Seatrade management. 
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Pepping. This was initially only a chartering and agency operation but soon 
ordered its own vessels. The Biscaya and the Casablanca, both coasters were 
delivered in 1950 and promptly and profitably sold to Indonesia in the follow-
ing year. These were the boom years of coastal shipping and vessels were in 
short supply because of the war. However, 1951 was also the year that Van der 
Heide passed away. It was also the year that Hendrik Pepping came onboard as 
the Director of the technical department.
Four more vessels followed in 1951-52, including a replacement – Casablan-
ca – reflecting that a liner service to Morocco was an important trade for Dam-
mers in the fifties. All of these vessels were built at Gusto Shipyard in Schiedam 
and were below the 500 grt limit to be classed as short sea shipping. One of 
these, the Fedala, was converted into a reefer in the mid-fifties when the com-
pany received a U.S. government contract to carry meat from Ireland to Rot-
terdam and from there by lorry to the armed forces stationed in Germany. 
Further conversions followed including the Tom van der Heide in 1957. In 1965 
this was the first Dammers vessel to be placed on time-charter with Marine 
Chartering Co (MCC) of San Francisco. This began a longstanding business in 
West Africa and South America with frozen tuna on behalf of Refrigerated Ex-
press Service; Seatrade inherited the contract when Dammers was acquired. 
Newbuilding intensified in the sixties as Dammers’ vessels started sailing in 
American waters between New York and the Caribbean on behalf of American 
Chester, Blackburn & Roder. Ten part-reefers were constructed as the “Atlan-
tics” for Atlantic Lines. These vessels had one regular hold and another that 
carried frozen cargo. These vessels were also below the 500 grt limit and were 
built at Boele Bolnes and at Nieuwe Noord Nederlandshe Scheepswerven in 
Groningen. This was in the same period as Scheepvaartkantoor Groningen 
(later Seatrade) constructed its first reefer that, as mentioned previously, was 
chartered to Dammers. Fully refrigerated vessels were also constructed during 
this period and they were larger as well. The four Inca’s were built at Gusto with 
100 000 cbf and the slightly smaller Laura Christina’s were built in France. Two 
of the former were built for a subsidiary of Anthony Veder of Rotterdam, later 
with vessels in the Seatrade pool. The end of the decade saw Dammers take on 
the management of three vessels 125-150 000 cbf from a Kuwaiti fishing com-
pany and with this also came building contracts for vessels of 160 000 cbf (“EA-
series”). There were other vessels built, purchased or chartered and vessels 
were also sold.
In 1972 Dammers & van der Heide became a serious player in the fruit busi-
ness by buying Belgian Fruit Lines (BFL), which owned six reefers at slightly over 
300 000 cbf. The vessels, known as the “Frubel-types” (for Fruit Belgium) had 
been sailing in the fruit trades, particularly bananas from Ecuador. Dammers 
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actually only bought three of the vessels; KNSM (later a part of Nedlloyd) took 
the other three but all the vessels sailed with Dammers. These vessels were 
involved in many fruit trades, not just bananas, apples from New Zealand for 
example. Most of these vessels were sold about five years later when Standard 
Fruit (later Dole) decided to re-establish itself as a shipping company. This was 
the start of the relationship that developed between Dammers and Dole. Dam-
mers also developed a strong business relationship with Chiquita. 
Hendrik Pepping had retired in 1973 but remained a shipowner until just 
prior to passing when he handed them over to his three sons. One of his sons 
was Geert Pepping who had worked in Dammers’ chartering departments in 
Monaco and Rotterdam. When Geert left to Seatrade in 1977 he took the Pep-
ping vessels with him, thus breaking the Pepping family’s long connection 
with Dammers – until Seatrade took it over in 1989.
Dammers & van der Heide had by the mid-seventies sold most of its small 
vessels though a few would remain in the fleet until the early eighties. The 
company became more focused as a reefer operator but it had developed a 
fairly diverse portfolio. It managed a couple of tankers for the Shah of Persia, a 
bulker, a ro-ro, and the Giant, a heavy lift ship. Dammers also had a liner ship-
ping agency, a travel agency and were the European agent for the Columbian 
and Venezuelan national lines. It had taken Jan Dammers about twenty years 
to build a solid and respected Rotterdam shipping company, and he had start-
ed from scratch.
The focus on reefers solidified when the Netherlands began the shipping 
investment premiums in 1976. Dammers immediately ordered eight 130 000 
cbf reefers from Nieuwe Noord Nederlandse Scheepswerven in Groningen and 
they were delivered between 1977 and 1980 and lengthened to a 181 000 cbf ca-
pacity in 1983. The first of the class was the Jan Willem, named after Jan Dam-
mers’ only son who had passed away in 1965.
Even more ambitious was the programme to build new large vessels to re-
place the older Frubels that had mainly been sold to Standard Fruit (Dole). The 
result was the Honolulu’s that were fixed on time-charter with Dole. These ves-
sels were “full-size” fruit carriers at over 530 000 cbf and were built at the Van 
der Giessen-de Noord shipyard. The initial four, the Honolulu, Lanai, Rio Frio 
and Christina were delivered in 1979-80. Two more, the Tineke (named after Jan 
Dammer’s daughter) and the Peggy Dow, were delivered in 1984 and 1985. In 
1985 Dammers also purchased three of the Spring vessels from the estate of the 
bankrupt Swedish Salén. Seatrade at the time showed no interest in these ves-
sels, they were still focused on the smaller size. 
Meanwhile the first four of the Honolulu’s had been handed back to Dam-
mers by Dole. One problem with these vessels was that they were not ideally 
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suited to palletised cargo, lacking squaremeter deckspace. There had also been 
friction between the two parties over the type of bunker fuel used. The vessels 
had been designed to be able to operate on a heavier (and thus cheaper) grade, 
something that Jan Dammers refused to allow for the auxiliary engines. He 
wanted to protect his investment but Dole was unhappy about the additional 
expense. Jan Dammers presented a long list of damage claims when the char-
ter was completed and the vessels returned. What constituted reasonable wear 
and tear? The situation was bad enough to cause Dole and Dammers to sepa-
rate for a few years before they got back together again. The immediate prob-
lem for Dammers was what to do with the newly purchased Spring vessels. The 
simplest and most expedient solution was chosen. They sailed with Cool Car-
riers for a few years on time-charter. When Dole and Dammers patched it up 
they were usually sailing for Dole. The Central America-Wilmington-Newark 
service is an example of one of the trades that the Spring’s sailed on. In 1988 
Dammers and Dole set up a joint pool but in that same year Jan Dammers died 
at the age of 77 and the family decided to put the company up for sale. Dale 
Ploughman was put in charge of the commercial operation and the Dammers/
Dole pool continued after the sale.
Jan Dammers had indicated to his family before his passing that if it ever 
should come to pass and the company had to be sold then: “Sell it to the Dutch!” 
It may very well be hearsay, but it’s also claimed that he added: “And preferably 
not to Seatrade!” There were few options however and key people at Seatrade 
were ex-Dammers. Besides Geert Pepping there was also Erik Musterd, a char-
terer and later director, who had left Dammers for Seatrade in 1987. Vroon was 
the only major Dutch shipping company, beside Seatrade, with significant in-
terests in reefers but nothing eventuated. Swedish Cool Carriers were also in-
terested. Swedish sources say that a hurdle to acquiring Dammers was that the 
vessels built with Dutch subsidies would be prohibitively expensive due to the 
conditions that were attached to them in the event of a sale to a non-Dutch 
concern. Seatrade management remark that there would have been no diffi-
culty for Cool Carriers to set up a Dutch subsidiary and that the issue simply 
boils down to Dammers’ wish to keep it in Dutch hands. The subjective percep-
tion and values of the owner thus had a clear impact on the development of 
the business. 
6 Integrating Dammers into Seatrade
The acquisition of Dammers & van der Heide in 1989 implied that Seatrade dou-
bled in size, both in terms of tonnage and personnel. A growing medium-sized 
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reefer operator was transformed into one of the market leaders. In terms of the 
number of vessels, Seatrade entered the nineties with the world’s second larg-
est reefer fleet, after Cool Carriers. In terms of capacity Seatrade was third, the 
discrepancy due to the continued presence of many smaller vessels serving the 
fish trades. Nevertheless, the major implication of the Dammers acquisition, 
besides growing in sheer size, was Seatrade’s expansion into the fruit trades. 
Doubling in size virtually overnight is of course no simple thing. In this section 
we’ll look at how the integration of the company took place and in doing so 
we can actually learn quite a bit about not only Seatrade but Dammers as well. 
After the acquisition it didn’t take long before Seatrade closed the Dammers 
head office in Rotterdam and combined the operations in Groningen. The Rot-
terdam staff was given the chance to follow with the move. Seatrade had just 
recently moved to new premises, the “Ice Cube” building, alongside the Hoorn-
sediep canal, and could handle the influx of ex-Dammers personnel. However, 
only about a third, around twenty, made the move. Yntze Buitenwerf, present 
day CEO of Seatrade in Antwerp, explains that it was a big step for many people 
to move from the cosmopolitan city of Rotterdam to a regional, semi-rural 
place like Groningen. Some of the ex-Dammers employees moved to Gronin-
gen, some commuted from Rotterdam. After a few years only a few remained. 
Mark Jansen is the Managing Director of Seatrade Holding in Groningen 
and also has a background in Dammers as a seafarer, is well placed to compare 
the two organisations. He says that the culture of the companies was com-
pletely different and adds that Seatrade was more creative, in finding back-
haul cargoes for instance, while Dammers was more traditional in its approach. 
Both Seatrade and Dammers developed out of the old dry-cargo coaster trade 
and into reefers but they did so in different ways. Seatrade maintained its 
“small-shipping” traditions and only gradually expanded the size of their ves-
sels along with their ambitions. The image that comes to mind is that of a small 
ship where everyone including the captain pitches in to do whatever needs to 
be done. Walter Wildöer at Seatrade means that this culture results in a flexible 
and “hands-on” organisation that is flatter in its structure and where people 
can make and are expected to make fast decisions. Dammers on the other 
hand made a rapid leap into the larger vessels of the fruit-trades and took on 
the “big-shipping” style with a more formal hierarchy. Walter adds that with 
Jan Dammers at the helm it could be in no other way.
Jan Dammers has been variously described as “headstrong”, “charming”, a 
“streetfighter” and as running a “one-man-show”. In any case, decisions were 
made at the top. Mark Jansen says that it wasn’t easy for everyone that went 
from Dammers to Seatrade to adapt to a completely different way of doing 
things. We can perhaps consider it to be some sort of cultural collision. These 
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differences were not just restricted to the office. When Dammers built larger 
vessels (like the Honolulu’s) senior crew were recruited from traditional major 
shipping companies like Nedlloyd (who were laying off at the time). Mark 
Jansen means that this brought along a more traditional old fashioned or for-
mal hierarchy onboard. Furthermore, he adds that a hierarchy existed between 
the vessels, with greater prestige attached to the larger ones. 
Seatrade’s integration of Dammers was not without its problems due to all 
of these differences. There certainly were disagreements and the fact remains 
that only a small number of Dammers employees remained. A word that re-
curs when listening to the management of Seatrade is “control”. By purchasing 
Dammers & van der Heide they gained vessels, in particular larger but also 
smaller, they gained markets but they also took control and quite rapidly en-
sured that things were done in their way. The M-types, however, were being 
delivered as these events were taking place. The M’s were modern medium-
sized reefers designed for palletised trades and as newbuildings were partly 
backed with time-charters. The vessels from Dammers were employed with 
Dole and this relationship continued and was managed at Seatrade’s end by 
Hans Rodenburg. Dale Ploughman at Dammers did not join Seatrade, however. 
He left to become Head of Shipping at Chiquita’s Great White Fleet but knew 
people at the newly expanded Seatrade operation which led to business be-
tween Seatrade and Chiquita. Seatrade had no shortfall of know-how in the 
fruit trades but they were expanding, and their preference for liner trades 
(combined with spot) rather than time-chartering vessels out to a third party, 
required more hands-on involvement. This can again be linked to the idea of 
control, in this case controlling one’s own vessels. Anyway, Seatrade were on 
the lookout for people with expertise with the fruit trades and four people 
from Sweden joined a couple of years later, something that will be detailed 
below. Meanwhile, with Dammers integrated, it was time to restructure the 
company.
Table 11 Fleet in the Pool and/or Managed by Seatrade in 1991a
Name Built Cbf Comment
Oceanic Ice 1977 126 440 Built as Oceanic
Atlantic Ice 1979 134 120 Built as Atlantic. Lengthened in 1981
Baltic Ice 1979 134 120 Built as Baltic. Lengthened in 1981
Celtic Ice 1979 134 120 Built as Celtic. Lengthened in 1981
Dakota 1977 181 000 Built as Jan Willem. Lengthened in 1983
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Name Built Cbf Comment
Swalan 1978 181 000 Built as Laura Christina. Lengthened in 
1983
Inca 1978 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Maya 1978 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Calafia 1979 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Magdalena 1979 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Mathilda 1979 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Casablanca 1980 181 000 Lengthened in 1983
Pacific Tulip 1977 193 599 Lengthened/rebuilt into reefer 1983/84
Pacific Violet 1978 194 305 Lengthened/rebuilt into reefer 1983/84
Pacific Lily 1978 195 047 Lengthened/rebuilt into reefer 1983/84
Pacific Freesia 1978 195 047 Lengthened/rebuilt into reefer 1983/84
Pacific Rose 1979 195 047 Lengthened/rebuilt into reefer 1983/84
Pacific Queen 1978 177 988 Lengthened in 1983
Pacific Marchioness 1978 177 305 Built as Klipper II
Pacific Princess 1979 204 166 Lengthened in 1983
Honolulu 1979 533 845
Rio Frio 1980 533 845
Tineke 1984 538 667
Peggy Dow 1985 538 667
Antarctic 1982 185 739 Built as Ena Maru
Arctic 1983 187 535 Built as Sapporu Maru
Adriatic 1984 182 510 Built as White Reefer
Asiatic 1986 191 810 Built as Sanuki Reefer
Nautic 1983 265 245 N-Type
Normandic 1983 265 245 N-Type
Nyantic 1984 265 245 N-Type
Nordic 1984 265 245 N-Type
Neerlandic 1985 265 245 N-Type
Nayadic 1986 265 245 N-Type
Northern Express 1986 265 245 N-Type
Neptunic 1989 273 713 N-Type
Northern Explorer 1991 273 713 N-Type
Mystic 1988 310 394 M-Type
Majestic 1988 310 394 M-Type
Magic 1990 310 394 M-Type
Table 11 Fleet in the Pool and/or Managed by Seatrade in 1991 (cont.)
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Name Built Cbf Comment
Music 1990 310 394 M-Type
Magnific 1992 310 394 M-Type, under construction
Maveric 1993 310 394 M-Type, under construction
Nidaros 1985 163 200 Built as Olavur Gregersen
Tinganes 1985 163 200 Built as Svanur
Cape Finisterre 1990 300 124
Cape Cod 1990 300 124
Cape Vincente 1991 300 124
Cape Cavo 1991 300 124
Cold Express 1979 184 118 Lengthened in 1983
Ice Express 1979 184 118 Lengthened in 1983
Spring Tiger 1984 470 494 Built as Spring Breeze
Spring Bear 1984 466 871 Built as Spring Dream
Spring Panda 1984 461 816 Built as Spring Ballad
Spring Bob 1984 460 895 Built as Spring Blossom
Schoener 1991 452 816
Royal Klipper 1987 261 262
Orange Klipper 1991 263 300
Oceaan Klipper 1992 263 300 Under construction
Nova Scotia 1983 263 097 Built as Hokusei Maru
Nova Zembla 1986 239 258 Built as Aoshima Maru
Nova Liguria 1985 230 384 Built as Ligurian Universal
Nova Terra 1985 230 014 Built as Adriatic Universal
Nova Klipper 1992 270 189 Under construction
Prins Willem Van Oranje 1987 350 852
Prins Casimir 1988 354 452
Prins Frederik Willem 1990 354 452
Iglo Express 1979 220 384 Built as Guadeloupe. Lengthened in 
1983
Joint Frost 1979 139 335
Fenland 1979 112 706 Built as Boston Sea Lance. Lengthened 
in 1985
Nickerie 1985 190 525
a Peerbolte 1991, p. 76-78.
Table 11 Fleet in the Pool and/or Managed by Seatrade in 1991 (cont.)
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7 Internationalizing the Operations
The global capacity of conventional reefer vessels reached its maximum in 
1993 as a result of the massive newbuilding of larger reefers in the eighties and 
early nineties. The market struggled with oversupply as a consequence of this 
and Seatrade faced additional competition in the frozen-fish segment by the 
influx of vessels from the former Eastern Bloc. Rates were low and as a conse-
quence the next years saw a necessary but probably inadequate increase in 
scrapping. Seatrade’s fleet was modern however, and the plan in the face of a 
sluggish market was to both continue in its expansion and to improve profit-
ability. Seatrade moved its chartering department to Antwerp, a move that was 
driven by tax incentives, but also put the operation in a place where it was 
easier to attract qualified personnel8. 
Shipmanagement, the technical side, remained in Groningen and Tom 
Tammes, one of the owners, remained there for over a year before retiring. Tom 
Tammes was not too interested in moving to Antwerp, and he had two daugh-
ters, who were not interested in carrying on the business. This led to Tammes 
selling his shares to Marnix and Geert in November 1989. Henk Schuur had 
sold his shares earlier. Commercial management, including the shipping pool, 
moved to Antwerp9 and the name of the operation was temporarily changed to 
Scaldis Reefer Chartering10, again for tax reasons, it reverted to the Seatrade 
brand as Seatrade Reefer Chartering in 1998. The move entailed that many of 
Seatrade’s personnel moved to Antwerp; the operation was headed up by Erik 
Musterd. The company’s working language in the office was changed from 
Dutch to English due the various nationalities working within the increasingly 
internationalised organisation.
An additional benefit to moving the chartering operation to Antwerp was 
that the company gained a physical proximity to some of its shipping opera-
tions. This connection between chartering and the actual vessels had been 
close in the early years of the company, but was fading. A remaining vestige of 
this connection was about to disappear with the delivery of the last newbuild-
ings from Groningen. The move to Antwerp changed all this. Reefers coming 
in to port can be seen through the windows of Seatrade’s present day Antwerp 
office in Atlantic House. A major cold-storage facility is literally across the 
8 Tonnage tax was related to this and means that the income of the ships is calculated 
based on the gross tonnage of the ships. Companies are taxed based on this income rather 
than on the real income of the ships. 
9 The Antwerp operation was formally a subsidiary of a newly established parent company 
in Curacao. 
10 Antwerp lies on the banks of the river Scheldt, in Latin: Scaldis.
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road. Seatrade likes to market itself as a “hands-on” company and the loca-
tion in the port of Antwerp is advantageous. It’s a simple matter for people 
from the office to speak with captains and to see the vessels. And if Seatrade’s 
customers are visiting, they can be given a tour if a Seatrade vessel is in port at 
the time. Consequently Seatrade personnel explain that they try to keep their 
vessels freshly painted and generally looking good. It can also be maintained 
that the Antwerp location may have the intangible benefit of connecting head 
office personnel, empathically, to the vessels, crew and cargo. Sources within 
the industry have contrasted Seatrade’s location with Cool Carriers’ location in 
Stockholm where the head office is physically remote from the nuts and bolts 
of shipping. 
Seatrade’s shipbuilding also moved away from the local Groningen cluster. 
Contacts were established in Japan which was an important market and also 
an attractive place to build the next generation of reefers. When Seatrade first 
started to build at Kitanihon shipyard, they had a trading house as intermedi-
ary between them and the shipyard. When Seatrade wanted to make changes 
in ship design during the building process, the trading house said that such 
changes were not part of the deal. Later on Seatrade turned to their Japanese 
partner East-West Navigation. The company’s founder Mr Ikeda dealt directly 
with the yards and became Seatrade’s sales & purchase broker in Japan. But 
East-West also supplied commercial connections. Marnix explains: 
East West was established by Ikeda who had left Nissui to explore new 
opportunities. He had good relations with both Seatrade and Laskaridis 
and considered becoming an agent for one of those companies. Eventu-
ally, he set up East West as an independent organization that was particu-
larly associated with Seatrade.
Van Overklift actually coined the name which reflected the link between East-
ern and Western markets. Marnix explains that from Seatrade’s perspective 
East-West had a wide network of contacts in the reefer business, for example 
the fish trades from Alaska, North Pacific and South Atlantic. Furthermore, 
they were well connected with banana trades from the Philippines to Japan, 
Korea and the Russian Far East. Seatrade started to fix ships through East West, 
and gained contacts with Korean shipping companies and the Far East Ship-
ping Company, FESCO. Another outcome was that since 1997, Seatrade started 
to source Russian crew from Vladivostok.
Seatrade was also able to attract commercial know-how from the market 
leading Cool Carriers. The Swedish Salén was for years the global leader in re-
frigerated shipping. It dominated the prestigious fruit segment of the market. 
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The Salén bankruptcy in 1984 and its phoenix-like resurrection as Cool Carriers 
was commercially successful but was followed by ownership problems which 
left several of its employees disillusioned. Four of them, Lars-Gunnar Larsson, 
Thorsten Klenell, Gösta Norén and Peter Jedeur-Palmgren, saw an opportunity 
to break out and start their own operation, with the support of Seatrade. Their 
departure was seen as a breach of loyalty at Cool Carriers, but Lars-Gunnar 
Larsson points out that their loyalty was to Salén and that this had been eroded 
by the developments of Cool Carriers.
The “four” founded Scanreefer Chartering in Stockholm and, and because of 
their extensive experience, managed to attract new business. One of the man-
agers recalls that Seatrade had an ambition to grow and says that he believes 
that they played an important part in achieving this. Together they owned 40% 
of the new company; the remaining 60% belonged to Seatrade. Each of the 
four brought particular chartering specialisations: Lars-Gunnar Larsson with 
Australia and New Zealand, Thorsten Klenell with Argentina, Gösta Norén 
with the citrus trade as well as Israel and Chile and Peter Jedeur-Palmgren with 
the spot market as well as Turkey and South Africa. They also recruited Lars 
Nilsson, formerly Cool Carriers Maritima in South America, to head up Sea-
trade’s new representative office in Argentina – Navisur in 1993. Bror Bjurström 
in Australia also moved over to Seatrade. 
Scanreefer was attempting to break into new trades, for example citrus from 
Argentina and meat from Australia to the US East Coast, and one aspect of do-
ing this was to offer highly competitive pricing. One outcome of these events 
was that a good portion of Seatrade’s fleet of larger vessels was put to work in 
the citrus trades during off season. According to Seatrade’s management, the 
access to the off-season citrus trade was necessary to ensure that Seatrade’s 
growing modern fleet could be employed throughout the year. However, there 
were reasons for combining the operations. It was difficult to coordinate paral-
lel organisations doing things in different ways and located in different 
countries. Walter Wildöer sums up the problem as “too many cooks” and adds 
that the solution to buy out Scanreefer “comes back to the genes of the com-
pany, it comes back to control”. Scanreefer’s existence thus ended a little over a 
year after its inception when Seatrade bought out the Swedes and merged the 
operation into their own. The four Swedes moved to Antwerp and Lars-Gunnar 
Larsson became General Manager of Seatrade Antwerp. 
These newly developed fruit trades required a higher service commit-
ment from Seatrade so local representative offices were established to make 
the trades work. Since then many more offices have opened so that in 2014 
they were twenty-five in total. Seatrade ventured into cold storage facilities in 
 Argentina in 1995 to mainly support the fruit trades. Old sheds were bought 
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and converted in Rosario, Concepcion del Uruguay, Bahia Blanco and Puerto 
Deseado in the far south for fish. Seatrade exited the entire operation only five 
years later due to industrial conflicts and lack of profitability.
8 In the Turbulent Market of the New Millennium
The years around 2000 were characterised by many attempts at consolidation 
between the players in the market. Also, the low rates that prevailed within the 
reefer segment, primarily as a result of competition from the container lines, 
made life increasingly difficult for many. Seatrade was frequently the buyer 
when others wanted to sell. Tentative discussions were held with Lauritzen, 
Cool Carriers and Star but nothing eventuated. Lauritzen ended up buying 
Cool Carriers and later exited by selling to NYK. Seatrade were disappointed to 
miss out on purchasing the bankrupt Swan Reefers of Norway, which was ac-
quired by Siem who later acquired Star. However, Seatrade successfully ac-
quired a part of Nissui’s reefer operation in 2001, which resulted in the 
formation of Tokyo Reefer Chartering. The purchase also included new busi-
ness for Seatrade: carrying squid and krill from the South Pacific to the Far East 
and Europe. Tokyo Reefer Chartering was later integrated into Seatrade’s pool 
and East-West Navigation.
Another significant deal for Seatrade was when Vroon’s United Reefers was 
bought. Vroon of Breskens is a major Dutch family-owned shipping company, 
founded in 1890, that is highly active in several areas of shipping including 
livestock transport, offshore support and dry cargo. In the seventies they diver-
sified into the reefer segment by purchasing a few vessels that were put into 
the Seatrade pool around 1980. More vessels were obtained in the nineties and 
finally in 2001, after some 20 years in the Seatrade pool, Vroon decided to take 
control over their reefer fleet and established United Reefers as an independ-
ent operation. Vessels owned by third-parties joined the United Reefer fleet so 
that by 2005 there were 22 vessels when Vroon decided to exit the reefer seg-
ment. Seatrade bought United Reefers including Vroon’s reefers. Most of the 
third-party owners joined the Seatrade pool. The relationship with Vroon dat-
ed back to 1952 when Vroon bought its first cargo ship, the David, which was 
managed for some time by Scheepvaartkantoor Groningen with Schuur as 
partner in the ship. 
At this time, the shipping markets were good and the German Kommandi-
tgesellschaft (KG’s) were keen on finding investment opportunities. In 2005 
and 2006 Seatrade sold 28 vessels to MPC Münchmeyer Petersen Steamship 
based in Hamburg. Seatrade maintained a minor level of ownership in the 
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vessels which continued to sail in the Seatrade pool. The market value of the 
vessels was high, due to the good market. A consequence of the sale to the 
German KG house was the purchase of Triton, a shipmanagement company. A 
requirement of the KG operation is to have a fully-fledged outfit on German 
soil. This was developed as a parallel shipmanagement to the operation in Gro-
ningen and is located in Leer, close to the Dutch border.
This period of expansion also coincided with Geert Pepping’s plans to retire. 
Marnix explains: 
After having bought in 2006 the majority of the shares of my partner Pep-
ping, he withdrew from daily activities, however he remained as a share-
holder and boardmember, being fully aware of the company whereabouts, 
though he remained in the background. 
Twelve smaller vessels were also sold to Norwegian Green Reefers of Bergen in 
2006 in exchange for cash and 25% of the shares11. Seatrade purchased five 
Phoenix class vessels from London-based Zodiac Maritime in 2007. Zodiac, 
part of the Israeli Ofer group, is a major shipping operation that diversified into 
reefers by purchasing Honolulu class vessels from Seatrade and vessels from 
NYK. They were active for several years before deciding to exit. Also in 2007, 
Seatrade purchased the reefer business of Maritima del Norte, an independent 
Spanish operator. This added seven smaller reefers to Seatrade’s fleet and these 
were put to work in the frozen fish, mainly tuna, trade. Furthermore, Seatrade 
bought a part of Amer Reefers’ fleet in 2008. 
In 2007 four new reefers were ordered at the Kitanihon Shipyard, and until 
summer 2008 another four had been added to the order. 
Seatrade purchased the operations of the bankrupt Europe West Indies Line 
(EWL) in 2008. There were no vessels involved but it was a container operation 
and according to Yntze Buitenwerf, it brought a new focus on containers into 
the company. Seatrade incorporated EWL into its container division which is 
marketed as StreamLines. StreamLines is focused on the reefer trade and may 
be considered an integrated, but somewhat detached, part of Seatrade. Stream-
Lines also operate container vessels.
Due to the collapse of the financial and shipping markets in the wake of the 
2007-2008 crisis, it was clear in 2009 that Seatrade wanted to reduce the num-
ber of ships on order at the Kitanihon shipyard. Eventually the Atlantic Klipper 
and Baltic Klipper materialized from the order and these two were fixed to Rus-
sian Joint Fruit Co in 2010 for a period timecharter. 
11 “Zodiac sells off stack of reefers”, TradeWinds 10 May 2007.
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The aforementioned sale and lease-back of ships to MPC included a gua-
ranteed minimum earning for the ships. Tradewinds wrote that: “Seatrade is 
also guaranteeing a minimum income of $0.78 per cbf per ship if charter rates 
fall over the next 5 years.”12 The charter rates did fall, but a spare fund had been 
created to cope with this market risk, and according to Van Overklift, it was 
sufficient to cover the deficit that emerged.
What caused the most significant problems was the takeover of the Amer 
Reefer fleet in 2008. Marnix explains that not all of these ships were supposed 
to be owned by Seatrade, but by poolpartners and other investors. However, 
given the financial crisis, the prospective owners could not fulfil their commit-
ments. The financial crisis of course also affected the supply of debt funding. 
ING, the house bank of Seatrade, got into trouble and had to be bailed out by 
the Dutch Government. This caused problems for Seatrade, as explained by 
Marnix: 
We received a short loan from a consortium of banks, lead by ING Bank, 
the loan had to be renewed or paid back after one year. Although Seat-
rade had been their customer for 35 years and never failed on any com-
mitment, the bank refused at the very last moment to renew the loan, not 
even willing to give us any time for a solution. A solution had to be found 
and I decided to sell my shares to my old partner to solve the liquidity 
problem. My old partner made a deal with the bank and got involved 
again in running the company. This ended a 32 year old cooperation and 
relationship but I also had to say goodbye to loyal people and friends in 
the organisation and on board of the ships, who made it possible to cre-
ate such a great company. 
Now Geert Pepping was back as the main owner of Seatrade and the company 
continued to develop. 
9 New Partnerships: GreenSea Chartering and Joint Ventures
A new pool called Hamburg Reefer Chartering was established in 2010 by Sea-
trade, Laskaridis and Green Reefers. Seatrade already had an established rela-
tionship with Green Reefers. Green Reefer’s originator, Nomadic Shipping, 
entered reefers in 1989, and placed a reefer in the Seatrade pool. In 1993, they 
created their own pool called Green Reefers. Seatrade perceived Green as a 
12 “Seatrade charter term questioned”. TradeWinds 1 March 2007. 
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fierce competitor particularly in the fish segment. Seatrade sought to collabo-
rate and eventually established a joint service from Florida to Flushing with 
frozen juice. A joint pool operation was created around 1997, each party brin-
ging 12 ships of about 260 000 cbf. It worked for less than a year and then Eides-
vik, Green’s new owner cancelled the agreement.
Lavinia with its Alpha Reefer pool, controlled by the Laskaridis family, was a 
large company that also competed with Seatrade in the fish segment. Lavinia 
has at various times placed their larger vessels in the Seatrade pool and the two 
companies had also coordinated their purchases of ships from distressed ship-
owners. 
Hamburg Reefer Chartering did not last long and ceased at the end of 2011. 
Yntze Buitenwerf says that in this industry “nobody trusts each other” and that 
a problem with Hamburg Reefer Chartering was that both parties wanted one 
of their own people to be “the real boss”. The result was that this attempt at 
consolidation was discontinued and Seatrade and Green Reefers pulled out of 
the operation and formed GreenSea Chartering. Lavinia’s larger ships that 
sailed in the Seatrade pool were was also subsequently removed.
GreenSea is based in Antwerp close to Seatrade’s offices and operates the 
two companies’ vessels with a capacity between 190 000 and 400 000 cbf. It 
mainly deals with fish and seafood. There were about 38 vessels in the pool in 
2017. Tuna companies are frequently charterers and the major trades are with 
fish from Northern Europe to ports in West Africa and then returning with tuna 
from Abidjan. Tuna in the Indian Ocean to Bangkok is another important 
trade. 
An alliance with St Petersburg-based Baltic Shipping was established in 2013 
and appropriately named Reefer Alliance. Reefer Alliance is a sales and mar-
keting operation with coordinated scheduling. Three trades were included in 
the arrangement and they link Chile, Morocco and South Africa with St Peters-
burg. The main cargo was citrus and deciduous fruit. Later in the same year 
a new company came to being: Global Reefers. This was a joint operation with 
 Pacific Seaways, a shipping company that represents major Chilean fruit ex-
porters. They were major users of reefer tonnage and the new operation can be 
seen as an effort to ensure the availability of vessels and cargo for the respec-
tive parties. 
The backdrop to all of these joint ventures was a market with both shrinking 
demand and shrinking numbers of specialized reefers. Exporters who were us-
ing these vessels wanted to ensure their continued availability. Operators, on 
the other hand, sought to maintain their customer base and to optimise their 
operations by coordinating their efforts with their competitors to the extent 
that is possible.
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An unusual venture eventuated in Australia where Cool Carriers and Seat-
rade were competing in the meat trade. The cutthroat competition from the 
container lines resulted in the arch competitors burying the hatchet and open-
ing the joint-venture C&S headed by Bror Bjurström which existed until the 
container lines completely took over the trade in 2008. 
360 Quality
The 360 Quality initiative was born in 2005 when LauritzenCool, Seat-
rade and NYK Reefer decided to collaborate on quality issues with di-
verse actors within the cold chain. It was primarily a joint reaction to the 
increasing competition from the container lines. 360 Quality aimed to 
both improve quality in the operations and to jointly market the logisti-
cal alternative provided by specialized reefers as a high-quality option. 
10 Newbuildings and Reefer-Containerships
Seatrade was gradually adapting to containerization, as evidenced by its acqui-
sition of EWL in 2008 and its conversion of two reefers in 2012. The ships were 
cut in half and a section was added which tripled the number of containers 
that could be carried13. 
2014 was the year that Seatrade ordered its first two reefer-container vessels 
and this was followed by orders for a further four with options for a further six. 
Delivery commenced in 2016 with the Seatrade Orange, which was timechar-
tered to Africa Express Line. These vessels, the Colour Class, were built in 
Shanghai by the Yangfan Group14. 
For decades reefer operators had defined themselves in contrast to the ma-
jor container lines, and now Seatrade ordered container ships. A radical step? 
Mark Jansen, managing director of Seatrade Holding points out that there is a 
natural progression in the development of reefer vessels. From breakbulk to 
palletised to palletised with container capacity and now to fully containerised. 
With, hindsight, we can call the previous type, many were built in Japan in the 
late nineties, a hybrid vessel and thus a stage in the development to what is 
happening now. Another aspect is that fruit companies, particularly Dole, have 
 
13 “Carriers put money on hybrid designs”. The Journal of Commerce, 2012-11-16. <http://
www.joc.com/maritime-news/ships-shipbuilding/carriers-put-money-hybrid-ship-de 
signs_20121116.html>.
14 “In focus: Seatrade’s newbuilding program” Simply Seatrade 2015/2, p. 12.
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previously built similar vessels. The modern type has the cooling and ventila-
tion necessary to be able to stow reefer-containers below deck. 100% contain-
erisation aside, the ships otherwise have much in common with previous 
reefers. They utilise their speed, they can access and handle cargo in small 
ports due their shallow draft and their own cranes. The latter also makes them 
independent of container terminals in major ports, thus speeding up turna-
round times. Seatrade focused their marketing on the idea: “Fast, Direct, Dedi-
cated” to differentiate their service offer from those offered by the container 
lines. Seatrade increased its investment in containerisation in 2016 by placing 
a 55 million dollar order with Maersk Container Industry for 4 000 reefer con-
tainers. A meeting room at the Antwerp office was constructed out of the inter-
nal walls of a refrigerated container in 201515. This initiative physically brought 
the container into the lived reality of the office. To us, this represents a will to 
embrace containerization in an industry which has often been reluctant to do 
so. In 2017 a planned vessel sharing agreement with the major container line 
CMA CGM was announced. This agreement would replace Seatrade’s existing 
New Zealand line and would employ six of the company’s new reefer-con-
tainer vessels.
Seatrade also returned to its roots in 2015 by developing and then ordering 
four new reefers to support the fish trades. These 300 000 cbf vessels are 
15 “Reefer in Atlantic House”. Simply Seatrade 2015/2, p. 28
Figure 16 Seatrade was the first independent reefer operator to build reefer container ships, 
starting with the Seatrade Orange in 2016  
Photo: SeatradeGroningen
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dubbed as “freezers” although they can also carry goods at cool temperatures. 
They are equipped with derricks, rather than with cranes, to facilitate fish tran-
shipments on the high seas. There was an also an option for a further four of 
these vessels, all of which are intended for the GreenSea pool.16 Seatrade also 
ordered a new juice carrier at around the same time, replacing the old Joint 
Frost which dated back to 1979. Expected delivery of this ship, the Juice Express, 
was June 2017.17
11 Green Reefers
Odfjell, Chairman and owner of the Bergen-based Nomadic Shipping A/S and 
Skibsaksjeselskapet Storli, entered the reefer market in 1993. Nomadic was the 
holding company while the name of the commercial pool was Green Reefers. 
Odfjell’s short move into reefers was because he was convinced by Ronhovde to 
receive two reefers. In 1998, Odfjell sold to Eidesvik and in 2001 the pool con-
sisted of 20 small size reefers. The parent company Nomadic exited the dry 
cargo market and concentrated fully on reefers in 2002. In 2003, a collaboration 
between Green Reefers and Seatrade was initiated and in the same year, Odfjell 
came back, acquiring 7.3% in Green Reefers. Kristian Eidesvik, the 40% owner 
of Green Reefers bought shares in Star in 2004. Green Reefers expanded in the 
mid-2000s. Among other things Green Reefers bought ships from Seatrade in 
exchange for ownership shares. In 2007, the fleet consisted of 47 vessels. Eides-
vik strengthened his ownership position in Green Reefers, acquired another 
10% of the shares in 2007. In 2008-2009, Green Reefers made some cutbacks 
and made a new stock offering in 2010. Green Reefers also started collaborating 
with Silver Sea, which had 13 small reefers of 104 000 to 190 000 cbf. Together 
they formed the SilverGreen pool. In 2010, Green Reefers joined Hamburg 
Reefer Chartering with all its 27 ships. The main owner, Eidesvik announced in 
2010 that he planned to take over Green Reefers. In 2011, his ownership share 
was 66%. In 2012, Green Reefers pulled out of Hamburg Reefer Chartering to 
team up with Seatrade in the GreenSea pool. The strategy seems to be to keep 
being in the reefer market, but maintaining status quo. In 2016, they have a 
fleet of 24 owned reefer vessels from 265 000 to 375 000 cbf. In the same year 
Green Reefers also discontinued its joint-venture with Silver Sea.
16 “Management corner”. Simply Seatrade 2015/2 p. 3 and “300,000 cubic feet handy-size 
reefer”. Simply Seatrade 2015/2 p. 15.
17 “Juice Express”. Simply Seatrade 2015/2, p. 14.
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Table 12 Seatrade Fleet List 2016
Specialised Reefers operated by Seatrade Reefer Chartering
Name Built Cbf FEU slots Reefer FEU Pallets
Baltic Klipper 2010 661 636 249 200 9 392
Atlantic Klipper 2011 661 530 249 200 9 392
Swedish Reefer 1992 645 586 164 147 8 671
Schweiz Reefer 1992 645 586 164 147 8 671
Italia Reefer 1992 645 586 164 147 8 671
Hellas Reefer 1991 645 586 164 147 8 671
Nederland Reefer 1991 645 586 164 147 8 671
Lombok Strait 2002 626 011 220 200 9 561
Luzon Strait 2002 626 011 220 200 9 561
Atlantic Reefer 1998 597 139 226 200 9 155
Pacific Reefer 1999 596 925 226 200 9 154
Lady Korcula 2000 590 227 120 120 7 632
Lady Racisce 2000 590 227 120 120 7 632
Summer Flower 1984 589 903 82 82 6 506
Summer Meadow 1985 590 102 82 82 6 505
Royal Klipper 2000 580 754 207 185 8 710
Comoros Stream 2000 580 754 207 185 8 710
Hansa Lubeck 1990 590 654 99 80 6 666
Hansa Bremen 1989 587 974 99 80 6 640
Polarstream 1999 564 280 136 109 7 100
Polarlight 1998 564 160 136 109 7 099
Elsebeth 1998 549 326 106 106 6 837
Emerald 2000 548 718 106 106 6 850
Elvira 2000 548 666 106 106 6 850
Esmeralda 1999 548 643 106 106 6 850
Crown Emma 1996 547 680 96 96 6 638
Pacific Mermaid 1992 540 572 73 65 5 902
Atlantic Mermaid 1992 540 026 73 65 5 895
Tasman Mermaid 1993 539 670 73 65 5 897
Caribbean Mermaid 1993 539 648 73 65 5 897
Coral Mermaid 1992 539 634 73 65 5 895
Timor Stream 1998 535 112 166 126 7 068
Agulhas Stream 1998 535 109 166 126 7 068
Benguela Stream 1998 535 109 166 126 7 068
Klipper Stream 1998 535 109 166 126 7 068
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Discovery Bay 1997 534 246 100 100 6 486
Southern Bay 1997 535 093 90 73 5 948
Eastern Bay 1997 533 899 90 73 5 941
Mexican Bay 1994 542 905 63 44 5 691
Fortuna Bay 1993 542 470 63 44 5 691
Regal Bay 1993 526 250 67 46 5 353
Fegulus 1993 526 141 67 46 5 351
Atlantic Acanthus 1999 504 511 88 80 5 963
Messina Strait 2004 460 498 382 192 7 782
Magellan Strait 2003 460 498 382 216 8 262
Santa Catharina 2000 463 986 115 115 6 194
Santa Maria 1999 463 963 124 124 6 374
Santa Lucia 1999 463 652 124 124 6 374
Cold Stream 1994 456 785 113 106 6 072
Pacific Breeze 1990 459 861 66 66 5 275
Runaway Bay 1992 516 227 19 19 4 813
Aconcagua Bay 1992 512 361 19 19 4 845
Humboldt Bay 1990 508 551 0 0 4 435
Fuji Bay 1990 502 514 0 0 4 438
Everest Bay 1989 449 201 0 0 3 954
Whitney Bay 1990 449 175 0 0 3 945
Prince of Waves 1993 402 900 52 50 4 461
Prince of Tides 1993 402 574 52 50 4 444
Bay Phoenix 1993 400 884 6 6 3 562
Lagoon Phoenix 1993 400 884 6 6 3 562
Water Phoenix 1992 400 884 6 6 3 562
Green Italia 1994 377 100 45 29 4 003
Green Honduras 1992 376 221 45 29 3 994
Green Chile 1992 375 477 45 29 3 987
Reefer Container Vessels
Name Built Cont. Reefer Pallets DWATa
slots FEU
Seatrade Orange 2016 2 259 674 13 480 27 200
Table 12 Seatrade Fleet List 2016 (cont.)
Specialised Reefers operated by Seatrade Reefer Chartering
Name Built Cbf FEU slots Reefer FEU Pallets
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Seatrade Red 2016 2 259 674 13 480 27 200
Seatrade White 2017 2 259 674 13 480 27 200
Seatrade Blue 2017 2 259 674 13 480 27 200
Seatrade Green 2017 770
Seatrade Gold 2017 770
Seatrade vessels operated GreenSea Chartering
Name Built Cbf Pallets
Sierra Queen 1996 398 470 3 588
Asian Cosmos 1998 373 827 3 205
Prince Of Seas 1993 371 412 3 122
Cool Expreso 1994 362 351 3 267
Nova Florida 1989 298 320 2 661
Breiz Klipper 1991 265 246 2 382
Sierra King 1989 261 262 2 243
Sierra Lara 1996 260 050 2 216
Sierra Laurel 1998 260 050 2 216
Sierra Leyre 1997 260 050 2 216
Sierra Loba 1997 260 050 2 216
Nova Zeelandia 1986 238 985 2 033
New Takatsuki 1991 237 136 1 933
Coppename 1990 212 102 1 858
Reefers ordered for the Greensea Pool
Name Built Cbf
Orange Sun 2017 300 000
Orange Sea 2017 300 000
Orange Stream 2018 300 000
Orange Storm 2018 300 000
a DWAT or “Deadweight all told” expresses the quantity of goods a ship can carry including 
provisions, lubricants, and fuel. This is usually what is referred to when we write dead-
weight tonnage, DWT. 
Source: <http://www.seatrade.com/fleet/> accessed 06/11/2016. Some data also from Simply 
Seatrade Issue 1/2016.
Table 12 Seatrade Fleet List 2016 (cont.)
Reefer Container Vessels
Name Built Cbf FEU slots Reefer FEU Pallets
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12 Summary 
Seatrade grew out of a coaster operation with sailing ship owners, who in 
the late 1950s when the general cargo markets fell decided to diversify. The 
subjective feeling of the company was very much one of local hands-on en-
trepreneurs with extensive knowledge about everyday shipping operations. 
A younger generation took over in the early 1970s and from that point expand-
ed with new customers towards an increasingly internationalized operation. 
They derived pride from their development of the fish trades, but an impor-
tant step was also to gradually move into the large reefer trades with bananas 
and other fruit, something that was made possible by strategic acquisitions of 
ships and competent people. Similar to Salén in the 1950s through the early 
1980s, Seatrade continuously built new vessels allowing them to gradually im-
prove the ship design and their market knowledge. The company grew while 
other reefer operators were struggling in or exiting the segment from the 1980s 
through the 2000s. Many profitable sales and purchasing activities were done, 
perhaps the most spectacular was the acquisition of Dammers and van der 
Heide. Similarly to the impression of the Danes by Swedes at Cool Carriers 
after the merger with Lauritzen, Seatrade was perceived by many as a deal ori-
ented, fast, and tough business partner. And much more so than the Danes. 
The company was seen to find new creative solutions to old problems, and 
always trying to think outside of the box, in unconventional ways. This was not 
always meant positively, but was also expressed as a form of discursive criti-
cism by the established parties such as Lauritzen and Cool Carriers. Still, by 
engaging in this unconventional way of doing business always trying to fill the 
ships with whatever cargo and keep the ships in business no matter what, in 
addition to the fast sales and purchase activities, the company remained prof-
itable while the competitors were struggling. Seatrade did not only manage 
to grow but to a certain extent redefined what an independent reefer opera-
tor was. In the last few years, rather than positing themselves as pallet-based 
or conventional, they embraced containerization and adopted a discourse of 
specialized reefers – “fast, direct, and dedicated”. Similarly to how Mats Jans-
son of Cool Carriers described that the battle between reefers and containers 
was inadequately expressed discursively, Seatrade was not only able to grasp 
this misleading dichotomy but also had the financial muscle to change it. They 
were the first reefer operator to build all-container reefers and to change the 
subjective perceptions of the co-workers they even used a container to create 
a meeting room in their head office. 
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Chapter 7
Japanese Specialized Reefer Companies
Japan has been a major importer of perishables after the Second World War 
and also has a long tradition in shipping1. Unsurprisingly, they have been ma-
jor actors in the reefer industry. Besides the large shipping conglomerates, the 
Japanese reefer industry also has its origins in the fish industry. 
1 Japanese Fisheries
Japan was struggling to secure an adequate food supply following its defeat in 
World War II. A fleet of trawlers was built to fish in distant seas, for example off 
the coast of Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. After getting a successful catch 
the fish would be frozen and transported back to Japan with purpose-built 
reefers (also known as freezers). The reefer today still under Japanese law is 
classified as a number three category fishing vessel (Japanese: Daisansyugyo-
sen). 
Years passed, and the regulatory environment started to change. In the 1970s 
the United Nations affirmed that each country could have an exclusive eco-
nomic zone extending 200 nautical miles from the coast2. Within this zone, 
each country had control over various activities such as fishing, mining, and 
exploration and production of oil or gas, although ships from other countries 
had the right to pass through. For the Japanese fishing companies this meant 
that from the late 1970s, several fishing grounds were excluded, even though 
concessions were negotiated with various governments. Some fishing compa-
nies became fishtraders and worked with import and export. Others estab-
lished joint ventures with foreign companies, selling part of their fleet to them 
and manning those ships with local people. In order to provide employment 
for the seafarers that had been laid off, the companies expanded into the reefer 
trades. In combination with the reluctance to lay off people, this stimulated 
the entrance of the fishing companies to the broader reefer industry, including 
the major fruit trades. There were four major fisheries. The biggest was Maruha 
1 The part about Japanese reefer operators is based on Nissui. 2012 and NYK. 1988. 日本郵船
株式会社 100 年史 (Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Gaisha 100 Nenshi), articles in TradeWinds, as 
well as interviews with key people in the Japanese reefer industry. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
 157Japanese Specialized Reefer Companies
_full_alt_author_running_head (neem stramien B2 voor dit chapter en nul 0 in hierna): 0
_full_alt_articletitle_running_head (oude _articletitle_deel, vul hierna in): Japanese Specialized Reefer Companies
_full_article_language: en indien anders: engelse articletitle: 0
Taiyou Gyogyo, followed by Nippon Suisan also known as Nissui, and Nichiro 
Gyogyo and Kyokuyo, or KY. It was the latter two who were the first to diversify. 
1.1 Kyokuyo 
Kyokuyo Gyogyo, literally “polar sea fishing”, were heavily involved in the whal-
ing industry, which was stagnating. They were part of a business network in the 
Shikoku region, who had previously invested in the company’s fishing vessels. 
They supported Kyokuyo’s attempt to build reefers for the fruit trades. The first 
ship was delivered around 1973. Ships were delivered almost every year, and 
there were about 45 ranging from 150 000 to 350 000 cbf by the late 1970s. Kyo-
kuyo built ships for their own operation. However, a few ships were timechar-
tered out servicing trades with apples, kiwi, squash from New Zealand to Japan, 
and bananas and pineapples from Philippines. Kyokuyo serviced the Japanese 
market and mainly sailed in the Pacific. 
The reefer segment became an important part of the company, partly due to 
the role of Mr. Ishise, the manager of the reefer operations, that later became 
the president of the company. However, the interest in reefers from the com-
pany’s management dwindled, and in combination with declining returns and 
dull market prospects, Kyokuyo decided to gradually exit the segment starting 
in the early 1990s. They have redelivered ships to their owners, scaling down 
their activities and terminated its shipping activities in August 2016. 
1.2 Nichiro
Nichiro Gyogyo means “Japan-Russia fishery”, but despite its name, it could no 
longer catch trout and cod in Russian waters due to the enlargement of the 
economic zones. Rather than focusing on the Pacific, that Kyokuyo had done, 
Nichiro was very active in the European market. According to respondents, 
Nichiro learned the reefer trade from European brokers, and even started their 
own office in Hamburg, to get information and to be able to act more swiftly. 
Nichiro was seen as an aggressive new entrant to a market that was dominated 
by Salén and Lauritzen. 
Nichiro built Yamato Reefer in 1978 at Shikoku, in a period in which the ship-
yards were very hungry for orders. It was followed by the Shikishima Reefer, 
delivered in 1979, with a capacity of 193 000 cbf. Then they built Sky Reefer and 
Sunny Reefer (of 250 000 cbf each) built also in 1979. The Sakura class reefers of 
five ships was delivered from 1978-19803. Bizen and Bungo Reefer were delivered 
in 1983, followed by four Shrine type ships from Hitachi Zosen in 1983-4. Also, a 
ship called Sanuki Reefer was delivered in 1986. Nichiro’s reefer business is held 
3 Tokyo, Ariake, Akebono, Sakura, Fuji
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to have been of moderate importance for the Japanese reefer industry. They 
have operated both independently and together with NYK. 
Nichiro controlled a fleet of 20-25 ships from 200-430 000 cbf. Given that a 
main reason for diversifying into reefers was to protect employment, it is not 
surprising that when the seafarers gradually became older and retired, much of 
the raison-d’être of the reefer section diminished. The shipowners, that Nichi-
ro had mobilized for expansion into reefers, gradually sold off their ships, or 
employed them with another operator. The development of exchange rates 
also affected profitability as the cost of the ship was in yen but the income was 
in USD. Similarly to Kyokuyo, it was decided that the reefer division would be 
dismantled in the mid-1990s. Rather than a gradual phase-out, Nichiro quickly 
dismantled its shipping activities. 
…
In the early phase of the expansion of the Japanese reefer fleet, the interna-
tional market for transportation of refrigerated goods was growing, which 
meant that the extra capacity provided by the Japanese fisheries was absorbed 
by the market. However, their entry was a shock to established players in the 
Figure 17 Japanese fishing companies originally acquired reefers to service their fishing 
fleets but later entered the fruit trades with ships like Kyokuyo’s Nagato Reefer 
built in 2000. The ship sails in 2018 as the Frio Nagato in the Alpha Reefer Pool  
Photo: AlfvanBeem (2007)
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international reefer market. Both Japanese and European respondents have 
pointed to the limited English language skills of the new entrants. This com-
bined with their fishing background and their status as new entrants kept 
them apart from the mainstream reefer establishment. Established actors were 
hostile towards these new entrants who built their own ships which subse-
quently increased the amount of tonnage available on the world market. 
Following the move by the smaller fishing groups, we will now describe how 
the largest fisheries, Maruha and Nissui, also diversified into reefers. 
1.3 Nissui
Nissui was experiencing similar problems as Nichiro and Kyokuyo, but since 
Nissui was a bigger company, it could wait longer until it saw a need for diver-
sification. Senior management in Nissui decided to develop the business of 
transportation4. 
A project team started to look into the business of fruit distribution in 1976. 
Respondents indicate that the move from fish to fruit was relatively unprob-
lematic. Furthermore, Nissui had extensive contacts with the dominant actor 
at the time – Salén. The project team went around the world, talking to ship-
owners and brokers, and finally built two reefers of about 430 000 cbf5. A 
timecharter agreement was struck with United Brands for 2-3 years at a rate of 
53-55 cents per cbf which was not enough to cover the costs of the ship. After 
building the two ships, Nissui contracted about ten newbuildings from other 
owners. The market collapsed and United Brands offered to renegotiate a char-
ter at 34 cents, Nissui declined and decided to start their own operations. Mr. 
Ikeda, part of the project team, explains: “Nissui had a fish carrier called Iso-
kaze Maru, built in 1976, and I was its chief mate directly after it was built. We 
asked NYK to run the ship off season. I still remember one trip, we carried NZ 
apples to the Middle East. We’re able to carry apples for the first time. I thought 
“we can do that”, so why do we ask another company to do it? If I wouldn’t have 
had this experience, we might not have done our own operation.” 
Nissui’s operation struggled in a poor market and was burdened by expen-
sive crewing costs, since Nissui was a member of the employee union. Mr. Ike-
da, now manager of the unit, tried to seek collaborators in companies such as 
Maruha, NYK, Lauritzen, Salén, Reefer Express Line. The potential partners 
were claimed to be too big or too proud to collaborate. Mr. Ikeda realized that 
he had to find a company with a more appropriate size. At a meeting in the 
Canary Islands before a tender for carrying tomatoes and fruits to the 
4 Nissui 2012, pp. 239-240.
5 Asama Maru built in 1978 and Ikoma Maru built in 1979.
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European continent, Mr. Ikeda ran into Geert Pepping from Seatrade. At that 
time, in 1985, Seatrade and Nissui were almost of the same size, controlling 
about 25 ships each. Both companies also had a background in the fish trades. 
From 1986, they collaborated on the Canary trades. At the same time, the mar-
ket started to look better for reefers. 
But Mr. Ikeda felt disillusioned. He explains that Nissui, however much they 
were in the transport business, still in its “genetic coding” it was a fishery com-
pany. The organization was too slow in approving reefer investments because 
the managers were knowledgeable about fishing, not shipping. In 1991, Mr. 
Ikeda finally took the step and left Nissui Shipping to create East West Naviga-
tion. Nissui Shipping’s fruit division continued to struggle with its profitability 
and at the end of the 1990s, it was decided to dismantle Nissui Shipping. 
This dismantlement was seen as an opportunity for other actors to acquire 
reefers at a low price. A conflict ensued between Mr. Ikeda and Seatrade on the 
one hand and a broker, Mr. Nagaki, who worked with Nissui Shipping’s man-
agement and Dole. Mr. Ikeda wanted to bring the whole fleet to Seatrade and 
was in negotiations with Nissui’s central top management. Mr. Nagaki, on the 
other hand, wanted to separate the fruit carriers into a new company, since 
Dole disliked the idea of being in the hands of a major reefer operator such as 
Seatrade. Dole were perfectly happy with the service they got from Nissui, and 
wanted to continue operations as they were.
Nissui’s shipping activities were eventually divided into two major parts: the 
fruit carrying division became Fresh Fruit Carriers, and the fish transportation 
division became part of the joint venture Tokyo Reefer Chartering, with Seat-
rade. Tokyo Reefer Chartering hoped to access Nissui’s fish transport require-
ments, but results were disappointing, and the ships were soon integrated into 
Seatrade 
Fresh Carriers was initially owned 60% by Nissui and 40% by Fresh System, 
a repacking network in Japan. Nissui later sold its ownership stake and the new 
company invested in some ships. In 2015 they had three main customers: Dole 
(bananas from Philippines to East Asia), Zespri (Kiwifruit from NZ to East 
Asia), and timecharted ships to Africa Express Line. 
Toei Shipping
Before the fishery companies started building fruit carriers, early ven-
tures were made by Mr. Ken-nosuke Ohno. Having engaged in different 
shipping businesses in the 1960s, he had a dream of building internation-
al fruit carriers. He approached Nissui in the mid-1960s, but while Nissui 
deemed the idea to be sound, they had no intention to build fruit carriers 
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at that particular moment. Mr. Ohno also approached NYK, but they re-
sponded in the same way. Mr. Ohno decided to go ahead with his ideas 
and built two fruit carriers delivered in 1972-3 (Touei Maru, Touyu Maru), 
of 420 000 cbf. The lack of interest of the domestic market led Mr. Ohno 
to charter the ships to Salén. It would take another few years before the 
fishery companies built their own fruit carriers. 
As has been seen, the fishery companies operated reefers for indepen-
dent shipowners. To better understand the relationship between opera-
tors and ship-owners in the Japanese context, we will give a brief history 
of the ship-owner Toei Shipping. We have indeed already started the sto-
ry about Mr. Ohno, the driving force behind Toei shipping, above. After 
having built the reefers that were chartered to Salén, Mr. Ohno was inter-
ested in expanding in the reefer segment. A barter agreement was made 
with Nissui shipping. Nissui badly needed to cut costs but they could not 
flag out the ships due to membership in the seamen’s union. Mr. Ohno 
offered to buy three reefers built in 1961-1962 (Seiko, Hokko, and Toko 
Maru) and one oil-ore carrier and take personnel responsibility of 80 
crew members. In exchange, Nissui let Mr. Ohno build two fruit carriers 
of 260 000 cbf, which was to be timechartered by Nissui. 
But in 1978, a big change happened in Nissui, which came to affect Toei 
Shipping. One of Nissui’s crude oil tankers caught fire and exploded, kill-
ing 2-3 crew members. This led to the resignation of Mr. Takeko, the Nis-
sui shipping general manager, who had agreed on timecharter agreements 
with Toei Shipping, and the timecharter contracts were cancelled. Mr. 
Ohno had independently negotiated a timecharter agreement for the 
newbuilding Tama Ace to Reefer Express Line (the ship was renamed 
Tama Rex). The three older reefers were sold to Lavinia and they were 
cash cows in Laskaridis growing shipping business. 
For the moment, the crisis was over, but Mr. Ohno became ill, and the 
banks forced Mr. Ohno’s son – Sadaya Ohno – to take over the company 
in 1985. Before Sadaya Ohno took over the business, another barter was 
made between Nissui and Toei Shipping. In exchange for Toei Shipping 
taking over Asama and Ikoma (built in 1978-1979) plus an agreement to 
have Nissui’s Japanese officers onboard and chartering the ships back for 
8 years, Toei Shipping could build two newbuildings Tama Hope and 
Tama Star, delivered in 1986 and 1987. But another crisis happened due to 
the Plaza Accord, where the value of the yen rose dramatically. Sadaya 
Ohno started to restructure the company but due to his young age (he 
was in his thirties), he couldn’t get the banks’ support. Rather, an external 
member from Nipponkai Heavy Industries Co. (where Toei Shipping’s
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ships were built) was recruited to be CEO of the company. Mr. Ohno took 
over full management in 1993. 
But before this, there were other problems with Nissui, the charterer. 
The head of Nissui shipping told Sadaya Ohno that Asama and Ikoma 
were in very bad shape and deteriorated the image and business of Nissui 
Shipping. Therefore, Toei shipping lost the contract for Asama and Iko-
ma, although the newer Tama Hope and Tama Star continued sailing for 
Nissui. The reason for why Asama and Ikoma were in bad shape was due 
to the current shipmanager. Given Sadaya Ohno’s relationships with Mr. 
Ikeda, and Mr. Ikeda’s relationship with Seatrade, a meeting was set up. 
Mr. Ohno let Seatrade’s shipmanagement inspect the ship. Given the pro-
fessional inspection by Seatrade, Mr. Ohno decided to try Seatrade as an 
operator. In 1995, Asama and Ikoma were sold to Rosewell Shipping, an-
other Seatrade pool member. With the money from the sale of Asama 
and Ikoma, Mr. Ohno built Discovery Bay in 1997. The newbuilding con-
tract was signed in December 1996 and the Hokuriku bank agreed to fi-
nance that project with 3 years TC by Seatrade at a level of about 72 cents 
per cbf. After three years, the ship was to go into the pool. But, there was 
an Asian financial crisis, and Hokuriku could not finance Toei Shipping. 
Finally, a leasing company was used to finance the ship. In 1999, Mr. Ohno 
wanted to built yet another reefer, Santa Catharina. The ship was to enter 
pool operation directly, but without any timecharter agreement, it could 
not be financed by Japanese credit institutions. Rather, Mr. Ohno man-
aged to get the Dutch bank ING onboard, until the yen crisis in 2000, 
when the bank withdrew from the deal. By agreeing with the shipyard to 
defer the payment, the ship could be ordered. When Tama Hope and 
Tama Star were redelivered from Nissui, Mr. Ohno employed them with-
in the Seatrade pool in 2001, and has been employing all his ships in the 
Seatrade pool ever since.
1.4 Maruha and Reefer Express Line 
The largest fishing company Maruha Taiyou was one of the players behind 
Reefer Express Line (REL), a Japanese-American cooperation. But to under-
stand this cooperation, one needs to go back in time a little. After Japan’s loss 
in World War II, many Japanese-Americans were in Japan as part of the Amer-
ican occupation. These people knew English and Japanese and worked as in-
terpreters. One of these Japanese-Americans, a person named Kay Sugahara6 
6 Biographical information about Kay Sugahara can be found in Kanazawa, T. “Kay Sugahara–
’Nisei Onassis.’” Tozai Times, 1(Aug. 1985): 1, 10–11, 20., Niiya, Brian. 2001. (ed.) “Sugahara, Kay.” 
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(1909-1988), had a mixed reputation. During the war, Japanese Americans had 
been treated very badly in the United States, and Kay who had the reputation 
of being a fixer, offered services to these people that if they wanted to move 
back to Japan, Kay could ensure that their money was safely transferred. Ru-
mors have it that some of the money disappeared in these transactions. But 
Sugahara had something that was a great asset – an ability to handle interna-
tional business. And soon he would be called Nisei Onassis7 (Nisei means sec-
ond generation Japanese living abroad). 
Maruha was controlled by the Nakabe family. Just after the war Mr. Nakabe 
wanted, as has been mentioned, to send vessels to fish in distant seas. The fact 
that Japan had no international agreements during the period of occupation 
made fishing activity problematic. It was difficult, if not impossible, to get hold 
of the bunker and supplies to ships. It was here that Kay Sugahara and Mr. 
Nakabe got together. Sugahara could help Mr. Nakabe to get what was needed. 
Nakabe was very grateful for this and compensated Sugahara handsomely. 
Years later, when the Japanese economy had recovered, Sugahara and Nakabe 
pondered on whether to do business together again. This was the basis for 
Reefer Express Line, which was a collaboration between Maruha and Fairfield-
Maxwell (Sugahara), which started in 19688. Kay Sugahara passed away in 1988, 
and the business was run by his sons Bryan, taking care of tankers, and Byron, 
with the reefers. 
Reefer Express Line’s business idea was to find cargo for the ballast voyage 
that Maruha’s reefers made after they discharged fish in Japan. And since all 
income was on top of the vessels’ earnings as fish transporters, REL could offer 
low freight rates to customers. The vessels owned by Maruha, were handled by 
Japanese ship management, but were taken in by REL on timecharter or on 
voyage charter. Vessels were also chartered in from the market. The CEO of 
REL, Alex Hirschler together with Ira Heisler, ran an operation that has been 
described by our respondents as clever and speculative. Reefer Express Line 
did well and some important trades that can be mentioned are meat from Aus-
tralia to the US and fruit from Chile to Europe. 
Byron who was in charge of reefers also thought about the opportunity pre-
sented by Japan’s export of cars. And this he connected to the additional op-
portunity that was presented by the abolition of citrus import quotas, resulting 
in larger imported quantities. The shipping associated with car export was 
Encyclopedia of Japanese American History, Updated Edition. New York: Facts On File, Inc.




basically unidirectional, the car carriers returned to Japan empty. Byron’s idea 
was to combine these two opportunities. Byron approached Toyota with the 
idea of designing and building a special ship that shipped cars to the United 
States and returned with citrus. The deal was made and in 1978 Sunbelt Dixie 
was built at the Sasebo shipyard in Japan. The vessel was owned by Great 
American Lines – a joint venture between Toyota and Reefer Express Line. Al-
though the ship was a reefer it looked like a classic car carrier. Sunbelt Dixie was 
replaced in 2002 with the Sunbelt Spirit with a similar configuration, however 
after 2014 it was only used as a car carrier. Specialised ships built for a particu-
lar trade are vulnerable to changes in the market. 
REL had previously been in a unique position where they knew the trans-
port market for refrigerated goods much better than the exporters who REL 
serviced. When these exporters began to travel and learn about the market, 
they realized that REL had outlived its purpose. For example, REL was a close 
partner and sole supplier of transport to Pacific Sea Highways (PSW) – an as-
sociation of exporters from Chile established in 1980. However, many individ-
ual exporters left PSW to procure transportation services for themselves from 
companies that we know well, such as Cool Carriers and Lauritzen. REL had 
lost its competitiveness. In 1997 Maruha officially left the reefer segment and 
the ships were transferred to Reefer Express Lines. REL ceased to exist in 2002. 
1.5 Eastwind 
In the mid-1980s, when the shipping markets were deplorable, Fairfield Japan 
was approached by the Japanese bank Nissaigin that had 12 ships, including 
eight reefers in its books, since Shin Kurushima Shipyard had gone defunct. 
They desperately looked for buyers of these ships. One of the parties that were 
approached was Fairfield’s Japanese subsidiary for shipping activities and 
shipping agency, called Olympic International, spearheaded by Yoshihiro Azu-
ma. The bank gave Fairfield Japan good terms. According to hearsay, you could 
get more than 100% financing if you bought the vessels and employed them. 
Here, as so often, the stories diverge upon what really happened. According to 
one version, people at Fairfield Maxwell were not interested in the deal be-
cause of the bad markets, and therefore Azuma teamed up with John Kousi of 
Fairfield Maxwell to do the deal not for Fairfield, but for themselves. John Kou-
si, Don Simmons and Azuma broke out of Fairfield Maxwell and formed East-
wind in 1987. Simmons, Kousi and Azuma knew each other since they all 
worked at Fairfield Tanker. A second version is that Fairfield Maxwell was in-
terested in the deal and that what happened was a coup schemed by Azuma 
and Kousi. 
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Eastwind was established in 1987. Azuma’s name is written as the kanji, the 
Japanese letter, for east, and thus the company was called Eastwind. Their bu-
siness idea was to charter and operate tonnage of various types. Eastwind man-
aged to secured a large fleet following the collapse of the Soviet Union. During 
the transition from planned economy to market economy, when the state 
broke down, government officials who had managed ships, became owners. 
Eastwind approached these new ship-owners at the right time. But they were 
not alone. 
In 1991, Trans Ocean, a new pool, was led by Daniel Lev, a twenty-five year 
old from Russia, but the venture is also believed to be the brainchild of Sergei 
Yakubenko, who was employed by Far Eastern Shipping between 1978 and 
19889. Trans Ocean represented the interests Riga Reftransflot of Latvia, Lith-
uanian Klaipeda Shipping, Vladivostok-based Vostokrybkholodflot and Korf 
Shipping, Sevrybkholodflot of Murmansk, Kaliningrad Reftransflot, and the 
Crimean company Ygrybtranssbyt of Sevastopol. These fleets represented 95% 
of the Soviet reefer fleet. The early years of Trans Ocean were highly lucrative 
and according to sources their fleet numbered over 100 ships. These were 
mainly old freezers that had been used in Soviet fishing operations. 
Trans Ocean’s domination of the post-Soviet reefer business made it also a 
target for other players. Representatives from Eastwind went to various ship-
owners within Trans Ocean and tried to get them to move their ships to East-
wind’s pool. The Murmansk group left Transocean for Eastwind, and were 
followed by the groups from Sevastopol, Vladivostok and Kaliningrad. 
Eastwind was mainly transporting frozen products like squid, fish, and poul-
try from Brazil, Argentina, Falklands to the Far East. Like all other operators, 
Eastwind wanted to enter the fruit segment, and were able to secure know-
how from the ailing REL, for example Toby Moors who joined in 1995. East-
wind’s fleet grew, with several timecharters from Greek owners, and from 
having been a small niche operator, Eastwind was becoming a reasonably sized 
player. 
Eastwind and Cool Carriers set up the ECO joint venture in 1997, with over 
40 reefers serving various segments, including the more prestigious fruit busi-
ness. Eastwind continued to run its own operation of frozen products, some of 
it in competition with Cool Carriers. Eastwind’s collaboration with Russian in-
terests was handled by Eastwind in New York, also with about 40 vessels. Even 
though Eastwind had a large fleet, Lauritzen and Cool Carriers did not treat 
Eastwind as a serious competitor because the freezer business was under the 
9 <http://www.marinemoneyoffshore.com/node/6411>.
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radar. For example, in one year, Eastwind carried 600 000 tons of poultry from 
the US to Russia. 
In the mid-2000s, Eastwind began to expanded into several different ship-
ping segments. They built new dry cargo vessels in China and operated four-
teen tankers that were under the Bank of Scotland’s auspices. They even 
bought container ships from Maersk. Unlike the reefer segment Eastwind had 
limited experience with these segments. This expansion might look reckless in 
hindsight, but the market was bullish at the time and many ship-owners ex-
panded aggressively. Eastwind had over 100 ships prior to the financial crash in 
2008, and quite naturally they were heavily leveraged, with a lot of banks in-
volved. Reportedly, only the reefer division was profitable. Some banks, includ-
ing Nordea, pulled the pin when Eastwind could not fulfil its obligations. An 
insider recalls: 
It was carnage. From a reefer perspective it was one of the biggest disas-
ters that could happen because it devalued the world reefer fleet. Sud-
denly you dumped on the market 40-50 ships of varying quality. The ship 
called the Logan, 1990, 470 000 cbf, went from being 18 MUSD to eventu-
ally 10 MUSD, but the ship was overpriced. Even a very good ship like the 
Logan lost 50%. Every ship you owned became devalued. Eastwind may-
be went from an asset value of 300-400 million, but were suddenly worth 
only 200 million.
2 The Japanese Shipping Companies: NYK and the Others
Around 1965, the Japanese shipping lines entered into reefer trade. The ship-
ping lines were organized in conferences that regulated how much cargo each 
company could transport, of what kind, and at what price. Refrigerated goods 
were part of traditional liner cargo as some of the holds in ordinary liners 
could be cooled. To embark on reefer shipping should thus have been counted 
as traditional line freight and would thus be subject to the tough conference 
regulation. 
However, the Japanese shipping companies used other names for their op-
erations within the reefer segment. NYK, which began operations in 1965, was 
called Japan Reefer Carrier. NYK, or Japan Reefer Carrier, competed with the 
aforementioned car-citrus-ship Sunbelt Dixie on the trade with citrus from 
Florida to Japan. The main trade for NYK under the 1970s and early 1980s was 
frozen lamb from New Zealand to Korea and Hokkaido, as well as butter and 
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cheese from New Zealand to the Middle East. Until 1997 NYK used the name 
Japan Reefer Carrier. 
The competitor Mitsui OSK Line worked under the name Satsumaru Kaiun. 
They also began operations in 1965 but gave up already in 1970. What remains 
of Satsumaru Kaiun is the company Tokumaru Kaiun as a spin-off of Satsuma-
ru Kaiun. Tokumaru Kaiun invested in reefers (Atlantic Reefer, Pacific Reefer, 
Tasman Reefer) and allocated some to the Cool Carriers Leonina pool. 
The third major Japanese shipping giant K-LINE did not use a nickname for 
their reefer operations. Historically, K-LINE have been strong on the route be-
tween Japan / Asia and the Central and South American west coast. K-LINE 
began operations in the reefer segment by building a ship called the “M-type” 
used in their liner services, including the transport of bananas from Central 
and South America to Japan before Japan began importing bananas from the 
Philippines. The vessels were not fully reefers nor liners. They were, for exam-
ple, strongly built so that they would not only be able to ship fruit (which is 
light), but also steel (which is heavy). Due to the short life of Satsumaru Kaiun 
and K-Line in reefers, the following part focuses on NYK. 
When Mr. Michio Tamiya began at Japan Reefer Carrier in December 1981, 
he came to a business that constantly was in the red. The Japanese shipping 
companies had had difficulties to achieve profitability in the reefer trades, 
which led to both Mitsui OSK Line and K-Line leaving reefer business during 
the early 1970s. Mr. Tamiya wondered if these red numbers were because the 
management system of NYK did not fit the reefer business. At NYK, every third 
or fourth year managers change position, educating generalists rather than 
specialists. Someone said that this system is similar to that of public authority. 
Mr. Tamiya suggested that he should work with reefers for ten years. At least. 
In the summer of 1982 NYK was in charge of four to eight chartered-in reef-
ers. Since the company had been making losses, NYK had no permission to 
own ships. Returning to the history of the Japanese fisheries, it can be deduced 
that Mr. Tamiya came in just when the market collapsed after Maruha and Nis-
sui had entered the market. He looked at the situation and thought that this 
probably is the right time to build new vessels according to the old shipowner 
philosophy that one should build when the market is at the bottom. It was de-
cided from the management perspective that if one ordered two ships, one had 
to be for time-charter and the other for own operation. Some ships were deliv-
ered to NYK in the early 1980s, for example Kijima, Raffia Universal – a ship 
which was chartered to Universal Reefers, Ocean Onward and Ocean Pride, and 
two ships, Nienburg and Nordenham, built in 1984 and chartered out to Atlanta, 
the German importer of Chiquita Bananas. 
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The reefer division of NYK gained permission to build two Harvest class ves-
sels of 440 000 cbf plus reefer container capacity at a price of two billion yen 
per ship. Originally, they were supposed to be owned by a private owner (Ma-
sumoto Kaiun) and timechartered into NYK, but the owner left the project be-
cause of the sudden devaluation of the Japanese Yen following the Plaza 
Accord. NYK took ownership of these ships instead, and favourable financing 
obtained through NYK’s financial department, which due to internal struggles, 
had been encouraged to commission special loans to commercial divisions, 
loans that had very competitive interest rates. After some hesitation from the 
yard, however, the order was placed, with an option for another two ships, 
which were ordered later. The ships were ordered for own operation and there-
fore not to be time chartered out to any customer. At this time, the organiza-
tion consisted of five people. The Harvest Class ships, six in total, were delivered 
from 1988 to 1990. 
As we will see, there was a very large expansion in the own fleet of NYK’s 
reefer division. Although, NYK’s reefer division was of course aware of the chal-
lenge of containerization, the top management was confident that especially 
the banana trades would not be containerized in the near future. With this 
conviction, an aggressive expansion took place. The four Harvest vessels turned 
out to be a fortunate business, and right after these four vessels had been built, 
a new project started, with larger ships with more container capacity. The goal 
was to lease the vessels to banana companies in order to stabilize revenues for 
NYK. A collaboration began with Dole who chartered three ships. The three 
so-called Orion vessels were used in Dole’s intercarib trade, for example be-
tween Colombia and the US Gulf. Distances were short and three vessels fully 
covered the service. Mr. Tamiya remembers that: “I visited Dole Boca Raton in 
Florida, with Mr. Nagaki, who was my broker. We visited Dole. Since then the 
Dole contract continues on”. 
The Mermaid class vessels (built in 1992-1993) were also developed for Dole. 
While Orion was used for short trades, with the Mermaid ships NYK achieved 
a transatlantic contract, Ecuador to the Mediterranean. All the five Mermaid 
ships were timechartered for periods of 5-7 years to Dole. Then there might 
have been a few more Mermaid ships for own operation. 
1995 was the year when NYK Reefer had the biggest operation ever – a con-
trolled fleet of 57 vessels and an organization of about 20 people. Then the 
Crown type ships were built and delivered from 1996. The reason for develop-
ing the Crown type was that the Mermaid ships were not popular with some 
shippers. The banana companies did not particularly like the special deck, a 
hatch coaming, which was installed instead of a traditional hold. Although this 
special deck was very suitable for stronger fruits such as apples and pears, it 
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was difficult to maintain a steady and correct temperature for banana trans-
port. Tamiya concludes: “The banana companies did not like it, so, we had to 
change to Crown.” Although the market was not particularly good when the 
ships were ordered, NYK had to order them to keep business with Dole. The 
Crown vessels were both used for timecharter and in own operation. 
Apart from the timechartered vessels to Dole, NYK developed the Phoenix 
class (390 000 cbf), totalling seven ships, for its own operational fleet. Also, five 
ships in the Wild class (499 5000 cbf) were delivered from 1998. When it came 
to NYKs own operations, it started with New Zeeland (1986), expanded into 
South Africa, and later into Chile, which was held to be a particularly difficult 
market to enter, due to the absence of a national marketing board. Without 
thorough knowledge of who is who in the market, it was impossible to do busi-
ness. In 1988, NYK managed to get a contract for a minor trade with apples from 
Chile to Jedday (Mohammed Abdallah Sharbatly Corporation), and in 1990, 
they got into a major trade in Chile, with apples, pears and grapes. According 
to Mr. Tamiya: “The big trade of Chile was controlled by the major boys of Eu-
rope (Salén, Lauritzen, Cool).”
In other words, to get into that market was an accomplishment in itself. 
However, the success in the major Chile trade was short. The year afterwards, 
NYK lost the contract to Lauritzen. 
Apart from the expansive development of the fleet, in the early 1990s, NYK 
was on the way to take over Stockholm-based Cool Carriers. Mr. Hiroshi Ishi-
kawa, a key figure in NYK system who also founded both NYK Reefer and NYK 
Graph 14 NYK’s controlled reefer fleet 
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Car Carriers, had an idea that something should be done within the reefers 
segment to create the conditions for a long term sustainable business. In 1990, 
NYK bought Ugland European Car Carriers (UECC) which then changed its 
name to United European Car Carriers. Making a similar merger on the reefer 
side was considered desirable. As Cool Carriers was the global market leader, it 
was considered to be an appropriate target. Mr. Ishikawa knew Christer Ols-
son, who was the CEO of Wallenius and a well-known person in Swedish and 
international shipping. With the assistance of Christer Olsson, negotiations 
began with Bilspedition to buy Cool Carriers. They discussed the money and it 
was largely a done deal. At least from NYK’s perspective. But the employees 
spearheaded by Lars Gunnar Larsson rejected the bid from NYK and the deal 
never took place. Maybe it was because Cool Carriers were proud of their Salén 
past. This resistance was perceived from NYK’s perspective as resistance for 
resistance’s sake, without a clear idea of  how Cool Carriers would develop. It 
was also a fact that during the early 1980s NYK Reefer had only four ships in the 
fleet. That NYK would buy Salén, which had 100 ships at the time was unthink-
able. And actually Mr. Tamiya remembers that he visted Saléninvest in the 
early 1980s when the company had 100 vessels and appeared to make a profit of 
100 million SEK per year. Tamiya was inspired and wanted to build his own 
Salén. And that was precisely what NYK would have to do now that Cool Carri-
ers rejected their bid. 
But the end of the 1990s were difficult years for NYK Reefer. In April 2000, 
some of the staff moved to London. Mr. Aoki who was the new head of NYK 
Reefer saw the need to restructure, and part of this was injecting fresh equity, 
and part was to internationalize by relocating to London. One should remem-
ber that NYK Reefer had been a very Japanese business, located in Tokyo, with 
Japanese employees. However, under Mr. Aoki’s management, the company 
became more internationalized. Former employees from Universal Reefers 
and P&O were recruited. In October 2000 a task force committee was created 
with the name “Drastic Measure Task Force Team” (Bappon Taisaku Tasuku 
Foosu Cheemu). It was decided that NYK should leave reefers and instead es-
tablish a subsidiary in London, which would stand on its own. This subsidiary 
was created in November 2001. 
2.1 NYK STAR 
The cooperation with Star Reefers from January 2002 was initiated since the 
reefer market had collapsed and NYK was delivering poor results. Once again 
consolidation with other players was discussed, but this time, the idea was not 
to grow and become bigger as in the proposed merger with Cool Carriers in 
1993, but rather to survive. NYK began discussions with Star Reefers which was 
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a part of Blue Star Line (further covered in chapter 8). The container line part 
of the Blue Star Line had merged with P&O but the traditional reefer part re-
mained. Both NYK and Blue Star Line understood each other as traditional 
liner shipping companies, similar mentalities, and this seemed to be a good 
basis for a merger. Star were also chartering out many of their vessels while 
NYK focused more on their own operations, so there were synergies. There 
were also discussions with United Reefers, who had separated from Seatrade, 
and had a fleet of about 20 ships. NYK, United and Star were to form a joint 
venture comprising over 60 ships and thereby become an important competi-
tor to Seatrade. However, as we have seen in other chapters, Star Reefers was 
taken over by Christian Siem. 
NYK had the option of not proceeding with the planned Star collaboration 
after the latter’s change in ownership. But they went ahead, the need to con-
solidate the business was great. Star Reefers had no interest in collaborating 
with United Reefers, since they perceived their vessels to be inferior, which led 
to the formation of NYKStar. The joint-venture boasted nearly 40 ships. But the 
partnership was a bad experience for NYK. Aoki from NYK was the CEO and 
Aage Thoen who Christian Siem had nominated as Chairman did not go well 
together. During the process Lars Rutberg from Cool Carriers was recruited to 
replace Aoki as CEO, to improve the business from NYK’s perspective. Rutberg 
remembers that the management on the Star side weren’t keen on him joining 
NYKStar, and even tried to block his appointment. From Rutberg’s perspective, 
the pool operation was set up to favour Star. Attempts to renegotiate the pool 
parameters were dismissed by Star resulting in NYK’s decision to cancel the 
joint-venture. Despite the fact that the cooperation failed and formally closed 
down in June 2003, NYK had not abandoned their idea to consolidate with an-
other operator.
2.2 NYKLauritzenCool and NYKCool
Afterward the break-up, NYK looked for new partners, and finally the choice 
was LauritzenCool. Lars Rutberg had a background at Cool Carriers and ac-
cording to Mr. Tamiya, Rutberg helped convince NYK to buy a share of Cool 
Carriers from Lauritzen. According to NYK, it was obvious that Lauritzen was 
exiting the reefer business. From NYK’s perspective, it was important that Lau-
ritzen would keep their fleet for about three years with a gradual phase-out. 
In 2004, LauritzenCool entered a tonnage sharing agreement with NYK Reef-
ers and NYK Reefers bought 50% of LauritzenCool Logistics. NYK bought 50% 
of LauritzenCool in January 2005, and NYKLauritzenCool was created. The 
company employed around 60 specialized reefer vessels and once again, the 
operations were headquartered in Stockholm. The strategy for these owners 
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was to consolidate their operations, minimise their fleets, and focus on stable 
contracts with major fruit companies. Therefore, the ReeferShip venture with 
its older ships was dismantled. In 2007, Lauritzen completed its exit strategy 
and NYKLauritzenCool was renamed NYKCool. The old relationship between 
United Fruit and Salén, later between Chiquita and Cool Carriers, was still ac-
tive in the early 21st century. When Chiquita was in financial trouble in 2007, 
they turned to NYKCool with a proposal to sell and lease back 12 ships to im-
prove their balance sheet. Initial discussions were held between NYKCool and 
Star to share the investment. NYK agreed to the deal, but eventually the invest-
ment was shared with Eastwind and Chartworld in the company Eystrasalt, 
from whom NYKCool bareboatchartered the ships. As part of the deal, a NYK-
Cool affiliate, Seven Hills, was set up to handle all of Chiquita’s spot chartering 
as well as the commercial management for the chartered vessels. However, the 
Eastwind bankruptcy in 2009, as a result of the financial crisis, caused these 
arrangements to fall apart. According to respondents who were at NYKCool, 
Chiquita took the opportunity to get out of the deal in the turmoil surround-
Figure 18 Consolidation was seen as a way to improve profitability in the years around 2000, 
and this gave rise to NYKLauritzenCool for a few years. After Lauritzen’s and then 
NYK’s exit, the operation reverted to the name Cool Carriers, owned by Baltic-
Shipping  
Photo: AlfvanBeem (2006)
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ing the bankruptcy. After a year and a half, all contracts and the spotchartering 
business in Seven Hills were terminated. 
LCL, which was providing door-to-door logistics solutions, had been anoth-
er focus area for the company. However, this turned out to be overly ambitious 
and poor results followed. Particular problems had appeared in Spain, where 
they made significant losses. 
As a result of these setbacks, the Japanese parent company wanted the 
Stockholm operation to focus on maritime reefer operations. In relation to this 
decision, Mats Jansson and Lars Rutberg decided to leave NYKCool. Jansson 
was replaced by Boris Gersling, with long experience in Lauritzen, particularly 
in Chile. According to small-talk in the industry, this change of CEO led to less 
autonomy at Cool Carriers. In other words, the locus of strategy was moved 
away from NYKCool, which from this point became the operations department 
of NYK Reefer, although the Leonina pool operation continued. A few attempts 
by the organization to invest in the segment were turned down. From the per-
spectives of the employees, the period under NYK ownership is depicted as one 
of gradual stagnation, following the decline in the industry. That some employ-
ees had to leave before their retirement age was also a cause of discontent. 
Additional anecdotal information also suggests that employee morale and 
group solidarity declined after Mats Jansson left in 2009. 
In 2014, Baltic Shipping acquired NYKCool. This marked the end of NYK’s 
history in reefers. Discussing the issue with Mr. Tamiya, he explains that he had 
mixed feelings about selling to Baltic. He had suggested to NYK that they 
should exit the reefer segment already in 2008. He argues that the price that 
might have been obtained in 2008 was about 200-250 million USD, while the 
price in 2014 was far less. However, in 2008, the president of NYKCool said to 
Mr. Tamiya that it was “noted but a pity to give up the long-term operation of 
reefers. We started from scratch and grew organically. All of a sudden giving up 
is not good.” 
Baltic Shipping
Baltic Shipping has its roots in HSC Agency, which is run by Aveny Bich, 
the former managing director of the post-Soviet shipping company 
Klaipeda. Aveny had relations to Laskaridis and thus also to the Hamburg 
reefer cluster (see chapter 9). Bich’s son, Oleg Bich, founded the Maritime 
Reefer Agency in Hamburg. Oleg Bich was instrumental in setting up Bal-
tic Shipping in 1999. However, details regarding ownership and organiza-
tional structure of the company is largely unknown, but some of the 
ships in the fleet are owned by fruit importers Saptari and Sorusa. 
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From 2013 Reefer Alliance was established together with Seatrade 
combining the fleets of the two companies in specific trade lanes. They 
had a fleet size of 96 ships from 350 to 626 000 cbf. The fleet of Baltic 
Shipping is old, even in the context of the reefer industry. While the aver-
age age of reefers was 24 years in 2013, the reefer fleet of Baltic Shipping 
averaged 28 yearsb. Baltic Shipping acquired NYKCool in 2014.
The company’s main services, at this time, were the transportation of 
fruit from Latin America and Africa to European ports, predominantly St 
Petersburg. It also operated a liner service from Brest and Vlissingen to St 
Petersburg. Another important business was the ship agency in St Peters-
burg which reduces turn-around time in that portc. 
Notes: a “Russian importers buy up old reefers”. TradeWinds 1 August 2002. <http://www.
tradewindsnews.com/weekly/176407/russian-importers-buy-up-old-reefers>; b “In-
crease in Seaborne Trade Hides Uncertain Future for Specialized Reefer Vessels”, The 
Maritime Executive, 24 September 2013, <http://www.maritime-executive.com/pressre 
lease/Increase-in-Seaborne-Trade-Hides-Uncertain-Future-for-Specialized-Reefer-Ves 
sels-2013-09-24.>.; c Baltic Shipping webpage, <http://www.baltic-shipping.com/en/
news.htm>.
3 Summary
To make a summary of all the Japanese operators is not a simple task. But one 
can say that the fishing companies entered the reefer segment as a way to ei-
ther create employment for seafarers, to diversify into a segment which was 
related to the transport of fish following the implementation of the 200 miles 
economic zone, or to earn money on the ballast leg of fish transportation. Giv-
en the fish-related background, they were discursively positioned as outsiders 
by the established operators. This is somewhat similar to how Cool Carriers for 
a long time saw Seatrade as a fish carrying operator. Their lack of English skills 
corroborated this outsider identity. In any case, the Japanese fishing compa-
nies made a significant impact on the market given their ability to raise fund-
ing for a significant newbuilding programme. Much of the downturn in the 
1970s for the established operators was due to the Japanese operators entering 
the market. 
The Japanese shipping companies’ expansion into specialized reefer trades 
was first made in secret since they were regulated by liner conferences. The 
only player who remained within the reefer segment was NYK. It managed to 
get out of bad profitability in the early 1980s and was able to stay profitable 
while significantly growing the fleet. From the early 1980s to 1995 the fleet had 
grown from about 10 ships to over 50 ships. NYK was the only Japanese operator 
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that was able to outcompete the established operators on core trades and NYK 
even tried to acquire Cool Carriers in the early 1990s. Similar to the other op-
erators NYK Reefer was suffering from the market downturn at the end of the 
1990s, and looked for ways to internationalize and consolidate, first with Star 
and after that unsuccessful attempt, with Stockholm-based LauritzenCool. 
The Japanese operators were subjectively perceived and discursively con-
structed as outsiders, which is clear through references to cultural differences, 
black hair meetings, and just a fundamental incomprehension of what the 
Japanese operators were doing and what their aim was. The Japanese operators 
also saw themselves as outsiders trying to get into second-tier, and then first-
tier customers. Given their newcomer identity the established actors were not 
willing to collaborate with the Japanese operators, apart from Nissui and the 
other “newcomer” Seatrade which started collaborating in the mid-1980s. NYK 
Reefer moved to London at the end of the 1990s and recruited non-Japanese 
people from other reefer operators. This most probably led to NYK Reefer be-
coming more accepted within the reefer community that since the beginning 
was centred in Northern Europe. 
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Chapter 8
From Blue Star Line to Star Reefers
Star Reefers is one of the few remaining independent reefer operators and has 
a fleet of modern vessels chartered to the major fruit companies. Today’s op-
eration is owned by Siem Industries and is a result of Siem’s fusion of its previ-
ously acquired Swan Reefers and its purchase of the remaining vestige of the 
classic Blue Star Line. The latter, with its famous funnel logo, can trace its his-
tory back over a hundred years and its fortunes were inextricably linked to that 
of its owners and founders, the Vestey family. 
In the late nineteenth century Samuel Vestey, a provisioner with a butchery, 
sent his sons, William and Edmund to the USA where a meat cannery in Chi-
cago was established. The idea was to produce low cost corned beef to the 
business back in Liverpool. This venture was followed by the export from Ar-
gentina of frozen partridges and this gave the brothers exposure to the new 
technology of refrigeration leading them to open a cold store in England. The 
business was apparently successful and was publicly listed in 18971. In 1903 
the business had expanded with several cold stores around England as well as 
one in Riga2. The basic business idea was a follow-on from the meat cannery 
in Chicago: to provide cheap meat products to England and to the Merseyside 
in particular. The Vesteys identified that the burgeoning industrial population 
of the region was a potentially massive meat consumer, as long as it was in-
expensive, and were able to tap into that demand. 
It’s fair to say that the Vesteys were pioneers in the application of refrigera-
tion technology. The network of cold stores was expanding and, with hind-
sight, we can consider this as a necessary infrastructure that was a prerequisite 
for the development of refrigerated shipping. The Vesteys initiated a new ven-
ture from China in 1906 and the major business was eggs for the bakeries in the 
UK. Even though the Vesteys are associated with the meat trades it was the egg 
trade that led them to purchase two steamers that were converted to refriger-
ated vessels in 1909. 
The Vestey brothers formed Blue Star Line in 1911. The fleet grew and Argen-
tina became a major centre for their operations, a cold store was opened at 
Zárate and the Allied armies in France were supplied with meat during the 
1 Initial prospectus of the Union Cold Storage and Ice Company of Liverpool Limited from the 
Liverpool Daily Post, 23 Nov 1897, p.4.
2 The Standard, 17 Nov 1903, p 11.
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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First World War. In Britain the Vesteys invested in retail butcheries that num-
bered over 2000 by the twenties. And by the 1925 Blue Star Line claimed to have 
the largest refrigerated fleet in the world3. 
The vessels that Blue Star Line operated at this time had little in common 
with the reefers that we come across later in the century. These were multipur-
pose vessels with a frozen hold for meat, a regular hold for general cargo and 
they also carried passengers. In 1925 Blue Star Line ordered five large ships, 
known of as the A-class4. These vessels were completed two years later and 
carried 160-180 first class passengers particularly to and from Argentina, and 
also carried meat and other cargo. Modifications were made; the Avelona Star 
was converted to only carry cargo while the reverse was the case with the Aran-
dora Star. The Arandora Star with its lavish furnishings and ballroom, swim-
ming pool and tennis court, was the epitome of luxury cruising in the interwar 
years. 
In 1933 the company began using refrigerated vessels to carry meat from 
Australia and New Zealand. An impetus to this was the preferential treatment 
accorded to the Dominions when the UK abandoned free trade. Farms on a 
gigantic scale were acquired in South America and Australia resulting in a 
most remarkable vertically integrated meat operation employing tens of thou-
sands of people in the interwar years. All facets of the meat industry from the 
farm to the retail butchery were owned by the company and the shipping op-
eration was just one link in the chain. 
The Imperial Star class that followed in the 1930s and 1940s were motorships 
and while they carried passengers, they did not do so to the extent, or with the 
luxury, that the A-class did. The British Government pressed most of Blue Star 
Line’s 38 vessels into service when the Second World War broke out in 1939. 
Twelve vessels remained in 1945. Blue Star Line’s vessels were quite fast and 
frequently operated independently of the convoy system. The aforementioned 
A-class vessels could do 16 knots for example. 
Blue Star Line’s War Service
The Almeda Star was carrying passengers and cargo from Liverpool to the 
River Plate when she was torpedoed in 1941 by the German submarine 
U-96a. Rescue parties were sent following a brief distress signal but they 
discovered no sign of her. The vessel was lost with all hands, including 194 
passengers.
3 <http://www.bluestarline.org/william_vestey.htm>.
4 The Almeda, Andelucia, Arandora, Avelona and Avila. The name “Star” was added in 1929. 
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The Andalucia Star was carrying meat, eggs and passengers from Argen-
tina to England when she was torpedoed by U-101 at night off the coast of 
West Africa. During the evacuation the ship was repeatedly torpedoed. A 
four-year-old girl was discovered in the water some considerable distance 
from the lifeboats. A crewman swam to her and eventually they could be 
saved. The Stewardess that had turned on the girl’s red electric safety 
light was never found. The lifeboats were later picked up by a Royal Navy 
corvette, miraculously only four lives had been lost.
The cruise liner Arandora Star was used as a troop and refugee transport 
in the first year of the war. In 1940 she was controversially tasked with 
transporting civilian Italian and German male internees, as well as Ger-
man POW’s, to Newfoundland. The Arandora Star was torpedoed by U-47 
off the coast of Ireland. A little over half of the people, many covered in 
fuel oil, were rescued on a Canadian destroyer sent for the purpose. Fur-
ther searches discovered no further survivors. 805 people were lost and 
Blue Star Line never reused the name “Arandora”. 
The Avelona Star was the vessel that had been converted to only carry 
cargo. She was torpedoed by U-43 while in convoy carrying meat and or-
anges from Argentina. The survivors were picked by the French Beignon 
that was itself sunk later the same day. There were a few fatalities.
The Avila Star was carrying meat and passengers from Buenos Aires when 
she was torpedoed at night by U-201 in 1942. A further torpedo during 
evacuation caused additional casualties. The survivors of the sinking en-
dured a tortuous journey in the lifeboats, with many fatalities due to 
wounds, dehydration and exposure before finally being rescued by Portu-
guese vessels. One of the lifeboats was lost at sea. 73 of the 199 people 
onboard perished.
Many of the other vessels of Blue Star Line suffered similar fates. A well 
known example is the Doric Star that was sunk by the infamous German 
“pocket-battleship” Admiral Graf Spee. While we are on the subject it 
ought to be mentioned that several Blue Star Line vessels were actively 
involved in military operations during the war, Norway and the Siege of 
Malta for instance. Blue Star Line lost 646 of its personnel during the 
Second World War and, as previously mentioned, most of its fleet. 
Note: a See Taffrail, W. 1973. Blue Star Line at War, 1939-1945, London: Foulsham. An over-
view is available at <http://www.bluestarline.org>.
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The British Ministry of War Transport built low-cost “Empire” ships during the 
war and some of these were purchased or chartered by Blue Star Line after the 
war ended to replace lost tonnage. Blue Star Line took over Lamport and Holt 
Line in 1944 and the Booth Steamship Company in 1946. Four replacements for 
the A-class were also ordered and completed in 1947 and 1948. These vessels 
were the Argentina Star, Brasil Star, Paraguay Star and the Uruguay Star. They 
resumed their first class service to South America but with fewer passengers 
and the luxury and opulence of the interwar era was a thing of the past.
1 Entry into Specialized Reefers
The link to Australia and Queensland’s beef industry was identified by the 
names of vessels such as the Gladstone Star, Townsville Star, Queensland Star 
and Rockhampton Star in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These vessels and sev-
eral other reefers that were built around the same time heralded the compa-
ny’s major entrance into specialised reefer shipping. The Wellington Star of 
1952 was claimed to be the world’s largest reefer at the time with a capacity of 
almost 600 000 cbf5. Services between New Zealand and Japan were 
5 Collard, I. 2014. Blue Star Line: Fleet & History, Gloucestershire: Amberley Books, p. 28.
Figure 19 Prior to containerisation, many reefer cargoes, particularly meat, were carried in 
refrigerated cargo liners. Passengers were also carried, and vessels like the 
Uruguay Star had first class service  
Photo: Brown, W.H./ Sjöhistoriska museet
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inaugurated and carried fruit as well as meat and fish. General cargo was also 
carried. A line that was later to become very important was started in 1962 car-
rying meat from Australia to the east coast of the USA and Canada. Many ser-
vices were conducted jointly with other shipping operators.
Blue Star Line were pioneers in the field of containerised shipping. In 1966 
they were one of the five British shipping companies that formed Associated 
Container Transport (ACT). The other members of the consortium were Ben 
Line, Cunard Steam Ship, Ellerman Lines and Harrison Line. In 1967 a corre-
sponding company focused on Australia was formed ACT(A) by Blue Star Line, 
Ellerman Lines and Port Line. The funding of the new large container vessels 
required cooperation and the first of these vessels was the ACT 1 delivered in 
1969. In the seventies there were various constellations of shipping companies 
including Blue Star Line that were concerned with containerised shipping6. 
The California Star and the Columbia Star were delivered in 1971 and besides 
carrying ordinary containers also carried 125 insulated containers for refriger-
ated cargo. Blue Star Line cooperated in the North Atlantic trade with the Dan-
ish East Asiatic Company as ScanStar which became Johnson ScanStar when 
the Swedish Johnson Line joined in 1972. 
Johnson Line
The Swedish Johnson Line can trace its origins back to Axel Johnson’s 
trading with coal, iron and steel in the late 19th centurya. Shipping en-
terprises followed and this included the Johnson Line, a liner company. 
The first Swedish vessels fitted with refrigeration were the Axel Johnson, 
Annie Johnson and Margaret Johnson operated by the Johnson Line after 
the mid-1920s. They were designed for the north Pacific trade and had re-
frigerated holds of 50 000 cbf. Their cargoes included fresh fruit. Further 
liner vessels with refrigeration followed and the business with South and 
Central America grew. Several other Swedish companies operated similar 
vessels, such as Transatlantic, Swedish America Line, Swedish East Asia 
Company, Swedish Orient Line. Johnson expanded its reefer capacity with 
the Rio series (100 000 cbf reefer) in the 1950s and also modified existing 
vessels to increase their refrigerated and freezer capacity. They collabo-
rated with Atlanttrafik as well as German and Norwegian reefer opera-
tors and discussions were held with Salén so they were well acquainted 
with reefer operations. They were already chartering in reefers to ser-
vice its fruit cargoes from Argentina, and this was expensive in the high
6 For further reading see for example Collard 2014. 
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season, so in 1961 they ordered their first specialized reefers. The four Val-
ley class vessels that followed were designed in-house, and had a capacity 
a little under 300 000 cbf, had modern cranes and could do 19 knots. In 
1968, larger vessels, also referred to as Valley Class, were built and added 
to the fleet. These ships could do 22 knots and had a 487 000 cbf capacity. 
Johnson’s reefers were state of the art. 
Johnson Line’s focus was always on the liner business and similarly to 
other liner companies they experimented with refrigerated containers in 
the 1970s. Because of its involvement in the North-South trade particu-
larly from Argentina, Johnson used refrigerated containers on their ves-
sels. These vessels had a centralised refrigeration unit that was ducted to 
the insulated containers, the so-called porthole system. Johnson Line 
were in serious trouble around the time of the Salén bankruptcy in 1984, 
they pulled through, but the shipping operations later declined.
Note: a This section is mainly based on Rinman, T. 1990. The Johnson Line 1890-1990, 
 Gothenburg: Rinman & Lindén, pp. 88 & 148-149. Also, Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 1987/47 
p. 14-19 & 1987/49, p. 17-21.
The advent of containerisation, the growth of specialised reefer shipping as 
well as the emergence of affordable air travel all combined to end the era of the 
refrigerated cruise liner and these vessels were scrapped in the early seventies. 
Blue Star Line built six new reefers of around 500 000 cbf, the new A-class, and 
their delivery announced the company’s venture into the major fruit trades 
dominated by Saléns and Lauritzen-Peninsular Reefers. These larger, faster, 
and more technologically advanced vessels, starting with the Afric Star in 1975 
were comparable to the Snow vessels built by Saléns just a few years earlier. 
Two of these A-class reefers were chartered by the British government for use 
as support vessels during the Falkland Islands conflict in 1982. Meat continued 
to be an important sector for Blue Star Line but the refrigerated sector expand-
ed into the fruit market and with bananas in particular. 
In 1983 the company placed a major order for four newbuildings from Har-
land & Wolff of Dublin. The shipyard had built ships for Blue Star in the past 
and was also the birthplace of the Titanic. These vessels were the Scottish Star, 
Auckland Star, English Star and Canterbury Star of 465 000 cbf and were deliv-
ered 1985-86. These modern vessels were more economical than those before. 
They were fuel efficient, had modern handling equipment, rationally designed 
to maximise pallet intake and could handle a large number of containers. The 
vessels also had the advantage of being able to function with a smaller crew: 21 
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as compared to 36 with the A-class of the seventies7. They were successfully 
put to work in the fruit trades. 
On the container side Blue Star Line co-operated with amongst others Ham-
burg Süd on its South American services. The relationship with Hamburg Süd 
would become particularly significant on the reefer side a few years later. The 
meat trades in the eighties were increasingly containerised. Blue Star Line, as 
ACT, competed with Cool Carriers and Seatrade for some time with meat 
trades from Australia to the US East Coast. This was a battle between contain-
erised shipping and specialised reefers. The containerised services enjoyed 
economies of scale but the small refrigerated vessels were quicker at clearing 
their palletised cargoes through customs in the USA. Eventually the business 
became containerised. These trades carried meat from ports such as Towns-
ville, Brisbane and Darwin to Houston, Jacksonville and especially Philadel-
phia. The lean grass-fed Australian beef was ideal for hamburger patties that 
upon delivery at the Packer Avenue Terminal in Philadelphia went directly to 
the grinders and from there to well-known hamburger chains. 
Blue Star Line’s reefer division on other hand, was separate and quite small; 
in 1986 it was operating 17 reefers8. It was primarily involved in the fruit trades 
but also carried other cargo. Blue Star Line and Hamburg Süd merged their 
reefer operations and formed Star Reefers in 1989. The new joint venture was 
operating 25 vessels in 1991. It was also around this time that it became public 
knowledge that the Vestey group had serious financial problems.
It was the conjuncture of several factors that caused the downfall of the 
Vestey empire in the 1990s. This complex series of events can be broken down 
to three components. Firstly, Union International which was particularly 
recognised by its ownership of the massive J.H. Dewhurst butchery chain. This 
was a major source of the group’s problems. Union International had borrowed 
heavily to invest in expensive high street butcheries at the time when meat 
retailing was switching to the supermarkets. The hysteria surrounding Mad 
Cow Disease only served to exacerbate the problems. 
Secondly, Blue Star Line9, besides being Britain’s second largest shipown-
er, was a holding company for diverse shipping interests where the contain-
erised trades to the United States were the largest. This part of the business had 
recently been expanded by the purchase of the North American interests of 
 
7 Tolerton 2008, p. 155-156.
8 “Cool Carriers fortsätter världsledande kylsjöfart”. Svensk Sjöfarts Tidning 46/1986, 
pp. 35-40.
9 Owned in turn by Frederick Leyland which was the name of a shipping company acquired in 
1935. 
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ACT(A) when Cunard Ellerman sold its stake to P&O. Blue Star Line controlled 
Pacific Express Container Line, Booth Line and many other liner services as 
well as shipmanagement and its stake in Star Reefers, but profits were elusive. 
During the nineties Blue Star Line tried to improve its profitability by flagging 
out vessels and cutting costs which impacted on its British crews. The shipping 
interests of the Vesteys were struggling and during these years usually recorded 
a net loss. 
The third major part of the Vestey group were its property holdings. The 
agricultural holdings in South America and Australia were vast and a couple of 
hundred thousand beef cattle ranged upon them. These solid property invest-
ments were, however, coupled with more recent speculative investments in 
commercial real estate, in London, and their timing was unfortunate. 
So the three major parts of the Vestey empire had their own problems, to 
varying degrees. An additional problem that surfaced at the same time was 
that it became increasingly difficult for the Vestey Group to minimise its tax 
payments to Inland Revenue. Debts were rising and the outlook was unfavour-
able. 
Edmund Hoyle Vestey, the Chairman of Blue Star Line, had meetings with 
the banks. Huge properties in Australia were sold in 1992 as a part of the plan 
negotiated with the banks to refinance the debts of Union International. Sir 
John Collins was brought onboard by the banks as Chief Executive of the 
Vestey Group in 1993. Until 2001, he led the process of dismantling the group in 
the interests of creditors. Union International could not be saved and was put 
into receivership in 1995. Blue Star Line, with the exception of Star Reefers, was 
sold to P&O Nedlloyd in 199810. However, Blue Star Line acquired Hamburg 
Süd’s part of Star Reefers. The Vestey’s shipping operation was then confined to 
Albion Reefers as the ship owning company with six reefers11 and Star Reefers 
as the operating company that also included vessels on charter. Star Reefers’ 
present-day CEO Kenneth Ross remembers the period as “biblically bad basi-
cally”. Efforts were made to find another reefer operator to partner with. Unit-
ed Reefers, linked to the Dutch ship owner Vroon was an option that was 
explored but ultimately the choice settled on was NYK Reefers. However, as 
these matters were being discussed, the Vestey Group found a buyer for the 
reefer business. Christian Siem after rebuilding the ailing Swan Reefers was 
now set to purchase Star Reefers. This signalled the end of the Vestey’s involve-
ment in shipping. They retain substantial property holdings and some food 
10 P&O Nedlloyd was acquired by AP Møller-Maersk in 2006. 
11 The above mentioned Scottish Star, Auckland Star, English Star and Canterbury Star as 
well as the slightly older Tudor Star and Trojan Star.
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interests. In the next section we will go back a few years and briefly look at 
Swan Reefers and then proceed to look at the recent history of Star Reefers as 
a part of the Siem group.
2 Swan Reefer 
Swan Shipping was founded in 1984 by the captains Christer Jansson, Lars Eric-
sson and the chief engineer Bill Jansson. They purchased their first vessel, a 
ro-ro, by using their own homes as security. The company had been founded 
on the Swedish west coast but moved to Norway in the late eighties to attract 
capital. Bulk carriers were purchased from Klaveness and were operated in the 
Klaveness Bulkhandling Pool. Swan Shipping also owned reefers and ro-ro ves-
sels that freighted forest products. 
The company expanded its fleet but profits were elusive. The focus shifted 
to reefers. Swan Reefer was formed in 1997 with Actinor and Swan Shipping as 
the main owners. Actinor, besides its other interests, owned four reefers that 
were bareboat chartered to Del Monte and Lauritzen. Swan Shipping had five 
reefers at the time that Swan Reefer was formed. A tenth reefer was purchased 
from Chilean CAV and after a successful share emission another eight from Ir-
gens Larsen. The rapid expansion coincided with a declining market and 
mounting losses with the result that the company’s share price dropped sharp-
ly. Ugland began buying into the company and efforts were made to reduce 
costs. In 1999 Swan Shipping sold its share of the company leaving Ugland and 
Actinor as the largest owners.
Swan Reefer, as with other Norwegian-based ventures in the reefer market, 
was focused on ship owning as an investment and not as a commercial ship-
ping operation. Most of Swan’s vessels were operated in the Cool Carriers and 
Lauritzen pools. The company struggled and its situation became precarious 
when banks and investors began to lose faith. A new owner was sought, and in 
December 2000 it was announced that Christian Siem, of Siem Industries, was 
buying in. Siem was well known in shipping circles as a contrarian investor 
with the ability to turn things around. In order to ensure good returns, Swan 
needed a commercial operation. This meant that more ships were required as 
well as the know-how to operate them. Therefore, it was speculated that an 
additional acquisition was in the pipeline. 
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3 Star Reefers
The reinvigorated Swan Reefer, led by Christian Siem, acquired Albion Reefers 
in 2001 for USD 35 million, completing the Vesteys’ exit from shipping. For this 
relatively low price, Siem gained six reefers, a first class brand with deep cus-
tomer relationships, and the management and marketing expertise required to 
operate his growing fleet. Swan Reefer was renamed Star Reefers the opera-
tions were placed in the Star Reefers London office. Apprehensions at Star that 
Siem was a speculative investor proved to be unfounded; Siem was in for the 
long haul. 
Discussions of Star Reefers forming a joint-venture with NYK Reefers were 
already underway when Siem entered the scene. Consolidation was consid-
ered to be a sound strategy in the face of a difficult market. And NYK Reefers, 
from Star’s perspective, was seen as a suitable business partner. Both compa-
nies had similar ships and customers. The business idea was also similar; both 
companies chartered out tonnage to the major fruit companies. And both 
companies were generally conservative long-term players in the industry; on 
paper it seemed like a good match. 
A joint pool agreement was reached in late 2001 between Siem’s Star Reefers 
and NYK. This was the start of NYK Star Reefers, a joint-venture that although 
short-lived, was seen as a major industry consolidation at the time. NYK Star 
Reefers operated seventy-four ships and was the second largest player in the 
industry; only LauritzenCool, also a consolidation, was larger. 
Aage Thoen headed up the new operation and Kevin Harding, long-time 
manager at Star, continued in a senior capacity. On the NYK side, Fumiya Aoki 
was in charge. The office was a combined operation and people were employed 
by either NYK or Star and in a similar fashion the vessels belonged to one com-
pany or the other. Managing the joint-venture turned out to be difficult, each 
side prioritised its own interests and personalities were also a factor. There was 
a perception from NYK that their interests were coming off second best so in 
an effort to remedy this they recruited Lars Rutberg from LauritzenCool to 
oversee the operation. This move was perceived by managers at Star Reefers as 
confrontational. Star Reefers also had former Swan Reefer vessels still in the 
LauritzenCool pool and wanted to bring them over to the NYK Star Reefer Pool. 
Both NYK and Star had to agree on the terms placed on vessels entering the 
pool, and in this case, NYK effectively stopped the move. It later surfaced that 
NYK were already in talks with LauritzenCool. Later, when these bore fruit, Star 
Reefers was offered a role in NYK’s new operation on terms that Star, however, 
would not accept. The joint-venture was terminated in late 2003 and the two 
companies went their separate ways. In the same year, Laskaridis made an 
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unsolicited bid for Star Reefers, offering 70m USD and taking over 121m USD in 
debt. However, the offer was declined, possibly because of a promising market 
outlook. 
Star Reefers operated 36 reefers in 2004 and around half of these were 
owned and the remainder were chartered in. The market boomed, rates on the 
spot market were, for larger vessels such as those operated by Star, up 27% 
from the year before, and were the best since 1997. Fixed twelve month char-
ters were similarly climbing and the general demand for shipping assisted in 
fixing backhaul cargo (e.g. second-hand cars). 
The Japanese ship owning company Nissen Kaiun was a key partner for Star 
Reefers. The general modus operandi that emerged over the years was that Nis-
sen built new vessels at the Shikoku Yard and chartered them to Star Reefers 
who in turn chartered them out to the major fruit companies. After a number 
years Star purchased the vessels, sold or scrapped its old ones, and Nissen built 
new ones. In 2004 Star Reefers entered into 10 year time-charters for the first of 
what was eventually to become the 12 newbuildings of the Star class. 
Deliveries of these modern and large (615 000 cbf) vessels commenced in 
2006 and were profitably chartered out in batches of four to major fruit compa-
nies. Star First was the first of the twelve and its name is something of a play on 
words: it’s the first vessel of the class, and all twelve begin rather than end with 
the word ‘Star’, as had been the company’s practice since the 1920s. The Star 
class vessels are the largest investment in reefer newbuildings so far in the 21st 
century. They ensure that Star Reefers can supply quality tonnage to the mar-
ket and to the banana companies in particular. The vessels have a large reefer-
container capacity, modern handling equipment and are more fuel efficient 
than older vessels. Star Reefers successively purchased older vessels in its op-
eration including the Caesar reefer vessels from Oetker, Polar class from MPC, 
and the C class from Nissen. Star Reefers also developed an in-house shipman-
agement subsidiary in Gdynia, Poland starting in 2006. The technical manage-
ment of all of their owned vessels was eventually transferred to this operation.
In the booming market until 2008, Star Reefers was able to fix most of its 
fleet each year on timecharters at profitable rates and the newbuildings had 
long-term arrangements in place. The small portion of the fleet that traded on 
the volatile spot market could take advantage of the usually high rates that 
prevailed at the time. Russia had emerged as a major destination for specialised 
reefer cargoes. As a consequence, Star had several of its vessels ice-strength-
ened, which was a prerequisite to reach St Petersburg in the winter months. 
Five vessels were placed on long-term time charter with the Russian fruit im-
porter Sunway and in 2008 also to the Joint Fruit Company. 
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However, 2008 was also the year that the market started to slide as the glob-
al recession impacted. Scrapping prices were still high and many owners of 
older vessels took advantage of this. Star didn’t take this opportunity and their 
vessels continued to trade profitably for a time. Star managed to record a prof-
it in 2009 despite the market downturn due to its previously negotiated time 
charters. The recession also coincided with poor fruit harvests in Central 
America, poor squid catches in the South Atlantic, reduced poultry trade be-
tween the USA and Russia as well as high bunker prices. Reefer cargo rates were 
also driven down as a result of container line overcapacity. The combination of 
reduced supply, demand, financing and increased cost and competition from 
container lines caused the spot market to plummet to levels well below that 
necessary to cover operating expenses. Russian fruit importers encountered 
difficulties and returned their chartered vessels to Star which in turn exposed 
the vessels to the spot market with losses as a result. Star was eventually able to 
re-establish its connection to this trade with a contract to Banex that provided 
for a weekly service between Ecuador and St Petersburg. 
Figure 20 The Star First class is the largest series of reefers built in the 21st century. Pictured 
is the Star Endeavour, here on charter to Del Monte, leaving Antwerp in 2012  
Photo: AlfvanBeem
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Star’s fleet reached a total of 46 reefers but the state of the market had forced 
several of them into lay-up. Shippers were avoiding fixing their tonnage re-
quirements on timecharters and instead took advantage of the low prices that 
prevailed in the spot market. Star began scrapping older vessels when scrap-
ping prices improved in 2011. Some vessels were also sold. Star was able to re-
turn to a modest level of profitability when the market improved in 2013. The 
“C” class vessels Caribbean Star, Costa Rican Star, Cote d’Ivoirian Star, and Co-
lombian Star were lengthened and had new cranes fitted in 2013 and 2014. The 
four rejuvenated vessels were chartered to Africa Express Line. 
Siem Industries, the holding company, diversified its shipping interests into 
the transport of automobiles with Siem Car Carriers. Two Star First vessels 
were purchased from Nissen in 2015 and this was followed by an agreement to 
timecharter two newbuildings from the same owner and the same Shikoku 
Shipyard. These new ships, the Star Spirit and the Star Courage, have a capacity 
of 650 000 cbf under deck and can carry approximately 300 refrigerated con-
tainers12. As of 2016 Star Reefers operates 28 vessels mainly in the banana trade, 
and their average age is about 15 years.
4 Summary
Blue Star Line was similarly to the Japanese shipping companies a liner opera-
tion that expanded into the the specialized reefer trades as a complement to 
their liner business. Also, similar to NYK, Blue Star Line could not integrate the 
specialized reefer operations into the liner business, due to operational differ-
ences. The specialized reefer division came to live a fairly independent life, 
which consolidated with Hamburg Süd into Star Reefers in the late 1980s to 
increase their market presence. Due to the problems in the Vestey group Star 
Reefers declined during the 1990s and similarly to Lauritzen they knew that if 
they couldn’t consolidate with another actor they were doomed to a slow de-
cline. At this point in time NYK Reefer had established their main office in 
London and it was agreed to start a joint operation. The two parties fit per-
fectly, both being liner companies. However, before the joint venture material-
ized, Star Reefers was purchased by the Swan Reefer group led by the shipping 
investor Christian Siem in 2001. At first this was perceived by the market as a 
predatory investment basically for the hard assets, and this was most probably 
due to the subjective perception of Christian Siem as an outsider who also had 
12 Press Release of Siem Shipping Inc. 10 January 2016. Report for the first nine months and 
third quarter 2016. 
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done good M&As in the past. NYK Reefer perceived the collaboration to be bi-
ased and looked for an alternative partner. Star Reefers has after 2003 expand-
ed their fleet with newbuildings in collaboration with Nissen, which is the 
largest newbuilding programme in the first decade of the 2000s. Around 2010, 
Star’s fleet peaked at 46 vessels but declined to 28 vessels as of 2016. Star Reef-
ers discursively position itself as a modern, high-class partner to the fruit com-
panies, and the perception of Christian Siem as a short-term opportunist is 
gone. 
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Chapter 9
Laskaridis and the Hamburg Reefer Cluster
The Laskaridis family is today a major player in shipping. In contrast to many 
of the other players on the reefer scene, the Laskaridis family has since the 
1950s been involved in fishing business. Constantine Laskaridis, after studying 
ichtyology and applied fishing in Germany, started to work in the Greek Minis-
try of Economy. Simultaneously, he was involved in running the ship Evridiki, 
the first Greek fishing vessel to have space for deep-freezing fish1. In 1955, he 
left his job in the Ministry and dedicated himself fully to private business. To-
gether with Dinos Doziadis, he created the company Zephyros, which was in-
volved in ocean fishing, primarily outside West Africa, with five vessels 
equipped with deep-freeze systems. Some of the respondents have even said 
that Constantine was the first Greek who went fishing outside West Africa, an 
area which supplied fish similar to those of the Mediterranean, but in higher 
quantities. In 1967, Constantine Laskaridis started an independent business, 
initially with the fishing vessel Kyknos I and later with more ships. The fish was 
transshipped to reefer vessels, which took the fish to the areas of consumption. 
From the mid 1970s, his sons Thanassis and Panos joined the company, after 
completing their studies in Germany in the field of engineering. Similarly to 
the description of the Japanese fishing companies, this period witnessed the 
implementation of the 200 miles Exclusive Economic Zone which hampered 
Greek fishing interests. The Laskaridis brothers started to work as brokers for 
chartering reefer ships. From the 1970s the family specialized in the transport 
of fish, especially by means of transshipment in the ocean. 
In the end of the 1970s, the Laskaridis group bought three Japanese fish car-
riers, with exceptionally large tanks, which created the conditions for a lucra-
tive combination of fish transport and bunker supply to fishing fleets. In the 
early 1980s, the Nigerian fish importer Primlaks was struck by trouble, and Las-
karidis together with Seatrade bought half of Primlaks’ fleet of 16 ships each. 
As fish brokers who needed transport capacity for fish, the Laskaridis family 
had done quite some business with the International Reefer pool based in 
Hamburg, which had a large fleet of smaller reefers at the time. 
1 For overviews of the history of Greek merchant shipping and the presentation of major Greek 
shipping families, see Harlaftis, G. 1996. Α Ηistory of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of an 
International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the present day, London: Routledge. A brief description of 
the Laskaridis family’s shipping interest is available in Theotokas, I. and Harlaftis, G. 2009. 
Leadership in World Shipping: Greek Family Firms in International Business, London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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In 1982-1983, Joachim von Reiche, the manager of the International Reefer 
pool decided that he would like to take on new challenges somewhere else and 
was therefore looking for alternatives. A particularly interesting alternative 
was to join the Laskaridis group, which was attractive because of it being a 
family business, with quick decision making, and an unconventional way of 
working. Laskaridis who had experience with International Reefer and von 
Reiche gladly invited him to join. When von Reiche approached his nearest 
colleagues in the International Reefer pool, they also expressed interest in join-
ing Laskaridis if there was room for them. Given this potenial migration of the 
managers in the pool, those with know-how, in comparison to the various own-
ers, some owners started the perceive the risk of a brain drain, which would 
seriously hamper the future prospects of International Reefer. As a result, the 
German group Harmstorf and the Swiss Alpina group was willing to join von 
Reiche and Laskaridis. 
This was the start of a new pool called Alpha Reefer Transport. The name 
Alpha came from A as in Alpina, L as in Laskaridis, and Ha has in Harmstorf. 
Laskaridis also put tonnage into the pool, and in total the fleet was 12 ships of 
a size of up to 200 000 cbf. Apart from Alpha, another organization was formed 
– Frigoship Chartering in Hamburg. This was the exclusive broker of the Alpha 
pool, and thereby the organization with contacts to the market. In short, 
 Frigoship stood for chartering while Alpha was handling the operation. Also, 
Frigoship has only one owner which is Laskaridis, while Alpha has several part-
ners. 
The Alpha pool grew with new pool members. A Spanish company joined, 
as well as some banks which had unwillingly become reefer owners. Laskaridis 
and the Alpha pool was successful in securing tonnage from post-Soviet own-
ers such as Klaipeda, HSC Agency, and Yugreftransport. The other successful 
player in securing post-Soviet tonnage was Eastwind. Already during the Soviet 
era, the Laskaridis group had good contacts with Soviet reefer owners, provid-
ing various services to the Soviet fleet. The Soviet reefer fleet was before the 
demise of the Soviet Union exclusively working within the Soviet sphere, 
which meant that they had basically no experience of competing on an open 
market, which was very obvious in some early deals where the rumours go that 
the post-Soviet reefer owners were “taken to the cleaners”. From the reefer 
owners’ point of view, joining with Alpha was a way to learn how to operate on 
a global reefer market. From Alpha’s perspective, it was good to increase the 
number of ships in the pool, to get a broader offering to customers, as well as 
increasing the income of the pool. Alpha’s business was familiar to the new 
post-Soviet companies, since much was focused around fish. The ex-Soviet ves-
sels were particularly good for transshipment of fish – this was a Soviet spe-
cialty. Also, the U.S. started to export chicken legs to Russia, called Bush legs. In 
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one year they could export as much as 1.2 million tonnes. The ex-Soviet ships 
were excellent for carrying deep frozen poultry. The ships also had high ice-
class which meant that they could transport the cargo to St Petersburg also 
during winters. This business has been called a “gold mine”. But at the same 
time, the ships were uneconomical in that they consumed lot of bunkers – the 
transition to a market economy made some hidden inefficiencies painfully vis-
ible. Gradually, some of the post-Soviet ships were scrapped. 
However, this boost in tonnage led to Alpha Reefer Transport reaching its 
peak in controlled tonnage in the early 1990s: 55 ships. In the 1990s and first 
decade of the 2000s, the small ships have gradually left the pool since they are 
not economically viable. This fleet development coincided with the general 
trend in the second half of the 20th century towards larger reefers. As of 2015, 
the smallest ships are of a size of 150000 cbf. These ships have proven that 
fairly small ships can still be economically profitable, if they are employed on 
special trades, for example servicing ports that can only receive ships of a cer-
tain size. 
Apart from Alpha Reefer Transport, Laskaridis also owned larger ships of 
about 400 000 cbf which were employed outside the pool, often in the Seatrade 
pool. Six ships were built in Japan in the end of the 1980. One reason for build-
ing ships in Japan, apart from the high quality of the ships, was that Laskaridis 
was involved with a Japanese partner in the transportation of squid, and it was 
favourable to have Japanese built ship for the operation. Also, Laskaridis was 
very active on the second hand market buying tonnage at good prices. For ex-
ample, after the Saléninvest bankruptcy, Laskaridis bought a ship from the 
bank, and the investment cost was recovered in less than a year. It is well agreed 
by respondents that Laskaridis has a skill to buy tonnage at the bottom of the 
market. A related skill of the group was to sell ships at the top of the market. 
Therefore, ships in the Laskaridis group often change owners in order for the 
ships to always be as profitable as possible for the group. 
The trend within the Laskaridis group was an increase in controlled tonnage 
in the 1990s and 2000s, where they gradually bought ships, from companies 
who were willing to exit this declining industry. In 2003, Laskaridis is said to 
have placed a bid on Star Reefers which was not accepted by the shareholders. 
A more successful example was when Maritima del Norte, an independent 
Spanish operator, having a fleet of eight vessels was split between Seatrade and 
Laskaridis. Another was when Amer decided to sell its fleet of seven ships in 
2008, which were bought by Seatrade, Laskaridis, and others. 
Joachim von Reiche, who had been instrumental in increasing Laskaridis 
impact upon the reefer markets, had in November 2009 a big retirement party, 
to which many reefer companies were invited. During the party owners of La-
vinia and Seatrade met and said that they had to stop competing with each 
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other and instead start working together. It was left to the top managers Wolf-
gang Zielke, who had worked together with von Reiche since the 1970s, and 
Yntze Buitenwerf from Seatrade to sort out the details. The managers recom-
mended to start on a small scale, but the project escalated and soon Laskaridis 
wanted to put all his small ships in the pool, and the Norwegian operator Green 
Reefers wanted to join. The first meeting was in December, and in the begin-
ning of May the pool was operational. It was received with great surprise in the 
market. The marketing office Hamburg Reefer Chartering was based in Ham-
burg, and Alpha carried out the operation. Frigoship gave up part of its busi-
ness and handed it to Hamburg Reefer Chartering. The first two partners were 
Lavinia and Seatrade, but when Green Reefers joined the fleet size amounted 
to 110 ships comprising 27 million cbf. 
With such a substantial fleet, the company had to be assured that they 
would not be perceived as monopolistic according to EU monopoly law. Ac-
cording to the consulted laywers, the share of the pool in relation to worldwide 
transportation was too small to have an impact. However, there is no doubt 
that the impact was significant in the particular segment – small reefers – that 
the company was operating in. Some say that the market share of Hamburg 
Reefer Chartering was as high as 80-90% of the world fleet in that size segment. 
As with many other cooperations that we have seen in the book, Hamburg 
Reefer Chartering was shortlived. But according to respondents, they succeed-
ed with one major thing. When the pool went operational, an analysis was 
done to see how many ships were required. It was found that only about 75-
80% of the capacity was needed. Given this analysis, it was decided to scrap 20 
ships, or every partner had to scrap seven ships. A special bonus was given to 
those who agreed to scrap their ships – if they would scrap the ship as of 1 
January 2011, they were offered 500 000 USD of scrapping bonus plus the fact 
that the ships would be part of the pool virtually until the end of June, that is 
getting additional earnings of a year without even having a ship in the pool. 
The strategy was successful, and it is quite obvious that this has impacted on 
the charter rates of ships in the small segment. If the partners had not joined a 
pool together, no such concerted effort would have been possible. 
But Seatrade was uncomfortable in the relationship and decided to discon-
tinue the joint work. As with many of the break-ups seen in this book, this can 
probably be attributed to a number of factors ranging from operational phi-
losophy and money to control, power and cultural aspects. Green also decided 
to leave Laskaridis in 2012 and join Seatrade, forming the GreenSea pool of 48 
ships. 
From 2011, the former operation of Frigoship and Alpha was reactivated, 
starting with 24-25 ships. Laskaridis withdrew his ships from the Seatrade pool, 
effectively ending all connections to Seatrade, and the number of ships in the 
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Alpha pool increased to 45. Limarko, formerly Klaipeda, one of the early mem-
bers, is still part of the pool. HSC Agency is run by the former managing direc-
tor of Klaipeda, Aveny Bich, owning a few ships. Yugreftransport, formerly 
from Sevastopol, are now located in St Petersburg. Agder is a Norwegian inves-
tor, with a few ships in the pool. Fairport is run by the Greek Kalimassias – a 
major competitor to Hamburg Reefer Chartering – who has five ships in the 
pool. As of 2014, Laskaridis owned 27 (reefer) vessels. 
Laskaridis states that “We have a view, which we have consistently held for 
the last 20 years, that eventually everything that can be containerised will be 
containerised”2. This is a reason for which Lavinia is specializing on open sea 
transshipments, which is still a conventional reefer specialty. There is a con-
stant risk that the need for conventional reefers doing open sea transship-
ments will decline. If the catch is brought to port, container lines can be used 
to ship the fish to the market. Furthermore, bringing the fish to port can in-
crease the state’s control over the catch, as well as possibly creating employ-
ment ashore. However, it is plausible that fishing companies would like their 
trawlers to remain in the fishing grounds, which means that there will be some 
need for transshipment. The business will therefore not die overnight, but will 
most probably see a gradual decline. Laskaridis said, “You could call [the reefer 
trade] a business in a run-off mode, but it is a slow, profitable run-off, and as 
things seem today we may have to re-invest in a few ships to continue servicing 
very specific trades”3.
Apart from the reefers Lavinia has interest in more than 30 bulkers, tankers 
for supplying bunkers to fishing fleets, and two factory trawlers. The company 
has thus remained in a niche of the reefer market, while building up a fleet that 
is unaffected by the decline in the conventional reefer market. 
Eimskip
Another reefer operator with a close link to the fishing industry is Ice-
land’s Eimskip. The company was originally founded as Eimskipafélag 
Íslands (Iceland Steamship Co) in 1914, thousands of Icelanders proudly 
purchased shares in the company that would end Iceland’s reliance on 
Danish shipping. The first two ships, the Gullfoss and Godafoss arrived in 
1915, both named after waterfalls, a tradition that has persisteda. The 
company started sailing to America in 1917 due to the war and in 1926 the 
first vessel with temperature control, Brúarfoss was added to the fleetb. 
Shipping fish from Iceland and returning with miscellaneous cargo was 
the main business for many years but the company also diversified. 
2 “Going in for the krill”. TradeWinds 23 May 2014
3 “Going in for the krill”. TradeWinds 23 May 2014
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Eimskip dramatically expanded in the 2000s, by 2007 they operated 50 
ships and was the largest cold-storage provider in the worldc. However, 
the company crashed as a result of Iceland’s banking crisisd, but there 
were also other factors, and recorded a net loss of 645 million Euro for the 
year ended 31 October 2008e. 
Creditors took control over the company, it was reconstructed and the 
cold-storage business sold. The shipping business remained and returned 
to a North Atlantic focus and has been a profitable niche player in the 
reefer market ever since. In later years they have acquired several compa-
nies with a focus on freight forwarding but have also invested in cold 
stores and harbour infrastructuref. In 2018 they had a weekly service from 
Iceland to Portland Maine also calling on Halifax and Newfoundland, 
several lines connecting Iceland to Northern Europe, many calling on the 
Faeroe Islands, and also a line servicing ports in Norway and continuing 
on to Murmansk. Fish and seafood was the most important cargo. Be-
sides three ferries Eimskip operated 19 fairly small vessels, 10 owned and 
9 chartered. Some of these are specialized reefers and the remainder are 
container vessels with reefer capacityg. 
  
Figure 21 Small reefers like the Holmfoss connect Norway’s fishing ports and Mur-
mansk to the UK and the Continent. This vessel was delivered in 2008 and 
can handle different temperatures in its five holds. Eighty metres long, it can 
carry 28 FEU containers, with reefer plugs, and is rated to operate in one 
metre thick ice 
Photo: Joost J Bakker
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Notes: a Jóhannesson, G.T. 2013. The History of Iceland, Greenwood: Santa Barbara, p. 96; 
b Eimskip webpage <http://edit.eimskip.is/EN/about/history/default.html>; c Hf. Eim-
skipafélag Íslands Annual Report 2007, p. 6; d On the Icelandic banking crisis see for ex-
ample Boyes, R. 2009. Meltdown Iceland, London: Bloomsbury. For a perspective by a 
central figure connected to the crisis and to Eimskip see Bjorgolfsson T. 2014. Billions to 
Bust – and Back, London: Profile Books; e Hf. Eimskipafélag Íslands Annual Report 2007, 
p. 5; f Eimskip Annual Report 2017 p. 2; g Eimskip webpage <https://www.eimskip.com>
1 Hamburg Süd and the Hamburg Reefer Cluster
Hamburg Süd, a short version of the original name Hamburg Südameri-
kanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellshaft, is a liner operator that since 1871 has 
been focusing on North-South trades. While originally owned by a group of 
merchant houses, the Oetker family acquired an interest in the company in 
1936. Hamburg Süd was a major operation and boasted a fleet of 50 ships in 
1939. Both world wars led to a complete loss of the fleet, but from 1951 the liner 
service between Europe and the South American East Coast was resumed. In 
1952, the business expanded to tramp shipping. During the 1950s, Hamburg 
Süd started to develop its tramp reefer business. In the early 1950s they char-
tered tonnage, and later bought reefer vessels. The 1950s was also, according to 
respondents, the decade when the small tramp reefers started to appear on the 
market, with players such as Gustaf Erikson. This entry into the reefer segment 
was, however, not their first experience with carrying reefer cargo, their liner 
vessels had also carried reefer cargo. In the 1960s a typical liner vessel in the 
Hamburg Süd fleet would have a cargo hold for refrigerated goods of about 150 
000 to 200 000 cbf. It has been told that such liner vessels loaded mainly meat 
in Argentina and orange concentrate in Brazil on the way to the US or Europe. 
Hamburg Süd saw the potential of the reefer market, which was deemed 
much more attractive than the general cargo segment which saw a slump in 
the latter half of the 1950s. Hamburg Süd also followed the growing import of 
bananas closely, where per capita consumption increased rapidly. The com-
pany wanted part of this high-growth segment. Also, Hamburg Süd was now 
part of the Oetker conglomerate, which had significant financial resources, 
and were willing to invest in tonnage, not only because of the interest in ship-
ping, but also because of the attractive tax conditions associated with ship in-
vestment. 
In 1960, Hamburg Süd had 16 reefers from about 120 000 cbf to 230 000 cbf. 
Although these ships were already big compared to the small tonnage that ap-
peared in the 1950s on the tramp market, Hamburg Süd envied JLauritzen’s red 
painted ship of 270 000 cbf. In the early half of the 1960s a new series was built 
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with vessels of the size of 300 000 cbf, and in 1968 vessels of 420 000 cbf were 
built. We can therefore see an increase in ship size, and representatives of 
Hamburg Süd felt they were a major part of the trend of building larger reefer 
tonnage. The Polar class ships had an operating speed at banana draught of 
23.5 knots and had a capacity of about 420 000 cbf. The Polar ships were char-
tered out to Salén for banana trades. The ships of 300 000 cbf were on a five-
year timecharter to Standard Fruit. About 50% of Hamburg Süd’s reefer 
division was dedicated to carrying bananas. Part of the fleet was also servicing 
fruit trades from Chile, Argentina, and New Zealand. The smaller ships were 
chartered to German fruit importers on a yearly basis. The ships were also do-
ing tramp business, voyage charters, for example exporting chicken from the 
US to Europe. For the ships around 200 000 cbf, they were often chartered to 
Salén for nine months, and then the ship went to drydock when it was redeliv-
ered in June/July, and then employed on the spot market during the Northern 
summer. The reason why many ships were fixed to Salén was because they of-
fered the best rates – which is an indication that they could use their extensive 
fleet and network to reach synergies. 
Hamburg Süd were also agents for a fleet of 18 ships, from 30 000 cbf up to 
60 000 cbf. These are very small reefers that sailed the Norwegian coast carry-
ing fish. In that time, small ships could go as far as South America, into the 
Great Lakes, to the Middle East, and to New Zealand. The margins were there, 
the income was good and labour costs and bunkers were cheap. Times were 
good in the reefer business, which was of course a reason for small tramp reef-
ers being developed. They were also trading between India and the Gulf ports 
with bananas and livestock. Another cargo was blueberries from Poland and 
Sweden to Germany. 
There were some synergies between the reefer and the liners. In contrast to 
for example NYK which had reefers operating North-South and liners East-
West, both the reefers and liners potentially operated on the North-South 
routes. At times, when the liner vessels did not have enough capacity to carry 
all the cold cargo from South to North, they contacted the reefer department 
and asked for additional tonnage, which was either supplied from the in-house 
fleet, or more commonly chartered in from the open market. This would have 
been more difficult if Hamburg Süd didn’t have its own presence in this mar-
ket. Sometimes, the liner departments used reefers as dry cargo ships, carrying 
coffee and other non-refrigerated cargo. Since the reefer division operated on 
the global market, their chartering staff also learned about profitable refriger-
ated cargo that could be carried by the liner vessels, for example potatoes from 
Europe to South America. In that way, the liner department could get a better 
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yield on the voyage from North to South. However, the fact remained that the 
liner and reefer divisions had different mindsets. One was engaged in regular 
trade with a timetable and the other was more oriented towards the spot mar-
ket. The liner division was working with smaller quantities and the reefer divi-
sion with larger quantities of cargo: “in the liner operation you have 100 tons 
here and there. In reefers we are thinking 10 000 tons of bananas, 5000 tons of 
meat”. 
The 1960s were very good for the reefer division of Hamburg Süd, but the 
market suffered a downturn at the end of the decade. For the group this was 
compensated with better earnings on the liner side. As a response to the de-
cline in the reefer market, Hamburg Süd started to sell its smaller reefers, those 
smaller than 200 000 cbf. This decision was partly due to the slump in the reef-
er market and partly due to the fact that containerization started for Hamburg 
Süd in the late 1960s. It started out in Australia with Columbus Line, an affili-
ated company, carrying meat from Australia to the US. Financial means had to 
be focused on the investment into container ships and containers. Although, 
the containerization would lead to more reefer capacity on the new container 
vessels than in the previous liner vessels, it redirected attention away from con-
ventional reefers, especially smaller reefers. 
While Hamburg Süd had been agents for the fleet of smaller reefers, in 1970, 
Joachim von Reiche was asked to be the manager of a pool of small reefers, 
called International Reefer. This pool was concentrated on marketing a com-
mon fleet of small reefers from 60 000 to 130 000 cbf, supplied by 12 shipowners. 
The idea was to get a broader coverage of the market by working together. The 
pool also functioned as an information hub, where the owners could get infor-
mation about the present and potential futures of the reefer market. This infor-
mation function was already present at Hamburg Süd when they were handling 
the small reefers but was now set up as a stand-alone unit. This could be com-
pared to the Leonina pool of Cool Carriers, which was also an information hub. 
Furthermore, by employing the ships in a pool, each of the participating own-
ers didn’t require in-house chartering personnel – but could outsource that to 
the pool, cutting labour costs. However, the owners were still in charge of the 
operation of their ships. Like other pools, the earnings from the pool were 
shared between the partners given the ships capacity, speed, fuel consumption 
and any extra frills, such as cargo handling gear, etc. From the beginning, this 
pool had 18 ships, but it grew to a maximum of 35. 
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International Reefers, selection of pool members (incomplete)
Gustaf Erikson, Åland






In 1974, Wolfgang Zielke started to work at Hamburg Süd. He recalls that these 
were the glorious days for reefer ships. Germany operated a substantial fleet, 
with companies such as Ahrenkiel, Bruns, Ianka, Luhmann, Horn, and the In-
ternational Reefer pool. The German-owned ships were often built in Germany 
at shipyards such as Sietas, HDW Hamburg, and Blohm & Voss. 
In 1979, Hamburg Süd took delivery of two reefers of 480 000 cbf. They were 
chartered to Castle and Cook, Dole, but just after two years, the collaboration 
was discontinued. Rather than collaborating with Hamburg Süd, Castle and 
Cook, Dole acquired the reefer fleet of Bruns – another German reefer player 
– of about 10 ships. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Hamburg Süd had a fleet of 
about 15 owned and chartered reefers. The large Polar ships were still on char-
ter to Salén. Some smaller ships were left in the fleet and employed in the In-
ternational Reefer pool. However, it was clear that Hamburg Süd was no longer 
interested in building their reefer fleet. Rather, the situation was one of gradu-
al decline. The Polar ships were sold and chartered back for a few years. At that 
time, Joachim von Reiche from International Reefer had started to work to-
gether with Laskaridis and was interested in making Hamburg Süd join with 
Laskaridis. However, in 1986, Hamburg Süd decided to collaborate with Star 
Reefers and moved all the chartering operation for the larger ships to London. 
2 Summary
Similarly to SKG (Seatrade), Hamburg Süd experienced a downturn of the gen-
eral cargo markets in the late 1950s and also saw that the import of bananas 
to Germany was increasing significantly. Therefore, they decided to invest in 
reefers. In contrast to other liner companies such as Blue Star Line and NYK, 
Hamburg Süd’s lines were North-South which made it possible to create syner-
gies between the liner and specialized reefer segment. They subjectively per-
ceived the larger reefers to be more prestigious, which was a reason that they 
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continually built larger ships. Smaller ships were spun out into International 
Reefers in 1970. Due to the focus on the liner operation, Hamburg Süd’s special-
ized reefer operation gradually declined and in 1986 a collaboration was made 
with Star Reefers which moved the operation of larger ships to London. 
Laskaridis started out as a fishing company but expanded to be a reefer op-
erator focused on fish transports in the 1970s. Similarly to Seatrade, and in con-
trast to Lauritzen and Saléns, Laskaridis was focusing on fish transports. To 
gain more market knowledge and customer connections Laskaridis worked 
with the Hamburg cluster, similar to how other companies have approached 
the Stockholm cluster to get competent personnel. With a base in Hamburg, 
Laskaridis started the Alpha pool in the early 1980s. Given Laskaridis’ sense for 
business, seen as fast and unconventional, the company managed to get their 
hands on post-Soviet tonnage in the early 1990s. Given the increased competi-
tion and lower profitability in the 1990s the smaller ships were phased out. 
Given Laskaridis’ willingness and ability to invest, the company was able to 
buy tonnage from distressed owners and banks. A large-scale collaboration 
was Hamburg Reefer Chartering which had a fleet of over 100 ships. However, 
it is difficult to collaborate and in 2011 Laskaridis left the pool and recom-
menced an independent operation. Laskaridis, similar to other Greek owners, 
has been subjectively understood, by the largest players such as Lauritzen and 
Cool Carriers, as a second-tier player, operating with old tonnage on second-
tier trades. Still, it must be said that profitability does not always follow pride, 
and Laskaridis is seen by many to have been highly profitable over the years, in 
contrast to Lauritzen and Cool Carriers. 
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Part 3
Container Lines and Shippers 
∵
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As we described in the introductory chapter, there are a variety of actors in the 
cold chain. All these actors have had an impact on the historical development 
of the independent reefer operators. In this part, we describe two kinds of ac-
tors. First, we describe container lines, using the example of Maersk. Liner 
companies have always been a major competitor to the independent reefer 
operators. We describe Maersk in order to see the reefer industry from another 
perspective to understand the independent reefer operators’ competitors. Sec-
ond, we describe fruit companies and marketing boards which have been im-
portant customers of the independent reefer operators. 
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Chapter 10
The Traditional Liner Companies and the 
Container Lines
In the 1800s maritime trade underwent a revolution and much can be ex-
plained by four factors: steam engines, iron hulls, screw propellers, and a deep 
sea cable network. During the second half of the 19th century, the contours of 
the new maritime market were clearly visible. There were passenger liners 
which on regular services transported mail and passengers between North 
America, Europe and the Far East. There were cargo liners which transported 
cargo and some passengers between developed and imperial markets. And 
there was tramp shipping which carried spot cargoes, often bulk cargoes, such 
as coal and grain1. While tramp ships had a long history, the liner companies 
were a product of the transport revolution in shipping. 
The passenger liners were the fastest, operating at a speed of 16-25 knots. 
They were symbols of national engineering prowess. The passenger liners were 
fitted for passengers, obviously, but also for some cargo. The companies in this 
business were for example Cunard, White Star, North German Lloyd and Hol-
land America Line. 
The cargo liners were not as fast, often operating at a speed of about 12 
knots, but they were highly flexible. They had many decks to allow for loading 
and discharging in several ports, and compartments for specialty cargo, such as 
refrigerated goods. They could carry some passengers, but towards the end of 
the 19th century, most of the passengers were carried by passenger liners. The 
liner trades loaded and discharged in several ports and the stowing and dis-
charging operations were complicated and time-consuming. The cargo could 
come in bags, bales, cases, and casks. 
Soon after the birth of the cargo liners, in the 1870s, the conference system 
was developed. Major British companies such as P&O, Alfred Holt and Glen 
Line, realized that competition was forcing prices down to levels that did not 
cover their costs. To keep prices up there was a need to collaborate. The first 
conference was that between the United Kingdom and Calcutta, formed in 
1875. The rates were set, the number of sailings limited, and the participant 
companies should not grant preferences or concessions to shippers. This was 
not appreciated amongst the shippers. To understand the independent reefer 
1 Based on Stopford 2009, p. 23-32, 35-41, and chapter 13. 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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operators, it is important to understand the control that conferences had on 
maritime trade, and the alternative that the independent reefer operators and 
other tramp shipping companies could provide to shippers. However, confer-
ences continued to develop and by the 1950s there were 360 liner conferences 
in the deep-sea trades, which regulated sailings and freight rates. Each had be-
tween two and 40 members. Examples of the then dominating liner compa-
nies in the 1950s were P&O, Blue Funnel, and Hamburg Süd. 
In the 1960s, containerization had a great impact on the liner companies. 
The labour-intensive stowing and discharging of standardized containers 
could be mechanized. Many cargo liners were very inefficient spending up to 
50% of their time in port. Containerization also led to additional benefits such 
as the reduction of pilferage. And the cargo could more easily be re-loaded 
onto rail or barge with less delay. Apart from containerization, the traditional 
liners were affected by the development of airlines which took over passenger 
and mail trades. Also, as colonies gained independence, the liner companies 
lost their privileged position in many of its core trades. The passenger liners 
dissappeared within a decade, or were converted to cruise ships, and the cargo 
liners were gradually replaced by container vessels and specialty ships, such as 
reefers. Similarly to the independent reefer operators, the liner companies 
thought that containerization might be too inflexible and looked for solutions 
based on palletisation and the use of ro-ro vessels. 
The first container ships purpose-built to transport refrigerated containers 
were built by OCL and ACT in 1969. They had a capacity of 450 TEU reefer con-
tainers. In 1970 the Sydney Express was delivered to Hapag-Lloyd and the Co-
lumbus New Zealand to HSDG in 1971. Centralized cooling units ducted cold air 
to insulated, porthole containers.2 
The market changes ushered in by containerization, in combination with 
the penetration of market competition, led to a weakening of the conference 
system. The conference system was gradually changed to a more open system 
with stabilization agreements and alliances. 
The container lines are the new generation of liner companies, such as P&O, 
Blue Star Line, Hamburg Süd, and Johnson Line which regularly carried refrig-
erated cargo. While containerization of dry cargo was difficult in itself, con-
tainerization of reefer cargo was much more demanding. Furthermore, 
containerization required and continues to require significant investments 
2 Wijnolst and Wergeland 2009, p. 288.
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and the industry is now the most consolidated section of shipping3. The world’s 
largest players in 2012 are listed in table 13.
If we now turn to the reefer capacity of the container lines (see table 14), we 
see that Maersk is quite naturally the largest player. However, what is surpris-
ing is that Maersk has more than three times the container capacity, in terms 
of reefer containers, of the second largest container line MSC. If we consider 
the number of reefer plugs in the north-south trade, Maersk was the biggest 
player in 2016 with 103 000 plugs, followed by Hamburg Süd with 87 000 and 
Mediterranean Shipping Co. with 85 0004.
As has been mentioned in the second chapter, the container lines overtook 
the specialized carriers in terms of reefer capacity in 1997. In 2013, as table 14 
shows, the capacity of the container lines was 74% of the total global reefer 
capacity, and it is expected that in 2019, the share will reach 83%5. The trend 
reflects the strategic intent of the container lines to grow their reefer business, 
due to the rates in the reefer business and that attracting reefer cargo address-
es overcapacity. Furthermore, the growth is possible both because of growing 
3 See for example Poulsen, R.T. 2007. Liner shipping and Technological Innovation: Ostasiat and 
the Container Revolution, 1963-75, Scandinavian Economic History Review, 55: 83-100. 
4 “ Reefer ships forecast to lose share to container vessels” Journal of Commerce 31 January 2016. 
<http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/reefer-ships-bucked-trend-2015-dy 
namar-reports_20160131.html>.
5 “A Perspective on Refrigerated Container Trade Growth”. GEP Mind. <https://www.gep.com/
mind/blog/perspective-refrigerated-container-trade-growth>.
Table 13 World’s largest container ship fleets (TEU)
Container line Capacity (TEU)
Maersk Line 2.62m 






China Shipping (CSCL) 0.57m
Hanjin Shipping 0.56m
MOL 0.51m
Source: From Manners-Bell, J. 2014. Global Logistics Strategies, London: Kogan Page. 
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trade flows and because of the withdrawal of specialized reefer capacity. In 
2016, container lines were positive about the prospects in the reefer trades. 
Nick Fafoutis, chief commercial officer at the French container lines CMA 
CGM, believes that container carriers will continue to capture market share at 
the expense of specialized carriers, but, he claims that “Adversaries can be-
come complementary partners” suggesting that the increasing market demand 
in both emerging and developed economies is positive for both container lines 
and specialized carriers6. Not only do the container lines grow at the expense 
of specialized carriers. They also gradually move into produce that have tradi-
tionally been carried by specialized reefers, for example bananas. In 2015, the 
container lines carried 55% of the total volume of bananas compared with 
44% in 20127. 





Table 14 Reefer capacity of the container linesa
Container line Reefer capacity market share 
( available equipment)
Maersk Line 18%









Other container lines 27%
Specialized reefers 26%
a Drewry Reefer Shipping Market Review and Forecast, Annual Report, 2013/14, retrieved from 
Duggan, W.C. “Carrier perspective on Refrigerated Shipping”, Maersk Line. <http://agtrans.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/william-dugan-2014.pdf>.
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A full description of the container lines’ strategies in the reefer trades is out-
side the scope of this book. However, we will briefly describe the history, focus-
ing on the reefer business, of Maersk Line, which is not only the largest 
container line, but also the largest in terms of reefer plugs and reefer equip-
ment. 
1 Maersk 
Maersk is the largest player in the market for carrying refrigerated cargo8. Start-
ing out as a steamship owner in the late 19th century, the family business grew 
to be one of the world leaders in containerized liner shipping. Maersk Line 
developed a line from the US East and West coast to Asia in the late 1920s, and 
during the 1950s and 1960s added ports in the North Atlantic, West Africa, the 
Middle East and Europe. 
In the 1960s, similarly to other liner companies, Maersk had to decide how 
to face the growing challenge of containerization of cargo. When the contain-
erization challenge appeared, Maersk had already taken a decision to move 
away from break-bulk and unitize cargo around the pallet. By the end of the 
1960s many competitors, such as Sea-Land, APL, NYK and Mitsui had either 
containerized or were about to embark on containerization. In particular, 
Maersk watched the developments in the Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) 
with concern. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha and Maersk had since the latter half of 
the 1960s collaborated on a Europe-Asia service. In the FEFC, they saw how 
other competitors moved swiftly towards containerization, and in the winter 
of 1970, it was announced that from 1972, at least 27 container ships would be 
deployed in the Europe-Asia services. In response to this paradigm shift, the 
year after, in 1971, Maersk and Kawasaki Kisen ordered one container ship 
each. Eventually, due to ‘circumstances’, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha cancelled the 
agreement with Maersk, but since Maersk was committed to the trade, they 
continued to serve the Europe-Asia service with seven conventional ships, and 
chartered out the cellular container ship that they had ordered. One of many 
reasons for the slow venturing into containerization was due to the still profit-
able conventional liner services, and the fact that the liner division was com-
mitted to and strongly believed in conventional vessels, albeit with container 
capacity on deck. When the new Maersk Container Line division was created, 
the upper management could not just transfer people from Maersk Line into 
8 This part is based on Jephson and Morgen 2014 and Jensen, L. 2014. Culture shock in Maersk 
Line – From Entrepreneurs and Kings to Modern Efficiency, Copenhagen: Vespucci Maritime 
Publishing.
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the new organization – in fact, operating a container service is very different 
from operating conventional break-bulk and pallet services. After this slow 
start, the Panama Line was containerized resulting in an order of nine “A-class” 
container vessels that were delivered between 1975 and 1976. This shows that 
many companies struggled to face the growing challenge from containeriza-
tion. Also, the rigidities that exist in any organization when facing a paradigm 
shift are obvious. Maersk, however, successfully adapted to the trend of con-
tainerization, which has proved successful up to the present9. 
When it comes to refrigerated cargo, Maersk did some early ventures into 
owning reefer vessels, such as the M.S. Francine, acquired in 1936 and chartered 
out to J. Lauritzen, and owning conventional break-bulk carriers with reefer 
capacity from the mid-1930s. The move into containerized reefer cargo came 
with the A-class ships delivered in 1975-1976. They were equipped for ten refrig-
erated containers, and it was forecasted that the plugs would be used about 20 
per cent of the time10. The reason for the conservative prognosis was probably 
due to two reasons. First, most of the refrigerated cargo was moved in dedi-
cated reefers, which had made a solid inroad into refrigerated liner traffic in 
the 1960s. Second, the average size of the reefer vessels grew, which absorbed 
most of the growth in the market for maritime refrigerated trades. However, 
reefers had a significant drawback – the market price of refrigerated cargo (for 
example, bananas) would drop when large quantities of cargo arrived at the 
same port, as the market would be temporarily flooded. The conventional reef-
ers dominated the market however, but the refrigerated container traffic by 
liner companies were starting to carry frozen meat in the early 1970s and also 
non-traditional commodities, such as photographic film and enzymes. The ar-
rival of the Maersk Newton ships in the 1980s significantly increased refriger-
ated cargo capacity. 
Although refrigerated containers were bought at a cost of 3.2-3.7 times the 
price of standard dry equipment, Maersk saw the logic of continuing to ex-
plore the reefer market. In an internal report at Maersk, produced in 1986, the 
investigative team described the potential for penetrating the reefer market as 
follows: 
 ‒ This is a technically complicated operation calling for reliability, compe-
tence and flexibility in the carrier
 ‒ Overall cost comparisons between self-contained and port-hole reefers 
clearly indicate that up to 300 units per ship, self-contained units were more 
9 Jephson and Morgen 2014, ch. 2-3. 
10 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 96, 111.
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cost-effective and flexible in terms of temperature, commodity stowage, re-
frigerating techniques and terminal handling
 ‒ Containerised solutions can be offered at freight rates competitive with tra-
ditional reefer tramp vessels and still be an attractive business
In mid-1986, Maersk Line’s reefer capacity amounted to 160 plug connections 
per ship (in 28 ships) or an estimated 5 percent of the world reefer capacity. 
High cube reefer containers (40*8*9.5 feet) were developed and 1300 such con-
tainers were in operation in the Maersk fleet. The margins for refrigerated car-
go was at Maersk considered to be good, ranging from 3900 USD to 6000 USD 
per container in the major trades11. It is stated that the “reefer market shares in 
the main trades were doing well, despite rates being under pressure in several 
areas of the world”12.
Certainly, during the history of Maersk, the main strategic aim was not to 
develop refrigerated trades, but Maersk did pay attention to this growing seg-
ment. For example, in 1985, the Panama Line was divided into two lines, where 
the first line would call at Japanese ports directly when arriving from the US. 
This allowed Maersk to penetrate the major reefer trade from the US West 
Coast to Japan13. Another report was presented in 1986 about the trade to Aus-
tralia. Five years earlier a study had shown that the Australia service might be 
viable, but at that time, there was no spare capacity on the Maersk ships. The 
follow-up report showed that positive results could be generated for Maersk 
Line. It is argued that these ventures made the size of the reefer market from 
this area visible. 
In early 1992, a proposal was put forward to buy 1500 40-foot reefer contain-
ers to supplement the existing fleet, and the order was signed. During the same 
year, two Maersk representatives visited a number of South American coun-
tries to evaluate if there was a market for the company’s operations. They vis-
ited ports and also received a positive response from potential customers: 
We visited a major fruit exporter who in no uncertain terms invited 
Maersk Line to participate in their seasonal movements ... Past good ex-
perience with shipments to Japan had convinced shippers that the reefer 
container (porthole concept disliked), was here to stay and would even-
tually capture the market. The service was inaugurated in 199314. 
11 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 111-113.
12 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 142.
13 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 130-131.
14 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 229.
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In the mid-1990s, the upper management of Maersk, in a report, noted that the 
reefer container fleet was growing at roughly double the rate of growth of the 
general containerised trade. Also, Asian importers controlled 70-80 percent of 
reefer movements from the US and Europe and strengthened sales efforts were 
needed to ensure the protection of Maersk Line’s position. Moreover, “addi-
tional services to New Zealand and South Africa were expected to help Maersk 
Line grow in the reefer segment”. Yet another move in the reefer market in 1997 
was the introduction of the ‘super-reefers’, reefer containers catering mainly to 
Japanese fish importers providing temperatures as low as -60 degrees Celsius, 
suitable for transport of sea urchins, swordfish, food cultures, and pharmaceu-
ticals15. In 1999, some ships that were on order carried 2500-3000 TEU, with 700 
reefer plugs16. 
Apart from the ships, in 1996, a reefer container plant was built by Maersk 
Container Industries (MCI) in Tinglev, Denmark, followed by an acquisition of 
a Chinese factory in 1999. One year before the acquisition of the factory in Qin-
gdao, MCI had launched the Star Cool project to develop a reefer machine that 
was both reliable and that had a low energy consumption. Star Cool was 
achieved in 2005, and in 2012, 100 000 units had been sold. 
As is well known, since the end of the 1980s Maersk had been on an ac-
quisition trail, acquiring companies such as the Danish East Asiatic Company, 
Safmarine, and P&O NedLloyd. After having merged in 1999 with Sealand, 
the pioneer in containerization, Maersk-Sealand as the company was called, 
had become the largest reefer operator. Maersk-Sealand expected a growth in 
the reefer segment of 5.8 percent per year, where the main growth was in the 
frozen goods segment. Jephson and Morgan identify that the main strengths 
of Maersk-Sealand were in the fish, meat and deciduous fruit markets. 
Maersk-Sealand used high-technology reefer equipment, such as controlled 
atmosphere, high humidity or super-reefers. However, Maersk-Sealand’s parti-
cipation in the largest conventional reefer trade, namely bananas, was just 1.8 
percent17. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis had a significant impact on Maersk Line’s 
business, and in 2011, Maersk Line CEO Soren Skou described the situation in 
Maersk Line as a need to “get back to black”. Regarding the reefer operations, 
his remarks are interesting: 
15 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 249-250. 
16 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 252. 
17 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 271. 
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The reefer market is hugely important to us, and our mindset has been 
that every reefer is gold, that this is a great business. But when you look at 
the investment, where a reefer is four to five times the cost of a dry con-
tainer, plus the plugs and power on the ships, and the fuel bill for running 
the reefers, then the return on the reefer business is disappointing and 
we have to get our returns up. I think that on the reefer side, we may have 
to invest a little bit of market share in getting prices up, not a lot, as there 
is not a huge amount of excess reefer capacity out there. We have a good 
chance of making that business attractive again.18 
18 Jephson and Morgen 2014, p. 354. 
Figure 22 
Modern container 
vessels have the ability 
to carry enormous 




Jephson and Morgen state that Maersk had invested over 1.9 billion USD in a 
reefer fleet of 105 000 FFE of reefers. Following up on Skou’s analysis was a 
substantial price increase with effect from the first of January 2013 to bring 
reefer business Back to Black. In September 2012, Maersk announced a rate 
hike of 1500 USD per container19. A month later, the second largest reefer car-
rier, Mediterranean Shipping Company did the same20. 
According to an interview with Shereen Zerkani, Global Head of Reefer 
Management of Maersk Line, in 2015, the low oil price has resulted in a come-
back for some older, specialized reefers. However, she still believes that the 
future trend is toward containerization. Although at present the specialized 
reefers can thrive in the market, in the future their impact will be reduced. 
In the past 10-12 years there’s been a clear development toward contain-
erization, as the bigger and more traditional container ships have taken 
over a big portion of reefer transports from the specialized reefer fleet. 
This development will continue21.
2 Summary
The independent reefer operators have always been developing alongside the 
liner companies. In this part we have discussed how the liner companies saw 
increased competition from the new, wild reefer operators, that could offer 
more direct lines with specialized vessels. This competition became increas-
ingly difficult since the liner companies were forced to adapt to the trend of 
containerization in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, the infrastructure, both 
container equipment and land-based facilities was not fully developed for the 
refrigerated trades. Slowly, the container lines started to take reefer cargo from 
the independent operators, from meat and fish to more sensitive cargo like 
fruit. The container lines, particularly Maersk, has seen the reefer cargo not 
only as the fastest growing segment but also as a suitable back-haul cargo. The 
market decline for the independent reefer operators since the mid-1990s can 
therefore to a great extent be attributable to the come-back of liner companies. 
19 Carriers put money on hybrid ship designs, Shanghai Shipping Exchange, 19 November 
2012, <http://en.sse.net.cn/info/detailen.jsp?id=310233>.
20 “MSC applies 1500 dollar reefer rate hike globally Jan. 1”. American Shipper 24 October 
2012. <http://www.americanshipper.com/main/news/msc-applies-1500-reefer-rate-hike- 
globally-jan-1-51647.aspx?taxonomy=Industries#hide>.
21 “Maersk Line invests big-time in its reefer fleet”. Shippingwatch 28 January 2016. <http://
shippingwatch.com/carriers/Container/article8393934.ece>.
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In an attempt to reposition themselves in the face of the comeback of the liner 
companies the operators started to position themselves as operating conven-
tional reefers as opposed to containers, something that we will come back to 
in the chapters 12 and 13. 
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Chapter 11
Fruit Companies and Marketing Boards
The major fruit companies have an intricate relationship to the independent 
reefer operators. As global fruit exporters, they operate shipping companies 
but are at the same time major customers to the independents. Indeed, what 
makes the reefer operators independent is that they are not exporters trans-
porting their own cargo. What complicates the situation is that the fruit com-
panies have sometimes operated third-party shipping, making them direct 
competitors to the independents. Given the importance and complexity of 
transporting their own perishable commodities to distant markets it follows 
that the major fruit companies have been pioneers and innovators of refriger-
ated maritime transport. 
Marketing boards have been another major source of produce to be trans-
ported and therefore a major customer to the independent reefer operators. 
They have operated reefer tonnage but their importance as customers has de-
clined over the years. 
1 Chiquita
Chiquita’s history is a complex one and can be traced back to several, at the 
time, important fruit companies. The company’s relationship to the shipping 
industry has varied over the years. At times they have relied entirely on their 
own ships for the transportation of their fruit, while at other times they have 
outsourced parts and even their entire transport needs. The Great White Fleet 
– the shipping arm of Chiquita – peaked around 1970 when it merged with 
Salén’s fleet, and again around 1990, when it grew to become a major commer-
cial operator with a fleet of around 100 ships. 
Chiquita’s history can be said to start in 18711, when the American railroad 
entrepreneur Henry Meiggs, assisted by his young nephew Minor Keith, agreed 
with the government of Costa Rica to build a railroad from San José to the port 
of Limón. Meiggs passed away in 1877 and Keith took over. He planted his first 
bananas in 1872 and before they had matured also bought some bananas in 
1 This section is largely based on Adams, F.U. 1914. Conquest of the Tropics: The story of the 
Creative Enterprises conducted by the United Fruit Company, New York: Doubleday. Page & 
Company, ch. 3-4. 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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Colon which were profitably sold in New Orleans in that same year. The Costa 
Rican government defaulted on their payments in 1882, which led to Keith be-
ing granted 3200 sq.km of land as well as a 99-year lease on the operation of the 
railroad. The railroad proved difficult to build and was finally completed in 
1890, but rather than making money on passengers, Keith realized that it was 
more lucrative to transport bananas to Limón and thereafter ship them to New 
Orleans. He established a position where his companies including the Tropical 
Trading and Transport Company dominated the Central American and Co-
lumbian banana trades. However, a broker’s bankruptcy put Keith in a difficult 
financial position, resulting in the merger of his company with Boston Fruit 
and the establishment of United Fruit. The catalyst that led to the establish-
ment of Boston Fruit is recorded as Captain Lorenzo Baker’s voyage in 1870. He 
was looking for backhaul cargo in Jamaica and bought 160 bunches of bananas 
in Jamaica, and after a quick voyage, sold them profitably in Boston. Andrew 
Preston, a Boston fruit merchant, realized that the business had potential and 
started to trade in bananas and in 1885 Boston Fruit was established. Ten years 
later, the company owned 35 banana plantations and a fleet of steamships 
bringing cargo to Boston, Philadelphia and Baltimore. With the help of lawyer 
Bradley Palmer, United Fruit was created in 1899. 
The new company combined the various companies that were controlled by 
Minor Keith and the Boston Fruit Company. Andrew Preston became Presi-
dent, Minor Keith was Vice-President and Lorenzo Baker was one of the board 
members. United Fruit was profitable in its initial years2 and entered into a 
phase of rapid expansion buying competitors and developing the business. 
Particularly important from the reefer perspective was the acquisition of 50% 
of Elders & Fyffes in 1903 which enabled United Fruit access to the underdevel-
oped European market, which Elders & Fyffes were already developing. And it 
was this transatlantic business, in particular, that spurred the development of 
refrigerated banana transport.
Ships have always been an important part of any banana company’s opera-
tions. In the early period from 1870s to the end of the 1920s, the output of each 
plantation was determined by the size and frequency of available shipping3. 
The ships of United Fruit are mythical in the reefer industry and there are in-
dications that already in 1899, the company painted their ships white to reflect 
the tropical sun in an attempt to reduce heat. United Fruit operated over 60 
2 United Fruit Annual Reports 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904.
3 Read, R. 1986. The Banana Industry: Oligopoly and Barriers to Entry, in Casson, M. (ed.). 
Multinationals and World Trade, London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 317-342.
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steamers in 1901, ten of them owned and the remainder on time-charter4. In 
1903, United Fruit converted the steamer Venus to a refrigerated ship. Experi-
mentation with appropriate temperatures on the Venus, led to the develop-
ment of three coal-fired steamers that were purpose-built for the fruit trade in 
1904. More new-buildings followed and the trend was for the ships to become 
larger and to be fitted out with refrigeration. They also carried passengers. A 
large part of the fleet, mainly ventilated vessels, continued to be chartered, and 
significantly from Norwegian companies5. Scandinavian companies were to 
later become major actors in the field of fruit transportation. The Great White 
Fleet is usually associated with the United States naval fleet that circumnavi-
gated the globe between 1907 to 1909, but it also became the name of United 
Fruit’s shipping arm. By 1910 the company owned seventeen ships and also 
purchased the remainder of Elders & Fyffes including its fleet6. 
Diseases were to become a major problem for all banana producers. United 
Fruit detected the Panama disease on two of its farms in 1916 but the disease 
had previously been detected in other parts of Central America7. Another 
disease, Sigatoka, which had been recorded in Java and Fiji at around the same 
time and later ravaged banana farms in Australia in 1924. The disease reached 
banana plantations in Central America in the mid-1930s and caused major da-
mage to United Fruit’s plantations8. Sigatoka could be controlled by spraying 
while Panama disease could be managed to some extent by flood-fallowing. 
These diseases added to production costs and also led to a search for disease-
resistant varieties. 
United Fruit’s share of the world trade in bananas in the early 20th century 
has been estimated as high as 77%9. Monopoly allegations caused United to 
dispose of some of its holdings between 1908 and 1912 and this made the mar-
ket more competitive10. By 1930, in the face of increased competition from 
Standard Fruit and Cuyamel, United Fruit had absorbed more than 20 rivalling 
firms and its market share was around 60%11. United Fruit owned ninety 
ships in 1931 and also leased twenty-five12. In 1939 it had an estimated market 
4 United Fruit Annual Report 1901, p. 6.
5 Adams 1914, p. 307.
6 Adams 1914, p. 118.
7 Soluri 2005, p. 52-53.
8 Soluri 2005, p. 106.
9 Taylor 2003, pp. 67-96. p. 74.
10 Read 1986. 
11 Taylor 2003, p. 74.
12 Read 1986.
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share of 65% of the banana trade and had 54 ships, plus another 21 in the 
Elders & Fyffes fleet13. Directly after the Second World War, they added yet 
another 18 ships to its fleet14 and furthered its relationship with Salén in Swe-
den. 
United Fruit had a long history of political involvement in Latin America 
and had also successfully lobbied the US government to intercede on its behalf 
on several occasions. It is the clout of the banana companies (and United Fruit 
was the biggest) in respect to Central American countries that gave rise to the 
idea of the “banana republic”. United Fruit’s controversial involvement in the 
region gave it a competitive advantage on world markets since they managed 
to minimise production and land costs by supporting regimes that gave the 
company what it wanted with doubtful concern for the consequences to work-
ers and indigenous peoples. In the 1950s United Fruit successfully lobbied for 
the toppling of the elected government in Guatemala15. However, it can be 
mischievously said that the US had been opposing monopolies for longer than 
it had been stamping out communism. In the same year as the US-backed in-
surrection, in 1954, the Eisenhower administration brought an anti-trust suit 
against the company and United Fruit were going to be forced to divest some 
of its interests. What was demanded was that the company ceased its direct 
sales of bananas to retailers in the US market, that they acquired no more ba-
nana companies, and that they submitted a plan to spin off a banana company 
by 1966. In 1967, United Fruit announced that the new company would consist 
of the Armuelles Division on the Pacific Coast of Panama16 but it was ultimate-
ly the Guatemalan banana business that was disposed of to Del Monte17. So 
ironically, United Fruit’s lobbying to remove a government resulted also in its 
own departure from that country.
Bananas were loaded on the ships in bunches, but in the early 1960s, follow-
ing the lead taken by Standard Fruit, United Fruit started to experiment with 
the transport of bananas in cardboard boxes, to protect them from bruising. 
United Fruit had been experimenting for decades with modifying the atmos-
13 Tolerton 2008, p. 186. 
14 Tolerton 2008, p. 186.
15 Immerman, R.H. 1982. The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
16 McKern, B. and Dunning, J.H. 1993. Transnational Corporations and the Exploitation of 
Natural Resources, Abingdon: Taylor & Francis. pp. 205-206.
17 Neumann, P. and Somer, J.A. 2000. Reefership: The Art and Science of Supplying Fresh Pro-
duce to the world, Dole Fresh Fruit International, p. 60. 
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phere to delay ripening and this was now also applied to the individual box 
and a patent was awarded at the end of the decade. 
Eli Black, who started his career at the now defunct Lehman Brothers, be-
came the chairman of American Seal-Kap Company, which traditionally made 
seal caps for milk bottles. Black renamed this company AMK and used it as a 
vehicle for acquisitions. He starting purchasing shares of United Fruit and by 
1969 had taken control, fired part of the management and raised the stock 
price from 16 to 81 USD. After merging the company with John Morell meat-
packing company, United Fruit changed its name to United Brands. On the 
shipping side, it was decided to merge the fleets of Salén and United Brands, 
leading to a massive fleet of 130 ships. United Fruit continued to be at the fore-
front of refrigerated transport and as early as 1972 bought its first two refriger-
ated container vessels for a service between Honduras and Gulfport. These 
Spanish-built ships were expensive to run after the oil crises and were replaced 
in 1983 by the more efficient Puritan class.
But United Brands was in severe trouble and the hurricane Fifi added to the 
gloomy situation, destroying many of the company’s banana plantations in 
Honduras. In 1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission discovered that 
Black had bribed the Honduran president to reduce banana export taxes lead-
ing to Black’s suicide. Following these events, the American Financial Group, 
run by Carl Lindner Jr, bought into United Fruit, and in 1984 Lindner changed 
the company name to emphasise its key brand: Chiquita Brands. 
Driven by the Lindner family and Dale Ploughman, Chiquita vigorously ex-
panded its fleet using the company’s historical shipping brand: The Great 
White Fleet. Moreover, their reefers were used for third-party shipping to a 
greater extent than before. They built several reefers at Danyard and Kvaerner 
Kleven and three pure container ships that were built in Japan. In 1993, The 
Great White Fleet controlled 65 ships, of which they owned 2018 and the total 
later reached around 100. This development was driven by the introduction of 
the licensing system for the import of bananas to the European Union. Many 
believed that the licenses would be distributed in proportion to the volume of 
business that banana companies had in Europe, which led Chiquita to dra-
matically increase their volumes to position themselves. However, it did not 
turn out that way and Chiquita was instead faced with increased restrictions 
that caused its market share within the EU to plummet. This placed Chiquita 
in a very difficult situation19. It also had repercussions for many other parties, 
particularly for the countries that were heavily reliant on Chiquita. It also led 
18 “New Chiquita reefer grounds, then faces unwanted lay-up”. TradeWinds 9 July 1993, p. 6.
19 “Chiquita loses EC banana case”. TradeWinds 9 July 1993, p. 27.
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to the cancellation of various contracts, for example, the time charters with 
Holy House shipping in 1993. 
Chiquita tried to improve its financial situation by selling its meat business 
in 1995. Further appeals began to offer the prospect of the EU’s banana licens-
ing system becoming more advantageous for Chiquita, but the damage had 
been done. In 2001 Chiquita filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which effectively 
ended Lindner’s ownership of Chiquita in 2002. In 2004, Chiquita bought Fresh 
Express, whose primary business was packaged salads but this turned out to be 
a disappointment. Yet again Chiquita divested assets to improve its finances, 
this time ships. In 2007, Chiquita signed a shipping agreement with its long-
term partner NYKCool, with roots in Salén, which involved the sale and lease-
back of 12 ships. In 2015, Chiquita was completely acquired by Cutrale-Safra 
group. 
Figure 22 The Chiquita Deutschland was the first of a series of six “Country Class” reefers 
built in 1991 and 1992 for Chiquita at Danyard, a shipyard owned by J. Lauritzen. 




The company that we now know as Dole has, just like Chiquita, different ori-
gins. One strand, particularly important for bananas and shipping, started with 
the Vaccaro brothers and later became Standard Fruit. Italian émigrés were 
active in the American fruit trade and pioneers in this regard were Salvatore 
and Guiseppe Oteri who were based in New Orleans. As an example, in 1878 
they purchased a 454-ton steamer and carried 1000 stems of bananas, 15000 
plantains, 7000 pineapples and four barrels of limes to New Orleans from Hon-
duras20. Many Italians had immigrated either to New York or New Orleans, 
many were farmers who had lost their land in Italy, and some turned to the 
fruit trade in the U.S. One of those Italian families was the Vaccaros. After farm-
ing failures, due to the Mississippi River flooding and a winter freeze in 1899, 
the Vaccaros and D’Antoni decided to follow in the footsteps of the Oteris. The 
Vaccaros bought fruit in Honduras and transported it by sail in 1899, and the 
year after they acquired a steamship. By comparison, United Fruit controlled 
36 vessels at the time, so the Vaccaros were certainly underdogs21. The Vaccaro 
Brothers Fruit & Steamship Company offered biweekly services in the Carib-
bean. 
The Vaccaros sold half of their business to United Fruit in 1905 to finance the 
construction of a railroad from the plantations to the coast, but only a few 
years later, in 1908, the Vaccaros bought back the share. The fleet was renewed 
in 1911, when the ventilated fruit carriers Ceiba and Yoro were built. Although 
the levels of exports were high in the 1920s, the Vaccaro business was not 
healthy. In 1926, they incorporated as Standard Fruit & Steamship Corporation, 
and went public. Standard grew before the Depression, becoming a diversified 
company owning railroads, oil, and real estate apart from the fruit business. 
During the Depression, Standard continued to expand its fleet, for example 
converting four old US destroyers to banana boats. The rapid fleet expansion 
along with the difficult economic situation caused problems and the company 
was reorganised in 1935. Similarly to many of the companies we cover in this 
book, Standard’s ships were used in the Second World War. 
In the 1950s, Standard was the second largest banana importer in the US, 
after United. Similarly to United, Standard was struggling with the cost of 
treating Sigatoka disease and particularly Panama disease that attacked and 
destroyed banana plants and then remained in the ground. While United Fruit 
continued to manage this problem by flood-fallowing, leaving the infected 
land immersed during 3-6 months, Standard was running out of land to do 
20 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 45. 
21 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 47.
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so. The method was also capital-intensive and continued labour unrest made 
Standard’s situation worse. Standard had, however, been experimenting with 
disease-resistant varieties for some years. In 1956 Standard decided to switch 
its production to the Giant Cavendish despite opposition from fruit distribu-
tors who preferred the existing Gros Michel. The Cavendish was sensitive to 
bruising and also required additional measures to ripen properly. Standard had 
also been trialling boxing bananas as early as the 1930s and this measure was 
employed to overcome the bruising issue. Boxing the bananas at the planta-
tion reduced the amount of handling that the bananas were exposed to and 
this innovation was later picked up by United22. But the costs associated with 
the switch to Cavendish and boxing were factors behind the company’s deci-
sion to sell its entire of fleet of 29 vessels in 1962. Standard’s tonnage require-
ments were met by time-chartering vessels from Saléns and other independent 
reefer operators. In 1964, 56% of the company was acquired by Castle & Cooke 
and the rest of it in 1968. 
Castle & Cooke had a history going back to 1851 in Hawaii, with the mission-
aries Castle and Cooke, who turned into successful merchants by running gen-
eral stores and sugar plantations23. They had come to dominate the Hawaiian 
pineapple business during the Depression and established business in Califor-
nia in 1934. By the early 1960s it was a diversified company with sugar, real es-
tate, and the Matson shipping line. At the time of the merger, United Fruit had 
70% of the banana market, while Standard had 15%. 
The third part of Dole was the business of James Dole. Moving to Hawaii in 
1899, he was inspired by Castle & Cooke, bought some land and started to plant 
fruit and particularly – the pineapple. Rather than selling on the local market, 
he was convinced that the fruit had to be exported, but he saw some difficulties 
in exporting it fresh. He therefore raised the capital to build a canning factory 
and started to can the fruit. When the Hawaiian pineapple tariff was aban-
doned in 1901, James started to export canned pineapples to the U.S. His Hawai-
ian Pineapple Company (Hapco) filled 43000 cans in 1903 and three years later 
it was close to a million. By 1922, Hapco was a top pineapple producer, and 
Dole traded a third of the shares in the firm for cash and a long-term lease of 
12000 acres of Waialua’s land. With the cash, he bought the 90000-acre island 
of Lanai and turned it into a massive pineapple plantation. In 1928, it account-
ed for a third of the pineapple market share, and two thirds of the land under 
pineapple cultivation. The Great Depression hit Hapco hard, holding a large 
inventory of canned fruit when sales plummeted, and owing large amounts of 
22 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 58. Soluri 2005, p. 177-180.
23 Neumann and Somer 2000.
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money to banks and other creditors in order to enlarge its production capacity. 
Due to this trouble Hapco was essentially merged into Castle & Cooke in the 
mid-1930s. Jim Dole became the figurehead chairman, with little influence, 
and soon retired. Standard’s bananas had previously been marketed under the 
Cabana brand and the acquisition of Dole meant that the company could lev-
erage this better-known brand for its bananas. Dole was of course a pineapple 
brand. In 1972 the Dole brand was advertised in the US with the slogan “Dole 
has gone bananas”, a campaign that was described as “one of the most aggres-
sive advertising and promotion campaigns ever seen in the banana business”24.
Dole shipped its first bananas to Europe in 196525 and formed Eurobana in 
1972, a partnership with the German fruit company Astheimer & Sohn in Ham-
burg, which it later took over. A few years later they expanded their business in 
Japan with collaborations with two Japanese trading companies. 
Dole decided to return to ship-owning in 1976. The shipping component of 
the business had become more significant because of the rise in oil prices and 
Dole therefore considered continued reliance on third-part tonnage to expose 
them to too high a level of risk. Instead they adopted the policy that a third of 
their ships should be owned, a third should be short-term chartered and a third 
on long-term charters26. Castle & Cooke created a fully owned subsidiary to 
handle the transport needs called Intercontinental Transportation Services 
(ITS). In late 1976, ITS acquired two Clipper type ships, Golar Frost and Golar 
Freeze from Irgens Larsen and followed this up by purchasing two ships, Man-
darincore and Sabracore, from the defunct Maritime Fruit Carriers. In 1977, ITS 
purchased four Frubel ships from Belgian Fruit Lines which led to a collabora-
tion with Dammers and van der Heide, who in 1979 delivered six Honolulu-
type ships to ITS. In 1978, Castle & Cooke acquired the assets of Willy Bruns of 
Hamburg which included seven reefers, Bruns operations in Europe and Ecua-
dor, the banana producer Ubesa in Ecuador, a box manufacturing plant and 
production contracts with independent growers27. In 1983, ITS moved to Boca 
Raton, and the fleet operations were managed by Benjamin Paz. Paz started a 
newbuilding project that led to the delivery of four vessels Tropical Mist, Tropi-
cal Morn, Tropical Sky, and Tropical Star. ITS also took over the ships’ technical 
management but relied on Irgens Larsen for crewing. A further two Clipper 
vessels were acquired in 1987. 
24 The New York Times January 17, 1972, p. 48.
25 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 60.
26 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 101. 
27 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 199.
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The company was relocated to Costa Rica in 1991 and reorganized as Dole 
Fresh Fruit International, DFFI. In 1992, DFFI went into collaboration with 
Caesar Reefers, who had built six reefers at the Gdansk shipyard. Later, these 
ships were bought by Oetker, placed in the Star Reefers pool and timechartered 
to Dole. Dole were happy with these ships and decided to ordered four similar 
ones from the same shipyard. Dole also started to time-charter vessels from 
NYK. 
While United Fruit had started a container service from Honduras to Gulf-
port in 1972, Dole started its Central American container service in 1981. The 
Jade Bounty and the Sapphire Bounty serviced the trade. Dole add the reefer 
container vessel Concord in 1982, and three more ships in 1983. In 1987, Carta-
gena and Santa Maria entered into Dole transport system, servicing the trade 
between Colombia and Jacksonville28. In 1989, DFFI took delivery of Dole Cali-
fornia and Dole Ecuador with a capacity of 450 FEU, followed by the Dole Hon-
duras and Dole Costa Rica. Their container capacity was later expanded to 500 
FEU. Dole’s reefer container shipping was further enhanced in 1999 when two 
larger ships were built, Dole Chile and Dole Colombia, each with a capacity of 
1023 FEU. These sophisticated vessels carry around a million banana boxes per 
28 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 104. 
Figure 23 Dole Honduras in San Diego, 2008. Dole increasingly containerised its banana 
transport to the USA from the 1980s and built modern reefer container ships  
Photo: Port of San Diego (Dale Frost)
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voyage and have their own gantry cranes. Dole then controlled a fleet of about 
30 ships but this number was later reduced, the newer ships had ample capa-
city. Modernisation continued when three 770 FEU ships were ordered from 
the South Korean Ulsan yard in 201329. 
Meanwhile, in August 1991, Castle & Cooke diversified into real estate, and a 
separation was made where Castle & Cooke became the real estate company, 
while Dole was responsible for fruits30. In 1993 Dole made an effort to increase 
its access to the European banana market by acquiring interests in companies 
that sourced bananas from the African, Caribbean, Pacific areas that were fa-
29 “Dole orders in Korea”. TradeWinds 10 July 2013.
30 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 71
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voured by the EU regulations. A bid for Fyffes was rejected31 but Dole subse-
quently gained a 40 % share of Compagnie Fruitière and kept this until 2014. 
This company uses Africa Express Line for its transport from West Africa to 
Europe. Africa Express Line chartered pallet-friendly reefers and in 2016 were 
operating eight such vessels from Star Reefers and Fresh Carriers. A recent ad-
dition, however, was a new reefer-container vessel from Seatrade, the Seatrade 
Orange. 
Dole has continued on as a ship-owner but it also charters in vessels. Dole’s 
commercial shipping operation is managed by the subsidiary Dole Ocean Car-
go and the ships are managed by Dole Reefership Marine Services. Dole Ocean 
Cargo operated in 2016 lines linking Ecuador to San Diego, Central America to 
Gulfport, Central America to US East Coast, and Central America to Antwerp. 
The latter line was serviced by pallet-friendly reefers while the services to the 
US employed reefer-container vessels. Dole reefers were also employed in the 
Far East. 
Dole became the world’s largest supplier of bananas in the early 21st century 
and the leading shipping operator amongst the fruit companies. Their modern 
reefer-container vessels are regarded as state-of-the-art. 
2.1 Fyffes & Geest
The origins of Fyffes can be traced to Fyffes Hudson and the shipping company 
Elder Dempster that both started shipping bananas from the Canary Islands to 
Britain in the late 19th century. Elder Dempster bought Fyffes Hudson in 1901 
and inaugurated the refrigerated transatlantic banana trade when the Port Mo-
rant of the Imperial Direct West India Mail Service arrived in Bristol in 1901. 
The British Government subsidised the operation since it was also a mail ser-
vice. The acquisition of Fyffes Hudson’s fruit distribution business, combined 
with the Port Morant’s success led Elder Dempster to establish Elders & Fyffes 
as its purchasing company and established the Fyffes Line to specialise in ba-
nana shipping. The first ever purpose-built banana reefers were ordered for 
Fyffes in 1903 but the company had to turn to United Fruit for banana supply in 
the same year, partly due to a hurricane that destroyed the Jamaican crop. Sub-
sequent supply agreements included United Fruit’s acquisition of half of the 
company and in 1910, the entire operation. Elders and Fyffes continued as a 
separate division and was focused on supplying bananas from the West Indies 
to Europe although a banana plantation in the Canaries was also developed.32
31 “Dole’s bid for Fyffes falls flat”. TradeWinds 23 April 1993, p. 5.
32 This section is largely based on Read 1986, and McCutcheon, C. 2010. Elders & Fyffes: A 
photographic history, Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing. 
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The company pioneered banana branding by introducing the Fyffes “Blue 
Label” on its bananas in 1929 and it was the market leader in Europe. Fyffes’ 
fleet was very interlinked with United Fruits. By the start of WWI Fyffes fleet 
had grown to 18 ships but ten of these were lost in the war. Rapid expansion 
later resulted in a fleet of 36 vessels in 1932. The Depression and other prob-
lems scaled back the fleet to 21 by 1938. Fyffes built a few ships in 1949 and 1956 
but then withdrew from ship-owning in the early 1970s. In 1986, Fyffes was 
taken over by Fruit Importers of Ireland. In 1996, Fyffes and Wibdeco (Wind-
ward Islands Banana Development and Exporting Company) acquired Geest’s 
banana business. 
Geest had in itself been an important player in the banana market. This 
originated with a Dutch flower-growing business that was diversified after the 
brothers Jon and Leonard van Geest moved to the UK in the 1930s. Banana im-
ports from the Windward Islands started in 1952 and the company’s first ba-
nana reefers, Geestland and Geeststar, entered service in 1960. By the end of the 
decade Geest controlled around half of the UK banana market and the fleet 
was steadily growing. More ships followed including a vessel in the early 1970s 
that could carry 340 containers33. The Geest St Lucia and Geest Dominica from 
Danyard in 1993 were the last ships delivered to Geest as an independent com-
pany. Geest Line continued to charter vessels that were used to operate ser-
vices that ship bananas from the Caribbean to France and the UK and 
miscellaneous cargo on the return voyage.
Fyffes, now as an independent company, expanded its presence in the US by 
partnering with Columbian UniBan in 2005. The company has particularly fo-
cused on Fairtrade bananas and was the largest supplier of these to Europe34. 
A proposal to purchase Chiquita in 2014 failed to eventuate35. In 2014, the com-
pany operated eight specialized reefers. 
3 Del Monte
California Fruit Canners Association (CFCA) was formed in 1898, and one of its 
brands was Del Monte, known for its canned peaches. In 1916, CFCA merged 
with other companies and incorporated itself as California Packing Corpora-
tion and began marketing many of its products under the Del Monte brand. In 
 
33 Tolerton 2008, p. 169.
34 Fyffes Annual Report 2015, p. 23.
35 Fyffes Annual Report 2015, p. 14.
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the 1910s and 1920s, it operated many canneries, and acquired pineapple farms 
and a cannery in Hawaii. An international expansion followed and in 1967 re-
badged itself as Del Monte, its best-known brand. 
In 1967, United Fruit bought a 6% share in Del Monte as a first step in taking 
over the company. Del Monte were able to fend this off however. Since United 
Fruit were barred from acquiring another banana company, due to anti-trust 
legislation, they entered the banana business. They bought the Tampa based 
West Indies Fruit Company which had purchase contracts with banana pro-
ducers in Ecuador and Costa Rica. Del Monte were also looking for new op-
portunities. The company began operations in the Philippines, expanded its 
banana purchases, set up a plantation in Costa Rica, and bought six reefers. Del 
Monte was able to further expand when United Fruit were forced to divest 
some of its interests, once again due to anti-trust issues. Del Monte negotiated 
with United Fruit about the purchase of the Armuelles Division, but the deal 
was turned down by the Panamanian government. Instead Del Monte bought 
United Brands division in Guatemala – the Bananera Division in 1972. This led 
Del Monte to become a major competitor to United Brands and Standard Fruit. 
The ownership of Del Monte changed hands a number of times in the late 
twentieth century. In 1979, Del Monte was bought by R.J. Reynolds who sold the 
company to Polly Peck International in 1989. Del Monte had grown to be the 
largest supplier of fresh pineapples in the world and also the third largest in 
bananas36. In 1996, Del Monte was acquired by the Jordanian IAT Group, con-
trolled by the Abu Ghazaleh family and the company continued to be the mar-
ket leader in pineapples, with 40% of the market, and remained the third 
largest in bananas37. 
Network Shipping was incorporated in 1990 as the company’s shipping sub-
sidiary managing and operating a fleet of 32 vessels, partly owned and partly 
chartered-in38. In 1993 as Global Reefer Carriers was established. Del Monte 
built new reefers and also acquired older vessels and by the end of the 1990s 
their fleet consisted of 43 ships39. In 1997, they completed its acquisition of 
Horn Line, which had been a long-time transport partner carrying fruit to Eu-
rope40. 
36 “British Conglomerate to Buy Part of Del Monte from RJR”. Los Angeles Times 8 Septem-
ber 1989.
37 Neumann and Somer 2000, p. 106., Fresh Del Monte Produce 1997 Annual Report p. 7.
38 “Network Shipping starts US-Costa Rica service”. Journal of Commerce Mar 20, 1991. 
<http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/network-shipping-starts-us-costa-rica-service_ 
19910320.html>.
39 Fresh Del Monte Produce 1999 Annual Report p. 4.
40 Fresh Del Monte Produce 1997 Annual Report p. 3.
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By 2006, the fleet had been reduced and the company owned 20 reefers and 
chartered in another five units. In 2009 and 2010, Del Monte started a ten-year 
charter of four vessels from Star Reefers, sticking to non-containerized special-
ized reefer vessels. As of 2015, they owned 13 vessels and were chartering in a 
further six. They also spot chartered vessels according to seasonal require-
ments. Del Monte also owned and leased refrigerated containers, and con-
tinued its strategy of being a vertically integrated food company41. They 
maintained their leading position within the pineapple segment and its 
number three place in bananas42. 
4 Marketing Boards
National marketing boards are official institutions with a state-mandated mo-
nopoly to buy or sell a particular commodity. Early examples include the New 
Zealand Meat Producers Board formed in 1922 and the New Zealand Dairy 
Board in 1923. This type of board was established to improve returns to farmers 
and focused on pooling and selling national produce. The extent to which 
these boards are controlled by producers and their degree of autonomy from 
the national government has varied somewhat in different countries and at 
different times. Another kind of marketing board, frequently associated with 
developing countries and centrally planned economies, is set up as a buying 
monopoly. 
One example of a marketing board on the buying side is the Comité Inter-
professionel Bananier (CIB) created in 1932 to organise the French market for 
bananas. The board consisted of representatives from Government, agents, 
ripeners-wholesalers, shipping companies as well as producers from the pre-
ferred regions. French banana marketing was based on its support of domestic 
production in Martinique and Guadeloupe as well as that of African countries 
in the franc-zone, chiefly Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. The CIB was reorgan-
ised several times but the strategy was to support these producing regions and 
to achieve stable pricing by matching supply with demand. Bananas were 
sourced from other regions as required to make up for any shortfalls from the 
preferred producers. Shipping the bananas from the Caribbean was in the 
1970s carried out by reefers operated by the state-owned Compagnie Générale 
41 Fresh Del Monte Produce 2015 Annual Report p 8.
42 Fresh Del Monte Produce 2015 Annual Report p 2.
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Transatlantique and its successor Compagnie Générale Maritime which con-
tainerized banana-transport in the years around 1980.43
The Soviet Union’s banana imports were handled, after 1966, by Soyuzplo-
doimport which was a state import and export agency, best known for vodka 
exports. The USSR’s banana imports were limited by its reluctance to spend its 
hard currency reserves on non-essential imports – reciprocal trading arrange-
ments were preferred. The USSR prioritised the purchase of bananas from na-
tional organizations thereby avoiding US based companies like United Fruit. 
Reefers from the national shipping line Sovfracht shipped bananas from Co-
lumbia and Ecuador, as well as small quantities from various lesser-producing 
countries such as Vietnam, to mainly Riga, Tallinn and Odessa.44 
The national marketing board and the specialised reefer were a perfect 
match. The board was a planned operation with high cargo volumes of a sin-
gle commodity. The marketing board commanded a monopoly and negoti-
ated from a position of strength. Zespri, the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing 
Board, is a successful and surviving example of a board on the supply side. 
Although regarded as a tough customer that expected low rates it had the ad-
vantage, from the reefer operator’s standpoint, of being a “single desk” repre-
senting large volumes of a single commodity. 
These operations, the large seasonal trades of for example grapes from 
South Africa is a good example, were well suited to the large specialised reefers 
operated by Saléns/Cool Carriers, Lauritzen and others (including Holy House, 
in the 1990s with the aging but still capable Snow vessels). The independent 
reefer operators were also ideal from the perspective of the marketing boards 
since they could maintain a greater degree of control over the cargo. Maintain-
ing control over an exported commodity was a reason why the boards existed 
in the first place. A chartered specialised reefer is under the charterer’s control 
and the cargo can be sold and resold whilst en route. The port destination is 
easier to change and this stands in contrast to shipping the goods with a liner 
operation. 
Some marketing boards were slow to switch to containerization and contin-
ued to be major charterers of non-containerized reefer tonnage. One explana-
tion given by our respondents was that a marketing board may be more 
resistant to change than a more dynamic privately-owned operation. Another 
explanation that has been offered is that they may prioritise dependability and 
43 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1986. The World Banana Econ-
omy, 1970-1984: Structure, Performance, and Prospects, Rome: FAO. p. 44-45.
44 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 1986. The World Banana Econ-
omy, 1970-1984: Structure, Performance, and Prospects, Rome: FAO. p. 54.
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refrigeration quality and keep a longer-term perspective than a listed company 
that can be castigated for a poor quarterly result.
Most of the marketing boards were abolished or given a reduced mandate 
during the 1980s and 90s. The Citrus Marketing Board of Israel, for example, 
lost its role as exclusive exporter in 199145. This was linked to the general move 
towards deregulation and privatisation. Larger producers in particular lobbied 
for their abolition. The boards, it was argued, were an ineffective bureaucratic 
obstacle, an unnecessary link in the logistic chain; an expense. The abolition of 
boards was also supported by advocates of free trade. The Soviet Union’s col-
lapse and the related changes in Eastern Europe also led to a reduction of 
large-scale state-sponsored purchasing. However, the Eastern Bloc were sel-
dom customers to the independent reefer operators since those countries pre-
ferred to use their own vessels. Anyway, the main result of the abolition of the 
marketing boards was the emergence of a plethora of small and medium-sized 
fruit importers and exporters. There are exceptions besides the aforemen-
tioned Zespri; the successor to the New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing 
Board (marketing as ENZA) has maintained a large share of exports despite 
losing its monopoly. 
The problem for the reefer operators was that these smallish importers and 
exporters were in no position to fill a large reefer. Interestingly this occurrence 
intersects with the advent of oversupply in container capacity and the con-
tainer lines’ consequent advances into the reefer business. The opportunity 
of shipping a lone reefer container with a container line enabled a small pro-
ducer to operate as an independent exporter. And for many this was a desirable 
outcome. The small exporter is however subject to the shipping terms dictated 
by the large container line. Their smaller volumes also place them in a weaker 
bargaining position in relation to the major fruit importers and this includes 
supermarket chains some of which have experienced massive growth over the 
last decades. The pendulum has swung from a producer-dominated situation, 
with marketing boards, to one where major buyers can pressure weaker pro-
ducers. The aforementioned example of the French CIB illustrates that even 
importing boards could be set up very much in the interests of the producers. 
How have producers responded to the new market situation? One response 
is that the larger producers, in several countries, have begun to collaborate in 
terms of marketing and transportation, for example in Morocco. We can sum-
marise the sequence of events as beginning with national marketing boards 
with compulsory producer membership. These were to a large extent abolished 
45 The Citrus Marketing Board of Israel lives on in a reduced capacity. It is mainly concerned 
with marketing the “Jaffa” brand.
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leading to a fragmented market of smaller actors. Subsequently the larger ex-
porters have in several cases teamed up to form voluntary organisations that to 
some extent mirror the previously existing marketing boards. 
The planned and coordinated imports and exports characteristic of the era 
of the national marketing boards suited specialised reefer operations. An out-
come of their politically sanctioned demise was the emergence of a larger 
number of smaller-volume exporters. This resulted in a reduced demand for 
large specialised reefers and a corresponding increased demand for refrigerat-
ed containers individually shipped by regular container lines.
5 Summary
The fruit companies, and particularly the so-called banana majors, have always 
played a decisive role for the development of maritime reefer shipping. The 
size of the banana market and the fruit’s intrinsic perishability made the ship-
ment of bananas a challenge that drove technological development, from ven-
tilated carriers to increasingly precise refrigeration, and to modified and 
controlled atmospheres and their eventual application to containers. Salén 
was able to leverage their relationship with United Fruit to gain crucial tech-
nology in the particular circumstances that prevailed immediately after WW2. 
From the perspective of the independent reefer operators more broadly, to be 
associated and do business with the likes of United Fruit or Dole, was to be as-
sociated with the biggest and the best in the business. Long-term banana con-
tracts provided the security to finance newbuildings but they were also an 
indication of market leadership, of subjectively being perceived as a first-class 
independent operator that could, for example, negotiate with ship-owners and 
banks from a position of strength and integrity. It is no accident that Salén’s 
and later Cool Carrier’s market leadership coincided with their more or less 
preferred-supplier arrangement with the largest shipper, United Fruits/ Chiq-
uita. Lauritzen likewise developed long-term relationships with these compa-
nies, Noboa for example. Star Reefers with its impeccable Blue Star heritage 
was able to do the same. For others, including NYK, it was a struggle to gain 
admittance to a rather exclusive club. 
The marketing boards were an entirely different kind of shipper. Their emer-
gence, particularly for exports of seasonal fruit, led to growth in a segment that 
the liner companies found difficult to service. This provided an opening for the 
wild reefers and led to established relationships between independent reefer 
operators and many of these boards. Large planned exports, and imports for 
that matter, were ideal for large dedicated reefers. The subsequent decline of 
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the marketing boards, and the defragmentation of the market, led to smaller 
exporters unable to fill reefers who thus turned to the refrigerated containers 
that the liner companies, struggling with overcapacity, were expanding into at 
around the same time.
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Chapter 12
The Independent Reefer Operators from Material, 
Discursive, and Subjective Perspectives
1 The Interwar Period: the Birth of the First Independent Reefer 
Operators
The companies active before the Second World War, which we have covered in 
the book are banana companies such as United Fruit, meat conglomerates 
such as the Vesteys, including Blue Star Line, and third party shipping compa-
nies specializing in reefer cargo such as Lauritzen and Salén. The banana com-
panies had reefer fleets, but these were entirely dedicated to carrying the 
respective company’s cargo – they were in-house logistics departments. Blue 
Star Line operated reefers, but these were either catering to the Vestey group’s 
internal needs for meat (and dairy) transport or as a complement to Blue Star’s 
established general cargo lines. 
What could be called the independent reefer industry was, before the Sec-
ond World War, very limited. Sven Salén shipped United Fruit’s bananas from 
the Continent to the Northern countries as a third-party shipping company. 
His company also offered inland transport for bananas, and other fruit. In this 
period there were still significant challenges for the transport of bananas, and 
much of the system built up by Salén and Matthiessen tried to solve this trans-
port problem. Salén was an entrepreneur with ambition, an entrepreneur who 
was not content with being just a link in the logistical chain of United Fruit. In 
the end of the 1930s, we know that it took the step to order its first purpose 
built reefer ship in order to start carrying bananas across the Atlantic. The 
company wanted more. 
Lauritzen developed differently than Saléns. Rather than taking the leap 
from transporting general cargo to transporting bananas as did Saléns, Laurit-
zen gradually moved into the segment. Given its dry cargo tramping business, 
it had carried fruit at times, but in the 1920s, it made a calculated decision to 
avoid tramping. To move its focus towards the fruit trades in the Mediterra-
nean was seen as a good, rational choice, headed by the young generation of 
Lauritzen. Lauritzen’s cargo, for example citrus, was less problematic than ba-
nanas and was more common in the Northern countries. One could therefore 
carefully suggest that forces of logos were dominant in the earliest period of 
Lauritzen’s fruit shipping. Lauritzen originally had an ambiguous relationship 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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with the established shipping conferences. Sometimes it participated in them 
and at other times they were outsiders snapping up cargoes as the opportuni-
ties arose.
Soon, however, Lauritzen started to see fruit shipping as one of its core busi-
nesses. Given its good reputation as a fruit carrier, Lauritzen was asked to carry 
bananas long-distance in the 1930s. The first cargo was carried with conven-
tional ventilated fruit carriers, and Lauritzen took considerable pride in man-
aging to successfully transport the cargo from West Africa to France. The 
banana was, in the 1930s (and onwards), the symbol of reefer shipping excel-
lence. In the 1930s, Lauritzen gained contacts worldwide to transport fruit, in-
cluding bananas, thereby being in stark contrast with Salén’s reefer part which 
was basically a one-trade business. Part of the desires of Lauritzen, and more 
especially Ditlev Lauritzen, was to always have a modern fleet, which led to 
considerable fleet renewal, and many newbuildings of reefers. The thymos of 
Lauritzen was plausibly related to its quite newly established reputation as a 
high-quality shipping company, able to carry any kind of fruit including the 
banana, as well as a shipping company with a very modern fleet. 
Materially, the two companies were different. At this time, Salén was still 
operating its Nordic feeder service with ventilated fruit carriers. The rapid ex-
pansion of Lauritzen in contrast with Salén was most probably due to Laurit-
zen’s wider scope of fruit carried, more varied trades, as well as the fact that the 
company was large, compared to Saléns, and had more resources for new ven-
tures. Not the least was the aggressive fleet renewal policy important. Laurit-
zen had taken delivery of about eight reefers when Salén’s built its first one. It 
is obvious that Lauritzen was the first company which could really qualify as 
an independent reefer operator. Carrying reefer cargo was its core business, it 
had considerable independence from its customers, and it was not owned by a 
shipper. Lauritzen’s banana customers were also smaller players with less, if 
any, shipping of their own. This may have stimulated Lauritzen’s development 
as a genuinely independent operation. Salén on the other hand were a link in 
market-leading United Fruit’s logistical chain. Shifting our perspective to the 
general reefer industry, but still taking a material perspective, we know that its 
history goes back to the late 19th century. Therefore, both Salén and Lauritzen 
were new, small players compared to the liner companies which shipped sig-
nificant amounts of refrigerated and frozen cargoes both carried in part-reefers 
and in dedicated reefers complementing their liner operations. And likewise 
small compared to the shippers, for example United Fruit’s own reefer fleets. 
The phenomenon of independent reefer operators therefore started as a very 
marginal phenomenon. 
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Regarding the discourses on the level of the general reefer industry, we 
would like to pay attention to that about the banana. Already since the end of 
the 19th century, as has been described in chapter 2, there was a quality dis-
course around the banana, more so than regarding other fruit: It was of utmost 
importance that the banana arrived to the markets in a good condition. The 
banana was, and still is, the most sensitive major reefer cargo within the cate-
gories of fruit, fish, and meat. Many stories about early specialized reefer ship-
ping were about spoiled bananas arriving at the docks. In other words, the 
discourses about the sensitivity and perishability of the banana, coupled with 
the need to deliver bananas in pristine condition provided the discursive back-
ground to the subjective forces discussed above. Both Salén and Lauritzen de-
rived pride from being able to carry the banana and the quality discourse 
trickled into the two companies. 
The birth of independent reefer operators mostly stems from the material 
realities of trans-Atlantic and other long-distance fruit trade. For this purpose, 
reefer ships were needed. The banana had a particular status amongst the fruit 
discursively and it was not even seen as a fruit but as a separate cargo category. 
To be able to carry bananas successfully was a source of pride for the indepen-
dent reefer operators. The meat trades were often catered for by shippers or by 
general liners and did not spur the creation of independent reefer operators. 
At this stage in history, there was no collective, subjective sensemaking 
amongst for example Salén and Lauritzen to be part of an independent reefer 
industry. This would change after the Second World War. 
1 1950s: the Wild Reefers
Salén and Lauritzen were the main independent reefer operators in the decade 
following the Second World War. Indeed, it is in the 10-15 years after the war in 
which one could say that an industry of independent reefer operators really is 
established. The most remarkable post-war development is the growth of 
Saléns. 
A complex set of factors led to Salén establishing itself as the leading inde-
pendent reefer operator. As we already saw in the preceding section, Sven 
Salén was interested in growing his reefer business, by importing bananas 
across the Atlantic. He therefore had a will to expand and grow, an entrepre-
neurial drive of eros. But much of Salén’s growth was due to the strategies of 
United Fruit. They recognized that Salén was a potential strategic partner, not 
only on the regional but on the global level. He was a partner who was willing 
to build the tonnage that United Fruit so desperately needed after the losses 
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caused by the war. The material base was reduced during the war, which led to 
a space for tonnage renewal and innovation. However, Saléns lacked the know-
how to build the most modern reefers. Therefore, United Fruits let Salén gain 
access to the drawings of their latest reefers in the late forties. This instantly 
put Saléns at the cutting edge of reefer technology. Newbuildings soon fol-
lowed, and many of these were built in Sweden that had escaped the war with 
its industry intact. This established an industrial competence in Sweden which 
served as a resource base for Saléns for decades. The combination of know-
how from United Fruit with the material production capacity of Swedish ship-
yards was crucial for Saléns. In other words, Salén’s was to a large extent a 
product of the relationship with United Fruit. 
Salén positioned itself as a loyal transport provider to United Fruit, but also 
realized that they should not rely solely on one customer, and therefore devel-
oped side businesses with other fruit, fish, and meat. The material and imma-
terial resources built up in the banana trade could be leveraged in order to 
expand into other lucrative refrigerated trades. The side business was Salén’s 
way to enter into the specialized reefer industry, where it, thanks to its numer-
ous newbuildings quickly became the main actor. Lauritzen also expanded 
during the post-War period buying 43 ships from 1945 to 1958, many of which 
entered the banana and fruit trades. Lauritzen continued to renew its tonnage 
constantly, given the reduced material base as well as the desire in the com-
pany to always have modern tonnage. 
Now, these two independent reefer operators started to interact more with 
the general reefer industry. Both companies broke into the trades that had tra-
ditionally been carried by liner conferences. Saléns and Lauritzen could offer 
more dedicated transports at a good price which suited the exporters and im-
porters of perishables. The combined capacity of the two companies now led 
fruit exporters to consider the specialized reefers as a viable alternative to liner 
conferences. In the minds of the customers, the independent reefer industry 
was established. As we discussed in the introduction, the subjective percep-
tions of actors are of high importance for what happens in an industry. The 
birth of the specialized reefer industry is based on this shift of perception – 
from being a set of material artefacts (reefers) which were often tied up in es-
tablished patterns of trade, the operators had managed to create the perception 
that there was an independent reefer industry, with several actors such as Salén 
and Lauritzen but also others like Gustaf Erikson based in Finland. 
The whole reefer industry was a small challenger to the established liner 
companies and saw themselves as being wild, in contrast to the traditional, 
outdated, and even boring, liner companies. As far as into the 1970s, the inde-
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pendent reefer industry, the part which was not tied up into stable flows of 
products, such as bananas, was called “wild reefers”. 
Materially, the companies grew because of the rising demand for the trans-
port of refrigerated products. Part of this growth was absorbed by liner compa-
nies, but there were niches which independent reefer operators were quick to 
fill. The banana companies needed to build up their fleets after the Second 
World War and used third-party players, such as Salén and Lauritzen. The same 
discourses reigned over the general reefer industry – the discourse of banana 
quality. The demands of the banana companies for constantly better trans-
ports led to quality improvements at Salén and Lauritzen, who now were in 
charge of technological development. The large number of newbuildings in 
combination with the discourse of quality led to incremental changes being 
incorporated into the ships. Also, the ships became faster which was repre-
sented both materially and discursively. The specialized reefer industry saw 
and talked about themselves as being able to deliver goods to the market more 
quickly than liner companies, due to fast ships and more direct trading pat-
terns. It is plausible that with the increasing speeds, the discourses about “ba-
nana destroyers” – fast, dedicated ships were born here. Yet another material 
and discursive element which emerged was size. The specialized reefer compa-
nies promoted their large refrigerated capacity. So even though they were rela-
tively small vessels, the fact that they were fully refrigerated meant that they 
could take larger refrigerated cargoes than most liner vessels. Furthermore, 
liner vessels were tied up in regular trading arrangements, so additional capac-
ity available at any one time was more limited. In contrast, the wild reefer, 
raced to its destination, frequently in ballast, and could fill the entire ship with 
the customer’s cargo. This was particularly well suited to seasonal trades which 
was something that kicked-off during the wild reefer era. So the wild reefers 
were positioned to be able to take large one-off cargoes which is a different 
style of business than the industrial shipping carried out by both the liner 
companies and the regular shipments of the major banana companies.
All of the above led to the discourse of the wild reefer, which in a sense is the 
discourse of the new, small, aggressive competitor, in contrast to old-fashioned 
liner companies. A fight between David and Goliath. The upstarts were driven 
by eros, by a will to win and they were thrilled at the prospect of taking on the 
big guys. They were proud to be the underdog that chipped away at the liners’ 
fruit trades. And Goliath hardly noticed that David was even there.
To sum up this decade, it was the birth of the discourse about the inde-
pendent reefer industry – consisting of several operators. They were all talked 
about as fast, large, and wild. All of these discourses were framed in opposi-
tion to the characteristics of the prevailing, dominant transport mode – the 
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conference lines. The banana companies were still important actors, as they 
spurred technological development, related to the quality discourse, which led 
independent reefer operators to constantly renew tonnage, which led to a large 
base of somewhat older ships suitable for the transport of other fruit, fish, and 
meat. Subjectively, although there was competition between the independent 
operators, much of the eros concerned the thrill of breaking into new trades, 
usually at the liner companies’ expense.
2 1960s: Rationalizations and Explosive Growth
The 1960s were marked by different forms of rationalisation with some degree 
of incompatibility: boxes, pallets, and containers. 
Panama Disease led the banana companies to switch to the resistant but 
otherwise more fragile Cavendish variety which resulted in the bananas being 
placed in boxes instead of being shipped in bunches. The problems concerning 
the banana led to lower profitability, causing banana companies to outsource 
their capital-intensive fleets. In the late 1960s, Sunkist, which increasingly be-
came a major partner of Salén, wanted to export their produce on pallets as a 
way to rationalize the handling of cargo. Last but not least, containerization 
swept through the shipping industry. Container technology for refrigerated 
products were introduced on a number of lines, but given the cost and difficul-
ties of containerization, liner companies left the refrigerated trades. The re-
placement of liner tonnage with non-refrigerated container ships caused an 
important supply shortfall that the independent reefer operators were quick to 
exploit.
These material changes led to the growth of the independent reefer opera-
tors. They were the takers of the outsourced fleets of the banana companies 
and they could also fill the market gaps left by liner companies which left due 
to containerization. Although demand of seaborne refrigerated transport grew 
modestly, Salén’s grew explosively and had in the end of the 1960s a fleet of 
over 100 ships. Lauritzen was significantly smaller, but also grew during the 
period. Hamburg Süd grew as an independent player with a fleet of about 20 
reefers. 
This once again led to a change in the subjective perception in and of the 
specialized reefer industry. They were no longer a wild, eros-driven, alternative 
to the liner companies, but increasingly became the way to transport refriger-
ated cargo. They were now of such a large size that they could more adequate-
ly be seen as (equal) partners to their customers, rather than their servants. 
This led to strong sensations of pride across the whole industry, which was one 
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way how thymos was represented during the period. Within the industry, the 
players had different positions. Salén’s had become the market leader and prid-
ed themselves on their rationalised transport systems and advanced schedul-
ing, including computerized scheduling. They did not just see themselves as 
the market leader, but as the uncontested market leader, since Lauritzen was 
less than half the size of Salén. Lauritzen, on the other hand, still saw them-
selves as a hungry competitor, remembered as “shark’s teeth” by one of our 
sources. 
Discourses of large capacity and speed were still prevalent, but to this we 
must add the increasing sophistication and flexibility of the new ships that 
were developed, and this had consequences for the specialized reefer industry. 
Since the players in the specialized reefer industry were no longer a wild alter-
native, but increasingly became established specialists, able to offer sophisti-
cated services to its customers, Logos entered the stage to a larger extent than 
previously. Logos meant that the specialized reefer industry should be able to 
fulfil the customers’ expectations to be able to provide low-risk, industrial 
shipping. And we know that each customer was rationalizing its cargo han-
dling in slightly different ways. This resulted in ship designs that could cater for 
different cargoes with different requirements. Examples of such flexible ships 
were the Snow series and the Italian Reefer class, which could handle pallets as 
well as boxes. Still during this period, the container technology was not incor-
porated into specialized reefers. In the specialized reefer industry, there was a 
growing perception that it was the pallet that was going to be the preferred way 
of handling refrigerated cargo. 
3 1970s: the Others
In the late 1960s, Salén was the largest company followed by significantly 
smaller Lauritzen and Blue Star Line and even though there was competition 
between them, there was a degree of understanding about the rules of the 
game. Salén would keep its dominance throughout the decade, while Laurit-
zen joined forces with P&O to create LPR. The fruit trades were widely per-
ceived as lucrative by the independent reefer operators. Blue Star, for example, 
expanded its presence in the fruit trades by building the modern A-class in the 
mid-1970s. 
Salén became more professionalized during the 1970s and divisional manag-
ers, for example the managers of the reefer division, became more powerful. 
The trend of rationalization that was started in the 1960s, continued into the 
1970s. During this decade, independent reefer operators became convinced 
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that the pallet was the natural way to unitize refrigerated cargo. They followed 
the trend of containerization, which was growing, but still thought that the 
pallet would be preferred amongst customers. Both Salén and LPR worked on 
optimizing pallet handling. A ship type that was optimized for pallet handling 
was the Winter class. Despite considerable continuity from the 1960s, the com-
petitive situation amongst the independent reefer operators would change be-
cause of some new entrants. The 1960s had spurred the interest of companies 
looking for attractive business opportunities within the reefer segment.
A first entrant was the Israeli company MFC. It represented the first large-
scale speculative reefer investment in the history of the industry. MFC con-
trolled about 40 reefers, which was about half the size of Salén’s fleet, and 
basically built them to force Salén to charter them. Salén was provoked by this 
entry which is highly visible in its discourses. MFC was called unknowledge-
able, financial, and speculative. Salén claimed that MFC had no understanding 
of the reefer market, or otherwise they would not have built so many reefers. 
For a short while, MFC’s market entry was successful as they managed to char-
ter their fleet to Saléns and thereby secure income. But for our purpose, this 
shock to the industry make us understand that there was more or less a con-
trolled situation in the industry before the entry of MFC. 
Then, there were the Japanese entrants, such as the fishing companies and 
NYK. The Japanese entrants were seen by the incumbent companies, in our 
empirical material mostly from the perspective of Salén, as a radical other. The 
entry of the Japanese cast a light on the racial constitution of the industry. All 
reefer companies were controlled by caucasian male managers and employ-
ees, who all were internationally minded and of course spoke English. With the 
entry of the Japanese, there were a new breed of competitors, where possibly 
only one or a few persons in the organization could speak English. That they 
further were critiqued for being too competitive and offering too low rates only 
contributed to this othering. 
A third entrant at this stage was Seatrade. It had started out with a single 
reefer in 1962, but grew towards bigger and more ships. In contrast to Salén and 
Lauritzen, its main business was fish transport. From the perspective of the 
incumbent specialized reefer operators, Seatrade was a non-issue because they 
did not have many ships, the ships were small and therefore of a different kind 
than the ships that really mattered – the big fruit carriers, and also they were 
focused on fish, which both Salén and LPR only engaged with as a non-core 
business. From Seatrade’s perspective, the competitors were not really Salén 
and Lauritzen. A representative of Seatrade even remembers Salén giving away 
a trade to Seatrade, since Salén was not interested in it. They were indeed in a 
different segment, but Seatrade knew that it was more profitable to move 
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towards larger ships, due to economies of scale. For the moment, the point was 
just to pragmatically employ the ships as well as possible. The company was 
doing deals as they appeared and to some extent seemed to lack a strategy. It 
did not thymotically pride itself by carrying a certain cargo type, like the ba-
nana, but similarly to Salén and Lauritzen they took pride in optimizing trade 
patterns, for example their great Atlantic Circle. They also prided themselves 
thymotically for being very hands-on and frequently referred to their history of 
stemming from a group of captain-owners. This stands in contrast to the aca-
demic culture that reigned at Salén, where people with good education was 
sought for. The company was therefore, in contrast to LPR and Saléns, much 
more engaged in S&P activities, quickly responding to new opportunities in 
the market. 
The 1970s was the decade of the oil crises and significantly increased bunker 
costs. The transport cost therefore increased, particularly for ships that had 
high bunker consumption. This is likely to have favoured new players, such as 
Seatrade, which could build a business without having to manage a fleet of 
ships with high fuel consumption. Also, smaller reefers turned out to be even 
less economically viable than earlier due to lack of economies of scale. But 
while the smallest ships became bigger, the increases of reefer ship sizes in 
the largest category also ceased. In all, this led to a situation in the end of the 
1970s, where the discourses of “faster” and “bigger” to some extent declined. 
The Winter class was slightly smaller than the Snow class and also slower. The 
reefer industry was at a turning point, both due to oversupply of tonnage and 
due to increased fuel costs. Due to the increased transport costs, banana com-
panies took back part of their fleet into own control, which further increased 
the number of active players within the industry. Competition therefore went 
up and the rates were often low due to the oversupply of tonnage. These mate-
rial conditions can also have impacted on the view of the incumbents on the 
new entrants, in a sense blaming them for the low market. One could almost 
say that there is a perception of harmonious competition that changed to-
wards a fierce competition between many new actors that were unknown to 
each other, such as the Japanese companies, Seatrade, and Laskaridis. 
4 1980s: Striving for Efficiency 
The early 1980s caused problems for the two major independent operators, 
Salén and Lauritzen, who was now again a lone-standing organization after 
P&O’s exit from the reefer segment. Mainly due to problems in other parts of 
the Salén conglomerate, Salén went into bankruptcy in 1984. As we know, this 
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was led by a collective effort to rebuild a new organization. This was not just a 
process of logical reasoning – that there was a space in the market for a revived 
operator, but very much a process based on eros and thymos. The former em-
ployees all wanted to work for this new organization, not only to secure a new 
job, but to build something new. To make sense of their actions, they used dis-
courses from war and struggle, describing the office as a command center. 
When the new company was setup, they were all very proud and happy about 
the outcome, until the employees realized that they were not part-owners but 
mere employees. Some of the energy in the organization was lost already there 
and in the subsequent ownership struggles. But when the market went up, and 
with a new owner, the organization was once again filled with drives to grow. 
The people working in Cool Carriers had a strong thymotic feeling of being 
autonomous – as an organization that was resilient to ownership changes. 
Cool Carriers’ thymos was also linked to its stunning come-back to market 
leadership, its self-perception of superior expertise, and its perceived control 
over business partners. 
Lauritzen suffered similarly in the early 1980s. It was not hit by a bankruptcy 
but instead by a report that basically said that the reefer division should be 
dismantled fully or partly. This was seen as outrageous from the reefer division 
and also upper management. This gives a sense of what an important part the 
reefer division was to Lauritzen psychologically. While Lauritzen struggled 
with red numbers, it adopted the most rational, logos-oriented, way of con-
ducting business – namely to develop a ship type that was fuel-efficient, ratio-
nal, and which completely abandoned all previous aesthetic ideals of reefer 
ships – the Jumbo class. To gradually divest non-economic tonnage and invest 
in more Jumbo ships was seen as the way forward. But top management inter-
fered and created a prestige ship to be used by the reefer division – the Family 
vessels. On the one hand, this was purely rational, logos-oriented, from a group 
perspective since it solved the problem of Lauritzen’s shipyards. One the other 
hand, to develop the biggest and most modern reefer in the market, stemmed 
from the particular thymos of the Lauritzen spirit: to always choose the high-
quality solution. This conflicted with the logos-orientation of the reefer divi-
sion. Not the least since all other actors, including Lauritzen’s reefer division, 
was opting for the simple, slower, inexpensive, and rational. The Family class, 
although appreciated by some at Lauritzen’s reefer division was seen as a blow 
to the agency of the reefer division. When they had just found a way of ratio-
nalizing their tonnage, a new kind of uneconomic ship type was entering its 
fleet. Still, the good market in the end of the 1980s kept the spirits up at Laurit-
zen. 
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Apart from these two operators, Seatrade, which Saléns and Lauritzen saw 
as more or less insignificant in the 1970s began to make its presence felt. They 
started to envision growth and larger ships, which resulted in newbuildings, 
recruitment of personnel and the acquisition of companies. They became 
proud of their new, highly optimised and rational ships. Furthermore, Seat-
rade’s thymos was highlighted when they acquired of Dammers & van der 
Heide in 1989. Seatrade perceived Dammers to be a traditional, hierarchical, 
high-shipping company in Rotterdam, in total contrast to the hands-on thy-
motic spirit at Seatrade. 
NYK and other Japanese operators continued to have a significant presence 
in the market. It is interesting to see how they started in the periphery of inde-
pendent reefer operators, to gradually move closer to the core. They have told 
us that it was far less prestigious to carry mutton from New Zealand to the 
Middle East than the large and lucrative banana trades or the trades from 
South America. Another example that illustrates the problems for the new en-
trants was Nissui’s desired collaboration with Lauritzen and Cool Carriers, but 
these plans were rejected. Unsurprisingly, they teamed up with another out-
sider, Seatrade, on a trade from the Canaries. So, although they had a signifi-
cant fleet, the Japanese companies felt that they, together with Seatrade, were 
playing in the second division, below that of Cool Carriers and Lauritzen. 
The independent reefer operators increasingly aimed for rational, fuel-effi-
cient ships. The discourse of rationality was contrasted with the sleek ships of 
the past, which disappeared along with the romantic era of the wild reefers. 
Perhaps there were some concerns about long-term outlook already in the 
1980s, but the overriding belief at the time was that the next decade would be 
the golden 1990s, with rates of 100 cents per cubic feet. With efficient and ratio-
nal tonnage, this would all be possible, wouldn’t it? This newbuilding boom 
was the last collective boom of eros witnessed in the reefer industry. 
5 1990s: We are Conventional! 
The container lines had been on the independent reefer operators’ radar for 
decades, but it was during the 1990s when they would enter the reefer industry 
en masse. Several material changes within the industry led to container lines 
being able to compete against independent reefer operators. The combina-
tion of economic liberalisation and the flexibility afforded by containerization 
resulted in the fragmentation of the market to the benefit of the container 
lines. Moreover, the national marketing boards lost their importance as ship-
pers and were replaced by direct contacts between buyers and exporters. The 
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concurrent emergence of powerful buyers, such as the major supermarket 
chains, put pressure on both producers and transport providers. They also 
contributed to the fragmentation of the producer side by directly encouraging 
smaller exporters which they in turn could exercise considerable control over. 
There were therefore more shippers, but with smaller volumes, usually insuf-
ficient to fill a specialized reefer. The flexibility and low price offered by the 
container lines were better suited to this market situation. 
Cool Carriers were overexposed when the market weakened in the early 
1990s, but re-embarked on a cautious growth strategy later in the decade. Cool’s 
organization maintained its autonomy despite several ownership changes and 
this thymotic feature was still a source of pride. These owners were relatively 
passive since the owners recognized that Cool surpassed them in competence 
and market know-how. Rather than adopting the textbook owner governance 
model, that owners control the organization, the discourses at Cool Carriers 
were that “if we don’t like the owner, we find a new one”. This was particularly 
salient in one episode, when NYK was interested in buying Cool Carriers in 
1993. The deal could have materialized was it not for the Cool employees, who 
stated that if NYK would buy Cool, the employees would leave and start a new 
competing independent reefer operator. Furthermore, the collective trauma 
and the overcoming of it in the 1980s led to a strong group culture at Cool Car-
riers. When a few key employees left in the 1990s to work with Seatrade, this led 
to much frustration as well as a collective will to take revenge, strike back. This 
is another manifestation of thymos. Also, this episode shows that, finally, Seat-
rade was a genuine competitor. The thymos was derived from collective au-
tonomy and was still coupled with the pride of being a high-tech market leader 
with large modern ships servicing high quality customers. Cool Carriers there-
fore placed their older and smaller tonnage in separate organizations. This 
pride and prestige was not only perceived internally. For example, respondents 
from Eastwind stated that their relationship with Cool Carriers gave them le-
gitimacy and status within the industry. Due to the threat of the container 
lines, many ship-owners planned to exit and offered to sell their ships. Cool 
Carriers wanted to continue its fleet expansion, and was able to do this some-
what during Höegh’s ownership. Nevertheless, Cool was frustrated at the 
amount of opportunities that they were not able to pursue because of the lim-
itations imposed by its owners. 
Lauritzen, on the other hand, was locked into the same ownership structure 
as in the 1980s. The reefer division could not produce adequate results, despite 
its modern tonnage, and was put under pressure. This led to feelings of impo-
tence and resignation. Some people decided to leave the organization to try 
new ventures, while others stayed and witnessed the division’s decline. The 
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management knew that the status quo would lead to a gradual decline and 
exit, and suggested a bolder move – to consolidate with another operator. 
Seatrade, as well as Laskaridis, expanded while other companies were scal-
ing back or exiting the industry. Seatrade grew and constructed, bought and 
sold vessels, and combined this with a will to maximize returns in the opera-
tions, under the leadership of its active owners. A former Seatrade employee 
told us how the company talked about becoming big, that they wanted to be-
come a reputable player on the global stage, “the grand ballroom”. This actually 
contrasted with the company’s prevailing discourses about pragmatism and 
hands-on owner management. Seatrade were happy to expand into the fruit 
trades, but much of the enthusiasm manifested in interviews with them was 
about the sheer quantity of fish delivered. 
In contrast to Cool Carriers and Lauritzen, NYK had an expansive newbuild-
ing strategy in the 1990s. The management of the reefer division believed in the 
future of the segment despite containerization and managed to convince the 
upper management of NYK to invest. Still, compared to other segments at NYK, 
the money invested in reefers was small. The strategy paid off. NYK secured a 
prestigious contract with Dole, which was a cause of great pride. It also tempo-
rarily broke into Lauritzen’s Chile trade, which they described with a strong 
sense of pride. NYK also was in discussions to acquire Cool Carriers. Salén, 
which had been role model of NYK Reefer, could now be acquired, which was 
seen as a source of pride. NYK Reefer’s fleet peaked in 1995 when it controlled 
57 vessels. They became a reputable independent reefer operator due to both 
its newfound size, its ability to challenge Lauritzen and Cool Carriers, and the 
solidity of its parent company. 
As we have seen, during the 1990s the container lines’ capacity surpassed 
that of the specialized reefer companies. Rather than being the way of carrying 
refrigerated cargo, the liner companies had now resurfaced as an alternative 
way. During this decade the discourse of “conventional reefers” took off. The 
independent reefer operators positioned their service, in contrast to that of the 
container lines, as conventional. In other words, it was not some risky innova-
tion, it was just the service that customers had learned to trust. 
We even venture to suggest that the independent reefer operators have 
been subjected to “container fetishism”, which has been visible both in the 
chapters describing Cool Carriers and Seatrade. Many interviewees have ex-
pressed a disdain towards the container. Respondents frequently discuss the 
container’s performance in and by itself, when they are actually discussing the 
real threat – the threat of the competition from the container lines. We would 
therefore venture to say that the reefer companies have centered their percep-
tions on the container as a representation of the large shipping lines, thereby 
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condensing a larger issue on one material artifact, which would be similar to 
fetishism. The importance of containers for reefer operators has been discur-
sively peripheral, even though reefer companies have been placing contain-
ers on the weather deck since the 1970s. Therefore, the reefer companies have 
been negating the container, positioning themselves as an alternative to con-
tainer technology, rather than positioning themselves as an alternative to the 
container lines. With a bit of a drier approach, one could state that it is not 
strange that so much has been focused on the container. The very possibility of 
the container lines being able to compete with the reefer companies depended 
significantly on the technological development of the reefer container. And 
in the beginning, the reefer container did not deliver the service quality of a 
non-containerized reefer ship. It is similar to many other technological shifts, 
where the new technology is in the beginning inferior to the prevailing alterna-
tive1. This misperception, or at least the discourse of container fetishism, was 
so widespread that Mats Jansson of Cool Carriers needed to emphasise in the 
late 1990s that the race was not between the container and the non-contain-
erized cargo (see chapter 5). It was between the independent reefer operators 
and the container lines. This line of reasoning was also later picked up by Seat-
rade when the point was to find a competitive edge for the independent reefer 
operators. And this could hardly be found in just being “the conventional alter-
native”. But the discourse of the conventional reefer was spreading at the same 
time and even during our empirical research in 2013-2016, respondents had to 
stop themselves from saying the word “conventional”, instead of “specialized”. 
6 2000s: Decline and Consolidations
In the 2000s, the container lines aggressively competed for refrigerated cargo 
and rapidly added container capacity. However, this negatively impacted on 
the independent reefer operators and resulted in a wave of consolidations. 
Lauritzen acquired Cool Carriers in 2000 and merged the operations, but 
stated explicitly that it would not invest in tonnage. Still, many felt that this 
was a new beginning, something which was felt with almost every new owner 
of Cool Carriers. A respondent stated that “it started to feel exciting again”. The 
upper management had several ideas for newbuilding projects but all projects 
were declined by Lauritzen’s board. This stifled the drives of the company, 
since the eros and thymos could not be satisfied in the present setup. We know 
1 Christensen, C. 1997. The Innovator’s Dilemma: when new technologies cause great firms to fail, 
Boston, Mass. : Harvard Business School. 
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that LauritzenCool, through Mats Jansson and others, tried to avoid container 
fetishism and instead started to talk about themselves as experts in refrigerat-
ed transport; the discourse shifted from reefers to logistics. Building on Laurit-
zen’s previous success in Chile, they started a global door-to-door service called 
LCL, expanding vertically in the value chain, with no clear preference for ship-
ping the refrigerated cargo in containers or not. This development can also be 
linked to the broader discourse of logistics that became prevalent at the same 
time. For LauritzenCool it was a potential solution to the contradictory situ-
tion of being financially constrained while battling to maintain market leader-
ship. 
NYK Reefer was struggling in the end of the 1990s and decided to relocate to 
the core of the industry in North-Western Europe. NYK Reefer had become part 
of the establishment and also built up a pool of human resources that was 
more international, which to some extent reduced the Japaneseness of the 
company. When it set up NYKStar, the joint venture with Star, it was deemed 
important that the nature of the two companies was similar – they were both 
owned by traditional liner companies. However, Blue Star Line’s Star Reefers 
was acquired by Christian Siem, who was seen by the incumbent reefer opera-
tors as a short-term speculative investor. This could be related to Siem’s past as 
a successful investor, but also resonates with the attitudes of the independent 
reefer operators towards newcomers. Siem was definitively not one of the old 
boys. Despite that the conditions for a successful partnership had changed, 
both parties pressed ahead with the joint venture that became NYKStar. Siem 
was focused on developing his new investment which, it is claimed, caused the 
NYK side to take measures to ensure that they were not disadvantaged. For 
example, Lars Rutberg from Salén and Cool Carriers was recruited to help NYK 
protect their interests. The inability of the two sides to work together resulted 
in the joint venture being dismantled and NYK looked to LauritzenCool as a 
potential consolidation partner.
As a first step the relationship concerned tonnage sharing, but NYK Reefers 
subsequently bought 50% of LauritzenCool and LCL. The strategy for these 
owners was to consolidate their operations, minimise their fleets, and focus on 
stable contracts with major fruit companies. Therefore, the ReeferShip venture 
with its older ships was dismantled. This is not only connected to a rational 
strategy that more money can be made with modern ships. It can also be seen 
as thymos – the organization’s drive to be the highest quality operator in the 
field. NYKLauritzenCool was no longer the largest independent reefer operator 
– Seatrade was – but strived to be perceived as the best one. NYK bought the 
remaining 50% in 2007 and the company was renamed NYKCool. When NYK 
had entered as new owners in 2004, the management saw a new chance to 
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develop the business and do some newbuildings, but these desires could not 
be fulfilled. Similarly, they felt that they missed many good second-hand deals 
because of the new owners’ lack of expansive ambitions. Cool Carriers which 
had until Lauritzen entered the scene seen themselves as autonomous was 
now subject to what they saw as the slow decision making of NYK. This led to 
the mobilization of stereotypes, both racial and cultural, about the Japanese, 
and about NYK in particular. At the same time, they knew that NYK had sur-
vived for more than a century, possibly because of this structure. NYK didn’t 
allow any newbuildings, but allowed LCL to keep expanding and also approved 
a major financial deal with Chiquita. However, both of these businesses turned 
to disaster partly because of the financial crisis in 2008. As a result of these 
setbacks, the Japanese parent company wanted the Stockholm operation to 
focus on maritime reefer operations. The locus of strategy was moved away 
from NYKCool, and there was a significant feeling of decline in the organiza-
tion. Ships were sold, people made redundant. In 2014, the company was sold 
to Baltic Shipping. 
After the end of the relationship with NYK in 2002, Star Reefers built on 
their relationship to a Japanese ship-owner, which in turn had ties to a Japa-
nese shipyard. This led to the construction of 12 state-of-the-art hybrid reefer 
ships – the largest investment in reefer newbuildings so far in the 21st century. 
Star grew its fleet but after the economic crisis in 2008 consolidated by scrap-
ping its older vessels. Star is proud of its modern fleet and its contracts to the 
major fruit companies, but its strategy is governed by logos – to be a long-term 
reefer tonnage provider. 
Seatrade continued expanding in the 2000s buying second-hand ships and 
ordering newbuildings in Japan. After a short period of turbulence, Geert Pep-
ping emerged as the owner of Seatrade. In spring 2010 Seatrade created a pool 
of small vessels together with Laskaradis’ Alpha Reefer pool and Green Reefers 
as a means to consolidate in a weak market. After a successful policy to scrap 
ships, the market rates improved and the two parties felt that they were better 
off going alone. Green Reefers continued to jointly operate with Seatrade while 
Laskaradis and Seatrade cut all their ties. 
Seatrade has become the only remaining large independent reefer operator. 
They have embarked on a program of converting its reefer fleet to reefer-con-
tainer vessels and are unique amongst the independent reefer operators in 
promoting full containerization. Seatrade have tried to convince customers to 
use reefer containers and promoted the quality of the reefer container. They 
have even constructed a meeting room in their head office out of the internal 
walls of a reefer container – symbolizing its focus on containerization. From 
the perspective of those companies now owning break-bulk reefers and still 
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tied up in the discourse of container fetishism, Seatrade is moving to the dark 
side, educating customers in forbidden knowledge, since the message of the 
independent reefer companies has always been that the container is inferior to 
break-bulk reefers. Seatrade is thus positioning themselves as a company that 
offers a service different from the container lines. Casting aside container fe-
tishism, they have returned to the original role of the independent reefer op-
erators – providing direct maritime links with state-of-the-art technology. Its 
fleet renewal may also improve the company’s ability to attract investment and 
the adoption of the dominant design of reefer shipping – container ships – in-
creases the returns that the company could expect if it were, hypothetically, to 
exit the industry at some point in the future. Many wonder whether Seatrade 
will be able to compete, only the future can tell. 
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Chapter 13
Snow in the Tropics: Conclusions
The aim of this book was to describe and explain the individual and collective 
development of the independent reefer operators in their material, discursive, 
and subjective dimensions. 
Collectively, the independent reefer operators, such as Lauritzen and Salén, 
started out in a minor niche dedicated to transporting bananas and other fruit, 
then grew into becoming a stand-alone, independent industry in the 1950s and 
1960s. While the competitive situation within the independent reefer opera-
tors was oligopolistic in the 1950s and 1960s, new actors entered in the 1970s, 
such as Seatrade and NYK. After a short boom in the end of the 1980s, the liner 
companies, now fully containerized and interested in expanding in reefer car-
go, came back in full force, and the independent reefer operators’ controlled 
capacity peaked and started to decline. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, con-
solidations have been the norm. Regarding the industry structure of the inde-
pendent reefer operators, there is a clear pattern. In the early phases, until the 
late 1950s, there was competition between a number of smaller operators, such 
as Lauritzen, Salén, and Gustaf Erikson. From the late 1960s to the mid-1980s, 
concurrent with a growth of the segment, Salén established a dominant posi-
tion, controlling twice or three times the tonnage of the second-largest player. 
From the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, when the capacity of the independent 
reefer operators peaked, several actors competed for industry supremacy, 
amongst them Cool Carriers, Lauritzen, Seatrade, and Chiquita’s independent 
operation the Great White Fleet. Since the year 2000, when the capacity of the 
industry has contracted, the competitive situation looks very much like that 
from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s, with one very dominant operator and a 
few smaller players. But it is not Salén, but Seatrade, which dominates the now 
reduced industry. 
By applying our theoretical framework, our description has been informed 
by three dimensions: the material, the discursive and the subjective. 
1 The Material Dimension
The material dimension strongly resonates with established scholarship in 
maritime history. From this perspective, we have described development of 
trades, ships, and companies. We have covered how operators developed larger 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC-BY-NC License.
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and faster ships until the oil crises in the 1970s and onwards focused on more 
optimized and fuel-efficient designs. Furthermore, their competitive edge was 
to have refrigerated capacity dedicated to customers’ needs. They had capacity 
to take exporters’ cargo and take it to the destination faster than the liner con-
ferences. In this conclusion, we will discuss why different reefer operators have 
grown, stagnated, or left the industry. In general, similar factors as those identi-
fied for other kinds of shipping companies apply here. For example, the impor-
tance of dedicated, active ownership. Seatrade, which has been the prime 
example of having successful active ownership, only really stumbled on one 
occasion, and that was when the ownership structure was changed. Imagine 
then a company like Cool Carriers with its succession of ownership changes – 
it is certain that the ownership changes negatively affected the development of 
the company. Why is ownership important? Owners always have a potential 
locus of strategy and they can choose to exercise it to a greater or lesser extent. 
For example, the fact that Seatrade has grown to become the biggest operator, 
while Cool Carriers has declined, is difficult to explain by the differences in 
know-how and business acumen in the two organizations only. Rather, Seat-
rade’s owners, compared to most of those of Cool Carriers, were interested in 
growing the business. Lauritzen have also had long-term owners, but the own-
ers were during the past decades interested in other segments, given the low 
profitability and perceived dull prospects of the reefer segment. The conclu-
sion to be drawn is that if owners are committed to staying and growing in the 
reefer segment, they will do so, of course depending on their financial means, 
know-how, and their business success. However, the management and organi-
zation’s ideas, interest, and know-how do not suffice if they do not have the full 
support of the owners. The cases of Lauritzen in the 1990s and Cool Carriers 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s exemplify this conclusion. 
Furthermore, in the reefer industry, similarly to other segments of the ship-
ping industry, quick decision-making is seen as essential, particularly with re-
gards to Sales & Purchase deals. A close relation between the owners and the 
upper management of the independent reefer operator is considered to be 
crucial. Seatrade and Laskarides are, and Lauritzen and Salén in early phases 
were, benefitting from being strongly owner-managed. They could rapidly, 
within days or hours, make sales or purchase calls. The contrast to companies 
where ownership and management is more separated is clear. Cool Carriers, in 
its various guises, often reportedly missed deals due to slower response from 
the owners, which in turn was due to lacking interest in investing in the reefer 
segment. Why is Sales & Purchase important for a reefer operator? Much of the 
profitability of the operation of a shipping business is dependent on that ships 
are purchased at an attractive price compared to the current market rates. The 
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price paid for a ship trickles down to yearly depreciations, which is a signifi-
cant part of the expenses of a shipping operation. Good Sales & Purchase ac-
tivities therefore create the conditions of business success. Since the shipping 
industry is markedly cyclical, the timing of making investments is crucial. A 
ship-owner once told us that if you buy a ship too expensively, you will pay for 
your mistake for decades to come. The adage of buying when the market is low 
and selling when it is high is repeated by all operators and ship-owners. Those 
companies who manage to do it attribute their success to a variety of reasons: 
better analytical skills, a gut feeling for the market, or luck. Ship investment is 
a risky business, a little like gambling, which we are of course not the first to 
point out. Another aspect of ship investment is the construction of new ves-
sels. Newbuildings require the ability to mobilize resources and, once again, 
the role of ownership is important. The ultimate success of newbuildings is 
also linked to the relationships to customers, shipyards, and the know-how 
within the organization. In turn, constructing new vessels generates additional 
know-how, particularly for companies that are actively engaged in the new-
building process. Newbuildings are thus a way to maintain one’s place at the 
cutting-edge of innovation within shipping. Respondents have said that if you 
don’t build ships regularly, you will have a tough time when you want to build 
one. The decline of reefer newbuildings in recent years results in a decline of 
competence. 
While we have focused on ship investment until now, the other side of the 
coin for the independent operators is the successful day-to-day operation of 
the ships. A good operation needs to cater for the various stakeholders such as 
customers and ship-owners. To the customers, the operators need to deliver 
the shippers’ goods to the right place, at the right time, at the right price, and 
given the perishability of the cargo in the reefer industry, in the right condi-
tion. Continued operational success can spur shippers to commit to the inde-
pendent reefer operator on the medium or long term, which provides the base 
for tonnage expansion. In the case of Salén, the main customer United Fruit 
even supported Salén’s technological know-how significantly. 
The independent reefer operators must also cater for the ship-owners’ 
needs. They must therefore demonstrate that it will be profitable for the ship-
owners to place their ships in this operator’s pool. Data of outperforming com-
petitors, an image of professionalism, a thorough market know-how, and that 
the operator is delivering quality to the shippers might convince ship-owners 
to allocate their ships to a particular operator. Trust in an independent opera-
tor to be profitable is therefore of importance for attracting ship-owners. Fur-
thermore, an operator handles the tonnage of several owners. Therefore, a 
constant issue that has crept up in our data is that of fairness and justice, or 
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ethics if you will. The question each ship-owner asks is: am I paid a fair price 
for my ship in relation to the price that is paid to other ship-owners? This issue 
is important when it comes to the relation between various ship-owners with 
ships in an independent operator’s pool but becomes even more salient when 
the independent reefer operator has its own ships in the pool – since the other 
ship-owners will suspect that the operators are favouring their own ships. The 
various independent reefer operators have constructed their own systems with 
trade formulas complemented with negotiations with ship-owners to try to 
please all parties. It is interesting, from a more subjective perspective, that all 
independent operators see their own way of handling these ethical issues as 
superior to those of the others. Ethics, or at least the perception of it, is a suc-
cess factor for independent reefer operators. A good reputation also means 
that brokers and other actors will know about the operator, potentially bring-
ing ship deals and new contracts before turning to others, following the word-
of-mouth logic. 
The independent reefer operators need to mobilize the resources of other 
companies but aim to maintain control over their operations. Reefer operators 
want to attract ship-owners that commit ships but don’t interfere in day-to-day 
operations. In other words, the locus of agency is kept by the independent 
reefer operator. When Seatrade mobilized resources from its local Groningen 
cluster, or when Lauritzen mobilized funds from Drammen Shipyard, or when 
Salén made use of Japanese trading houses to finance ships, they all followed 
this model – to expand the fleet while maintaining control. One of our respon-
dents, who incidentally sees himself as a competent ship-owner, has even said, 
to provoke, that the independent reefer operators thrive on “stupid” ship-own-
ers. On the other hand, fleet expansion resulting from the merger of two inde-
pendent operators, have often led to problems due to conflicting loci of 
strategy, for example the short-lived collaborations Hamburg Reefer Charter-
ing and NYKStar. In any case, the ability to mobilize resources and maintain 
control is a main competitive factor amongst the operators. 
We would also like to problematize the concept of success in the reefer in-
dustry. From our empirical narratives it is clear that Salén grew to become the 
largest operator in the mid-1960s, followed by Seatrade which since the 1990s 
has been the largest operator. These two companies could therefore be alleged 
to be the most successful companies in their respective time periods. However, 
size is not all. A successful operator can also be a company that, without any 
spectacular growth, generates profits to its owners. Data about profitability is 
unfortunately lacking in our study, and this is because most of the industry’s 
value is connected to ship-owning, and this information is by its nature elu-
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sive. Also, companies who made a timely exit from the industry, may be con-
sidered to be successful. 
However, when a company controls significant resources, such as Salén did 
and Seatrade does, it has more leeway to try out things and experiment with 
their business models, with a controlled risk level. This has been observed both 
in the cases of Salén and Seatrade. For example, dealing with the macro trend 
of containerization, in the early 1980s, Salén bought two reefer container ves-
sels that were operating on a service with Dole. Seatrade has embarked upon a 
fleet replacement program that consists of new reefer container vessels. More-
over, due to the few newbuildings of reefer vessels, fewer shipyards are inter-
ested in building reefer vessels. Many shipyards are interested in building 
longer series of ships than just a few reefers. The most recent examples of long 
series of reefer vessels covered in this book is that of Shikoku Shipyard’s new-
buildings for Star and Danyard’s newbuildings for Lauritzen and other fruit 
companies. Currently, the price of non-containerized reefer vessels would like-
ly be higher than for reefer container vessels, even including the price of con-
tainers. And the second-hand market is better than for a non-containerized 
reefer vessel. 
Also, the fruit companies, such as Dole and Chiquita, have already moved to 
fully containerized reefers on some trades since the 1970s. Seen in this way, 
Seatrade is a latecomer, but still more advanced than the other operators. But 
on the other hand, Seatrade is the only independent reefer operator who was 
able to renew its fleet in this way. Cool Carriers’ last owner NYK was defini-
tively on its way towards a controlled exit, and Baltic Shipping’s intentions 
with Cool are unclear, so Cool Carriers was unable to take any fleet renewal 
initiatives. Star is embedded in a system with state-of-the-art non-fully-con-
tainerized vessels, since they have a customer demand and this coincides with 
what the Shikoku Shipyard wants to build. Green Reefers and Seatrade’s fish 
transportation business have renewed their fleet with new freezers for fish 
transshipments, of course not containerized. In other words, Seatrade is not 
testing anything new, since the fruit companies have used reefer container ves-
sels since the early 1970s. Rather, they are now following the trend of contain-
erization and are fighting to maintain a niche for independent specialized 
reefer operations. Seen in this light, Seatrade is the most advanced reefer op-
erator, but in a quite backwards industry. 
Taking a long perspective, we could compare this with the low technological 
maturity of reefer operators, such as Lauritzen, in the 1930s, when they oper-
ated ventilated fruit carriers, while shippers such as United Fruit had operated 
reefers for around 30 years. What pushed the technological leap for Laurit-
zen and others was the physical demands of the cross-Atlantic trades, which 
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required reefer vessels. At the moment, it is the macro trend of containeriza-
tion which pushes reefer operators to change and the maritime link cannot be 
conceived without looking at the rest of the cold chain. Inland transport, par-
ticularly in the US and Europe, is containerized. Port operations, particularly in 
the consumption markets are becoming increasingly containerized. Terminal 
operations are also moving towards containerization, which leads to the disap-
perance of cold storages, since containers have their own integrated cooling 
machinery. Furthermore, container ships have become the dominant design at 
the shipyards and this creates an additional barrier towards the construction 
of new non-containerized specialized reefers. 
As has been described, the independent reefer operators are a part of the 
cold chain’s maritime link but their function can also be catered for by ship-
pers and liner companies. Shippers and liner companies have influenced the 
development of independent reefer operators in various ways. In the early 
years it was the shippers – the meat companies and banana companies – that 
led the development. They had no choice but to establish a maritime link for 
their products and to do that they had to build specialized ships, ships that did 
not exist at the time. As new exporters and importers entered, opportunities 
emerged for independent operators to meet their transport needs. The irregu-
larities of the fruit trades were also an opportunity that liner companies were 
ill suited to cater for. The establishment of independent reefer operators meant 
that the shippers were no longer obliged to completely control the maritime 
link. Outsourcing their shipping requirement became an option and this is 
what United Fruit did when they educated Salén in building modern ships. Up 
until the 1960s, the liner companies were carrying a fair share of cold and fro-
zen goods. The advent of containerization changed this. The difficulties with 
refrigerated containerization meant that liner companies lost most of their re-
frigerated cargo to the independent operators, resulting in a boom which last-
ed for decades. As the liner companies gradually sorted out the difficulties with 
refrigerated containerization, they increased their market share at the expense 
of independent reefer operators. 
Independent reefer operators and exporters had a long-standing relation-
ship, and their businesses were well suited to each other. The business of per-
ishables was largely in the hand of exporters, who transported large quantities 
in dedicated reefers. This formed the core of the industrial logic, at least up 
until the 1980s. However, exporters are not as powerful as they used to be. 
There is no player on the banana market that is as dominant as United Fruit 
was in the past. Similarly, the decline of export boards has fragmented the mar-
ket resulting in more, but weaker fruit exporters. Smaller exporters do not re-
quire a dedicated ship and prefer to ship their goods with liner companies. 
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The reason for the weakened power of exporters is that the power of import-
ers, particularly supermarket chains, has increased. Supermarkets have differ-
ent priorities and this cascades down and changes the industrial logic of the 
maritime link. They are interested in importing goods in smaller quantities 
more frequently, just-in-time if you will, which favours the regular delivery of 
containers. 
Moreover, the increasing competition between supermarkets leads to a re-
gime of cost-cutting which impacts on both fruit exporters and shipping com-
panies. Supermarkets have therefore questioned the value of branded fruit, 
and have looked to create their own supply, possibly using private labels. This 
spiralling competition creates new actors that try and undercut major brands 
like Dole, Chiquita, DelMonte, and Zespri, brands that traditionally were 
shipped to the market in dedicated reefers. The traditional industrial logic of 
exporters and dedicated reefers still prevails within the banana segment and 
this is due to the cargo’s perishability and the fact that the major banana com-
panies still try to control the maritime link for their own production. 
We have shown that the indepedent reefer operators are particularly tied to 
an industrial logic which is being replaced. This begs the question: what will 
the future look like for the reefer operators? In some segments, such as trans-
porting fish and seafood from fishing grounds to ports, as long as the fishing 
fleet is too valuable to remove from its core activity – fishing – reefers, or rath-
er freezers, will most probably continue to exist. In other port-to-port opera-
tions, specialized reefers will exist as long as there is a demand by exporters to 
get their produce to the market quickly and as long as container lines cannot 
handle the peaks in the season shifts. But as we know, the power of exporters 
is decreasing. Another important niche for independent reefer operators stems 
from seasonality. Given the seasonal nature of reefer cargo, there will be a need 
for reefer tonnage in the high season, since the capacity is just not enough on 
liner vessels. As it has been for decades, the specialized reefer operators carry 
branded fruit from the exporters to the market faster than what the liner com-
panies can. The question remains open whether customers will be prepared to 
pay a premium for the “taxi service” when there is a regime of cost-cutting 
prevalent in the market place. 
2 The Discursive Dimension
Turning away from the material, it has been productive to take a discursive 
view of the industry. In a sense, the segment of independent reefer operators 
was born by means of discourse. Rather than being just a few companies 
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engaging in material practices, in other words, transporting reefer cargo, the 
companies started to talk about themselves as independent reefer operators 
and a new segment was established. The discourse of wild reefers positioned 
the independent reefer operators in opposition to the liner companies, being 
fast rather than slow, dedicated rather than serving all, and being modern rath-
er than conservative. Also, the industry was influenced by discourses of inclu-
sion and exclusion, for example by the incumbent Salén when newcomers 
arrived in the 1960s and 1970s, and by the incumbent reefer operators when 
Christian Siem appeared on the reefer scene. The consequence of this dis-
course was that it became difficult for newcomers to enter into collaborative 
relations with established parties, which led them to seek to collaborate with 
other newcomers. Other examples of discourses are more company specific. 
They concern how the different actors distinguish themselves from the others, 
as being the established market leader such as Salén and Cool Carriers, the 
smaller high-quality, aggressive champion such as Lauritzen, or the hands-on, 
down-to-earth anti-establishment newcomer such as Seatrade. Another im-
portant discourse is how the various companies that we have studied are de-
scribed in terms of stereotypical attributes of their nationality. Nationalist, or 
racial, discourses are widespread, and attributes such as arrogance, greediness, 
collectivism, are strongly related to nationalities. Such discursive framings 
have had impact on the actions of companies and the images of companies 
that are created by means of such discourses have no doubt influenced the 
trust given to them by investors, financiers, and others who wield resources. 
Greedy Dutch and the black-hair meetings of the Japanese. 
However, the most salient discourses that have influenced the industry in 
recent decades have been container fetishism and a discourse of decline. The 
former framed reefers as not being primarily involved with transport using 
containers. The fetishism concerned boiling down a difference in business 
models to a material artefact – the container – similarly to how the shoe be-
comes a fetish of sexual attraction. The emergence of this discourse can very 
well be related to the discourse of wild reefers, which contrasted the reefer 
operators starkly from the liner companies, thereby leading to a hesitation 
amongst reefer operator to undergo the same technological paradigm shift as 
their main competitors had done. The discourse of container fetishism was 
important and could have delayed full containerization of the independent 
reefer operators for a decade, or more. 
The discourse of decline – in other words that independent reefer opera-
tors are collectively in decline and will continue declining – is very dominant 
within the industry. It has been ongoing at least since the mid-1980s, even 
though the peak of reefer tonnage was in the early 1990s. At first sight, it is not 
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surprising that such a discourse exists. In terms of capacity, there has been 
decline since the mid-1990s. Also, many respondents have told us that the fact 
that Seatrade is the only large actor left is a sign of decline. But, the fact that 
Seatrade is the only major player is hardly a new phenomenon. As explained 
above, Salén was by far the dominant player during some decades in the past. 
Also, although many see declining industries as less than interesting, reefer op-
erators have told us that the decline can still lead to profitable business. For ex-
ample, Thanassis Laskaridis said: “You could call [the reefer trade] a business 
in a run-off mode, but it is a slow, profitable run-off”1. Taken one step further, 
one could even argue that the discourse of decline is something which makes 
the industry less attractive for potential investors. This interestingly hinders 
the possibilities of expansion for established actors within the industry, as cap-
ital is scarce, but it also keeps profitability up by not spurring new entrants to 
try their luck. Historically, there have been several phases where new entrants, 
such as the late 1960s and early 1970s and the late 1980s, spurred by interest in 
the segment, contributed to lowering market rates by creating an oversupply 
of tonnage. To reduce the attractiveness of such actions, a discourse of decline 
can actually be helpful. 
3 The Subjective Dimension
From a subjective perspective, we have seen that many strategic actions in the 
industry have been shaped by the force of logos – a rational, calculating atti-
tude. This force is to some extent present in all business decisions, which goes 
in line with the literature on strategy. For example, many reefer operators have 
expanded into larger and larger vessels to reap the benefits of economies of 
scale. However, there was always concern about whether there would be 
enough cargo to fill the ship. This trade-off between the decreased cost per 
transported unit and the risk of not filling the ship, was reasoned, discussed, 
and argued in all companies. The buying of ships, market expansions, consoli-
dations, and exits are all created by thoughts about what the future is for the 
segment and the prospects of one’s participation in it. However, given our the-
oretical concepts, there are also parts of thymos and eros in business decisions. 
Thymos – the sense of pride, courage, and spiritedness – appears concern-
ing the identity of the companies, for example the pride of Salén in the 1970s 
and 1980s and Cool Carriers to be the market-leader, the most rational and 
systematized company. Salén was also very proud of its relationships to United 
1 “Going in for the krill”. TradeWinds 23 May 2014.
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Fruits and United Brands, which was the number one banana company in the 
world. A respondent from Salén said that “there was us up here”, holding his 
hand above his head, and then slowly lowering his hand to below the table and 
then, when reaching a really low level, saying “and the others were here”. There 
is even a sign that the Five saw Cool Carriers as the Rolex of the reefer industry. 
Such attitudes have affected business decisions, such as turning down poten-
tial collaborations, as well as not paying enough attention to the growing com-
petitor in the Netherlands. Interestingly, feelings of industry superiority tend 
to stick even though the material conditions are changing. Cool Carriers was 
slowly declining but still they perceived themselves to be the best. It is possible 
that the subjective is less malleable than the material, although it might seem 
more ephemeral and fleeting. 
Thymos is very present in the discourses and practices of the newcomers, 
especially in their will to grow larger and better than the previous incumbents. 
NYK’s journey from what they saw as second-tier customers to getting con-
tracts with Dole was as much a story of business development as one of the 
pride of increasing their social status. Some companies seemingly lack notions 
of pride. Some actors have explained how, in contrast to the proud Cool Carri-
ers, they were down-to-earth and only focused on the rational pursuit of prof-
its. However, when telling us about this, they did not express this fact in a cool, 
rational way, but rather seemingly derived pleasure from their down-to-earth 
identity. The opposite is perhaps Lauritzen, identifying with Danish design and 
spick-and-span looking ships. One Lauritzen respondent compared his own 
ships with a competitors’ and said: “Those pictures are photoshopped. In fact, 
the ships look like shit”. Also, when we discussed reefer business with a Japa-
nese ship-owner, he stated that he was very proud of his reefers, and would not 
trade them away for car carriers, which look like shoe boxes, or any other ship 
type. 
Eros – this very complex concept embodying connotations such as excite-
ment, fun, urges, thrill – is a driver in the shipping business, an aspect fre-
quently neglected. Respondents from growing companies, such as Salén in the 
1960s and 1970s, talk about the thrill of being in an organization that was grow-
ing exponentially: “We were everywhere. We were the biggest. We developed 
new sophisticated ship-types.” The Christmas of 1984; collective effervescence 
drove the people at Saléns to arise from bankruptcy as Cool Carriers. However, 
when the ambitions of the employees and upper management of Cool Carriers 
were stifled over and over again, the will to fight, the will to dream and desire, 
faded away. Seatrade tries new ideas and is described as intuitive, meaning 
that the distance from thought to materialization was short. People could live 
out their ideas, get listened to, and feel that this was a company that was 
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well-worth working for. To keep these drives alive in a company is important. 
For many people in shipping, the ultimate manifestation of eros is the drive to 
own ships, particularly big, modern vessels. “Everybody wants to be a ship-
owner”, as one of our respondents put it. 
Not only in the case of Cool Carriers, but more importantly at Lauritzen in 
the 1990s, we have seen the consequences of stifling employees’ desires and 
thrill. People who were there were dissatisfied and felt that the working cli-
mate was not about work but about politics. Many employees had ideas, but 
since they couldn’t be materialized within Lauritzen, they left to join others. In 
other words, the thrill of growing one’s business, the thrill of acquiring a ship 
or a competitor, the thrill of becoming great again, and not the least the frus-
tration when one cannot satisfy one’s desire for excitement, have all influenced 
the development of the segment. Given the strong discourse of decline from 
the 1980s and onwards, many of our respondents, apart from those at Seatrade, 
feel a bit at a loss. They cannot live out their eros, but rather stay afloat and 
subsist in work places, sometimes dubbed by a respondent as “reefer refugee 
camps”. 
…
In this book, we have paid particular attention to the discursive and the subjec-
tive dimensions, as well as the material dimensions that are usually covered in 
similar works. It is common in today’s business scholarship to narrow down 
one’s research to follow for example the material turn or the discursive turn. 
Although we are very sympathetic to such research, we believe that these turns 
could be even more productive if they would combine several such aspects. By 
adopting three dimensions, we do not run as large a risk of forgetting impor-
tant facets of the industry, but on the other hand, the findings do not become 
as well-defined and neat. Since we try to include all three dimensions, one 
might also wonder how they interrelate and if some dimension is more impor-
tant than others. 
As stated, much of the actions and strategies of the different actors can be 
explained by focusing solely on the material dimension. However, we have 
shown that discourses, for example that of container fetishism, have affected 
the industry. A description of the industry focusing on the 1980s and 1990s 
which does not include container fetishism would therefore be insufficient. If 
one would only have focused on the material dimensions, it would have been 
much more difficult to identify such discourses. To appreciate the material di-
mensions, one has to go beyond figures when analysing an industry and pay 
attention to how the industry is discussed, how it is expressed, and not only 
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take discourses as representations of reality. Furthermore, interview data can 
also be valuable for identifying discourses, as it gives first-hand insight into 
how the industry is talked about, in a sometimes more uncensored way than 
what appears in annual reports and industry trade papers. The subjective per-
spective, has for us emerged methodologically by thinking thorougly about 
interview data, not the least emotions, silence, laughter, cynicism, in relation 
to the material and the discursive. With the subjective dimension we get closer 
to what the actors really want and do not want, as well as what enjoyment and 
frustrations they express. For example, annual reports might say that there is a 
need to consolidate and that the parties look forward to the consolidation, but 
do the involved actors want to do it? Or, that a particular ship type, which from 
some perspectives, and particularly in newspaper articles and corporate 
speech is seen as the reefer ship of the future – in other words the Family class 
– by many was perceived with great frustration and rather seen as an obstacle 
to creating that very future. By paying attention to what lies between the lines, 
people’s subjective attitudes in relation to discourses, what remains unsaid 
and so on, we believe that we can throw additional perspectives that are not 
always visible with a more conventional theoretical framing, and an exclusive 
use of archival methods. 
…
Let us return to the cornucopia in the supermarket. We’ve read about the dra-
ma, the struggles of the independent operators and the liner companies, the 
entrepreneurship and innovation, the discourses about the good, the bad and 
the ugly, and the psychological struggle between the rational, the affective, and 
the libidinous, which are all embodied in that simple, innocuous banana. To be 
able to enjoy the tropics in a place far away, even in the snow, then there is a 
need for snow in the tropics – a well functioning cold chain, the maritime part 
of which has been serviced by the independent reefer operators, with ship 
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